Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The defendants, Namrata Patnaik and Kartiki Parekh, served as the chief executive officer and human resources manager of a semiconductor chip design consulting and staffing company, respectively. They were charged with submitting fraudulent H-1B visa applications by falsely stating that the visa applicants would be working on internal projects on-site, while in reality, they were contracted out to other companies. The government alleged that these false statements were material misrepresentations that could influence the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in granting the visas.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the indictment, accepting the defendants' argument that the false statements could not be materially false because it was unlawful for the government to ask for such information. The district court relied on the ITServe All., Inc. v. Cissna decision and a USCIS memorandum that suggested USCIS could not require details about specific projects or work assignments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that lying on H-1B visa applications constitutes visa fraud even if the government asked questions it was not legally entitled to ask, as long as the misrepresentations could have influenced USCIS at the time they were made. The court emphasized that the government may protect itself against fraud regardless of whether it had the right to ask the questions. The case was remanded for reinstatement of the criminal charges against the defendants. View "USA V. PATNAIK" on Justia Law

A family of four from Ecuador, including Milton Geovanny Vargas Panchi, his wife, and their two children, entered the United States in August 2021. They sought asylum and withholding of removal, claiming persecution based on race and membership in the social group of "Indigenous Ecuadorian men." Vargas Panchi cited frequent discrimination, including verbal harassment, threats, and a physical attack after a soccer game, as well as denial of medical treatment due to his indigeneity. He provided declarations, photographs, and country-conditions evidence to support his claims.The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, and Vargas Panchi conceded removability but applied for asylum and withholding of removal. An Immigration Judge (IJ) found his testimony credible but concluded that the attack after the soccer game was motivated by the opposing team's loss rather than his indigeneity. The IJ also found that other discrimination he faced did not rise to the level of persecution and that his fear of future persecution was not objectively well-founded. Consequently, the IJ denied his asylum and withholding of removal claims.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that there was no clear error in the IJ's finding that the soccer game attack lacked a nexus to a protected ground. The BIA also concurred that the other discrimination Vargas Panchi faced did not constitute persecution. As a result, the BIA concluded that he was not eligible for asylum or withholding of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA's decision. The court found that substantial evidence supported the agency's findings, including the lack of a nexus between the soccer game attack and a protected ground, and the determination that the denial of medical care did not rise to the level of persecution. The court also agreed that Vargas Panchi did not have a well-founded fear of future persecution. Consequently, the petition for review was denied. View "Vargas Panchi v. Garland" on Justia Law

Mateo Alexander Mateo-Esteban and his father, Montejo, natives of Guatemala, entered the United States illegally in 2015. Mateo-Esteban applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention against Torture (CAT). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) served both with notices to appear, and they were ordered removed in absentia after failing to attend their hearing. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) later reopened the case. At the reopened hearing, Montejo testified about gang extortion and threats in Guatemala, leading to their flight to the U.S.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Mateo-Esteban’s application, finding that his proposed social group, “people who are afraid of gangs in Guatemala,” was not legally cognizable and that he failed to demonstrate that the Guatemalan government would acquiesce in his torture if he returned. The IJ also found Montejo’s testimony lacked credibility and noted that they could have relocated within Guatemala or that Mateo-Esteban could have lived with his mother. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing that the proposed social group was not cognizable and that there was no likelihood of government acquiescence in torture.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Mateo-Esteban’s proposed social group was not legally cognizable, as it lacked particularity and social distinction. The court also found that the evidence did not compel the conclusion that the Guatemalan government would acquiesce in Mateo-Esteban’s torture. The court noted that the Guatemalan government had made efforts to combat gang violence and police corruption. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit denied Mateo-Esteban’s petition for review. View "Mateo-Esteban v. Garland" on Justia Law

