Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Igor Quinn-Goncalves, an undocumented native and citizen of Brazil, petitioned for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision that upheld an immigration judge's order for his removal from the United States. Quinn-Goncalves, who has been detained throughout the relevant period, acknowledged that his petition was filed late, arriving at the clerk's office three days after the deadline. His wife sent the petition via UPS on the last permissible day, following incorrect advice from the clerk's office that mailing by the deadline was sufficient.The BIA had previously denied Quinn-Goncalves's appeal of the immigration judge's removal order. The immigration judge had ordered his removal based on his undocumented status. Quinn-Goncalves then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, but his petition was not filed within the required 30-day period after the BIA's final order of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit dismissed the petition due to its untimeliness. The court emphasized that under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 25(a)(2)(A)(i), a petition for review must be received by the clerk within the statutory deadline to be considered timely. The court rejected Quinn-Goncalves's argument that mailing the petition within the deadline should suffice, distinguishing his case from the precedent set in Houston v. Lack, which applied a mailbox rule for pro se prisoners. The court concluded that it could not extend the filing deadline under Rule 26(b)(2) and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Goncalves v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Luis Guillermo Gonzalez-Juarez, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States in 1999. After the government initiated removal proceedings against him, Gonzalez conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal. He argued that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his two sons, who planned to accompany him to Mexico. Gonzalez relied primarily on country conditions reports about crime and violence in Mexico, and also cited his sons' lack of fluency in Spanish, their separation from their older sister, and financial concerns.The Immigration Judge (IJ) granted Gonzalez's application for cancellation of removal, finding that he had demonstrated the requisite hardship. However, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reversed the IJ's decision, concluding that Gonzalez had not established that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying relatives. The BIA was not persuaded that the general conditions of crime and violence in Mexico, which would apply to any qualifying relative, met the hardship standard. The BIA also rejected the argument that Gonzalez and his sons would be targeted for criminal violence due to their perceived wealth.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision. The court held that the substantial evidence standard of review applies to the hardship determination in cancellation of removal cases. The court found that substantial evidence supported the BIA's conclusions. The court noted that Gonzalez's other family members had lived in Mexico without harm and that a country conditions report that applies equally to a large proportion of removal cases does not compel the conclusion that the hardship standard is met. The court also rejected Gonzalez's argument that the BIA failed to consider the record evidence. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit denied Gonzalez's petition for review. View "GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI" on Justia Law

Suqin Xia, a citizen of China, has lived unlawfully in the United States for over thirty years. She applied for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident under 8 U.S.C. § 1255. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied her application, citing discretionary reasons. Xia then challenged the decision in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York under the Mandamus Act and the Administrative Procedure Act.The district court dismissed Xia's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, referencing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which bars judicial review of any judgment regarding an application made under § 1255. The court concluded that the denial of Xia's application was a "judgment" under this statute, thus precluding judicial review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the denial of an application for adjustment of status under § 1255 is a "judgment" for purposes of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), regardless of whether it is issued by an immigration court or USCIS. Consequently, the court held that there was no jurisdiction to review Xia's claims, affirming the district court's dismissal of her complaint. View "Xia v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The President invoked the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) to remove Venezuelan nationals identified as members of the Tren de Aragua (TdA), a designated foreign terrorist organization. Two detainees, along with a putative class of similarly situated detainees in the Northern District of Texas, sought injunctive relief against their summary removal under the AEA. The detainees were being held in U.S. detention facilities and were notified of their imminent removal.The District Court denied the detainees' motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) against their removal. The detainees then moved for an emergency TRO, which was not promptly addressed by the District Court. Consequently, they appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which dismissed their appeal for lack of jurisdiction and denied their motion for an injunction pending appeal, citing insufficient time given to the district court to act. The detainees also applied to the Supreme Court for a temporary injunction.