Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

A native and citizen of Honduras, the petitioner entered the United States illegally and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), citing fear of harm from gangs who had killed his father. In 2017, an immigration judge denied his claims and ordered his removal to Honduras. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal, and he did not seek judicial review. After being removed and subsequently reentering the United States illegally in 2021, he was detained and, in 2023, the Department of Homeland Security reinstated his prior removal order. He did not contest this reinstatement. Later, while awaiting removal, he underwent a reasonable fear interview based on new claims of fear related to his political opposition to the Honduran president. An asylum officer and, upon review, an immigration judge each found he had not established a reasonable possibility of persecution or torture.The petitioner challenged the immigration judge’s negative reasonable fear determination, arguing due process violations and incorrect findings. However, he did not challenge the final order of removal or the reinstatement order itself. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the petition.The Sixth Circuit held that it lacked statutory jurisdiction to review the petition because its authority is limited to final orders of removal. Orders denying CAT or withholding relief, or their procedural precursors (such as negative reasonable fear determinations), do not constitute final orders of removal and do not affect the validity of a removal order. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review, recognizing that Supreme Court precedent now abrogates prior circuit practice permitting review of such orders outside a challenge to a final removal order. View "Castro-Fuentes v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A noncitizen from Mexico entered the United States without inspection in 1997 and was later placed in removal proceedings. She applied for cancellation of removal but was denied relief by an Immigration Judge, who instead granted her voluntary departure. She appealed the denial, but her subsequent departure from the United States, due to a family emergency, caused her appeal to be automatically withdrawn, making the original decision final. After returning to the United States without inspection in 2013, she was apprehended and a reinstatement order of removal was issued. She remained in the country under stays of removal until she was detained again in 2025, at which point she sought review of the reinstatement order while also pursuing withholding-only proceedings due to fear of persecution in her home country.Previously, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had held that a removal order did not become final until the conclusion of withholding-only proceedings, following circuit precedent. However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259 (2025), abrogated this approach, holding that an order of removal becomes final upon its issuance or administrative affirmation, regardless of ongoing withholding-only proceedings.In the present case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the petitioner’s arguments that jurisdiction existed to review her reinstatement order and that the deadline for filing her petition should be equitably tolled due to the change in law. The Tenth Circuit held that it retains jurisdiction to review reinstatement orders as final orders of removal, consistent with its precedent and not contradicted by Riley. However, the court found that the petition for review was untimely, as it was not filed within thirty days of the reinstatement order, and the petitioner failed to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling. The court therefore dismissed the petition as untimely. View "Vizguerra-Ramirez v. Blanche" on Justia Law

Three individuals, all foreign nationals who had resided in the United States for many years without lawful admission, were detained by immigration authorities under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) following traffic stops. Each sought habeas corpus relief, arguing that their continued detention without a bond hearing to assess their dangerousness or flight risk violated their Fifth Amendment due process rights.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted habeas relief in each case, ordering the release of the individuals and enjoining federal authorities from further detaining them absent individualized bond hearings. On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district courts’ rulings, holding that the Fifth Amendment required a bond hearing within 90 days of detention. The panel also consolidated the cases due to their similar legal questions regarding detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, subsequently reconsidered the panel’s decision. The en banc court held that unadmitted aliens detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A) are not constitutionally entitled to individualized hearings on dangerousness or flight risk before detention, and that the duration of their detention did not present constitutional concerns warranting habeas relief. The court reasoned that such procedural protections are not required by the statute, nor by the Fifth Amendment, given Congress’s plenary power over immigration and the specific statutory framework for applicants for admission. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district courts’ judgments and vacated their orders granting habeas relief to the petitioners. View "Alvarado v. Vergara" on Justia Law

