Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

A native and citizen of Afghanistan, the petitioner formerly worked for the Afghan Ministry of Education and, following the Taliban’s 2021 return to power, was required by Taliban officials to provide information about female students and their families. After participating in a protest against the Taliban’s closure of girls’ schools and sharing evidence of the protest, he was arrested, detained, and beaten by the Taliban, then released after intervention from his family and community. He subsequently left Afghanistan, entered the United States without valid entry documents, and sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).An Immigration Judge (IJ) found that the petitioner’s actions constituted material support to a terrorist organization, making him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal, but did not find him eligible for CAT relief, concluding the petitioner had not shown it was more likely than not that he would be tortured if returned to Afghanistan. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal, denied his motion to remand for the IJ to consider new evidence, and later denied his motion for reconsideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed both BIA decisions. The Fifth Circuit applied the substantial evidence standard to the agency’s CAT determination and found that the record did not compel a contrary result. The court held that the BIA did not err in denying CAT relief, did not abuse its discretion in denying remand for new evidence, and did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration. The petitions for review were therefore denied. View "Zahid v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A coalition of twenty-seven Judeo-Christian organizations challenged a change in federal immigration enforcement policy that removed longstanding protections for houses of worship. For over thirty years, the government had a "Sensitive Locations Policy" that limited immigration enforcement at places like churches, synagogues, and mosques, except in exigent circumstances or with high-level approval. In January 2025, the Department of Homeland Security rescinded this policy, instructing immigration officers to use their discretion when conducting enforcement at these locations. Subsequent agency memoranda implemented this change, allowing supervisory agents to approve enforcement operations at or near houses of worship on a case-by-case basis, with no bright-line rules. Plaintiffs, representing congregations that serve undocumented immigrants, alleged that the new policy created a credible threat of enforcement, causing declines in attendance, financial burdens, and moral dilemmas.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to have Article III standing, finding their asserted injuries were not sufficiently imminent, not traceable to the policy change, or not redressable by reverting to the prior policy. Specifically, the district court relied on a legal standard requiring plaintiffs to show they were uniquely targeted for enforcement, which it found was not satisfied.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs likely have associational standing based on the imminent threat of enforcement actions at houses of worship, which burdens expressive and religious rights. The court determined that the harm was imminent, traceable to the government’s policy change, and redressable by the requested relief. The main holding was that plaintiffs likely have standing, and the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mennonite Church USA v. DHS" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a native of Jordan, lawfully entered the United States in 2014 as the unmarried child of a U.S. citizen. In 2019, after being convicted in Virginia for a crime involving moral turpitude, he was charged with removability by the Department of Homeland Security. He sought relief from removal by applying for asylum, humanitarian asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), asserting that he feared persecution or torture if returned to Jordan due to past sexual assaults by two men, Abdul and Anas. The petitioner alleged that Abdul, a government employee, targeted him because of his vulnerability, and that Anas joined Abdul in the assaults. He reported these incidents to the police in Jordan, resulting in Anas’s conviction, but claimed Abdul was never charged. The petitioner returned to Jordan multiple times after the assaults but avoided further harm.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found the petitioner’s testimony about the assaults credible but denied all forms of relief, concluding there was no nexus between the alleged persecution and his proposed social group of “imputed homosexuals.” The IJ also determined he had not shown it was more likely than not that he would be tortured if returned to Jordan. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the IJ’s decision, finding substantial evidence that the abuse was motivated by vulnerability rather than perceived homosexuality and that claims of future persecution on this basis were speculative. The Board also concluded that the petitioner had not established a sufficient probability of future torture.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed both the IJ’s and Board’s findings. Applying a highly deferential substantial evidence standard to factual findings and reviewing legal conclusions de novo, the court held that the agency did not err in denying relief. The court denied the petition for review, affirming the Board’s determinations that the petitioner did not qualify for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT protection. View "Qaiymah v. Blanche" on Justia Law

