Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the defendant applied for U.S. citizenship in 2011 and, on his application and during an interview, denied ever having committed a crime for which he was not arrested. However, in 2013, he pleaded guilty in North Carolina state court to attempted statutory rape for conduct that occurred in 2008, admitting to engaging in a sexual act with a minor. He did not disclose this conduct on his naturalization application. Years later, a federal grand jury indicted him for naturalization fraud, alleging he knowingly concealed his criminal history to obtain citizenship.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment for unconstitutional preindictment delay, finding he had not shown actual prejudice from the delay. The court also denied his motion to suppress evidence of his state guilty plea, ruling that he could not collaterally attack the validity of his state conviction in federal court except for a deprivation of counsel, which did not apply here. At trial, the court limited the testimony of the defendant’s expert witness regarding his cognitive abilities, excluding certain opinions about his capacity to understand the application question. The jury convicted the defendant, finding he knowingly made a false statement, and the court sentenced him to six months in prison and revoked his citizenship.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that the defendant failed to demonstrate substantial actual prejudice from the preindictment delay, that the district court properly refused to suppress the state guilty plea, and that while the limitation of the expert’s testimony was error under recent Supreme Court guidance, the error was harmless given the other evidence presented. The conviction and sentence were therefore affirmed. View "US v. Palmer" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States unlawfully several decades ago. In 2017, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him, alleging that he was inadmissible under the Immigration and Nationality Act due to his illegal entry. The petitioner admitted the allegations and sought cancellation of removal, arguing that he met the statutory requirements, including continuous residence and good moral character for the preceding ten years. He also requested voluntary departure as an alternative form of relief.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied the application for cancellation of removal, finding that the petitioner had not demonstrated good moral character for the required ten-year period. The IJ acknowledged positive evidence regarding the petitioner’s family and work history but emphasized his history of alcohol abuse and criminal conduct, specifically noting a 2017 DUI conviction that was his fourth such offense, with the previous three occurring in 1995 and 1996. The IJ concluded that the 2017 conviction was not an isolated incident but part of a pattern of recidivist behavior. The IJ granted voluntary departure. The petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the IJ that the 2017 DUI conviction reflected recidivism and outweighed positive equities. The BIA also rejected the petitioner’s due process claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision de novo, focusing on whether the BIA improperly considered DUI convictions outside the ten-year statutory period for good moral character. The court held that the BIA properly considered the recidivist nature of the petitioner’s 2017 DUI conviction, even though the earlier convictions occurred outside the statutory period, because recidivism aggravates the seriousness of the most recent offense. The court denied the petition for review. View "Luna-Corona v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Marilu Calderon-Uresti, a native of Mexico, entered the United States unlawfully in 2011 after previously being returned to Mexico by immigration authorities. She sought permanent residency through Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, but her application was denied when she reached adulthood. In 2018, she was arrested for a misdemeanor DWI, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement served her with a notice to appear for removal proceedings. Shortly after, she married a U.S. citizen and applied for cancellation of removal under two schemes: the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) “special rule cancellation” for battered spouses, and “regular rule cancellation.” She testified to an immigration judge (IJ) that her husband had physically and emotionally abused her, but she did not provide corroborating evidence such as police reports or hospital records.The Immigration Judge found Calderon-Uresti’s testimony credible but determined she was ineligible for VAWA special rule cancellation because she failed to provide reasonably available corroborating evidence of battery or extreme cruelty. The IJ also found her ineligible for regular rule cancellation due to not meeting the ten-year residency requirement. The IJ ordered her removal but granted voluntary departure. Calderon-Uresti appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing her credible testimony should suffice and that corroborating evidence was not reasonably available. The BIA dismissed her appeal, agreeing she had not met her burden for special rule cancellation and did not address her hardship claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision. The court held that the BIA’s finding—that Calderon-Uresti failed to meet the statutory eligibility for VAWA special rule cancellation due to lack of corroborating evidence—was supported by substantial evidence. The court also held it lacked jurisdiction to consider her regular rule cancellation arguments because she had not exhausted them administratively before the BIA. The petition for review was denied. View "Calderon-Uresti v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, the petitioner was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 2007. In 2022, he pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida to conspiracy to commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). The judgment included a forfeiture order stating that at least $3,934,518 was obtained and laundered by the petitioner as a result of his participation in the conspiracy. In 2023, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, alleging that the petitioner was removable as an aggravated felon because his offense involved more than $10,000.An Immigration Judge found the petitioner removable as charged, relying on the conviction records, including the forfeiture order. The petitioner applied for cancellation of removal, but the Immigration Judge concluded he was ineligible due to the aggravated felony conviction. On appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, the petitioner argued that the forfeiture order did not meet the evidentiary standard required to establish that his conviction was an aggravated felony, as it did not specify the amount directly attributable to his conduct. The Board, applying the circumstance-specific approach endorsed by the Supreme Court in Nijhawan v. Holder, found that the forfeiture order was sufficient to establish that the funds involved exceeded $10,000 and dismissed the appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision de novo. The court held that an unrebutted forfeiture order entered solely against an alien, finding a specific amount of laundered funds attributable to the alien’s conduct of conviction, can constitute clear and convincing evidence that the amount of funds required by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(D) is met. The court denied the petition for review. View "Reyes v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Guatemalan national was convicted of possession of a controlled substance in Illinois and, in 2004, was found removable from the United States based on that conviction. He was removed to Guatemala that year but later reentered the country illegally. In 2021, Illinois enacted a law allowing individuals to seek vacatur of convictions that could have immigration consequences. The petitioner sought and obtained vacatur of his possession conviction in December 2023, citing procedural and substantive deficiencies in the original proceedings.After the state court vacated his conviction, the petitioner filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings with the Board of Immigration Appeals in January 2024, arguing that the vacatur eliminated the sole ground for his removability. The Board denied the motion, finding it untimely and concluding that the petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling because he had not demonstrated due diligence in pursuing his rights. The Board also denied his motion for reconsideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the Board’s decisions under a highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. The court held that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen, as the petitioner failed to show that he acted with reasonable diligence either after the Illinois law was enacted or after learning of his ability to seek vacatur. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion for reconsideration, as the petitioner’s arguments were essentially the same as those previously rejected. The Fifth Circuit therefore denied both petitions for review. View "Rosa Arevalo v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A native and citizen of Mexico was placed in removal proceedings after being charged with a misdemeanor offense in 2014. He conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b, listing one alias on his application. During his merits hearing, he disclosed additional aliases used for work and border crossing, but did not initially mention another alias, “Juan Sanchez Cabrera,” which the government later introduced through documentary evidence. He explained that he had used a false name during a border crossing but could not recall the specific alias. Throughout his testimony, he stated he did not remember all the aliases he had used.The Immigration Judge of the immigration court denied his application for cancellation of removal, finding him statutorily barred from establishing good moral character under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6) due to providing false testimony. The judge relied on his failure to disclose the “Juan Sanchez Cabrera” alias on his application and during direct testimony. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the denial, finding no clear error in the judge’s determination that he provided false testimony with the intent to deceive for immigration benefits, as evidenced by his incomplete disclosure of aliases until confronted by the Department of Homeland Security.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision. The court held that it had jurisdiction over the mixed question of law and fact regarding the application of the false testimony bar, but not over factual determinations of intent. The Fourth Circuit found that the Board applied the incorrect standard of review by reviewing the legal question for clear error rather than de novo. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded the case for the Board to apply the correct standard. View "Martinez-Martinez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Eva Daley, a Guatemalan national, entered the United States as a child without inspection. As an adult, she was convicted of second-degree murder in California, but that conviction was later vacated and replaced with a conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. After serving nearly fifteen years in prison, Daley was detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) upon her release and transferred to a facility in Colorado. She applied for asylum and related relief, but after over a year in detention without a bond hearing, she filed a habeas corpus petition challenging her continued detention.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted Daley’s habeas petition, ordering the government to provide her with an individualized bond hearing. Following the court’s order, an immigration judge held a bond hearing and released Daley on bond after 450 days in ICE custody. Daley then moved for attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), and the district court awarded her $18,553.92 in fees. The government appealed the fee award, arguing that the EAJA does not authorize fees in habeas actions challenging immigration detention.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s fee award de novo, focusing solely on statutory interpretation of the EAJA. The Tenth Circuit held that habeas actions challenging immigration detention are “civil actions” within the meaning of the EAJA, based on common law history, judicial precedent, and statutory text. The court concluded that the EAJA unambiguously authorizes attorneys’ fees in such cases and affirmed the district court’s award of fees to Daley. View "Daley v. Choate" on Justia Law