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and found that the Fifth Circuit erred in dismissing the detainees' appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Court held that the District Court's inaction had the practical effect of refusing an injunction, given the extreme urgency and high risk of irreparable harm faced by the detainees. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Fifth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court emphasized that due process requires adequate notice and time for detainees to seek habeas relief before removal. The Government was enjoined from removing the detainees under the AEA pending further proceedings and disposition of the petition for a writ of certiorari. View "A.A.R.P. v. Trump" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of illegally reentering the United States, which under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) carries a maximum sentence that depends on the defendant’s criminal history. Without a prior felony, the maximum is two years; with a prior felony, it is ten years; and with an aggravated felony, it is twenty years. The defendant had two prior felony convictions, but neither was for an aggravated felony. However, the government and probation office mistakenly assumed one conviction was for an aggravated felony, suggesting a twenty-year maximum.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico sentenced the defendant, possibly under the mistaken belief that the statutory maximum was twenty years. The defendant did not object to this error at the time. On appeal, both parties agreed that the correct statutory maximum was ten years, not twenty. The defendant argued that this error should be presumed prejudicial, while the government contended that the defendant must show actual prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the government, stating that the defendant must show prejudice from the error. The court noted that other circuits have similarly required defendants to demonstrate prejudice in such situations. The court found no evidence that the district court’s error affected the defendant’s substantial rights, as the 42-month sentence was well below the correct ten-year maximum and at the bottom of the guideline range. The court concluded that the defendant did not show that the error had a substantial impact on his sentence and affirmed the 42-month sentence. View "United States v. Calderon-Padilla" on Justia Law

Zackaria Dahir Mohamed, a native of Somalia, entered the United States as a child refugee in 1998. He was later convicted of several offenses, including theft and assault with a dangerous weapon. In 2013, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him due to these convictions. An Immigration Judge (IJ) ordered his removal in 2018, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal. Mohamed then petitioned for review.The IJ initially found Mohamed removable for aggravated felony theft and crimes of violence. In 2020, the IJ ordered his removal to Somalia. Mohamed appealed to the BIA, which remanded the case to the IJ to assess Mohamed’s competency. On remand, Mohamed presented evidence of his mental health history, including a psychological evaluation by Dr. Jerry Kroll. The IJ ruled in 2021 that Mohamed was competent during the 2020 merits hearing, based on Dr. Kroll’s testimony and the IJ’s observations. The BIA dismissed Mohamed’s appeal on de novo review, leading to the current petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Mohamed argued that the BIA’s affirmation of the IJ’s competency finding was unsupported by the record. The court noted that it has jurisdiction to review final agency removal orders but not factual findings related to criminal offenses. The court found that Mohamed’s competency determination was a factual finding, which is generally affirmed unless clearly erroneous. Mohamed’s claims were barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).Even if Mohamed presented a legal or constitutional claim, the court found no fundamental procedural error or resulting prejudice. The IJ had considered all appropriate evidence, including Dr. Kroll’s testimony and Mohamed’s behavior during proceedings. The court concluded that there was no procedural error in holding a retroactive competency hearing. The petition for review was denied. View "Mohamed v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Erick Jose Sandoval Argueta, a Salvadoran national, was lawfully present in the United States when he solicited sex over the internet from someone he believed to be a thirteen-year-old girl, who was actually an undercover police officer. He was convicted in Texas of online solicitation of a minor. Based on this conviction, an immigration judge (IJ) ordered him removed for committing a "crime of child abuse." The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed this decision.Sandoval Argueta filed two petitions for review. In the first, he challenged the BIA's determination of his removability and its denial of his motion to reconsider. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that Sandoval Argueta had been convicted of multiple crimes, including property theft, drug trafficking, and online solicitation of a minor. The government initially charged him with removability based on the solicitation conviction but later added charges related to his drug trafficking conviction. After the drug trafficking conviction was vacated, the government reasserted the "crime of child abuse" charge.The Fifth Circuit held that the best reading of "crime of child abuse" under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) includes convictions for online solicitation of a minor, even if no actual child was involved. The court reasoned that the statute's broad language encompasses offenses that create a high risk of harm to a child, including attempt offenses. Therefore, Sandoval Argueta's conviction under Texas Penal Code § 33.021(c) categorically met the definition of a "crime of child abuse."In his second petition, Sandoval Argueta argued that the BIA erred by not considering his equitable tolling argument when denying his motion to reconsider. The Fifth Circuit found that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion, as it was procedurally barred by statutory limits on the number of motions to reconsider and the prohibition on reconsidering a decision on a prior motion to reconsider.The Fifth Circuit denied both petitions for review. View "Argueta v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Mohsen Mahdawi, a Lawful Permanent Resident and undergraduate student at Columbia University, was arrested during his naturalization interview in Vermont. He was detained and served with a Notice to Appear, indicating that the U.S. Secretary of State had determined he was removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Mahdawi filed a habeas petition, claiming his arrest and detention were in retaliation for his advocacy on the war in Gaza, violating his First and Fifth Amendment rights. The district court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) preventing his removal from Vermont and later granted his release on bail, finding he was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community.The United States District Court for the District of Vermont initially granted Mahdawi’s emergency motion for a TRO and later extended it. The court also granted his motion for release on bail pending the resolution of his habeas petition. The government sought an emergency stay of these orders, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Mahdawi’s habeas petition and the authority to order his release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and denied the government’s motion for a stay. The court found that the government was unlikely to succeed on its arguments that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Mahdawi’s habeas petition and the authority to order his release. The court also concluded that the government had not demonstrated irreparable injury and that the balance of equities tipped in favor of denying the stay. Consequently, the government’s motion for a stay and request for a writ of mandamus were both denied. View "Mahdawi v. Trump" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the Department of Defense's (DoD) authority to impose time-in-service requirements for expedited naturalization of noncitizen servicemembers under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Historically, the DoD certified noncitizens' honorable service for naturalization without a time-in-service requirement. However, in 2017, the DoD issued a policy requiring a minimum of 180 days of active-duty service or one year for reservists before certifying honorable service. In 2020, a group of noncitizen servicemembers challenged this policy under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding the policy arbitrary and capricious, contrary to law, and that the DoD's role in certifying honorable service was purely ministerial. The court vacated the time-in-service requirement and enjoined the DoD from withholding certification based on the policy. The DoD appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. During the appeal, the DoD rescinded the challenged policy and did not introduce a replacement. The court determined that the case was moot due to the rescission of the policy and dismissed the appeal. The court also vacated the district court's judgment, finding no indication that the DoD rescinded the policy to evade review and emphasizing the need to clear the path for future litigation on the issue. View "Samma v. DOD" on Justia Law

Erika Marie Plancarte pleaded guilty to conspiracy to transport an alien into the United States. The plea agreement required the government to recommend a 90-day imprisonment sentence. At the San Ysidro Port of Entry, Plancarte illegally transported a woman and her three children into the U.S., using false documents. She was arrested after admitting to the smuggling.The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California received a presentence report (PSR) that contained ambiguities about the relationship between the woman and the children. Plancarte requested a non-custodial sentence, while the government adhered to the plea agreement, recommending 90 days of custody. The government also clarified the PSR's ambiguities and highlighted Plancarte's criminal history and recidivism, arguing that previous sentences had not deterred her behavior. Plancarte argued that the government breached the plea agreement by including additional commentary and referencing her criminal history.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the government did not implicitly breach the plea agreement. The government’s references to Plancarte’s criminal history and its clarification of the PSR were permissible and did not undermine the plea agreement. The court found that the government’s comments were made in good faith and were consistent with advocating for the agreed-upon sentence. The court also noted that the government was not required to present mitigating evidence. Consequently, the appellate waiver in the plea agreement was enforced, and the appeal was dismissed. View "USA V. PLANCARTE" on Justia Law