The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's finding that petitioner was removable and denial of his applications for cancellation of removal and adjustment of status. The court held that, because it has previously upheld the BIA's determination that child endangerment offenses fall within the Immigration and Nationality Act's (INA) crime of child abuse provision, the court agreed with the district court that New York law -- which criminalizes conduct that poses a likelihood of physical, mental, or moral harm to a child -- falls within the BIA's definition. Therefore, petitioner's New York convictions for endangering the welfare of a child were crimes of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment under the INA. View "Matthews v. Barr" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Appellant's petition for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) vacating the decision of the immigration judge (IJ) granting Appellant's application for asylum and ordering her removal, holding that the that BIA's finding that Appellant failed to establish that she suffered persecution or that she was a member of her particular social group was supported by reasonable, substantial evidence. After Appellant, a native of El Salvador, entered the United States without inspection with her two sons, Appellant sought asylum, with her sons as derivative beneficiaries, arguing that the children's father threatened her on numerous occasions. Appellant never lived with the father. In her application, Appellant argued that she had been persecuted because of her membership in the social group of "women in El Salvador unable to leave a domestic relationship." The BIA found that Appellant's harm did not rise to the level of persecution required to grant asylum and that Appellant's relationship with her ex-partner was not a "domestic" relationship. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the BIA's findings were supported by substantial evidence. View "Rivas-Duran v. Barr" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Jose Luis Eliseo Arias-Quijada entered a conditional guilty plea to illegal reentry into the United States. He reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his Motion to Assert a Defense of Duress. In this appeal, Arias-Quijada challenged the denial of his motion, arguing he presented sufficient evidence to create a triable issue on the affirmative defense of duress. He specifically challenged the district court’s conclusion that he failed to make a bona fide effort to surrender to immigration authorities once the alleged duress lost its coercive force. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying Arias-Quijada's motion. View "United States v. Arias-Quijada" on Justia Law

Doe, an Iranian national, sought conditional permanent residency using the EB-5 admission category, which offers visas for immigrants who invest in new job-creating enterprises. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) initially approved Doe’s petition but revoked its approval two years later. The revocation notice identified material changes: USCIS discovered information that contradicted evidence in the record, that the project had moved, and that Doe had not provided a business plan or targeted employment area certification for the new location. The record contained no evidence that the center was under construction or would create 10 jobs. Doe sought judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court concluded that Congress had stripped its jurisdiction to review discretionary revocations of visa petitions (8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).) and dismissed Doe’s suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument based on Musunuru v. Lynch (2016), in which the Seventh Circuit held that section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not preclude judicial review of purely procedural rulings during the adjudication of a visa petition. The Doe ruling was not procedural. Doe challenged the agency’s substantive decision-making and cannot evade a jurisdiction-stripping statute by repackaging his substantive complaints as procedural objections. “Taken to its logical conclusion, Doe’s approach would eviscerate 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Any petitioner dissatisfied with a final agency decision could secure judicial review by alleging that the agency committed a procedural violation by overlooking favorable evidence.” View "Doe v. McAleenan" on Justia Law

Frederico Alvarado Hinojos, a citizen of Mexico, immigrated to the United States in 1991 with his wife and two daughters. Sixteen years later, in 2007, he pled guilty to felony menacing with a deadly weapon and misdemeanor third-degree assault. Alvarado Hinojos successfully completed both his deferred judgment and his probation sentence. Therefore, in 2009, the trial court dismissed the guilty plea to the felony count and terminated the probation sentence on the misdemeanor count. In July 2015, Alvarado Hinojos filed a motion for postconviction relief in which he collaterally attacked his third-degree assault conviction under Crim. P. 35(c). The question Alvarado Hinojos' appeal raised for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether, as a noncitizen, Alvarado Hinojos was entitled to a hearing on the timeliness of his Crim. P. 35(c) postconviction motion when he invoked the justifiable excuse or excusable neglect exception and alleged that plea counsel provided him no advice regarding the immigration consequences of his plea. The Supreme Court held that when the plea agreement or the plea hearing transcript is submitted, the trial court should consider it in conjunction with the allegations advanced. In this case, the Court held Alvarado Hinojos was not entitled to a hearing. The factual allegations in his motion (which were assumed to be true), when considered in conjunction with the plea agreement, were insufficient to establish justifiable excuse or excusable neglect for failing to collaterally attack the validity of his misdemeanor conviction within the applicable eighteen-month limitations period. The immigration advisement contained in the plea agreement, at a minimum, gave Alvarado Hinojos reason to question the accuracy of his plea counsel’s advice regarding the immigration consequences of the plea. "Thus, even taking at face value the allegations in his motion, he was on notice at the time of his plea that he needed to diligently investigate his counsel’s advice and, if appropriate, file a timely motion challenging the validity of his conviction." View "People v. Alvarado Hinojos" on Justia Law

