Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident, was convicted of attempting to elude police in violation of RCW Section 46.61.024 in 2016 and 2018. An Immigration Judge and the BIA concluded that RCW Section 46.61.024 is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude and found Petitioner removable for having been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. The BIA relied on Matter of RuizLopez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 551 (BIA 2011).    The Ninth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review. The panel concluded that the BIA failed to address substantive changes the Washington Legislature made to the statute and subsequent Washington case law interpreting the revised statute and remanded. Applying the categorical approach, the panel identified the elements of statute of conviction. As relevant here, the version of the statute at issue in Matter of Ruiz-Lopez required driving with “wanton or willful disregard for the lives or property of others.” However, in 2003, the Washington Legislature altered that element: the current version requires proof that the vehicle was driven “in a reckless manner.” The panel explained that although the term “reckless manner” is not defined by statute, the Washington Supreme Court has held that operating a motor vehicle in a “reckless manner” means operating it in “a rash or heedless manner, indifferent to the consequences.” The panel explained that, in some circumstances, “reckless” may be the equivalent of “willful or wanton,” but under current Washington law, “reckless manner” is not the equivalent of “recklessness,” and “reckless manner” is the required mens rea in Petitioner’s statute of conviction. View "ZHOVTONIZHKO V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, was ordered by an immigration judge (IJ) to be removed from the United States after the IJ ruled that Petitioner’s application for relief from removal was untimely. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) agreed with the IJ and dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner timely petitioned for review, arguing that the rejection of his relief application violated his due process rights.   The Ninth Circuit granted the petition. The panel held that the IJ’s rejection of the opportunity to file a relief application on December 18 deprived Petitioner of a full and fair opportunity to be heard. The panel concluded that Petitioner’s immigration proceedings were fundamentally unfair because (1) the purported deadline to submit a relief application was ambiguous; (2) Petitioner’s counsel offered to submit the application on the day of the apparent deadline while the IJ was still on the bench, making any delay in the proceeding practically nonexistent; and (3) the IJ’s denial of a continuance so that Petitioner’s recently-retained counsel could submit the application was an abuse of discretion. The panel concluded that the IJ’s rejection of Petitioner’s application clearly affected the outcome of the proceedings and thus caused him prejudice because the merits of his application were never considered by the agency at all. View "ARIZMENDI-MEDINA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner was born in 1967 in Western Samoa to a Western Samoan father and an American Samoan mother. His mother is now a non-citizen national, but she only became eligible under the 1986 amendments and did not attain her status until after Petitioner was born. Petitioner sought a declaration that his mother’s status qualifies him to be a non-citizen national. The district court held that Petitioner’s mother’s status as a national commenced only on the date it was conferred and was not retroactive to her date of birth. The court, therefore, found Petitioner did not qualify to be a non-citizen national.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of the Government’s motion to dismiss. The panel explained that Congress has extended citizenship to individuals born in every United States territory except American Samoa, meaning that those with ties to American Samoa are the only group eligible for noncitizen national status. The status of an American Samoan is a hybrid. The panel concluded that the text of the 1986 amendments makes clear that Congress intended for the addition to apply retroactively and to bestow the same status on those born before, on, or after the date of enactment: “national, but not citizen, of the United States at birth.” The panel concluded that Petitioner’s mother’s non-citizen national status extends back to her birth and, as a result, that Petitioner qualifies for non-citizen national status too. View "ILAI KOONWAIYOU V. ANTONY BLINKEN, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner testified that she was afraid to return to Guatemala because a woman had attempted to rob her after she withdrew money from a bank. The woman told Petitioner that she targeted her because Petitioner had family in the United States and a lot of money. The woman also threatened that Petitioner’s son would “pay for it” due to Petitioner’s refusal to give her the money. Petitioner and her son asserted that she had suffered past persecution and had a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of her political opinion of refusing to submit to violence by criminal groups or gangs and their claimed membership in three particular social groups: “Guatemalan families that lack an immediate family male protector,” “Guatemalan women,” and “immediate family members of Petitioner.”   The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner and her son’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ dismissal of their appeal of an immigration judge’s denial of asylum and related relief. The panel held that Petitioner failed to show that the agency erred in concluding that her proposed social group comprised of “Guatemalan families that lack an immediate family male protector” was not cognizable. The panel also concluded that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination that Petitioner had not expressed a political opinion. The panel explained that Petitioner’s refusal to give money to the threatening robber was not evidence of a “conscious and deliberate” decision that would naturally result in attributing a political position to her and that she instead simply reacted to being robbed. View "DORIS RODRIGUEZ-ZUNIGA, ET AL V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Mexican citizen, petitioned for habeas relief after being held in immigration detention for over a year without a bond hearing. A district court judge granted Petitioner’s petition for relief and ordered the Government to provide her with a bond hearing on statutory grounds, relying on Casas-Castrillon v. Department of Homeland Security, 535 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2008). The Government appealed on the ground that Casas-Castrillon is no longer good law.