A Russian citizen who identifies as bisexual sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture in the United States. He based his application on his membership in a social group defined by sexual orientation, specifically “the LGBT community” or “queer Russian men.” The petitioner described a history of abuse and discrimination in Russia, including physical violence from his mother’s partner, harassment and assaults by classmates, discrimination and violence at work, threats of compulsory conversion therapy, a violent attack by classmates, dismissive responses from law enforcement, and continued threats after fleeing Russia.An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied all claims for relief. The IJ did not make an adverse credibility finding but concluded the petitioner had not provided credible evidence proving his bisexuality and had not shown he suffered significant harm amounting to persecution due to his sexual orientation. The IJ’s reasoning rested in part on the fact that the petitioner had never had sexual relations with a man or woman, reflecting a misunderstanding of how sexual orientation is defined. The IJ also faulted the petitioner for lacking corroborative evidence, but did not notify him that such evidence was required until issuing the decision.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s denial, finding the petitioner’s evidence insufficient to satisfy his burden of proof for membership in the claimed social group or for past or future persecution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review and remanded the case. The court held that the agency fundamentally misunderstood the petitioner’s proposed social group, specifically misapprehending the nature of bisexuality. Additionally, the agency violated statutory notice-and-opportunity requirements by failing to inform the petitioner of the need for specific corroborating evidence before denying relief, thereby depriving him of a meaningful opportunity to provide such evidence or explain its unavailability. View "A.M. V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

A noncitizen from Iran, who was granted asylum in the United States as a child, faced removal proceedings after a drug conviction. In 2002, an immigration judge deferred his removal under the Convention Against Torture, and he was released on supervision, consistently complying with all terms for over 20 years. After relocating from California to Kansas with approval from immigration authorities, he was unexpectedly detained by ICE officers in June 2025, despite no alleged violations of his release terms. He was subsequently notified that his release was revoked due to a supposed new possibility of removal to a third country, yet was not given the required informal interview to contest this revocation.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas denied his initial habeas petition challenging the legality of his detention, as well as his request for a preliminary injunction to stop his transfer out of Kansas. The court suggested he could file a new habeas petition if detained for more than six months. After over eight months in detention, the petitioner filed a second habeas petition, which the district court granted, leading to his release. The government then moved to dismiss his appeal as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit determined the appeal was not moot, applying the exception for wrongs capable of repetition yet evading review. On the merits, the court held that the district court misapplied the applicable legal standards. It concluded that the government violated its own regulations by failing to promptly provide the petitioner with an informal interview upon revocation of his release, a due process violation that was per se prejudicial. The court also found error in the district court's application of the six-month presumptive reasonableness standard for detention under Zadvydas v. Davis, ruling it did not reset with each re-detention. The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Abedi v. Carter" on Justia Law

A native and citizen of Afghanistan, the petitioner formerly worked for the Afghan Ministry of Education and, following the Taliban’s 2021 return to power, was required by Taliban officials to provide information about female students and their families. After participating in a protest against the Taliban’s closure of girls’ schools and sharing evidence of the protest, he was arrested, detained, and beaten by the Taliban, then released after intervention from his family and community. He subsequently left Afghanistan, entered the United States without valid entry documents, and sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).An Immigration Judge (IJ) found that the petitioner’s actions constituted material support to a terrorist organization, making him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal, but did not find him eligible for CAT relief, concluding the petitioner had not shown it was more likely than not that he would be tortured if returned to Afghanistan. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal, denied his motion to remand for the IJ to consider new evidence, and later denied his motion for reconsideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed both BIA decisions. The Fifth Circuit applied the substantial evidence standard to the agency’s CAT determination and found that the record did not compel a contrary result. The court held that the BIA did not err in denying CAT relief, did not abuse its discretion in denying remand for new evidence, and did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration. The petitions for review were therefore denied. View "Zahid v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A coalition of twenty-seven Judeo-Christian organizations challenged a change in federal immigration enforcement policy that removed longstanding protections for houses of worship. For over thirty years, the government had a "Sensitive Locations Policy" that limited immigration enforcement at places like churches, synagogues, and mosques, except in exigent circumstances or with high-level approval. In January 2025, the Department of Homeland Security rescinded this policy, instructing immigration officers to use their discretion when conducting enforcement at these locations. Subsequent agency memoranda implemented this change, allowing supervisory agents to approve enforcement operations at or near houses of worship on a case-by-case basis, with no bright-line rules. Plaintiffs, representing congregations that serve undocumented immigrants, alleged that the new policy created a credible threat of enforcement, causing declines in attendance, financial burdens, and moral dilemmas.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to have Article III standing, finding their asserted injuries were not sufficiently imminent, not traceable to the policy change, or not redressable by reverting to the prior policy. Specifically, the district court relied on a legal standard requiring plaintiffs to show they were uniquely targeted for enforcement, which it found was not satisfied.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs likely have associational standing based on the imminent threat of enforcement actions at houses of worship, which burdens expressive and religious rights. The court determined that the harm was imminent, traceable to the government’s policy change, and redressable by the requested relief. The main holding was that plaintiffs likely have standing, and the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mennonite Church USA v. DHS" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a native of Jordan, lawfully entered the United States in 2014 as the unmarried child of a U.S. citizen. In 2019, after being convicted in Virginia for a crime involving moral turpitude, he was charged with removability by the Department of Homeland Security. He sought relief from removal by applying for asylum, humanitarian asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), asserting that he feared persecution or torture if returned to Jordan due to past sexual assaults by two men, Abdul and Anas. The petitioner alleged that Abdul, a government employee, targeted him because of his vulnerability, and that Anas joined Abdul in the assaults. He reported these incidents to the police in Jordan, resulting in Anas’s conviction, but claimed Abdul was never charged. The petitioner returned to Jordan multiple times after the assaults but avoided further harm.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found the petitioner’s testimony about the assaults credible but denied all forms of relief, concluding there was no nexus between the alleged persecution and his proposed social group of “imputed homosexuals.” The IJ also determined he had not shown it was more likely than not that he would be tortured if returned to Jordan. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the IJ’s decision, finding substantial evidence that the abuse was motivated by vulnerability rather than perceived homosexuality and that claims of future persecution on this basis were speculative. The Board also concluded that the petitioner had not established a sufficient probability of future torture.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed both the IJ’s and Board’s findings. Applying a highly deferential substantial evidence standard to factual findings and reviewing legal conclusions de novo, the court held that the agency did not err in denying relief. The court denied the petition for review, affirming the Board’s determinations that the petitioner did not qualify for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT protection. View "Qaiymah v. Blanche" on Justia Law

