Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Two individuals, one a Nigerian citizen and another a Jamaican citizen, were held in U.S. immigration detention for extended periods following the completion of criminal sentences or pending immigration proceedings. Both petitioned for writs of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, challenging their prolonged detention without individualized bond hearings as violations of their Fifth Amendment rights. The District Court granted both petitions, ordered bond hearings, and both individuals were subsequently released on bond.Following their success, each petitioner sought attorneys’ fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). The District Court found that the government’s position in opposing the habeas petitions was not "substantially justified" and awarded fees: $18,224.58 to the Nigerian petitioner and $15,841.60 to the Jamaican petitioner. The government appealed these fee awards to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed whether a habeas corpus petition challenging immigration detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 qualifies as a “civil action” under the EAJA, thus entitling prevailing parties to attorneys’ fees and costs. The Third Circuit held that such habeas actions are indeed “civil actions” within the meaning of the EAJA, relying on longstanding legal tradition and statutory interpretation. The court further affirmed that the government’s position in the Nigerian petitioner’s case was not substantially justified, due to the lengthy detention without a bond hearing. Accordingly, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s awards of attorneys’ fees and costs to both petitioners. View "Michelin v. Warden Moshannon Valley Correctional Center" on Justia Law

A citizen of the Ivory Coast immigrated to the United States as a child refugee and later became a lawful permanent resident. As an adult, he was convicted in North Dakota of robbery, a Class B felony, for brandishing a gun and menacing others during a theft. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, charging him with removability based on two convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude and for the robbery conviction, which it classified as an aggravated felony for attempted theft.The Immigration Judge initially found the individual removable for the moral-turpitude convictions but determined he was eligible for cancellation of removal, concluding that the North Dakota robbery statute was overbroad compared to the federal definition of theft. The Department appealed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) disagreed, finding the statute not facially overbroad and instructing the Immigration Judge to apply the “realistic probability” test to determine if the statute was applied to conduct beyond the generic federal definition. On remand, the Immigration Judge found the petitioner failed to show a realistic probability that the statute covered nongeneric conduct and ordered removal. The BIA dismissed the appeal, upholding the order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed only the legal and constitutional claims, as required by statute. It held that North Dakota’s robbery statute is not unambiguously broader than the federal generic definition of attempted theft and that the petitioner had not demonstrated North Dakota actually prosecutes robbery based on conduct beyond that definition. Thus, the court found the robbery conviction to be an aggravated felony, rendering the petitioner ineligible for cancellation of removal, and denied the petition for review. View "Banyee v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, including individual Temporary Protected Status (TPS) beneficiaries and an organization, challenged actions taken by the Secretary of Homeland Security. These actions included vacating and terminating Venezuela’s TPS designation and partially vacating Haiti’s TPS designation. TPS provides eligible nationals of designated countries temporary protection from deportation and work authorization due to conditions such as armed conflict or environmental disaster in their home countries. The Secretary’s actions resulted in many TPS holders losing their protection and work authorization, leading to job loss, detention, deportation, and family separation.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The district court initially postponed the effectiveness of the Venezuela TPS vacatur and later granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The district court held that the Secretary exceeded her statutory authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a by vacating and terminating the Venezuela TPS designation and partially vacating Haiti’s TPS designation. The court also found these actions arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and set them aside. The government appealed these rulings to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the TPS statute does not grant the Secretary authority to vacate an existing TPS designation or to partially vacate a TPS extension. The court further held that the Secretary’s attempted vacatur and terminations were in excess of statutory authority and invalid. The Ninth Circuit also concluded that setting aside these actions under the APA was appropriate and not barred by statutory limitations on judicial review or injunctive relief. The court affirmed full vacatur of the Secretary’s actions, restoring the prior TPS designations and extensions. View "National TPS Alliance v. Noem" on Justia Law