Two individuals, Roberto Miranda and Roberto Orellana, traveled together to a restaurant parking lot, where a casino employee handed them a box containing $352,000. The employee had been deceived into surrendering the money, which belonged to the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe. Both men were charged with federal crimes related to transporting stolen money and aiding and abetting that offense. Orellana also faced a charge for illegal reentry into the United States. Each pleaded guilty to the relevant offenses.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota sentenced Miranda to seventy months’ imprisonment, an upward variance from the Sentencing Guidelines range of 41–51 months, based in part on findings that Miranda minimized his involvement and was not candid. Orellana received a fifty-month sentence, also exceeding his Guidelines range of 30–37 months. Both defendants had entered plea agreements containing broad appeal waivers, though each preserved limited rights to appeal the substantive reasonableness of a sentence above the Guidelines range.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that Miranda knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to challenge the district court’s calculation of his Sentencing Guidelines range and dismissed that part of his appeal. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in Miranda’s sentence and affirmed it. With respect to Orellana, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court committed plain error by speculating, without record support, that Orellana was involved with Mexican drug cartels and that this speculation was a principal basis for the sentence imposed. The court determined this error affected Orellana’s substantial rights and the fairness of the proceedings. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit vacated Orellana’s sentence and remanded his case for resentencing. View "United States v. Orellana" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a noncitizen born in Venezuela who later overstayed a travel visa in the United States, became involved in a drug conspiracy led by her abusive husband. She was charged with conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. Her primary concern throughout the criminal proceedings was remaining in the United States, as she had two children who were U.S. citizens. Her court-appointed counsel assured her that accepting a plea agreement would allow her to "work out" any immigration issues after serving her sentence, despite warnings in the plea agreement and at the plea hearing that she "may" be deported. Relying on this advice, she pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 84 months' imprisonment and three years of supervised release.After completing her sentence, the petitioner received a removal notice, prompting her to seek legal assistance. Upon learning that her conviction rendered her mandatorily removable and permanently inadmissible to the United States, she filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and found that she had adequately explained her delay in seeking relief, the counsel's advice was constitutionally deficient under Padilla v. Kentucky, and she suffered prejudice because she would not have pleaded guilty if properly advised. The court granted the writ and vacated her conviction, concluding that equitable considerations favored relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of coram nobis relief. Applying de novo review to legal conclusions and clear error to factual findings, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The main holding is that the petitioner met all requirements for coram nobis relief: timely explanation for delay, ongoing collateral consequences, fundamental error due to ineffective assistance of counsel, and equitable grounds justifying relief. View "Morillo v. US" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a native of The Gambia, entered the United States on a student visa but never attended the educational institution for which he was admitted. Prior to leaving The Gambia, he worked as a professor and was targeted and physically abused by government officials after expressing views critical of the then-president during a lecture. Following his release from detention, he received warnings to avoid political subjects and ultimately left the country without proper clearance. Subsequent bench warrants were issued for his arrest for his method of departure. After a change in government leadership in The Gambia, his wife continued to receive inquiries about his whereabouts.The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings in 2018, and the petitioner applied for asylum, humanitarian asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The Immigration Judge held an evidentiary hearing, found credible evidence of past persecution, and determined the petitioner was initially entitled to a presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. However, the judge concluded that substantial changes in The Gambia’s political climate, particularly after the election of President Barrow and the implementation of reforms, rebutted this presumption. Relief was denied, and the petitioner was ordered removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the Immigration Judge’s findings, agreeing that the new administration’s steps established a fundamental change in circumstances and that the past persecution was not so severe as to warrant humanitarian asylum.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the administrative record and found substantial evidence supporting the decisions of both the Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals. The court held that the government successfully rebutted the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution, the past harm did not warrant humanitarian asylum, and the petitioner failed to meet the higher standards for withholding of removal and CAT relief. The petition for review was denied. View "Jatta v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A woman fled Honduras with her partner and daughter after years of harassment and stalking by a man named Jose Funes. Funes sent frequent threatening messages, stalked her at work, threatened her partner’s life, and tried to obtain her whereabouts even after she relocated within Honduras. He also allegedly orchestrated an incident that Alvarado interpreted as an attempted kidnapping of her daughter. Despite reporting these threats to local authorities, police did not intervene. Fearing further harm, the family left Honduras for the United States in 2016, where Funes continued to attempt contact via social media. Alvarado sought mental health treatment in Massachusetts due to ongoing fear.Removal proceedings were initiated in early 2017, and Alvarado applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, with her partner and daughter as derivative applicants. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied all claims, finding insufficient corroboration of the alleged kidnapping attempt, questioning her testimony, and determining that the harassment did not rise to the level of persecution. The IJ also made an adverse credibility finding regarding her partner’s affidavit. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reversed the adverse credibility finding but upheld the denial of relief, concluding that Alvarado had not established past harm rising to the level of persecution or an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the final BIA decision under the substantial evidence standard. The court held that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determinations: neither the threats nor the alleged kidnapping attempt compelled a finding of persecution, and Alvarado’s fear of future harm was not objectively reasonable. The court denied the petition for review. View "Alvarado-Hernandez v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A citizen of Bangladesh, who had lawfully resided in the United States since 2009, was convicted in New York of misdemeanor second-degree sexual abuse under New York Penal Law § 130.60(2) for engaging in sexual contact with a person less than fourteen years old. This offense resulted in a 364-day jail sentence. Following his release, the Department of Homeland Security charged him as removable for having committed an aggravated felony—specifically, "sexual abuse of a minor"—under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The individual had previously been active in the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and claimed fear of torture if returned to Bangladesh due to political affiliations and recent unrest.The Immigration Judge concluded that the New York conviction was a categorical match to the federal generic offense of "sexual abuse of a minor" as defined in the INA, referencing both Second Circuit and Third Circuit precedents, and denied the respondent’s motion to terminate removal proceedings. The judge also found the petitioner credible but denied relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), finding insufficient evidence that he would be individually targeted or likely tortured upon return. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the Immigration Judge’s rulings, agreeing that the conviction constituted an aggravated felony and upholding the denial of CAT relief. The BIA also noted improved country conditions in Bangladesh following a change in government.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that its prior interpretation of "sexual abuse of a minor" remained binding precedent, even after the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which limited Chevron deference. The court found no categorical mismatch between the New York statute and the federal definition, and substantial evidence supported the denial of CAT relief. As a result, the Third Circuit dismissed the challenge to removability for lack of jurisdiction and denied the petition as to the CAT claim. View "Islam v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

A Lebanese citizen who worked as a physician and educator in the United States traveled to Lebanon to visit family and, upon her return to Boston Logan International Airport, was detained by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers. During inspection, officers reviewed her phone and found photos and videos related to Hezbollah, which is designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States. She acknowledged deleting some of the photos before her arrival, explained her religious motivations and familial connections, and denied supporting Hezbollah’s political or military activities. After an interview, CBP officers determined she was inadmissible as an immigrant without valid documents because her intentions could not be verified due to derogatory information found during inspection. She was issued an expedited removal order, her H-1B visa was revoked, and she was returned to Lebanon, subject to a five-year bar on reentry.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed her amended habeas corpus petition for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review expedited removal orders except in narrow circumstances not present in her case. The district court also concluded that the Suspension Clause did not preserve jurisdiction for her claims and that her remaining arguments fell outside the scope of habeas review permitted under the INA.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the petitioner’s challenge to the expedited removal order and the revocation of her visa because her claims did not fall within the exceptions enumerated in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2). The court further concluded that the Suspension Clause did not require broader habeas review in these circumstances and rejected arguments that her case was distinguishable from binding Supreme Court precedent. View "Alawieh v. Mullin" on Justia Law

After her husband was kidnapped and likely murdered in Honduras, and her brother-in-law—who had opposed a local gang—was murdered, a woman and her young daughter fled to the United States. The woman believed the 18th Street Gang was responsible for both crimes and feared retaliation against her family. After arriving in the U.S., she applied for asylum, citing her relationship to her husband’s immediate family as the basis for her claim. She submitted supporting evidence including a death certificate, police report, and affidavits. Later, after receiving direct death threats from individuals identified as gang members, she sought to reopen her asylum proceedings based on this new evidence.The Immigration Judge found her testimony credible but determined the evidence did not sufficiently establish persecution on account of her membership in a protected group—her husband’s family—due to a lack of proof regarding the gang’s involvement in the murders. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reviewed and affirmed this decision. After the death threats, the woman filed a motion to reopen, providing new evidence; however, the BIA denied the motion, concluding the threats did not demonstrate a nexus between the persecution and her family membership.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial. The Fourth Circuit held that the BIA abused its discretion by failing to adequately consider the new evidence and the context surrounding the threats. The court found that the nexus requirement was satisfied, as the threats and violence were sufficiently connected to the woman’s family membership. The Fourth Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Fajardo-Rivas v. Blanche" on Justia Law