Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

A class of noncitizens with final removal orders challenged new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policies issued in March and July 2025, which authorized their removal to “third countries”—countries neither designated in their removal orders nor identified in writing during prior proceedings. The plaintiffs alleged that DHS’s policy failed to provide effective notice or a meaningful opportunity to contest removal to these third countries based on reasonable fear of persecution or torture. The policies also relied on diplomatic assurances from receiving countries, sometimes removing individuals without further protective procedures.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts issued a temporary restraining order, granted class certification, and later a preliminary injunction requiring DHS to provide written notice and an opportunity for class members to assert fear-based claims before any third-country removal. After DHS appealed, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a stay pending appellate review. On remand, the district court dissolved the preliminary injunction and issued a final judgment, concluding that DHS’s guidance violated statutory requirements for sequencing removal destinations, and failed to provide notice and hearing for fear-based claims, including those under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court ordered declaratory relief and vacated the guidance as unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing on the “sequencing” claim and vacated the related declarations. However, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment that DHS must provide effective notice and a meaningful opportunity to contest removal to a third country based on fear-based claims, and upheld the vacatur of DHS guidance as unlawful under the APA. The court rejected DHS’s jurisdictional and remedy arguments, clarifying that declaratory and vacatur relief were permissible and not barred by statute. View "D.V.D. v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who entered the United States without inspection and was placed in removal proceedings after being detained by immigration authorities. While in custody, he was properly served with a Notice to Appear and provided the detention center address as his location. Shortly before his release, his relatives posted a bond and filled out a bond form with his residential address and telephone number, but not his mailing address. The relatives were unaware that the individual received mail via a P.O. Box and not at his residential address. After release, the government sent a hearing notice to the residential address listed on the bond form, but the notice was returned as undeliverable since mail could not be received at that address.An Immigration Judge ordered the individual removed in absentia after he failed to appear at the hearing, relying on the assumption that he had received written notice. The individual, who did not know about the hearing, promptly moved to reopen the proceedings, providing his correct mailing address and explaining, via sworn statements, that he had notified the court of his address for receiving notices and had lived at the same location since release. The Immigration Judge denied the motion to reopen, applying a presumption of delivery based on regular mail. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, concluding that the government had complied with statutory notice requirements by sending notice to the last known address and rejecting the argument that he was entitled to actual notice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the government violated the petitioner’s due process rights by relying solely on a residential address provided by third parties on a bond form, which was not reasonably calculated to provide notice. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the removal order, and remanded for further proceedings. The court dismissed a later petition for review as moot. View "MEDINA V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

A lawful permanent resident originally from the Philippines, Nemis, entered the United States on a temporary work visa and adjusted to permanent residency. In 2016, he was indicted in the Southern District of New York for conspiracy to commit immigration fraud, specifically by preparing and submitting fraudulent documents in support of H-1B visa applications. Nemis pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate paragraph four of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), which criminalizes knowingly making or presenting false statements, or presenting required immigration documents lacking any reasonable basis in law or fact.After Nemis traveled abroad in 2018 and sought reentry, the Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings, alleging he was removable due to his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) or conspiracy to commit such a crime. An immigration judge ordered his removal, finding his conduct constituted a CIMT. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed this decision. Nemis sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which initially remanded the case to the BIA for proper application of the categorical approach to determine whether Nemis’s conviction under paragraph four of § 1546(a) categorically constituted a CIMT. On remand, the BIA again dismissed Nemis’s appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed whether paragraph four of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) categorically describes a CIMT under the modified categorical approach. The court held that both knowingly making or presenting false statements and knowingly presenting required immigration documents lacking any reasonable basis in law or fact constitute CIMTs. Consequently, Nemis’s conviction rendered him removable. The Second Circuit denied Nemis’s petition for review, affirming the BIA’s determination. View "Nemis v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A group of more than 150 U-visa petitioners in the United States challenged the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) over delays and denials related to their pending U-visa petitions. Due to a statutory cap on U visas, these petitioners faced long waits. Some were placed on a waiting list (“WLD Plaintiffs”), while others received only a “bona fide determination” (“BFD Plaintiffs”). All had deferred action and work authorization but lacked advance parole, which would allow them to travel abroad and return. The plaintiffs argued that USCIS unlawfully withheld or delayed waiting list decisions (Claim 1), unlawfully withheld or delayed consideration for advance parole (Claim 2), and arbitrarily and capriciously denied advance parole to those on the waiting list (Claim 3).The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Claims 2 and 3 for all plaintiffs, finding that the APA does not permit courts to compel discretionary agency actions and that the plaintiffs did not plead or prove that they requested and were denied parole. The court allowed only Claim 1, brought by BFD Plaintiffs, to proceed, but later granted summary judgment to USCIS, holding that the BFD Plaintiffs lacked standing because being waitlisted would not independently entitle them to parole.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that granting parole to waitlisted U-visa petitioners is discretionary under 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d)(2), not mandatory. The panel affirmed dismissal of the WLD Plaintiffs’ claims for lack of statutory jurisdiction, as the APA does not permit courts to compel discretionary action and there was no final agency action on parole denials. The panel also affirmed the district court’s rejection of the BFD Plaintiffs’ parole-related injury theory for standing, but reversed and remanded for consideration of their alternative injury theories and, if necessary, the merits of Claim 1. View "U VISA APPELLANTS V. DIRECTOR, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES" on Justia Law