A woman from Honduras, along with her daughter, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States. She described a history of abuse by male relatives and partners in Honduras, culminating in severe stalking and threats from a man named Matute, who attempted to abduct her and threatened her and her daughter’s lives. After repeated failures by local police to respond to her pleas for help, she fled Honduras with her daughter, leaving her son with her grandparents. She later learned that Matute continued to harass her family after her departure.After entering the United States, an asylum officer found she had a credible fear of persecution or torture. The Department of Homeland Security charged her and her daughter with inadmissibility. At her merits hearing before an immigration judge, she presented testimony and country-conditions evidence about violence against women in Honduras. The immigration judge found her not credible, gave little weight to her expert evidence, and denied all relief, concluding that her proposed social groups were not cognizable and that there was no nexus between her persecution and a protected ground. The judge also found she had not established a likelihood of torture with government acquiescence and could have relocated within Honduras.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the immigration judge’s decision, focusing on the lack of nexus between her harm and a protected ground, and finding no clear error in the denial of CAT relief. The BIA concluded that the harm she suffered was due to a private dispute rather than persecution on account of a protected ground.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded the case. The court held that the BIA abused its discretion by failing to meaningfully consider the country-conditions evidence relevant to her claims, as required by precedent. View "Alfaro-Zelaya v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Three U.S. citizens each sponsored a close family member for an immigrant visa to the United States. After their petitions were approved by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the family members applied for visas at the U.S. Consulate General in Guangzhou, China. Following interviews, the consular officers denied the visa applications, citing fraud or misrepresentation as the basis for inadmissibility. The U.S. citizen sponsors challenged these denials in federal court, alleging that the decisions were not facially legitimate or bona fide, were issued in bad faith, and that the notices were untimely.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the claims. It found that one plaintiff’s claim was brought in an improper venue and dismissed it without prejudice. The remaining claims were dismissed with prejudice under the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, which generally bars judicial review of consular visa decisions. The district court concluded that, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Department of State v. Muñoz, U.S. citizens do not have a constitutional right to reunite with parents or siblings through visa sponsorship, and thus no constitutional right was burdened by the denials. The court also found the allegations of bad faith insufficient and rejected the timeliness argument as a repackaged merits challenge.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability precludes judicial review of the visa denials because the plaintiffs did not have a constitutional right implicated by the denials. The court also agreed that the plaintiffs’ alternative arguments lacked merit and that the consular officers’ decisions were insulated from judicial review. View "Chen v. Rubio" on Justia Law

A Mexican citizen, whose legal permanent resident status in the United States had been revoked, was previously removed from the country multiple times following a criminal conviction. In August 2023, he entered the United States from Mexico by bus, intentionally seeking arrest in order to challenge his prior deportation and potentially regain legal status. Upon arrival at the port of entry in El Paso, he bypassed a pedestrian turnstile, was quickly apprehended by Customs and Border Protection officers, and admitted his intent to be arrested. He was indicted for illegal re-entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas conducted a jury trial. The defendant did not dispute the factual basis of his entry but argued that he was not “free from official restraint” and therefore had not “entered” the United States in the legal sense. He requested a jury instruction defining “official restraint,” which the district court denied, reasoning that the concept was not an additional element of the offense and that the pattern jury instructions sufficed. The jury found him guilty of illegal re-entry, and the court entered judgment for attempted illegal re-entry, sentencing him to 18 months’ imprisonment and supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in refusing the requested instruction. The Fifth Circuit held that while “freedom from official restraint” is part of the definition of entry for § 1326(a), the pattern jury instruction given was a correct statement of law and adequately covered the issues. The court found that the defendant was able to present his defense theory to the jury, and thus, the absence of the requested instruction did not constitute reversible error. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction but remanded for correction of a clerical error in the judgment. View "United States v. Hernandez-Adame" on Justia Law