Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

A noncitizen, originally from El Salvador, unlawfully entered the United States in 2003. In 2018, he was convicted of serious crimes, after which he was placed in removal proceedings while still incarcerated. During those proceedings, he conceded removability but sought deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, fearing for his life if returned to El Salvador. The immigration judge denied his application, finding his testimony not credible and ordering his removal. He was informed of his right to appeal by a set deadline. The noncitizen informed his attorney he wished to appeal, but due to delays in receiving and returning a fee waiver form, the notice of appeal was filed after the deadline. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely, and the noncitizen was removed.After unlawfully reentering the United States and being convicted of new state felonies, he was indicted for illegal reentry under federal law. He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that his prior removal order was invalid due to ineffective assistance of counsel, as his attorney failed to timely file the notice of appeal. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied the motion, holding that he had not exhausted available administrative remedies, specifically by failing to properly present his ineffective-assistance claim to the Board in accordance with procedural requirements set forth in Matter of Lozada.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that, under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), a noncitizen must exhaust administrative remedies before collaterally attacking a removal order. It found that the appellant did not substantially comply with Lozada’s requirements for raising an ineffective-assistance claim before the Board, and thus failed to exhaust his remedies. Accordingly, the denial of the motion to dismiss was affirmed. View "US v. Gil" on Justia Law

A Honduran citizen, who was a lawful permanent resident in the United States, was convicted in Virginia of embezzling over $46,000 in scrap metal from his employer. After serving his sentence, the Department of Homeland Security detained him and charged him as removable, alleging that his conviction was for an aggravated felony involving fraud or deceit under federal immigration law. His wife and daughter, also lawful residents, sought to help him avoid removal by filing a family visa petition, but the immigration process was delayed.An immigration judge denied further continuances for the visa process and concluded that the embezzlement conviction involved fraud or deceit, ordering removal to Honduras. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed both the denial of the continuance and the finding that the conviction was for an aggravated felony. Although the government mistakenly deported the petitioner during his appeal, they brought him back and assured the court of procedural safeguards. The Board's decision resulted in the petitioner’s removal, and he sought review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo, applying the categorical approach to determine whether Virginia’s embezzlement statute necessarily involves fraud or deceit. The court concluded that the statute does not categorically require fraudulent or deceitful conduct, as its elements criminalize wrongful taking but do not always require misrepresentation, trickery, or intentional concealment. Therefore, the conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony under the charged theory. The Fourth Circuit granted the petition, vacated the final order of removal, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ramos v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A family from Honduras entered the United States in 2021 and sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, claiming they faced violent threats in their home country. Their applications were denied by an Immigration Judge. On December 19, 2023, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the denial. The BIA sent notice of its decision to the family’s attorney and a courtesy copy to the family. However, their attorney failed to inform them of the decision or the thirty-day deadline to file a petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. As a result, the family missed the deadline to seek further review. The attorney acknowledged her error and withdrew from representing the family.The family, with new counsel, filed a motion with the BIA to reopen the case and reissue the decision, arguing that their prior attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to notify them of the decision and deadline. The BIA denied the motion, reasoning that it lacked authority to address ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to actions before a different tribunal and that the courtesy copy of its decision sent to the family provided sufficient notice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the BIA abused its discretion in denying the motion to reopen. The Ninth Circuit clarified that the BIA does have the authority to consider ineffective assistance claims for conduct that impacts a petitioner’s ability to seek review in federal court. It also held that mailing a courtesy copy to the petitioners did not rebut the presumption of prejudice created by counsel’s deficient performance. The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings. View "MENJIVAR-AYALA V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