In this case, a non-citizen was apprehended by a United States Border Patrol agent near the U.S.-Mexico border and charged with misdemeanor attempted illegal entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1). During the bench trial before a magistrate judge, the defendant requested evidence regarding the government’s witnesses’ involvement in a Facebook group where Border Patrol agents had posted offensive content. The government at first denied any witness involvement but later disclosed that two witnesses were members of the group. The defendant renewed his request for additional discovery related to this issue, but the magistrate judge denied it. The trial proceeded, and the magistrate judge admitted immigration documents over hearsay objections to establish the defendant’s citizenship status. After testimony from three agents, the defendant was convicted and sentenced to time served.The defendant appealed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, arguing that the magistrate judge erred in denying discovery requests for Brady and Rule 16 material and improperly admitted hearsay evidence. The district court affirmed the conviction, finding any error in denying discovery requests harmless because Agent Copenhaver’s testimony and the removal documents sufficed to prove the offense. The district court also determined the removal documents were admissible under the public records exception to hearsay.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo for Brady issues and for abuse of discretion on discovery and evidentiary rulings. The court held that the magistrate judge abused her discretion by denying further discovery regarding the witnesses’ Facebook group activity, as the government was obligated to disclose such material under Brady and Rule 16. The court also found that the removal documents contained inadmissible hearsay and should not have been relied upon to prove alienage. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order, conditionally vacated the conviction, and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether undisclosed evidence might have affected the verdict. View "USA V. TOVAR-DURAN" on Justia Law

The case concerns a long-term resident of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) who applied to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for NM-1 immigration status, a special status created by the Northern Mariana Islands Long-Term Legal Residents Relief Act. This status was designed to regularize the position of certain residents after federal immigration law was applied to the CNMI, which had previously operated under its own immigration system. The applicant’s request for NM-1 status was denied by USCIS on the grounds that he did not meet the required period of continuous, lawful residence. His request for administrative reconsideration was also denied.The applicant then filed suit in the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, seeking a declaration that his application satisfied the statutory criteria and an injunction ordering USCIS to approve his application. The government moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the Relief Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provision—specifically, 48 U.S.C. § 1806(e)(6)(D)—barred judicial review of the denial. The district court agreed with the government and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the jurisdictional bar in the Relief Act precluded review of decisions made by USCIS as the Secretary of Homeland Security’s delegate. The court held that the statute’s bar on judicial review of any “decision of the Secretary of Homeland Security” covers decisions made by USCIS pursuant to delegated authority. The court reasoned that delegation is a routine administrative practice and that Congress legislated against the backdrop of such delegation. The court further noted that precedent interpreting similar jurisdiction-stripping provisions supported this conclusion. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "BARMAN V. USA" on Justia Law

Jose Miguel Pena de la Cruz, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, was indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts on charges related to money laundering. After being released from criminal custody on conditions set by a magistrate judge, he was taken into Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody. The government then informed the district court that Pena de la Cruz would soon be deported. In response, the district court, treating the government’s notice as a motion to dismiss, ordered that the indictment be dismissed with prejudice upon his deportation.Before reaching the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the district court had issued several orders regarding ICE custody and deportation of criminal defendants, including a standing order that generally barred ICE detention or removal until a criminal case concluded through dismissal with prejudice, acquittal, or judgment. The government opposed dismissal with prejudice, arguing that there was no bad faith or prosecutorial harassment, and that dismissal under Rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should ordinarily be without prejudice. Defense counsel initially moved for dismissal with prejudice but withdrew the motion as unripe, and the district court ultimately dismissed the indictment with prejudice after ICE notified it of the impending removal.The First Circuit vacated the district court’s order dismissing the indictment with prejudice, holding that the circumstances did not meet the high bar required for such a dismissal. The court clarified that dismissal with prejudice under Rule 48(a) is appropriate only in cases of prosecutorial bad faith, harassment, or when dismissal without prejudice would create a patent threat of unfairness to the defendant—none of which were present here. The First Circuit also vacated the district court’s standing order and its modification, remanding with instructions to dismiss the indictment without prejudice. View "US v. Pena de la Cruz" on Justia Law

