Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The petitioner, a noncitizen born in Venezuela who later overstayed a travel visa in the United States, became involved in a drug conspiracy led by her abusive husband. She was charged with conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. Her primary concern throughout the criminal proceedings was remaining in the United States, as she had two children who were U.S. citizens. Her court-appointed counsel assured her that accepting a plea agreement would allow her to "work out" any immigration issues after serving her sentence, despite warnings in the plea agreement and at the plea hearing that she "may" be deported. Relying on this advice, she pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 84 months' imprisonment and three years of supervised release.After completing her sentence, the petitioner received a removal notice, prompting her to seek legal assistance. Upon learning that her conviction rendered her mandatorily removable and permanently inadmissible to the United States, she filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and found that she had adequately explained her delay in seeking relief, the counsel's advice was constitutionally deficient under Padilla v. Kentucky, and she suffered prejudice because she would not have pleaded guilty if properly advised. The court granted the writ and vacated her conviction, concluding that equitable considerations favored relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of coram nobis relief. Applying de novo review to legal conclusions and clear error to factual findings, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The main holding is that the petitioner met all requirements for coram nobis relief: timely explanation for delay, ongoing collateral consequences, fundamental error due to ineffective assistance of counsel, and equitable grounds justifying relief. View "Morillo v. US" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a native of The Gambia, entered the United States on a student visa but never attended the educational institution for which he was admitted. Prior to leaving The Gambia, he worked as a professor and was targeted and physically abused by government officials after expressing views critical of the then-president during a lecture. Following his release from detention, he received warnings to avoid political subjects and ultimately left the country without proper clearance. Subsequent bench warrants were issued for his arrest for his method of departure. After a change in government leadership in The Gambia, his wife continued to receive inquiries about his whereabouts.The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings in 2018, and the petitioner applied for asylum, humanitarian asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The Immigration Judge held an evidentiary hearing, found credible evidence of past persecution, and determined the petitioner was initially entitled to a presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. However, the judge concluded that substantial changes in The Gambia’s political climate, particularly after the election of President Barrow and the implementation of reforms, rebutted this presumption. Relief was denied, and the petitioner was ordered removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the Immigration Judge’s findings, agreeing that the new administration’s steps established a fundamental change in circumstances and that the past persecution was not so severe as to warrant humanitarian asylum.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the administrative record and found substantial evidence supporting the decisions of both the Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals. The court held that the government successfully rebutted the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution, the past harm did not warrant humanitarian asylum, and the petitioner failed to meet the higher standards for withholding of removal and CAT relief. The petition for review was denied. View "Jatta v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A woman fled Honduras with her partner and daughter after years of harassment and stalking by a man named Jose Funes. Funes sent frequent threatening messages, stalked her at work, threatened her partner’s life, and tried to obtain her whereabouts even after she relocated within Honduras. He also allegedly orchestrated an incident that Alvarado interpreted as an attempted kidnapping of her daughter. Despite reporting these threats to local authorities, police did not intervene. Fearing further harm, the family left Honduras for the United States in 2016, where Funes continued to attempt contact via social media. Alvarado sought mental health treatment in Massachusetts due to ongoing fear.Removal proceedings were initiated in early 2017, and Alvarado applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, with her partner and daughter as derivative applicants. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied all claims, finding insufficient corroboration of the alleged kidnapping attempt, questioning her testimony, and determining that the harassment did not rise to the level of persecution. The IJ also made an adverse credibility finding regarding her partner’s affidavit. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reversed the adverse credibility finding but upheld the denial of relief, concluding that Alvarado had not established past harm rising to the level of persecution or an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the final BIA decision under the substantial evidence standard. The court held that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determinations: neither the threats nor the alleged kidnapping attempt compelled a finding of persecution, and Alvarado’s fear of future harm was not objectively reasonable. The court denied the petition for review. View "Alvarado-Hernandez v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A citizen of Bangladesh, who had lawfully resided in the United States since 2009, was convicted in New York of misdemeanor second-degree sexual abuse under New York Penal Law § 130.60(2) for engaging in sexual contact with a person less than fourteen years old. This offense resulted in a 364-day jail sentence. Following his release, the Department of Homeland Security charged him as removable for having committed an aggravated felony—specifically, "sexual abuse of a minor"—under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The individual had previously been active in the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and claimed fear of torture if returned to Bangladesh due to political affiliations and recent unrest.The Immigration Judge concluded that the New York conviction was a categorical match to the federal generic offense of "sexual abuse of a minor" as defined in the INA, referencing both Second Circuit and Third Circuit precedents, and denied the respondent’s motion to terminate removal proceedings. The judge also found the petitioner credible but denied relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), finding insufficient evidence that he would be individually targeted or likely tortured upon return. