The Ninth Circuit amended a previous opinion and voted to deny the petition for panel rehearing. The panel denied the petition for review of the BIA's denial of petitioner's application for cancellation of removal on the ground that she was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The panel held that bribery under 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(2) is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude because it requires proof of a corrupt mind. The panel applied Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951), and Tseung Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1957), and held that the crime involving moral turpitude statute, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), is not unconstitutionally vague. The panel also held that Jordan and Tseung Chu remain good law in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), and Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018). View "Martinez-de Ryan v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's deportation order. The court held that the BIA erred in construing 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) to apply to an individual who was a naturalized citizen at the time of conviction. In this case, petitioner was not rendered an "alien" at the time of conviction by nature of his subsequent ab initio denaturalization. Therefore, petitioner was not subject to deportation under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because he was a naturalized citizen at the time he was convicted. View "Okpala v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part Petitioner’s petition for judicial review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision affirming an immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his requests for asylum, for withholding of removal, and for protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding (1) the BIA did not err in upholding the IJ’s determination that Petitioner did not provide adequate corroboration for his claims; and (2) this Court lacked jurisdiction as to Petitioner’s claims regarding past persecution, ineffective assistance of counsel, and protection under the CAT. Specifically, the Court held (1) there was substantial evidence for the IJ’s determination that Petitioner did not provide adequate corroboration reasonably available to him for crucial elements of his claims; and (2) Petitioner’s remaining claims were waived to due a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. View "Avelar Gonzalez v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, sought review of a final order of removal, challenging the BIA's determination that he was convicted of a "particularly serious crime" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii), which rendered him ineligible for statutory withholding of removal and withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Ninth Circuit held that the statutory phrase "particularly serious crime" was not unconstitutionally vague on its face. The panel reasoned that the "particularly serious crime" inquiry requires an imprecise line-drawing exercise, but it was no less certain than the "perfectly constitutional statutes" that the Supreme Court discussed. The panel held that the fatal combination in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), and Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), which applied an uncertain standard to an idealized crime on the context of the categorical approach, was not present in this circumstance, because the particularly serious crime inquiry requires consideration of what a petitioner actually did. View "Melgoza Guerrero v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review of a final order of removal issued by the BIA. Petitioner claimed that he never received notice of his removal hearing. The court held that petitioner failed to provide the immigration court with his correct mailing address, and failed to rebut the weak presumption of delivery of his notice of hearing. View "Mauricio-Benitez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The government's decision to rescind the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program is subject to judicial review. Upon review, the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that the rescission of DACA is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law. After concluding that neither the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) nor the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) precluded judicial review, the panel held that DACA was a permissible exercise of executive discretion, notwithstanding the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that the related Deferred Action for Parent Arrivals (DAPA) program exceeded DHS's statutory authority. In this case, DACA was being implemented in a manner that reflected discretionary, case-by-base review, and at least one of the Fifth Circuit's key rationales in striking down DAPA was inapplicable with respect to DACA. Therefore, because the Acting Secretary was incorrect in her belief that DACA was illegal and had to be rescinded, the panel held that plaintiffs were likely to succeed in demonstrating that the rescission must be set aside. The panel also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a nationwide injunction; the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' APA notice and comment claim and substantive due process rights claim; and the district court properly denied the government's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' APA arbitrary and capricious claim, due process rights claim, and equal protection claim. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the district court's grant of preliminary injunctive relief, and affirmed in part the district court's partial grant and partial denial of the government's motion to dismiss. View "Regents of the University of California v. USDHS" on Justia Law