A citizen of El Salvador entered the United States near El Paso, Texas, in February 2023 without proper documentation. He was detained and placed in removal proceedings, where he conceded removability but sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). He alleged that he had been detained and abused by Salvadoran authorities on several occasions, including being beaten and subjected to harsh conditions, and pointed to his and his mother’s limited involvement in a human rights organization as evidence that he was targeted for political reasons. He also described a general pattern of young men in his neighborhood being suspected of gang affiliation by police.An Immigration Judge (IJ) found that, while the petitioner’s testimony was at times lacking in detail, he was not found to be non-credible. However, the IJ concluded that the petitioner failed to establish a nexus between his alleged persecution and any protected ground such as political opinion or membership in a particular social group. The IJ also determined that the mistreatment described did not rise to the level of torture under the CAT and that internal relocation within El Salvador might be possible. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, agreeing that the petitioner had not met the requirements for asylum, withholding, or CAT relief, and rejected claims of an unfair hearing.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied the petition. The court held that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s determination that the petitioner had not shown persecution on account of a protected ground, nor that he was more likely than not to face torture if returned. The court also found no due process violation, determining that the IJ adequately developed the record and that there was insufficient evidence of prejudicial translation errors. The petition for review was denied. View "Bonilla-Espinoza v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A lawful permanent resident who had lived in the United States for nearly twenty years was twice convicted in Massachusetts for violating a statute that prohibits “open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior.” Following his second conviction, the government initiated removal proceedings, arguing that his convictions constituted two “crimes involving moral turpitude” (CIMTs) under federal immigration law. The resident contested this classification, contending that the Massachusetts statute did not require lewd intent and thus did not categorically define a CIMT.An Immigration Judge denied the resident’s motion to terminate proceedings and ordered him removed, finding that the statute was categorically a CIMT. The resident appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the order of removal. The BIA concluded that the statute necessarily required lewd intent and thus qualified as a CIMT.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision. The court applied the categorical approach, examining whether the Massachusetts statute required proof of lewd intent as an element for every conviction. The First Circuit determined that a conviction under the statute did not require a finding of lewd intent or sexual motivation; instead, it could be satisfied by intentional, open exposure that caused shock or alarm, even without a lewd purpose. The court found a realistic probability that Massachusetts would apply the statute to conduct not involving moral turpitude.The First Circuit held that the Massachusetts statute is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude because it does not require proof of lewd intent. The court concluded that the BIA erred as a matter of law and reversed the removal order. The petition for review was granted, the BIA’s decision was reversed, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Cabral Fortes Tomar v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A mother and her minor daughter, citizens of Honduras, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture in the United States. The mother credibly testified that she endured repeated and severe domestic abuse from her partner, Oscar, who was a gang member. The abuse included a stabbing incident and threats, which often occurred when she tried to attend church. She explained that Oscar threatened to kill her if she reported him to police, and that others feared reporting him due to his violent reputation. On one occasion, police briefly arrested Oscar for assaulting a man but released him the next day.An immigration judge with the Department of Justice denied all forms of relief, concluding that the petitioners had not shown the Honduran government was unable or unwilling to protect them, largely because the abuse was never reported to authorities. The Board of Immigration Appeals adopted and affirmed the immigration judge's reasoning, emphasizing the lack of a police report and finding no persuasive challenge to this determination on appeal. The Board also found the Convention Against Torture claim unexhausted because it was not raised before it.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision. The court held that the record compelled the conclusion that reporting the abuse would have been futile and dangerous, given Oscar’s threats and the government’s documented inaction. The court granted the petition for review as to asylum and withholding of removal, remanding for further proceedings on the remaining elements of those claims. The petition was denied regarding protection under the Convention Against Torture, as that claim was unexhausted. The court ordered that each party bear its own costs. View "GUEVARA-SERRANO V. BONDI" on Justia Law

Two U.S. citizens petitioned for immigrant visas on behalf of their relatives. After each relative interviewed with a consular officer, their visa applications were placed in administrative processing, requiring additional information. Both applicants submitted the required information but experienced lengthy delays. Eventually, after sixteen months, one applicant and his spouse filed a complaint alleging unreasonable delay; the other applicant and his son did the same after seven months. Both sought to compel the Department of State to adjudicate the applications.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed both complaints for failure to state a claim. The court applied factors from Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC to determine whether there had been an unreasonable delay and ruled that neither complaint met the standard. The applicants appealed the dismissals.While the appeals were pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the Department of State finished processing the applications: one applicant received his visa and entered the United States, while the other was refused a visa due to inadmissibility for terrorist activities, with no waiver available. The Court of Appeals held that these events rendered both appeals moot, as no effectual relief could be provided. The court found that neither of the recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine—voluntary cessation or “capable of repetition yet evading review”—applied. The court vacated the judgments of the district court and remanded with instructions to dismiss the cases as moot. The court also declined the appellants’ request to create a new exception to mootness for unreasonable delay claims. View "Mehneh v. Rubio" on Justia Law

