Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Israel Juan Miguel Urzua Ortega, a Mexican citizen, petitioned for a review of an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals that denied his request for withholding of removal. Ortega had illegally reentered the United States and his prior order of removal was reinstated. However, he sought withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act, arguing that he would face persecution in Mexico from individuals the Mexican government would not control.Ortega, who spent most of his life in Mexico City, faced multiple threats and attacks, including murder threats from his father's cousin, Tacho, a member of the Sinaloa cartel. He claimed that even while in the U.S., he continued receiving threats. Ortega was arrested in 2021 for driving on a revoked license, and his 2006 removal order was reinstated. He claimed a fear of returning to Mexico, but his claim was denied by an immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals, who found him ineligible for withholding of removal.The court reviewed both the decisions of the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals. The court applied a highly deferential standard of review and concluded that substantial evidence supported the decisions that Ortega failed to establish that he would be persecuted by groups or individuals that the Mexican government is unwilling or unable to control. The court noted that the Mexican government had been responsive to the prior threats against Ortega, that Tacho was incarcerated in Mexico, and that Ortega had continued to receive threats even while living in the United States. Therefore, the court denied the petition for review. View "Ortega v. Garland" on Justia Law

In a case involving an Egyptian petitioner, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the denial of the petitioner's claim for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The petitioner, a Coptic Christian and Egyptian citizen, claimed he experienced persecution based on his religion. He was beaten and subjected to demands for conversion to Islam after he refused to alter a sensitive medical test result relating to a Muslim religious leader's family.The Court found that the BIA failed to correctly apply the "one central reason" test for motive in asylum claims. The Court ruled that the petitioner's religion was at least one central reason for his persecution. The Court also held that the BIA applied the wrong standard of review to the IJ’s conclusion on the petitioner’s CAT claim.The Court, however, upheld the BIA's conclusion that the petitioner's experiences of verbal harassment and rock-throwing did not rise to the level of persecution. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. View "Khalil v. Garland" on Justia Law

In an effort to curb illegal immigration, the Texas legislature passed Senate Bill 4 (S.B. 4), which amended various statutes. The new laws prohibited noncitizens from illegally entering or reentering the state and established removal procedures. However, the United States, two non-profit organizations, and the county of El Paso challenged S.B. 4, arguing that it was preempted by federal law. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, and the state of Texas appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied Texas’s motion to stay the injunction, arguing that the state had not shown it was likely to succeed on the merits of its preemption claims. The court found that the federal government has broad and exclusive power over immigration, including the entry and removal of noncitizens. The court also noted that the Texas law interfered with the federal government's foreign policy objectives and could lead to unnecessary harassment of noncitizens who federal officials determine should not be removed.Furthermore, the court concluded that S.B. 4 conflicted with federal law because it blocked the federal government's discretion to decide whether to initiate criminal proceedings or civil immigration proceedings once a noncitizen is apprehended, and because it permitted state courts to impose criminal sanctions and order removal of noncitizens without the federal government's input.In light of these findings, the court ruled that the balance of equities weighed against granting a stay. The court emphasized that any time a state is prevented from enforcing statutes enacted by its representatives, it suffers a form of irreparable injury. However, the court also noted that enforcement of S.B. 4 could lead to international friction and potentially take the United States out of compliance with its treaty obligations. Therefore, the court denied Texas's motion for a stay pending appeal. View "United States v. Texas" on Justia Law

The case in question involves a defendant, Saba Rosario Ventura, who was initially detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) after the District Court ordered his release on bail pending his criminal trial. The District Court later dismissed the indictment against Ventura, arguing that ICE had detained him in bad faith, aiming to circumvent the bail order. The case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which previously remanded the case to the District Court to clarify whether it had found that ICE's detention of Ventura was a direct violation of a federal court order releasing him under the Bail Reform Act.On remand, the District Court reasserted its claim that ICE's detention of Ventura was pretextual and in bad faith, not for removal, but to detain him pending his criminal trial. However, the Court of Appeals disagreed, finding no substantial evidence to support the District Court's assertion. The Court of Appeals noted that the District Court's finding was based on legal arguments rather than factual evidence. It also noted that, even if ICE disagreed with the District Court's assessment of Ventura's risk of flight, it was not enough to prove that ICE's detention was pretextual.The Court of Appeals ultimately reversed the District Court's orders, concluding that the finding of ICE's pretextual and bad faith detention of Ventura was clearly erroneous, given the lack of factual evidence. View "United States v. Ventura" on Justia Law

Sandra Sabastian-Andres, an indigenous Mayan Akateko woman from Guatemala, appealed the Board of Immigration Appeals' affirmation of the Immigration Judge's decision to deny her claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Sabastian-Andres had fled to the U.S. after a man named Pedro threatened her for refusing his demand to become his wife and join his gang.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case under the substantial evidence standard, considering the Board's finding as reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record as a whole. The court found substantial evidence supporting the Board's conclusion that there was no nexus between the threats Sabastian-Andres received and her identity as a Mayan Akateko woman. Sabastian-Andres's own testimony confirmed that Pedro's threats were not due to her indigenous identity.Additionally, substantial evidence supported the decision that Sabastian-Andres was ineligible for withholding of removal. Despite the less stringent standard for demonstrating a nexus in the context of withholding of removal compared to asylum, the complete lack of a nexus rendered her ineligible.Finally, the court found substantial evidence supporting the decision that Sabastian-Andres did not qualify for relief under the Convention Against Torture. Despite her claims that she could not report Pedro's threats to the police due to language barriers and her belief that the police collaborated with gangs, the court found that the Guatemalan government had taken steps to address gang violence. Therefore, the court denied Sabastian-Andres's petition for review. View "Sabastian-Andres v. Garland" on Justia Law