California Penal Code 288(c)(1), which prohibits lewd or lascivious acts when a victim is a child of 14 or 15 years and the defendant is at least 10 years older than the child, is neither categorically a crime involving moral turpitude nor categorically a "crime of child abuse." The Ninth Circuit explained that because the offense required only sexual intent, and because a good-faith reasonable mistake of age was not a defense, a defendant was not required to have evil or malicious intent. The panel also held that section 288(c)(1) contains a single, indivisible set of elements such that the modified categorical approach did not apply. The panel granted separate petitions for review of the BIA's decision. The panel held that the BIA erred in concluding that Menendez's conviction triggered the stop-time rule and rendered her ineligible for cancellation. In regard to Rodriguez-Castellon's petition, the panel held that section 288(c)(1) was not categorically a crime of child abuse under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(1), because it was broader than the generic definition of a crime of child abuse. View "De Jesus Menendez v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

McClure-Potts contacted police about Samarin, who entered the U.S. without inspection from Ukraine. McClure-Potts claimed she was trying to adopt Samarin, who was 19 years old and that Samarin had been “speaking of Hitler against the Jews” and might have stolen a rifle. McClure-Potts provided a birth certificate indicating that Samarin was born in 1992. Police discovered that McClure-Potts had previously filed runaway reports regarding a minor son (Asher) apparently born in 1997; Samarin was posing as Asher and attending high school. The school provided a sworn statement from McClure-Potts that Samarin was born in 1997, with applications for free/reduced lunch and health benefits. Samarin claimed that he had moved in with McClure-Potts, then was told to cut ties with his family and surrender his money and his identification documents. He was forced to do household work. McClure-Potts obtained a Social Security card for "Asher," and used it to procure $7,336 in income tax credits and $13,653.28 in nutritional and health benefits. McClure-Potts was charged with Social Security Fraud, 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(6); Harboring an Illegal Alien, 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), (a)(2); and Unlawful Conduct Respecting Documents in Furtherance of Forced Labor, 18 U.S.C. 1589, 1590. McClure-Potts pled guilty to the Social Security Fraud and Harboring counts. Based on the amount of loss ($20,989.28) and the court’s refusal to grant an offense level reduction due to the claim that her fraud was committed “other than for profit," she was sentenced to five months. The Third Circuit affirmed. The benefits that McClure-Potts sought and received were “payment” for her harboring Samarin. View "United States v. McClure-Potts" on Justia Law

In 2001, Plaza-Ramirez entered the U.S. from Mexico without inspection or admission. In 2010, he was apprehended by Border Patrol agents. He sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, citing an attack he suffered in 1999 at a dance club in his hometown in Mexico. He was followed into the restroom by Los Negros gang members, who, mistakenly thinking he was affiliated with his cousin’s rival gang, beat him with a metal pipe. They subsequently threatened him repeatedly but did not attack him again. Afraid of retaliation, he never filed any police reports. Plaza-Ramirez argued that he was targeted because he is a member of a particular social group: his own family (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A)). The IJ denied relief. The asylum claim was untimely because Plaza-Ramirez did not apply until over a decade after his first year of entry, 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(2)(B). Plaza-Ramirez had failed to show that the 1999 attack occurred because of his family membership, and the attack did not rise to the level of persecution. The BIA affirmed, finding that Plaza-Ramirez failed to show sufficient persecution and failed to show any nexus between the 1999 attack and his membership in a particular social group. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, finding the denials supported by substantial evidence. View "Plaza-Ramirez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

A grant of regulatory employment authorization under 8 C.F.R. 274a.12(b)(20) does not confer lawful immigration status for purposes of establishing eligibility for status adjustment under 8 U.S.C. 1255(k)(2). The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision finding petitioner, the beneficiary of an H-1B visa, ineligible for status adjustment. In this case, petitioner's employer filed for an extension of his H-1B visa, but it was denied, and his employer failed to file an application for status adjustment within 180 days of the expiration of his H-1B visa. Although petitioner was legally authorized to work in the country during the months between the expiration of his H-1B visa and the denial of his application for an H-1B extension pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 274a.12(b)(20), the BIA correctly concluded that petitioner was ineligible for status of adjustment. View "Xiao Ma v. Sessions" on Justia Law