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of habeas relief and remand for consideration of Petitioner’s remaining constitutional argument. The court explained that t Jennings’s reasoning is “clearly irreconcilable” with Casas-Castrillon’s detention-shifting framework and held that Jennings abrogated this portion of Casas-Castrillon. Next, the panel explained that Subsection A provides the Government with authority to detain noncitizens “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States” and that Jennings provides that Subsection C authorizes detention during the same period as Subsection A, but does not define that period. The panel looked to Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2008), and held that detention authority under Subsection A continues through judicial review. The panel held that the authority under Subsection C likewise continues through judicial review. Finally, the district court declined to reach Petitioner’s alternative argument that she was entitled to habeas relief as a matter of due process. The panel remanded to the district court to consider this question in the first instance. View "LEXIS HERNANDEZ AVILEZ V. MERRICK GARLAND, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a forty-seven-year-old native and citizen of Mexico, first entered the United States in 1991 and, most recently, in 1996 without inspection. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated removal proceedings. Petitioner conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), claiming past persecution and well-founded fear of future persecution and torture in Mexico because of his membership in two Particular Social Groups (“PSGs”), “Married Homosexual Men” and “Homosexual Men in Mexico.” More than five years later, after evidentiary hearings but before Petitioner applied to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services for a U-visa, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Petitioner’s motion for a continuance to file a U-visa application. Then, in a lengthy Decision and Memorandum, the IJ denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal and CAT relief on the merits. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed Petitioner’s administrative appeal and denied his motion to reconsider. Petitioner petitioned for review of both BIA orders.   The Eighth Circuit denied the petitions. The court explained that under the deferential substantial evidence standard, evidence of “general, widespread discrimination” does not trump the BIA’s finding, based on specific facts in the administrative record, that Petitioner could avoid future persecution by reasonably relocating from his rural home town to another part of Mexico. The BIA pointed to Mexico City, where Petitioner’s husband is from and which is reported to have “taken the lead in . . . taking measures to protect the rights of the LGBT population.” View "Flavio Pacheco-Moran v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a forty-seven-year-old native and citizen of Mexico, first entered the United States in 1991 and, most recently, in 1996 without inspection. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated removal proceedings. Petitioner conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), claiming past persecution and well-founded fear of future persecution and torture in Mexico because of his membership in two Particular Social Groups (“PSGs”), “Married Homosexual Men” and “Homosexual Men in Mexico.” More than five years later, after evidentiary hearings but before Petitioner applied to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services for a U-visa, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Petitioner’s motion for a continuance to file a U-visa application. Then, in a lengthy Decision and Memorandum, the IJ denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal and CAT relief on the merits. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed Petitioner’s administrative appeal and denied his motion to reconsider. Petitioner petitioned for review of both BIA orders.   The Eighth Circuit denied the petitions. The court explained that under the deferential substantial evidence standard, evidence of “general, widespread discrimination” does not trump the BIA’s finding, based on specific facts in the administrative record, that Petitioner could avoid future persecution by reasonably relocating from his rural home town to another part of Mexico. The BIA pointed to Mexico City, where Petitioner’s husband is from and which is reported to have “taken the lead in . . . taking measures to protect the rights of the LGBT population.” View "Flavio Pacheco-Moran v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Ecuador, entered the United States without inspection on or about July 17, 1999. He was 25 years old. Soon after his entry, he was apprehended with others who had entered the country near Brownsville, Texas. On July 23, 1999, he was given a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), charging him as subject to removal because he was present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled. The NTA did not provide a hearing date or time. Petitioner’s then-current address was correctly listed on the NTA as the address of the processing center in Los Fresnos, Texas, where he was then detained. Petitioner challenged the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen removal proceedings and rescind his in-absentia removal order.   The Fifth Circuit denied his petition. The court held: (1) Rodriguez does not apply here; (2) Spagnol Bastos, Gudiel, and Platero-Rosales govern this case; (3) the applicable rule from those cases is that an alien who fails to provide a viable mailing address/to correct an erroneous address forfeits his right to notice under Section 1229a(b)(5)(B); and (4) Petitioner forfeited his right to notice by failing to correct the erroneous address listed in his “Notification Requirement for Change of Address” and Form I-830. View "Nivelo Cardenas v. Garland" on Justia Law

Arias and her sister, Maria, sold tortillas in El Salvador. Months after their business opened, a note was slipped under their door, demanding they pay $50 per week and enclose a piece of intimate clothing. The note threatened death if the police were contacted. Arias recognized the handwriting as belonging to a former classmate who she knew was a member of the Mara 18 gang. A friend of Arias told Arias that Mara 18 had killed her son because she had filed a police complaint in response to a similar demand. Unable to afford payments and afraid of the gang, the sisters closed the business. Arias illegally entered the U.S. in 2014. Maria remained in El Salvador, in a different home. Maria does not leave the home. Arias’s son only leaves home to attend school; he is driven to and from school to avoid gangs.An IJ denied Arias’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The BIA affirmed, finding that the gang targeted Arias to raise money for its criminal ventures, not for membership in an identified social group; she did not show she would be individually targeted for harm. Arias had not shown a nexus between her fear of future harm and a protected ground. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, finding the denials supported by substantial evidence. Arias failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. View "Arias v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Honduras, sought a review of an order from the Board of Immigration Appeals denying his application for cancellation of removal. The Fourth Circuit dismissed the petition for review. The court held that it lacks jurisdiction because Petitioner did not timely file his petition within 30 days of the Board’s final order of removal. The court explained that the availability of voluntary departure may have remained “up in the air,” but voluntary departure does not affect Petitioner’s removability – “it affects only the manner of his exit.” Further, the court wrote that its decision in Li to dismiss without prejudice a petition that was timely filed, however, has no bearing on the court's authority to act on a petition that was not. View "Williams Rodriguez Salgado v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law