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the Immigration Judge’s rulings, agreeing that the conviction constituted an aggravated felony and upholding the denial of CAT relief. The BIA also noted improved country conditions in Bangladesh following a change in government.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that its prior interpretation of "sexual abuse of a minor" remained binding precedent, even after the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which limited Chevron deference. The court found no categorical mismatch between the New York statute and the federal definition, and substantial evidence supported the denial of CAT relief. As a result, the Third Circuit dismissed the challenge to removability for lack of jurisdiction and denied the petition as to the CAT claim. View "Islam v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

A Lebanese citizen who worked as a physician and educator in the United States traveled to Lebanon to visit family and, upon her return to Boston Logan International Airport, was detained by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers. During inspection, officers reviewed her phone and found photos and videos related to Hezbollah, which is designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States. She acknowledged deleting some of the photos before her arrival, explained her religious motivations and familial connections, and denied supporting Hezbollah’s political or military activities. After an interview, CBP officers determined she was inadmissible as an immigrant without valid documents because her intentions could not be verified due to derogatory information found during inspection. She was issued an expedited removal order, her H-1B visa was revoked, and she was returned to Lebanon, subject to a five-year bar on reentry.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed her amended habeas corpus petition for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review expedited removal orders except in narrow circumstances not present in her case. The district court also concluded that the Suspension Clause did not preserve jurisdiction for her claims and that her remaining arguments fell outside the scope of habeas review permitted under the INA.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the petitioner’s challenge to the expedited removal order and the revocation of her visa because her claims did not fall within the exceptions enumerated in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2). The court further concluded that the Suspension Clause did not require broader habeas review in these circumstances and rejected arguments that her case was distinguishable from binding Supreme Court precedent. View "Alawieh v. Mullin" on Justia Law

After her husband was kidnapped and likely murdered in Honduras, and her brother-in-law—who had opposed a local gang—was murdered, a woman and her young daughter fled to the United States. The woman believed the 18th Street Gang was responsible for both crimes and feared retaliation against her family. After arriving in the U.S., she applied for asylum, citing her relationship to her husband’s immediate family as the basis for her claim. She submitted supporting evidence including a death certificate, police report, and affidavits. Later, after receiving direct death threats from individuals identified as gang members, she sought to reopen her asylum proceedings based on this new evidence.The Immigration Judge found her testimony credible but determined the evidence did not sufficiently establish persecution on account of her membership in a protected group—her husband’s family—due to a lack of proof regarding the gang’s involvement in the murders. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reviewed and affirmed this decision. After the death threats, the woman filed a motion to reopen, providing new evidence; however, the BIA denied the motion, concluding the threats did not demonstrate a nexus between the persecution and her family membership.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial. The Fourth Circuit held that the BIA abused its discretion by failing to adequately consider the new evidence and the context surrounding the threats. The court found that the nexus requirement was satisfied, as the threats and violence were sufficiently connected to the woman’s family membership. The Fourth Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Fajardo-Rivas v. Blanche" on Justia Law

Maria Lily Alvarenga and her son, E.D.B.A., are Honduran nationals who entered the United States unlawfully in April 2019. After encountering Border Patrol, Alvarenga was placed in removal proceedings for being present without admission or parole. She admitted to being a Honduran citizen and lacking a visa or passport. In the second phase of proceedings, Alvarenga sought relief from removal, claiming asylum, statutory withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), based on alleged gang-related persecution by MS-13. She stated MS-13 attempted to recruit her son, threatened him, and threatened to harm her, though no physical harm occurred, and the threats were not acted upon. Alvarenga did not report these incidents to Honduran authorities.An Immigration Judge determined Alvarenga was removable and denied her claims for relief, finding insufficient evidence of persecution based on a protected ground and no demonstration of government acquiescence in torture. Alvarenga appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), asserting that the IJ erred and violated her due process rights by committing procedural mistakes. The BIA dismissed the appeal, affirming the IJ’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed Alvarenga’s petition. The