A Salvadoran national entered the United States without authorization in 2016 and was later placed in removal proceedings. He sought relief from removal by applying for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming a history of violent encounters with the Zetas cartel and presenting evidence of threats and violence against himself and his family. He also admitted to a 2023 conviction for assault and battery against a family member in Virginia.An Immigration Judge (IJ) heard testimony from the petitioner and expert witnesses and reviewed documentary evidence. The IJ found the petitioner not credible, citing implausible elements in his testimony and inconsistencies with other evidence. The IJ denied all forms of relief, concluding that the petitioner was ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal due to his conviction for a “particularly serious crime” and that he failed to establish a sufficient likelihood of torture to warrant CAT protection. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision in full.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions. The court held that the IJ and BIA failed to apply the proper legal standard in determining whether the Virginia conviction was a “particularly serious crime,” specifically by not conducting the required two-step analysis in the correct order. This error required vacatur and remand for further proceedings. However, the court found the adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence and that the denial of CAT relief was not an abuse of discretion. The petition was therefore granted in part, denied in part, and the BIA’s order was vacated and remanded. View "Martinez v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A Gambian national, who entered the United States on a temporary business visa and later became a lawful permanent resident after marriage, was convicted in federal court of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. His conviction stemmed from a series of transactions over four months, during which he received and transferred substantial quantities of methamphetamine, ultimately leading to his removal proceedings. Upon his release from prison, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, charging him with being removable for committing an aggravated felony and a controlled substance offense. In his removal hearing, the individual applied for asylum, withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and protection under the Convention Against Torture, citing fear of harm by radical Islamists if returned to The Gambia.An Immigration Judge found him removable and denied his applications for relief, ruling that his conviction was a particularly serious crime, which made him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, applying the Attorney General's decision in Matter of Y-L-, which creates a strong presumption that drug trafficking aggravated felonies are particularly serious crimes. The BIA concluded that the presumption was not rebutted, and therefore, the conviction rendered him ineligible for withholding of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on whether the agency was required to make an individualized determination of dangerousness beyond the Y-L- presumption, and whether its precedent, Miguel-Miguel v. Gonzales, should be overruled in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. The court held that under existing precedent, the application of the Y-L- presumption sufficed to establish the petitioner’s ineligibility for withholding of removal and declined to overrule its prior statutory interpretation. The petition for review was denied. View "SARR V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

A noncitizen defendant, a member of the MS-13 gang, pleaded guilty to assault in aid of racketeering after providing advice and supplies to junior gang members involved in a shooting. He was charged as part of a multi-defendant racketeering indictment covering violent crimes from 2016 to 2018. The defendant was sentenced to 210 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. One special condition of his supervised release required him to “cooperate with and abide by all instructions of immigration authorities.” The defendant did not object to this special condition during sentencing.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York imposed the sentence and adopted the presentence report’s recommendations, including the special conditions of supervised release. The defendant filed an appeal challenging only the “Immigration Authorities Condition,” arguing that it was procedurally unreasonable, unconstitutionally vague, and impermissibly delegated judicial authority to non-judicial officers. The government argued the appeal was barred by a waiver in the plea agreement, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that the waiver did not cover conditions of supervised release and denied the motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case for plain error. The court held that the challenge was ripe, was not waived but forfeited, and that the district court’s reasons for imposing the condition were self-evident in the record. The court further held that the condition was not unconstitutionally vague and did not unlawfully delegate sentencing authority. The judgment of the district court, including the challenged special condition, was affirmed. View "United States v. Salvador" on Justia Law

Two noncitizens, E.E.V. and M.C.C.-G., challenged orders that would remove them from the United States to their native countries, where they claimed they would face persecution or torture. E.E.V., a citizen of El Salvador, was previously removed under an expedited removal order, reentered the U.S., and was then subject to a reinstatement order in 2015. She expressed fear of returning, was found to have a reasonable fear by an asylum officer, and was referred to withholding-only proceedings before an immigration judge, which remained pending. M.C.C.-G., a Mexican citizen, was issued a final administrative removal order in 2025 after a criminal conviction. She also expressed fear of return, was initially found not to have a reasonable fear, but that determination was vacated, and she was placed in withholding-only proceedings, which were still pending when these petitions were filed.Previously, under Seventh Circuit precedent, noncitizens like the petitioners were required to wait until all administrative proceedings—including withholding-only proceedings—were completed before seeking judicial review. However, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley v. Bondi, the statutory thirty-day deadline to file a petition for review was held to run from the issuance of a final administrative removal order, regardless of the status of withholding-only proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered the government’s motions to dismiss the petitions as untimely, as they were filed more than thirty days after the final removal orders, and also raised new jurisdictional arguments. The Seventh Circuit rejected arguments that reinstatement orders are not subject to judicial review and that the petitions were unripe. The court held that the thirty-day deadline is subject to equitable tolling due to petitioners’ reliance on the prior binding precedent, making these petitions timely. The court denied the motions to dismiss and to transfer venue, holding the petitions in abeyance pending completion of agency proceedings. View "E.E.V. v. Blanche" on Justia Law

