Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Gerson Adonay Cortez-Mejia, his wife, and their two minor children, all natives and citizens of El Salvador, petitioned for judicial review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). They sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming fear of persecution by rival gangs in El Salvador. The Immigration Judge (IJ) found the petitioners credible but denied their applications, determining they had not demonstrated past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground. The IJ also found they failed to establish eligibility for withholding of removal and CAT protection.The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the petitioners' experiences did not rise to the level of past persecution and that they had not established a well-founded fear of future persecution linked to a protected ground. The BIA also noted the petitioners had not articulated a cognizable particular social group and had not meaningfully pursued their CAT claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on the BIA's decision. The court found that the BIA's determinations were supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that the petitioners' fear of gang violence was generalized and not linked to a protected ground. The court also upheld the BIA's finding that the petitioners had not established a cognizable particular social group. Consequently, the court denied the petition for judicial review, affirming the BIA's decision to deny asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. View "Cortez-Mejia v. Garland" on Justia Law

Douglas Humberto Urias-Orellana, a native and citizen of El Salvador, along with his wife Sayra Iliana Gamez-Mejia and their minor child, petitioned for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order affirming the Immigration Judge's (IJ) denial of their asylum requests. Urias-Orellana also sought review of the denial of his application for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The denials were based on the grounds that the petitioners did not demonstrate harm rising to the level of persecution for asylum or withholding of removal and did not show they could not reasonably relocate within El Salvador. Additionally, Urias-Orellana did not prove it was likely he would face torture with the consent or acquiescence of a public official.The IJ found Urias-Orellana's testimony credible but concluded that the threats and assault he experienced did not amount to past persecution. The IJ also determined that the petitioners did not meet their burden of showing a reasonable fear of future persecution, noting that Urias-Orellana's relatives lived unharmed in El Salvador and that he had successfully relocated within the country without facing harm. The IJ further found that Urias-Orellana's CAT claim failed because he did not report his harassment to the police and did not demonstrate that doing so would be futile.The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the threats and assault did not constitute persecution and that the petitioners had not shown that internal relocation would be unreasonable. The BIA also upheld the IJ's finding that Urias-Orellana had not shown he qualified for CAT relief, noting his failure to report the mistreatment to the authorities.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and denied the petition for judicial review. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Agency's conclusions that the petitioners did not demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution and that Urias-Orellana did not meet the burden for CAT protection. View "Urias-Orellana v. Garland" on Justia Law

An Ecuadorian woman, along with her minor daughter, entered the United States in June 2021, fleeing domestic abuse by her former partner, Fausto. She applied for asylum, arguing that Ecuadorian authorities would not protect her from Fausto. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against her and her daughter. At a hearing, she conceded inadmissibility and applied for asylum. She testified about the abuse and an incident where neighbors called the police, who wanted to arrest Fausto, but she asked them not to due to fear of retaliation. She never reported Fausto to Ecuadorian authorities and eventually separated from him, moving to the U.S. with him and their daughter.An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied her asylum application, finding that she did not demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ noted that the violence was not connected to government action or inaction, as the petitioner never reported Fausto to the police, and the police had shown willingness to arrest him. The IJ also found that the petitioner did not have an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution, given her continued interactions with Fausto in the U.S. and her testimony that no one in Ecuador would harm her.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the petitioner failed to show that the Ecuadorian government was unwilling or unable to protect her. The BIA also upheld the IJ's finding that the petitioner did not have a well-founded fear of future persecution, as Fausto's return to Ecuador was speculative and there was no evidence of a pattern or practice of persecution against Ecuadorian women.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and denied the petition for review. The court held that the BIA's determinations were supported by substantial evidence, including the petitioner's failure to report the abuse and the police's willingness to arrest Fausto. The court also found that the petitioner did not demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution or a pattern or practice of persecution against Ecuadorian women. View "Medina-Suguilanda v. Garland" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Jose Ernesto Aleman-Belloso, a native and citizen of El Salvador, sought review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that upheld an Immigration Judge's (IJ) denial of his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Aleman, an influential lay minister in his church, was approached by members of the FMLN, a political party in El Salvador, to use his influence to garner support for the party. After refusing their proposition, Aleman was attacked by masked gunmen who threatened him and demanded he leave town. Aleman fled to the United States shortly after.The IJ found Aleman’s testimony credible and acknowledged that he was tortured by the FMLN. However, the IJ concluded that Aleman failed to establish a nexus between the harm he suffered and any protected grounds, thus denying his claims for asylum and withholding of removal. The IJ also denied CAT relief, finding it unlikely that Aleman would be tortured again in the future. The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that Aleman did not demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the persecution and his religious beliefs, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the BIA erred in its conclusions. The court held that substantial evidence did not support the BIA’s finding of no nexus between the persecution Aleman suffered and his political opinion or membership in a particular social group. The court noted that Aleman’s refusal to support the FMLN was a political opinion and that the FMLN attacked him because of this opinion. Additionally, the court found that the BIA mischaracterized Aleman’s proposed social group and improperly rejected it as circularly defined. The court also concluded that the BIA failed to consider probative evidence regarding government involvement in Aleman’s past torture and the FMLN’s continued power in El Salvador.The Ninth Circuit granted Aleman’s petition for review, remanding the case to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court instructed the BIA to reconsider Aleman’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief, taking into account the correct characterization of his social group and the evidence of government involvement in his persecution. View "ALEMAN-BELLOSO V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