court held that Alvarenga’s due process claim failed because she did not demonstrate prejudice from any alleged procedural errors. Regarding asylum and withholding of removal, the court found substantial evidence supported the BIA’s determination that Alvarenga’s proposed social group was not sufficiently particular or socially distinct, and her claim based on imputed political opinion was not substantiated by precedent. For CAT relief, the court concluded Alvarenga failed to show government acquiescence or awareness of the alleged threats. The Eighth Circuit denied the petition for review, affirming the BIA’s decision. View "Alvarenga v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A woman and her son, admitted as refugees to the United States in 2005, had their refugee status terminated by United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) after an investigation concluded that the woman had participated in the Rwandan genocide. This determination rendered her ineligible for refugee status under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), specifically due to the “persecutor bar.” Both were placed in removal proceedings. The woman denied the allegations, asserting they were politically motivated. In removal proceedings, an immigration court found her credible and granted her asylum, but denied asylum to her son, who had aged out of dependent eligibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals remanded the woman’s asylum grant and affirmed the denial for her son. The government’s appeal and the son’s petition for review were abated pending the outcome of related litigation.The pair then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, challenging USCIS’s termination of refugee status under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, relying on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which bars judicial review of actions specified to be in the agency’s discretion. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing the termination decision was not discretionary under the statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that termination of refugee status under 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(4) involves a two-step process: a mandatory, nondiscretionary determination whether the individual met the statutory definition of “refugee” at admission, followed by a discretionary decision whether to terminate status. Because the plaintiffs challenged only the nondiscretionary threshold determination, the court concluded that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) did not bar judicial review. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mukantagara v. Mullin" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant was convicted after a guilty plea for second-degree murder and attempted robbery after a failed robbery and fatal shooting of a drug dealer in Washington, D.C., when he was twenty-three years old. He was sentenced to twenty-four years in prison and five years of supervised release. After serving over seventeen years, he sought a sentence reduction under the Incarceration Reduction Amendment Act (IRAA), arguing that he was eligible based on his age at the time of the offense and his time served, and presenting evidence about his background, prison conduct, participation in available programs, and impending deportation.Initially, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia convicted the appellant in 2006 after a jury trial, but the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed most convictions due to procedural error and remanded for a new trial, after which the appellant entered a guilty plea. Upon his IRAA motion, the Superior Court held a hearing, reviewed supplemental briefing, and ultimately denied the motion. The court considered the statutory IRAA factors, finding that although some weighed in his favor, his disciplinary infractions and lack of substantial programming undermined his claim of rehabilitation and nondangerousness. The court also noted the practical challenges posed by his likely deportation but did not find it particularly relevant for dangerousness.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the denial for abuse of discretion. The court held that the trial court did not commit reversible error regarding the consideration of the appellant’s age or the availability of prison programs, clarified the proper approach to IRAA factors one and three, and found no plain error in the trial court’s treatment of deportation. The order denying the sentence reduction was affirmed. View "Euceda v. United States" on Justia Law

The defendant, a Mexican citizen, entered the United States illegally on three separate occasions. During his first period of unlawful presence, he was convicted of driving while intoxicated and dealing cocaine for a Mexican drug cartel. After deportation, he reentered the country, was again convicted of driving while intoxicated, and was found to be an aggravated felon in the United States after removal. Despite repeated warnings and deportations, he returned a third time, remaining undetected for several years before being stopped by Michigan police for a traffic violation, which led to federal immigration authorities being notified. He was subsequently charged with illegally being found in the United States after removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan presided over his trial. Before trial, the defendant sought to present a duress defense, claiming cartel threats compelled his illegal reentry. The district court ruled that he had not provided legally sufficient evidence to support duress, barring the defense. The defendant also moved to dismiss the indictment, alleging violation of the Speedy Trial Act; the district court found the government complied with statutory time limits. After a jury convicted him, the district court imposed a within-Guidelines sentence of 48 months’ imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court properly barred the duress defense because the defendant did not show an imminent threat, had reasonable alternatives, recklessly created the risk by joining the cartel, and did not promptly surrender to authorities. The court also held that the Speedy Trial Act was not violated, as the timing calculation starts with the initial appearance in the charging district. Finally, the court found the sentence to be substantively reasonable and affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Lopez-Escarrega" on Justia Law