Two individuals who had lived in the United States for many years after entering without inspection were detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement in October 2025. Both were apprehended while living and working in the Washington, D.C. area, and had established significant ties to the community. Removal proceedings were initiated against them on the basis that they had entered the country without authorization. Following their detention, neither was given an opportunity for a bond hearing, a process that, prior to July 2025, would have typically been available to noncitizens in their circumstances unless they posed certain risks or had committed specific crimes—none of which applied to these individuals.After the Department of Justice adopted a new interpretation of the relevant immigration statute in July 2025, mandating detention for all noncitizens who entered without inspection under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), the individuals filed habeas petitions in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. They argued that they were entitled to bond hearings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and that their continued detention violated due process. The district court agreed, granting habeas relief and ordering bond hearings under § 1226(a). During these hearings, immigration judges found neither individual posed a danger or flight risk, and both were released on bond. The government appealed, and the cases were consolidated.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of habeas relief de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that § 1226, not § 1225, governs the detention of noncitizens who have been present in the United States for years, regardless of their manner of entry. The court concluded that the statutory text, structure, history, and longstanding interpretation all supported this reading, and that detaining such individuals without bond hearings raised significant constitutional concerns. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of habeas relief, requiring bond hearings for the petitioners. View "Lopez Garcia v. Guadian" on Justia Law

The petitioners, a mother and her four children, are citizens of Mexico who fled their home in Ciudad Hidalgo, Michoacán, after receiving threatening phone calls from individuals claiming to be members of the Knights Templar cartel. The callers demanded ransom, threatened kidnapping, and demonstrated knowledge of the family's whereabouts and routine. After a second threat, the family fled to a farmhouse and soon after left Mexico for the United States. The mother also described an earlier incident where her sister’s husband was kidnapped by the cartel for ransom; other family members remained unharmed in Ciudad Hidalgo. The petitioners sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, citing cartel threats and government corruption.An Immigration Judge from the U.S. Department of Justice conducted a hearing, found the mother’s testimony credible, but denied relief. The judge concluded that the threats did not amount to past persecution, were motivated by extortion rather than protected grounds, and the Mexican government was not shown to be unable or unwilling to protect. The judge also determined that internal relocation within Mexico could avoid harm and that the risk of torture did not meet the threshold under the Convention Against Torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed and adopted the Immigration Judge’s decision.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit examined whether the petitioners had exhausted their administrative remedies before the Board. The court found that the petitioners, through counsel, failed to adequately develop arguments challenging key findings by the Immigration Judge, thus depriving the Board of the opportunity to address those points. As a result, the Seventh Circuit held that the petitioners had not exhausted their administrative remedies as required by statute and denied the petition for review. View "Gonzalez Perez v Blanche" on Justia Law

The case involves an individual, Perez, who entered the United States after completing compulsory military service in El Salvador, where he served as a radio operator in the Fourth Infantry Brigade and was occasionally loaned to the Atonal Battalion, an elite unit associated with severe human rights abuses. Perez and his wife sought immigration relief under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), claiming fear of persecution by guerrillas. During his application and subsequent proceedings, Perez’s testimony contained contradictions regarding his role and actions during his military service, including statements about firing his weapon, witnessing abuses, and his association with the Atonal Battalion. The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Perez not credible due to these inconsistencies and denied his NACARA application, citing his failure to rebut the persecutor bar, lack of credibility, and perjury.Perez appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the IJ’s adverse credibility finding. The BIA determined that Perez’s ties to the Atonal Battalion were sufficient to raise the persecutor bar under NACARA, shifting the burden to Perez to prove the bar did not apply. The BIA concluded Perez failed to rebut the bar due to his lack of credibility and held that even if Perez were credible, a duress defense was foreclosed by the Attorney General’s interpretation in Matter of Negusie.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the petition. The court determined that the persecutor bar does not contain an implied duress defense and that the statutory text excludes such an exception. The court accorded limited weight to the agency’s interpretation, finding the best reading of the statute is to deny a duress defense. The court denied Perez’s petition for review. View "PEREZ-CASTILLO V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law