In October 2022, Jose Guadalupe Hernandez Velasquez was found unlawfully present in the United States for the fifth time. Previously, in 2019, he had signed a written stipulation waiving his rights and agreeing to his removal, which led to his deportation. Upon his reentry in 2022, he was charged with illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Hernandez Velasquez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that his waiver of rights in the 2019 removal was unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary, making the removal order fundamentally unfair.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied his motion to dismiss, placing the burden on Hernandez Velasquez to prove the invalidity of his waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. The court found that he did not meet this burden and also failed to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement of § 1326(d)(1).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that when the government produces a written and signed stipulation and waiver, the burden rests on the defendant to prove its invalidity. The court found that the district court's burden allocation was proper and that Hernandez Velasquez's waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The court also noted that even if the burden had been on the government, the outcome would not have changed, as the evidence overwhelmingly supported the validity of the waiver. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Hernandez Velasquez" on Justia Law

Akeish Johnioy Morgan, a Jamaican national, entered the United States illegally on June 11, 2022. Prior to his entry, a Jamaican justice of the peace issued a warrant for his arrest on charges of murder, unlawful possession of a firearm, and wounding with intent. Morgan sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order dismissing his appeal from an Immigration Judge's (IJ) denial of his applications for asylum, statutory withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The IJ found Morgan ineligible for asylum, statutory withholding, and CAT withholding due to the warrants issued against him in Jamaica, concluding there were serious reasons to believe he committed a serious nonpolitical crime. The BIA affirmed this decision, agreeing that the warrants and supporting evidence barred Morgan's eligibility for non-CAT deferral relief. The BIA also upheld the IJ's determination that Morgan was ineligible for CAT deferral, finding that the beatings Morgan claimed to have suffered did not constitute past torture and that he failed to demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of future torture upon his return to Jamaica.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the agency's serious-nonpolitical-crime finding, agreeing it was supported by substantial evidence, thus sustaining Morgan's ineligibility for asylum, statutory withholding, and CAT withholding. However, the court found that the agency's likelihood-of-future-torture finding, which determined Morgan's ineligibility for CAT deferral, was based on an erroneously narrow legal definition of torture. Consequently, the court granted Morgan's petition in part, vacating the CAT deferral determination and remanding the case to the BIA to reassess the likelihood of future torture using the correct legal definition. View "Morgan v. Garland" on Justia Law

Everod Ray Anthony Reid, a Jamaican national, petitioned for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision affirming an Immigration Judge's (IJ) order for his removal and denial of his applications for a waiver of inadmissibility, adjustment of status, and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Reid suffers from schizophrenia, experiencing delusional thinking, hallucinations, and paranoia, which impair his ability to assist his attorney and participate meaningfully in his defense.The IJ found Reid incompetent to establish an attorney-client relationship but did not make a formal finding of overall incompetency. The IJ implemented safeguards, including relying on objective evidence, not requiring Reid to testify, and having his counsel present witnesses and affidavits. Despite these measures, the IJ denied Reid's applications, finding him ineligible for section 212(c) relief due to insufficient evidence of his prison term and denying CAT protection due to a lack of evidence of likely torture in Jamaica.The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the safeguards were sufficient to ensure a fair hearing, despite acknowledging the IJ's failure to make a formal competency determination. The BIA also upheld the IJ's discretionary denial of section 212(c) relief and the denial of CAT protection.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that the IJ improperly applied the framework for protecting the rights of incompetent noncitizens. The court held that the IJ must make a specific finding of competency, generate a record of sufficient findings regarding the noncitizen's incompetency, implement appropriate safeguards, and articulate how these safeguards protect the noncitizen's rights. The court granted Reid's petition, vacated the BIA's decision, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, directing the agency to reevaluate Reid's competency and consider additional safeguards if necessary. View "Reid v. Garland" on Justia Law