Three individuals, each having entered the United States unlawfully more than a decade ago, were detained by federal immigration authorities after routine traffic stops in Texas. None had criminal histories, and each was a long-term resident and father of U.S. citizen children. They petitioned for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), claiming exceptional hardship to their U.S. citizen children if removed. After being detained without bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), they filed habeas corpus petitions, asserting their detention violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas reviewed each petition, applying the procedural due process framework from Mathews v. Eldridge. The district courts found the mandatory detention regime unconstitutional as applied to these petitioners, ordered their immediate release, and required that any future detention must be preceded by a hearing to determine dangerousness or risk of flight. The government appealed these rulings, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit consolidated the cases.The Fifth Circuit examined precedent, including Zadvydas v. Davis, Demore v. Kim, and Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, and concluded that physical presence and long-term residence within the United States entitles aliens to due process protections. The court held that mandatory, indefinite detention of noncriminal, long-term resident aliens under § 1225(b)(2)(A) without a bond hearing violates the Fifth Amendment. The government must provide a bond hearing within ninety days of detention to determine if continued detention is justified by individualized findings of dangerousness or flight risk. The court affirmed the district courts’ grants of habeas corpus and clarified the scope of its decision to similar aliens detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A). View "Sosnava Rodriguez v. Ortega" on Justia Law

A man born and raised in Jamaica entered the United States as a teenager on a temporary visa and later overstayed. After being convicted of drug and firearm offenses, he was taken into custody by the Department of Homeland Security and ordered removed to Jamaica. He sought deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming that a powerful Jamaican drug dealer with ties to local authorities had already killed two of his cousins and would likely kill him if he returned. His mother and sister, still in Jamaica, corroborated these fears through affidavits describing threats and police indifference.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found the man’s testimony credible, determined he faced a particularized risk of torture with the acquiescence of Jamaican authorities, and granted deferral of removal under the CAT. On appeal by the government, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reversed, concluding that the threat was too speculative and the evidence insufficient to show government acquiescence. The man petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review. Initially, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the petition as untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed the untimeliness but clarified that the filing deadline was not jurisdictional and could be waived. Because the government waived the timing objection, the Supreme Court remanded the case.Upon remand, the government raised a new jurisdictional argument. The Fourth Circuit allowed the petitioner to amend his petition to include review of his original removal order, curing any potential jurisdictional defect. The court then reviewed the merits and held that the BIA improperly applied a de novo review rather than the required clear-error standard to the IJ’s factual findings. The Fourth Circuit granted the amended petition, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded for proceedings consistent with the correct standard of review. View "Riley v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A Serbian professional soccer player entered the United States on a visitor visa and sought asylum, claiming past persecution due to his membership in a group he defined as “Serbian soccer players who are victims of violence from soccer hooligans,” as well as persecution based on an imputed political opinion. He described being assaulted by soccer hooligans after a game, suffering moderate injuries, and receiving subsequent threats. He did not report these incidents to police, fearing connections between the hooligans and law enforcement, and argued that relocation within Serbia would not protect him because of the reach of these groups.An immigration judge found the applicant credible but ruled that the harm he suffered did not amount to past persecution, as it was based on a single incident without lasting impairments and was motivated by personal dissatisfaction with his performance rather than a protected ground. The judge held that being a soccer player was not an immutable characteristic and that the proposed social group lacked particularity and specificity. Furthermore, the judge found no evidence of government unwillingness or inability to protect him, nor of an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution. The judge denied asylum as well as withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture, which the applicant did not appeal.The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the judge’s decision, finding that the revised social group definition was waived and agreeing that the applicant failed to establish a nexus to a protected ground. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the agency’s conclusions for substantial evidence and held that the applicant’s harm did not occur on account of a protected ground, and that neither of his proposed social groups was cognizable under the law. The court denied the petition for review. View "Andric v. Blanche" on Justia Law