A Kenyan national, lawfully admitted to the United States, was convicted in 2014 and 2019 of felony vehicular fleeing or attempting to elude a pursuing police officer under Pennsylvania law. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged him with removability based on these convictions, arguing they constituted crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs). The Immigration Court and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the removal orders.In 2017, DHS charged the petitioner with removability based on his 2014 fleeing-or-eluding conviction and 2016 simple assault convictions. The Immigration Judge found that simple assault did not constitute a CIMT and terminated the proceedings. However, the judge noted that the fleeing-or-eluding conviction could be a CIMT if combined with another CIMT. In 2019, after the petitioner’s second fleeing-or-eluding conviction, DHS again charged him with removability. The Immigration Judge rejected the petitioner’s res judicata defense and concluded that both fleeing-or-eluding convictions were CIMTs, sustaining the charge of removability. The BIA affirmed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA misapplied the categorical approach by relying on a realistic-probability analysis to determine that the fleeing-or-eluding convictions were CIMTs. The court held that the Pennsylvania statute under which the petitioner was convicted is divisible and that one of the felony subsections does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. Consequently, the court granted the petition for review, concluding that the petitioner’s convictions did not qualify as CIMTs under the categorical approach, and thus, he was not removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). View "Ndungu v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Emerson Levi Godoy-Aguilar, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States in 2009 as a permanent resident. In 2015, he was charged and subsequently convicted under California Penal Code (CPC) § 136.1(c)(1) for dissuading a witness by force or threat. He was sentenced to 365 days in Los Angeles County Jail. Following his conviction, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security served him with a Notice to Appear, charging him with removability for having committed an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S), relating to obstruction of justice.An Immigration Judge (IJ) determined that Godoy-Aguilar's conviction under CPC § 136.1(c)(1) constituted an aggravated felony of obstruction of justice and issued a removal order. Godoy-Aguilar appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed the appeal, concluding that the state offense categorically fell within the federal definition of an offense relating to obstruction of justice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court analyzed whether CPC § 136.1(c)(1) is a categorical match for the generic federal offense of an aggravated felony relating to obstruction of justice under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S). The court concluded that CPC § 136.1(c)(1) is indeed a categorical match, as it involves specific intent conduct aimed at obstructing justice, and no pending investigation or proceeding is required. The court found that the elements of the underlying crimes in CPC § 136.1(a)(1)-(2) and (b)(1)-(3) do not sweep more broadly than the generic federal offense. Consequently, the court held that Godoy-Aguilar's conviction and sentence constituted an aggravated felony relating to obstruction of justice and denied the petition for review. View "GODOY-AGUILAR V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Rasheed Akinsanya, a Nigerian citizen, petitioned for review of the administrative denial of his application for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Akinsanya argued that he would be tortured by Boko Haram if returned to Nigeria. He had previously served in the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) of the Nigeria Police Force and cooperated in an investigation against his unit for corruption and ties to Boko Haram. After receiving threats and learning of attacks on his family, Akinsanya overstayed his visa in the United States. He was later convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and aggravated identity theft, leading to his identification as a removable noncitizen.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Akinsanya and his witnesses credible but concluded that he was ineligible for deferral of removal under the CAT. The IJ determined that Akinsanya failed to prove that he would be tortured with the acquiescence of Nigerian officials. The IJ noted the Nigerian government's efforts to combat Boko Haram, including designating it a terrorist organization and engaging in counterterrorism efforts, but found these efforts insufficient to establish government acquiescence.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the Nigerian authorities' inability to protect Akinsanya did not amount to acquiescence. The BIA emphasized that the Nigerian government was taking some measures to combat Boko Haram, and the potential ineffectiveness of these measures was not enough to prove government acquiescence.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the BIA did not adequately analyze whether Nigerian authorities would likely acquiesce in Akinsanya's torture. The court noted that the BIA failed to apply the correct legal standard for acquiescence, which requires identifying the government's legal duty and considering whether the steps taken by officials satisfy that duty. The court granted the petition and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Akinsanya v. Garland" on Justia Law

Beata Zarzecki, a Polish national, entered the United States on a six-month tourist visa in 1989 and remained in the country illegally. In 1998, she married a U.S. citizen, and they have a daughter who is also a U.S. citizen. In 2013, removal proceedings were initiated against her, and she applied for adjustment of status based on her marriage. Her application was complicated by a 2005 conviction for felony aggravated driving under the influence, resulting in a fatal accident. She was sentenced to nine years in prison and served over eight years. Additional incidents included a 2003 arrest for aggravated assault and a 2004 charge for driving without insurance.The immigration judge denied her application for adjustment of status, citing the severity of her criminal record and insufficient evidence of addressing her mental health issues. The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) reviewed the case de novo and upheld the immigration judge's decision, emphasizing the egregious nature of her offense and finding that her mitigating factors did not outweigh the adverse factors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Zarzecki's petition, focusing on whether the Board committed legal or constitutional errors. Zarzecki argued that the Board failed to properly consider her mental health evidence and did not apply the correct standard of review. The court found that the Board did consider her mental health evidence and applied the appropriate standard of review. The court concluded that the Board did not commit any legal or constitutional errors and dismissed Zarzecki's petition for lack of jurisdiction, as discretionary decisions regarding adjustment of status are not subject to judicial review. View "Zarzecki v. Garland" on Justia Law