Safiya Tayo Tukur Seldon, a native of Nigeria, entered the United States in 1992 using her sister’s passport and a tourist visa. In 1997, she married a U.S. citizen and obtained conditional permanent resident status. However, in 2000, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) concluded that her marriage was a sham and terminated her conditional status, ordering her removal. Seldon did not appear at her initial removal hearing in 2002, leading to an in-absentia removal order. In 2011, she successfully moved to reopen her case, claiming she never received notice of the hearing.An immigration judge (IJ) in Detroit later sustained the charges against her, including marriage fraud, and ordered her removal to Nigeria. Seldon appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing that the IJ failed to inform her of her rights to apply for a waiver of removal and to seek asylum. The BIA dismissed her appeal, finding that she was not eligible for a waiver of removal and that the IJ had fulfilled his duty to inform her of her right to apply for asylum.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Seldon was not "apparently eligible" for a fraud waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H) because her failure to attend the interview was independent of her fraudulent actions. The court also found that the IJ did not err in failing to advise her of her right to apply for asylum, as her counsel had confirmed that she did not express fear of returning to Nigeria and would not be filing other applications for relief. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit denied Seldon's petition for review. View "Seldon v. Garland" on Justia Law

Luis Alberto Sustaita-Cordova, a Mexican national, appealed a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision that dismissed his appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) order denying his applications for cancellation of removal and voluntary departure. Sustaita-Cordova argued that his removal would cause exceptional hardship to his U.S. citizen child, Judith, who has significant hearing loss. He also contended that he had good moral character and that the BIA abused its discretion by denying his motion for administrative closure or a continuance, ignoring his request for a remand to pursue a waiver of inadmissibility, and failing to terminate his removal proceedings due to a deficient Notice to Appear (NTA).The IJ found that Sustaita-Cordova did not meet the requirements for cancellation of removal, specifically failing to demonstrate good moral character and exceptional hardship to his child. The IJ noted his past criminal charge and failure to file taxes as negative factors. The BIA upheld the IJ’s findings and denied administrative closure, citing Sustaita-Cordova’s delay in pursuing a U visa and lack of diligence. The BIA also rejected his argument regarding the deficient NTA, stating that the omission of time and place did not deprive the IJ of jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Sustaita-Cordova’s claims regarding administrative closure and a waiver of inadmissibility were moot due to the denial of his U visa application and his removal to Mexico. The court upheld the BIA’s decision on the cancellation of removal, agreeing that Sustaita-Cordova did not demonstrate the required exceptional hardship to his child. The court also affirmed that the deficient NTA did not affect the jurisdiction of the immigration court, following precedent that such deficiencies are claim-processing errors that must be timely raised.The Fifth Circuit denied Sustaita-Cordova’s petition for review. View "Sustaita-Cordova v. Garland" on Justia Law

Hector Diaz-Arellano, a Mexican national, entered the U.S. illegally in 1989. In 2017, the Department of Homeland Security charged him as a removable alien. Diaz-Arellano conceded removability but sought cancellation of removal, claiming it would cause "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to his U.S.-citizen daughter, who was under 21 at the time. However, by the time of his final removal hearing, his daughter had turned 21, making her ineligible as a qualifying relative under the statute.The Immigration Judge (IJ) initially warned Diaz-Arellano that his daughter's upcoming 21st birthday could affect his eligibility for cancellation of removal. Despite this, Diaz-Arellano delayed filing his application and did not object to a hearing date set after his daughter's birthday. At the final hearing, the IJ denied his application, noting that his daughter no longer qualified as a "child" under the statute. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed this decision, citing Matter of Isidro-Zamorano, which holds that a child must be under 21 at the time of the final adjudication.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision. The court held that the statute unambiguously requires a qualifying relative to be under 21 at the time of the final decision on cancellation of removal. The court rejected Diaz-Arellano's argument that the BIA's interpretation was incorrect and found no undue or unfair delay in his proceedings that would warrant an exception. Consequently, the court denied Diaz-Arellano's petition for review, affirming that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal because his daughter was no longer a qualifying child. View "Diaz-Arellano v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law