Israel Chavez-Torres was born in Mexico who immigrated to the United States with his mother and three sisters in 1991 when he was thirteen years old. In August 1996, while in high school, Chavez-Torres pled guilty to first-degree felony criminal trespass. He received probation, which he completed successfully. In 2013, seventeen years after his conviction, the United States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) notified Chavez-Torres that it had initiated removal proceedings against him based on his conviction. Chavez-Torres promptly consulted an immigration attorney who advised him that his conviction made him ineligible for cancellation of removal proceedings. The immigration attorney thus opined that plea counsel may have provided Chavez-Torres ineffective assistance by failing to provide an advisement about the immigration consequences of the plea. The question Chavez-Torres' appeal raised for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether, as a noncitizen, Chavez-Torres was entitled to a hearing on the timeliness of his Crim. P. 35(c) postconviction motion when he invoked the justifiable excuse or excusable neglect exception and alleged that plea counsel provided him no advice regarding the immigration consequences of his plea. The Supreme Court held that when the plea agreement or the plea hearing transcript is submitted, the trial court should consider it in conjunction with the allegations advanced. In this case, Chavez-Torres was entitled to a hearing. "Chavez-Torres alleged that he had no reason to question or investigate his plea counsel’s failure to advise him regarding the immigration consequences of his plea. Further, although he was not required to do so, Chavez-Torres submitted the plea agreement and the plea hearing transcript with his motion, and neither references the immigration consequences of his plea." View "Colorado v. Chavez-Torres" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit granted a petition for review, vacating the denial of petitioner's asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) claims. The court reversed the agency's determination on the nexus requirement and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the agency erred in making a determination regarding whether a nexus exists between petitioner's protected status and her persecution. The court also took the further step of retaining jurisdiction over petitioner's appeal while the Board addressed the remaining issues on remand. View "Alvarez Lagos v. Barr" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success in connection with their claim that ORR's restriction on abortion access infringes their protected right to choose to terminate their pregnancies. In 2017, the government instituted a policy effectively barring any unaccompanied alien child in the custody of the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) from obtaining a pre-viability abortion. The district court granted a preliminary injunction and the government appealed. Agreeing that the case was not moot, the DC Circuit affirmed and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying a class consisting of pregnant unaccompanied minors in the government's custody. On the merits, the court held that, under binding Supreme Court precedent, a person has a constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy before fetal viability, and the government cannot unduly burden her decision. Consequently, these controlling principles dictate affirming the district court's preliminary injunction against the government's blanket denial of access to abortion for unaccompanied minors. The court vacated in part and remanded to the extent that the preliminary injunction barred disclosure to parents and others of unaccompanied minors' pregnancies and abortion decisions. The court held that this portion of the preliminary injunction warranted further explication to aid appellate review. View "J.D. v. Azar" on Justia Law

ICE agents were not permitted to carry out preplanned mass detentions, interrogations, and arrests at a factory, without individualized reasonable suspicion. The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal against petitioner and dismissal of his appeal. The panel rejected the government's argument that the evidence was sufficient to prove that petitioner's removability was not suppressible. On the merits, the panel held that petitioner's seizure was not a justified detention under Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), which held that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted. The panel held that Summers' categorical authority to detain incident to the execution of a search warrant does not extend to a preexisting plan whose central purpose is to detain, interrogate, and arrest a large number of individuals without individualized reasonable suspicion. Therefore, the agents violated 8 C.F.R. 287.8(b)(2) by detaining and questioning petitioner, and petitioner was entitled to suppression of the evidence gathered as a result of that violation. Finally, the panel held that the proceedings against petitioner should be terminated without prejudice. View "Perez Cruz v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision holding that the family court erred in declining to conduct a special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) hearing at the disposition phase of a dependency, neglect and abuse case regarding an unaccompanied Guatemalan child (Child), holding that the Kentucky General Assembly has not specifically directed Kentucky's courts to make SIJ findings. Child was detained by United States immigration authorities in Arizona and temporarily placed with a cousin pending immigration proceedings. An adult resident of Newport, Kentucky filed a dependency petition in the Campbell County Family Court regarding Child. The court concluded that it was without the jurisdictional authority to undertake SIJ findings because such findings were not relevant to the core dependency, neglect, and abuse matters before the court. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Kentucky courts are not required to make additional findings related to SIJ classification unless the court first determines that the evidence to be gathered from such a hearing is relevant to the child's best interests. View "Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health & Family Services v. N.B.D." on Justia Law