Lorenzo Vazquez-Alba, a Mexican citizen, lawfully entered the United States in 1986 and became a legal permanent resident in 1987. In 2008, he was arrested in Dallas, Texas, for using a juvenile as a paid prostitute and supplying her with drugs. He pleaded guilty to aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury and was sentenced to five years of probation. In 2011, he pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault of a child under 14 and was sentenced to eight years in prison for both the 2008 and 2011 offenses. He lost his permanent resident status and was deported to Mexico in 2017. He later unlawfully reentered the U.S. and was arrested in 2022 for driving a stolen vehicle and failing to register as a sex offender.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas indicted Vazquez-Alba for illegal reentry and failure to register as a sex offender. He pleaded guilty to both counts. The presentence investigation report (PSR) calculated an advisory guideline range of 30 to 37 months’ imprisonment. Vazquez-Alba objected to the PSR’s grouping determination and the indictment’s failure to allege a prior aggravated felony. The district court overruled his objections and sentenced him to 45 months’ imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Vazquez-Alba argued that his 2011 conviction was not an aggravated felony and that his counts should be grouped under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2. The court held that his 2011 conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child under 14 constituted an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). The court also found that the district court correctly declined to group the counts and properly treated his state-court sentences separately. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and sentence. View "USA v. Vazquez-Alba" on Justia Law

A Brazilian family of three, William Reginaldo Rodrigues, Debora Soares Gomes Rodrigues, and their son, W.T.S.R., entered the United States without inspection and were charged with being in the country without admission or parole. They sought asylum and withholding of removal, claiming fear of persecution from drug traffickers due to a debt owed by Mr. Rodrigues's brother-in-law, Daniel, and from the Gardingo family, a powerful political family in Brazil. Mr. Rodrigues testified that drug traffickers threatened Daniel and that the Gardingo family coerced employees to support their political candidates, but admitted that neither group had directly harmed or threatened his family.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Mr. Rodrigues's testimony credible but concluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ determined that the Petitioners had not shown that they would be singled out for persecution by either the drug traffickers or the Gardingo family. Consequently, the IJ denied their applications for asylum and withholding of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, finding no clear error or compelling reason to overturn it.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA's decision. The court found that the IJ's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence, noting that generalized country conditions reports and Mr. Rodrigues's testimony did not demonstrate a specific threat to the Petitioners. The court also agreed that the Petitioners failed to show an objectively reasonable fear of persecution based on their political opinion, as there was no evidence that the Gardingo family was aware of or would target Mr. Rodrigues for his political beliefs. The petition for review was denied. View "Rodrigues v. Garland" on Justia Law

Lucila Magana-Magana, a Mexican citizen, entered the United States unlawfully in 1995. She faced a series of abusive relationships, including with Rafael Camacho and later Clyde Wakefield, whom she married in 2017. Wakefield's abuse led to their separation and eventual divorce. In 2007, Magana-Magana was arrested by U.S. Border Patrol, and the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings. She applied for cancellation of removal, citing hardship to her U.S. citizen children, but her request was denied by an immigration judge (IJ) and later by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Her appeal to the Ninth Circuit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.In January 2022, Magana-Magana filed a motion with the BIA to reopen her removal proceedings, citing new evidence of abuse by Wakefield and her application for benefits under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). The BIA denied her motion, stating it was untimely and that she had not demonstrated "extraordinary circumstances" to waive the one-year filing deadline.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded it had jurisdiction to review the BIA's determination of "extraordinary circumstances" under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III), as it involved applying a legal standard to undisputed facts. The court found that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that the abuse suffered by Magana-Magana did not constitute "extraordinary circumstances" and that there was no basis to conclude that such circumstances caused the delay in filing her motion. The court also rejected her other arguments, including her unexhausted equitable-tolling claim and the BIA's discretionary decision not to reopen the case sua sponte. The petition for review was denied in part and dismissed in part. View "MAGANA-MAGANA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law