Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

In 2015, two Ecuadorian citizens, Mayancela and Santander, along with Mayancela's minor children, entered the United States without admission or parole. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged them with removability under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). They did not contest their removability but applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). An immigration judge (IJ) in the Boston Immigration Court denied their applications, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the denials.The IJ found that while both petitioners testified credibly, they did not meet the burden of proof for their claims. The IJ concluded that Mayancela did not establish that her persecution was on account of her membership in the particular social groups "Ecuadorian women" and "Ecuadorian females," attributing the harm to her cousin's violent behavior and substance abuse. The IJ also found that Santander's asylum application was untimely and that the government had shown a fundamental change in Ecuador's conditions, rebutting any presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the evidence did not establish the requisite nexus for Mayancela's claims and that the government had sufficiently demonstrated changed conditions in Ecuador for Santander.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the agency failed to conduct the required mixed-motivation nexus analysis for Mayancela's asylum claim and vacated the agency's decision regarding her asylum and withholding of removal claims, remanding for further proceedings. The court affirmed the agency's decision denying Santander's asylum and withholding of removal claims, as well as the denial of CAT protection for both petitioners, finding that the record did not compel a contrary conclusion. View "Mayancela Guaman v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Petitioners, a married couple from Guatemala, have resided in Massachusetts for over twenty years and have four U.S. citizen children. In 2015, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security issued Notices to Appear, charging them with removability. They applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b, citing their son L.C.'s medical and educational needs. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied their application, finding they did not meet the "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" requirement due to insufficient corroborating evidence about L.C.'s situation in Guatemala. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision and later denied their first motion to reopen based on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.Petitioners filed a second motion to reopen, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel by their previous attorney, who failed to submit crucial evidence about L.C.'s educational needs. They provided new evidence, including country conditions in Guatemala and additional information about their children's medical and educational challenges. The BIA denied this motion, stating that Petitioners had not shown that their counsel's performance was so deficient that they suffered prejudice and that they had not established a prima facie case for cancellation of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision. The court found that the BIA provided insufficient explanation for its ruling, making it impossible to review the legal bases for its conclusions. The court noted that the BIA did not adequately address whether the failure to submit corroborating evidence about L.C.'s educational needs constituted ineffective assistance of counsel or whether Petitioners had established a prima facie case for relief. Consequently, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Chanchavac Garcia v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A couple from Guatemala, Gustavo Evelio Mendez Nolasco and Blanca America Niz Mendez, entered the United States without inspection in 1981 and 2001, respectively. They married in 2004 and have four children, three of whom are U.S. citizens and one a Legal Permanent Resident. They own a landscaping business and a home in Massachusetts. They applied for cancellation of removal, arguing that their children would face exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if they were deported to Guatemala.An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied their applications, finding that they did not demonstrate good moral character due to undisclosed criminal histories and that their children would not face the requisite level of hardship. The IJ considered factors such as the children's limited Spanish skills, the family's financial assets, and the conditions in Guatemala but concluded that the hardships were not substantially beyond what is typically expected upon removal.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing with the IJ's assessment of the hardship factors and finding no need to address the good moral character determination. The BIA highlighted the children's limited Spanish skills, the couple's assets, and the potential for their oldest child to remain in the U.S. and petition for their legal status adjustment.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and found no legal error in the agency's application of the hardship standard. The court noted that the BIA properly considered the relevant factors and evaluated them in the aggregate. The court denied the petition for review, concluding that the agency's decision was consistent with its precedent and that the couple did not meet the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard. View "Mendez Nolasco v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Maris Oscar, a Haitian national, sought asylum in the United States, claiming persecution by the Parti Haïtien Tèt Kale (PHTK) in Haiti. Oscar testified that PHTK members attacked him in 2014 after he refused to join them. He fled Haiti in November 2014 and resettled in Chile in January 2015, where he lived for six years, attended university, worked, and received health coverage. Oscar and his family were granted permanent residence in Chile, as indicated by their Chilean identification cards. Oscar reported experiencing racism in Chile but did not claim any harm from the Chilean government.An immigration judge (IJ) denied Oscar's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), citing the firm resettlement bar due to his permanent residence in Chile. The IJ found that Oscar's reports of racism did not qualify him for an exception to the firm resettlement bar. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ's decision, leading Oscar to petition for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and denied Oscar's petition. The court held that the Chilean government's issuance of an identification card with "Visa: PERMANENT RESIDENCE" constituted direct evidence of a firm offer of resettlement. Oscar failed to show that the firm resettlement bar did not apply, as his argument that his Chilean residence status had been revoked was insufficient. Additionally, the court found that Oscar did not experience substantial discrimination that would qualify for an exception to the firm resettlement bar, and there was no evidence that the Chilean government consciously restricted his residence. Thus, the firm resettlement bar rendered Oscar ineligible for asylum. View "OSCAR V. BONDI" on Justia Law

Jin Yin Zhou, a Chinese citizen, married a U.S. citizen in 1996 and entered the United States as a conditional permanent resident in 1997. However, she never lived with her husband and instead lived with her boyfriend in Kentucky, with whom she had three children. Zhou concealed these facts during her immigration proceedings, including when she applied for naturalization. Eventually, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services discovered her marriage fraud, leading to her being placed in removal proceedings. The immigration judge sustained the charge of removability but granted her relief from removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H), considering her long residence, stable employment, and the hardship her children would face if she were removed.The Department of Homeland Security appealed the immigration judge's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Zhou's counsel failed to file a brief on her behalf, and the BIA reversed the immigration judge's decision, ordering Zhou's removal. Zhou filed an untimely motion to reopen her removal proceedings, requesting equitable tolling of the 90-day deadline due to ineffective assistance of counsel. The BIA denied the motion, stating that Zhou failed to demonstrate the requisite prejudice and due diligence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's determination regarding the lack of prejudice, as this determination was dispositive of the appeal. Consequently, the court dismissed Zhou's petition for review. View "Zhou v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Ansar Hassen Hussen, an Ethiopian citizen, entered the U.S. on a B-2 visitor visa in January 2014 and overstayed. He applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming persecution in Ethiopia due to his political opinion and ethnicity. An immigration judge (IJ) found his account implausible and denied his application. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, agreeing that material aspects of Hussen's story did not add up. Hussen filed a petition for review, No. 23-1047.While the first petition was pending, Hussen married a U.S. citizen, who filed an I-130 application for an immigrant visa on his behalf. Hussen then filed a motion with the BIA to reopen his proceedings to seek an adjustment of status based on his marriage. The BIA denied the motion, concluding that Hussen's evidence was insufficient to prove the bona fides of his marriage. Hussen filed a second petition for review, No. 23-2197.While the second petition was pending, Hussen filed another motion with the BIA to reopen the proceedings and reconsider its denial of his earlier motion. He provided additional evidence, but the BIA denied the motion, and Hussen filed a third petition for review, No. 24-1257.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court denied Hussen's first petition, No. 23-1047, upholding the BIA's adverse credibility determination. The court granted Hussen's second petition, No. 23-2197, vacated the BIA's order denying the motion to reopen, and remanded for further proceedings, finding that the BIA applied the wrong legal standard. The court denied Hussen's third petition, No. 24-1257, as moot in light of the relief granted on the second petition. View "Hussen v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Monsalvo Velázquez, a Mexican national, entered the U.S. unlawfully and has lived in Colorado for about 20 years. The federal government initiated removal proceedings against him in 2011. He requested either suspension of removal due to potential persecution in Mexico or permission to leave voluntarily. An immigration judge found him removable but granted him 60 days to depart voluntarily. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the removal order and granted a new 60-day voluntary departure period, which ended on a Saturday. Monsalvo filed a motion to reopen on the following Monday, but the BIA rejected it as untimely, stating the deadline expired on Saturday.The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the BIA, holding that the 60-day voluntary departure period in 8 U.S.C. §1229c(b)(2) refers to calendar days, with no extension for weekends or holidays. Monsalvo then petitioned for review by the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that it has jurisdiction to review Monsalvo’s petition under §1252, which allows for judicial review of final orders of removal and all questions of law arising from them. The Court determined that the term “60 days” in §1229c(b)(2) should be interpreted to extend deadlines falling on weekends or legal holidays to the next business day, aligning with longstanding administrative practices and other similar statutory deadlines.The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "Velazquez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Efrain Leonides-Seguria, a Mexican citizen without legal status in the United States, was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on June 15, 2021, for illegal reentry. Six days later, ICE referred him for criminal prosecution. On June 23, federal prosecutors filed a criminal complaint, and a magistrate judge issued an arrest warrant. Leonides-Seguria remained in immigration custody until June 28, when he was arrested on the criminal complaint. He later waived prosecution by indictment, consenting to the filing of a criminal information on July 27.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied Leonides-Seguria’s motions to dismiss the federal charge, arguing that the government violated the Speedy Trial Act and that 8 U.S.C. § 1326 is unconstitutional. He pled guilty but reserved the right to appeal these denials. The district court sentenced him to 51 months’ imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Leonides-Seguria argued that the Speedy Trial Act was violated because the criminal information was filed more than 30 days after his apprehension. He urged the court to recognize a "ruse exception," where civil detention by immigration authorities is used to delay criminal prosecution. The Seventh Circuit declined to resolve the legal question of the ruse exception, finding that the facts did not support its application. The court found no evidence of collusion between ICE and federal prosecutors to circumvent the Speedy Trial Act. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and upheld the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, consistent with precedent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v Leonides-Seguria" on Justia Law

Joseph Ebu, a lawful permanent resident, was involved in concurrent naturalization and removal proceedings. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) delayed considering his naturalization application due to the pending removal proceedings. When the delay exceeded 120 days after his naturalization examination, Ebu sought judicial intervention to determine his naturalization application and declare him prima facie eligible for naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). The district court dismissed his complaint, citing a provision that prohibits the determination of a naturalization application while removal proceedings are pending, relying on the unpublished opinion in Rahman v. Napolitano.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky dismissed Ebu’s complaint, agreeing with USCIS that removal proceedings take priority over naturalization applications. The court followed the precedent set in Rahman, which held that 8 U.S.C. § 1429 precludes district courts from considering naturalization applications under § 1447(b) while removal proceedings are pending.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that § 1429’s prohibition on the Attorney General from considering naturalization applications during pending removal proceedings also applies to district courts. The court emphasized that Congress intended for removal proceedings to take priority over naturalization applications, regardless of the forum. The court also rejected Ebu’s request for a declaratory judgment on his prima facie eligibility for naturalization, stating that such a judgment would be an impermissible advisory opinion. The court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed Ebu’s complaint based on § 1429 without considering the merits of his naturalization application. View "Ebu v. Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law

Eugenia Bautista Chavez, a native and citizen of Mexico, challenged the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order of removal based on her 2011 conviction for petit larceny under section 18.2-96 of the Virginia Code. The Board held that petit larceny categorically qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude, rendering Chavez ineligible for cancellation of removal. Chavez argued that a defendant in Virginia could be convicted of larceny for taking property that he or she sincerely but unreasonably believed was abandoned, which falls short of the requisite mental state for a crime involving moral turpitude. She also contended that petit larceny for taking property of de minimis value does not constitute sufficiently reprehensible conduct to make out a crime involving moral turpitude.The Immigration Judge ruled for the government, reasoning that he was required to find that petit larceny was a crime involving moral turpitude under the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Hernandez v. Holder. Chavez appealed to the Board, arguing that Virginia petit larceny did not require a culpable mental state and did not involve reprehensible conduct. The Board dismissed Chavez’s appeal, concluding that the offense required a culpable mental state and involved reprehensible conduct. Chavez then moved the Board to reconsider its decision, but a temporary Board member denied her motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and denied Chavez’s petition. The court held that Virginia petit larceny is a crime involving moral turpitude because it requires an intent to permanently deprive the owner of property, which satisfies the culpable mental state requirement. The court also found that the offense involves reprehensible conduct, regardless of the value of the property taken. Additionally, the court rejected Chavez’s challenge to the authority of the temporary Board member who decided her reconsideration motion, citing its previous decision in Salomon-Guillen v. Garland. View "Chavez v. Bondi" on Justia Law