Mahmoud Khalil, an Algerian citizen and lawful permanent resident, was arrested in March 2025 by Homeland Security agents at his New York City apartment and charged as removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act’s foreign-policy provision. Khalil, a Columbia University student and vocal advocate for Palestinian rights, was accused of having activities with potentially adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States. After his arrest, he was quickly transferred from New York to New Jersey, and then to Louisiana. His attorney initially filed a habeas petition in the Southern District of New York, seeking to enjoin his detention and removal, arguing retaliation against protected speech, and due process violations.The Southern District of New York, finding Khalil was already detained in New Jersey when the petition was filed, transferred the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The New Jersey District Court asserted jurisdiction, denied the government’s motion to dismiss, and determined that the INA did not strip it of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court granted Khalil’s motion for a preliminary injunction on the foreign-policy removal charge, ordered that he not be removed, and later ordered his release from custody. Meanwhile, an immigration judge in Louisiana found Khalil removable on both foreign-policy and fraud charges and ordered his removal, resulting in conflicting mandates.Reviewing the case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the District Court had habeas jurisdiction, as the petition was properly transferred and related back to Khalil’s district of confinement. However, the Third Circuit found that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) of the INA strips the District Court of subject-matter jurisdiction over claims arising from removal actions, channeling such claims into a petition for review of a final order of removal in the court of appeals. As a result, the Third Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss Khalil’s habeas petition. View "Khalil v. President United States of America" on Justia Law

Jose Fuentes-Pineda, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States unlawfully in 2022 and requested deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Fuentes-Pineda testified that he was forced to join the Barrio 18 gang as a teenager and later left the gang after becoming a Christian. He has tattoos indicating his former gang affiliation and was previously convicted of a gang-related homicide in El Salvador. He claimed Salvadoran police had tortured him twice in the past and argued that, if removed, he would likely be detained and subjected to torture or severe mistreatment due to his gang history.An Immigration Judge (IJ) found Fuentes-Pineda’s testimony credible but concluded he could not demonstrate a clear probability of future torture by Salvadoran authorities. The IJ noted his prior encounters with police and instances of torture but determined that most mistreatment did not rise to the level of torture. The IJ found it speculative to assume the same officers would be involved in any future detention and concluded that poor prison conditions in El Salvador were not specifically intended to inflict torture. After remand for further proceedings, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed both the BIA’s order and the underlying IJ decision, applying a highly deferential substantial evidence standard to factual findings and de novo review to legal questions. The court held that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s determination that El Salvador’s prison conditions, while harsh, were not intentionally designed to inflict torture. The court also found the risk of future torture to Fuentes-Pineda to be speculative, given the lack of compelling evidence he would be targeted. The Fifth Circuit accordingly denied Fuentes-Pineda’s petition for review. View "Fuentes-Pineda v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Two Venezuelan sisters, both recipients of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) in the United States, submitted affirmative applications for asylum, alleging past persecution and fear of future persecution in Venezuela. After interviews with asylum officers, they were denied asylum by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), which concluded that they had not shown a reasonable possibility of persecution. The denial letters stated that, due to their TPS, there would be no referral to an immigration judge for removal proceedings, and that the determinations could not be appealed at that time.Following delays in adjudication, each sister filed suit against various federal officials in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, seeking to overturn the asylum denials under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as arbitrary and capricious. The district court in one case dismissed the suit without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), finding no final agency action; the other district court dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), also citing lack of final agency action. The sisters appealed, and the cases were consolidated.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the USCIS denial letters were not final agency actions under the APA because the administrative process was not complete. The sisters could still seek asylum defensively in future removal proceedings once their TPS ended. The court concluded that, since the agency’s decision did not fix legal rights or obligations or trigger legal consequences, the district courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit affirmed both dismissals and modified the dismissal in the case that had been with prejudice to be without prejudice. View "Sayegh de Kewayfati v. Bondi" on Justia Law