Two individuals, Roberto Miranda and Roberto Orellana, traveled together to a restaurant parking lot, where a casino employee handed them a box containing $352,000. The employee had been deceived into surrendering the money, which belonged to the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe. Both men were charged with federal crimes related to transporting stolen money and aiding and abetting that offense. Orellana also faced a charge for illegal reentry into the United States. Each pleaded guilty to the relevant offenses.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota sentenced Miranda to seventy months’ imprisonment, an upward variance from the Sentencing Guidelines range of 41–51 months, based in part on findings that Miranda minimized his involvement and was not candid. Orellana received a fifty-month sentence, also exceeding his Guidelines range of 30–37 months. Both defendants had entered plea agreements containing broad appeal waivers, though each preserved limited rights to appeal the substantive reasonableness of a sentence above the Guidelines range.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that Miranda knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to challenge the district court’s calculation of his Sentencing Guidelines range and dismissed that part of his appeal. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in Miranda’s sentence and affirmed it. With respect to Orellana, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court committed plain error by speculating, without record support, that Orellana was involved with Mexican drug cartels and that this speculation was a principal basis for the sentence imposed. The court determined this error affected Orellana’s substantial rights and the fairness of the proceedings. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit vacated Orellana’s sentence and remanded his case for resentencing. View "United States v. Orellana" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a noncitizen born in Venezuela who later overstayed a travel visa in the United States, became involved in a drug conspiracy led by her abusive husband. She was charged with conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. Her primary concern throughout the criminal proceedings was remaining in the United States, as she had two children who were U.S. citizens. Her court-appointed counsel assured her that accepting a plea agreement would allow her to "work out" any immigration issues after serving her sentence, despite warnings in the plea agreement and at the plea hearing that she "may" be deported. Relying on this advice, she pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 84 months' imprisonment and three years of supervised release.After completing her sentence, the petitioner received a removal notice, prompting her to seek legal assistance. Upon learning that her conviction rendered her mandatorily removable and permanently inadmissible to the United States, she filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and found that she had adequately explained her delay in seeking relief, the counsel's advice was constitutionally deficient under Padilla v. Kentucky, and she suffered prejudice because she would not have pleaded guilty if properly advised. The court granted the writ and vacated her conviction, concluding that equitable considerations favored relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of coram nobis relief. Applying de novo review to legal conclusions and clear error to factual findings, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The main holding is that the petitioner met all requirements for coram nobis relief: timely explanation for delay, ongoing collateral consequences, fundamental error due to ineffective assistance of counsel, and equitable grounds justifying relief. View "Morillo v. US" on Justia Law