Carlos Gomez-Ruotolo, a native citizen of Venezuela, was brought to the United States in 2001 and became a lawful permanent resident. He was convicted twice in Virginia for crimes involving minors: once for attempted sexual battery and another for electronic solicitation of a minor. Based on these convictions, he was found removable as a noncitizen convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude and was denied relief by the Board of Immigration Appeals. Gomez-Ruotolo appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, arguing that his crimes were not morally turpitudinous and that he should receive protection against removal under the Convention Against Torture.The court disagreed. It held that attempted sexual battery and electronic solicitation of a minor both involved moral turpitude, thus making Gomez-Ruotolo deportable under immigration law. The court also affirmed the agency's decision to deny Gomez-Ruotolo protection under the Convention Against Torture, agreeing that he had not shown he was more likely than not to face torture in Venezuela. Therefore, the court denied Gomez-Ruotolo's petition for review. View "Gomez-Ruotolo v. Garland" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the petitioner, Silvia Tapia Coria, sought review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of her motions for remand and administrative closure. The Immigration Judge (IJ) had found Coria removable and denied cancellation of removal based on her conviction of a controlled substance offense. On appeal to the BIA, she requested remand based on her eligibility to become a derivative beneficiary of her husband’s pending U visa application, and also sought administrative closure of her proceedings.The court considered whether its jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial was limited by the “criminal alien bar” under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), as Coria was indisputably removable due to a covered criminal offense. She did not advance any constitutional claim or question of law that would have provided an exception to the criminal jurisdictional bar under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). The court held that its jurisdiction, under this circuit’s “on the merits” exception to the criminal jurisdictional bar, did not extend to this case.The court concluded that the “on the merits” exception was clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning and theory of Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683 (2020). Under Nasrallah, a “final order of removal” includes all IJ or BIA rulings that “merge into final orders of removal,” meaning all matters on which the validity of the final order is contingent, and judicial review does not extend to factual challenges to the final removal order. Thus, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review Coria’s challenge to the BIA’s factual finding regarding the speculative nature of her obtaining derivative U visa relief. View "CORIA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the United States considered whether an Immigration Judge's (IJ) determination of "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" for the cancellation of removal of a noncitizen was reviewable by an appellate court. The case arose when Situ Kamu Wilkinson, a noncitizen from Trinidad and Tobago, applied for cancellation of removal, arguing that his removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his U.S.-born son. The IJ denied Wilkinson's application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Third Circuit then dismissed Wilkinson's petition for review, holding it lacked jurisdiction to review the IJ's hardship determination.However, the Supreme Court held that the Third Circuit erred in its decision. It held that the IJ's determination is a mixed question of law and fact, and therefore reviewable under §1252(a)(2)(D), as per the precedent set in Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr. The Court emphasized that the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard is a legal standard applied to facts, not a factual inquiry.However, the Court also noted that while the question of whether established facts satisfy the statutory eligibility standard is subject to judicial review, the underlying facts in any determination on cancellation of removal remain unreviewable. The Court reversed the Third Circuit's decision, vacated its judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Wilkinson v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves an appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Madera County, California, denying Francisco Carrillo's motion to vacate his conviction and sentence under section 1473.7 of the Penal Code. The motion was based on the claim that Carrillo did not meaningfully understand the adverse immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence.Carrillo, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of assault with a firearm following a trial. He was sentenced to serve 301 days in jail and granted formal probation for five years. However, when Carrillo later admitted to a probation violation and received an additional 90 days in jail, his total term of imprisonment exceeded one year, thereby qualifying his conviction as an "aggravated felony" under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), leading to mandatory deportation.Arguing that he did not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence, Carrillo filed a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence under section 1473.7 of the Penal Code. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Carrillo failed to demonstrate that he suffered prejudicial error due to his lack of understanding, as he did not show a reasonable probability that he would have acted differently had he been aware of the immigration consequences.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's order but modified it to be without prejudice. This means that Carrillo could file another motion asserting grounds not raised in his initial motion. The appellate court agreed that Carrillo did not understand the potential immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence. However, it found that Carrillo failed to prove that this misunderstanding prejudiced his decisions at trial or during his sentencing hearing. View "People v. Carrillo" on Justia Law

The case concerns a review petition filed by Mariela Gricelda Chun Mendez and her minor son, natives and citizens of Guatemala. They sought review of the final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which upheld the Immigration Judge's (IJ) denial of asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The petitioners had fled Guatemala due to violence between their village and the neighboring municipality over land and water rights.The BIA had affirmed the IJ's findings that Chun Mendez did not establish extraordinary circumstances to excuse the late filing of her asylum application and that she did not demonstrate membership in the particular social group (PSG) she had defined for the agency. The court, after a careful review of the case, denied the petition.Chun Mendez claimed she was a member of the PSG of "communal landowners of Ixchiguán, Guatemala that refused to cooperate with criminal gangs." However, she conceded that she did not communally own the land. The court agreed with the government that Chun Mendez failed to exhaust her claim of imputed membership in the PSG before the BIA.Additionally, Chun Mendez alleged that the IJ and BIA failed to meaningfully assess her asylum and withholding of removal claims based on her race as an indigenous woman of Mam descent. However, the court found these race-based claims unexhausted, as Chun Mendez did not raise any race-based claim before the BIA. Consequently, the court denied the petition for review. View "Chun Mendez v. Garland" on Justia Law