Ramos-Braga's São Paulo neighborhood was controlled by a gang (PCC), which tried to recruit him and attacked him many times. Police did not help but beat him when he made reports. After a beating hospitalized him for two weeks, Ramos-Braga stopped attending college and spent months moving around. When he returned home, a PCC member shot him. Months later, Ramos-Braga was admitted to the U.S. on a student visa. He married a U.S. citizen, but Ramos-Braga estimated that his wife physically abused him over 100 times. Seven years after he arrived, Ramos-Braga was charged as removable, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B). He sought special-rule cancellation of removal for battered spouses and withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3) and the Conviction Against Torture. Meanwhile, Ramos-Braga and his wife got into a fight. He was convicted of battery and, after asking his wife not to testify, witness intimidation. DHS added a charge under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) for having been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. The BIA affirmed a removal order. During his appeal, his attorney ended the representation. Ramos-Braga continued pro se. After his petition was denied, Ramos-Braga, still pro se, moved the BIA to reopen proceedings. The motion was denied as untimely, but Ramos-Braga maintains he never received notice of this decision. Ramos-Braga filed a second pro se motion to reopen, which was denied as untimely and successive. The BIA rejected arguments that equitable tolling for ineffective assistance of counsel and changed conditions in the country of removal excused his noncompliance. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that neither exception applied. View "Ramos-Braga v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Appellant’s conviction for marriage fraud in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1325(c), which prohibits knowingly entering into a marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration laws, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Specifically, the Court held (1) the evidence presented in this case amply supported the district court’s conclusion that Defendant duped his wife into marrying him in order to avoid deportation; and (2) the trier of fact could reasonably have concluded that Defendant harbored no intent to establish a life with his wife and instead married her solely to avoid deportation. View "United States v. Akanni" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision upholding the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court held that petitioner's conviction for criminal sexual conduct in the third degree in violation of Minn. Stat. Sec. 609.344, subdiv.1(b) was an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The court explained that a person who has been convicted under the statute has necessarily committed sexual abuse of a minor under the Act and was both removable and ineligible for asylum. View "Garcia-Urbano v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted respondents' motion to dismiss this appeal as moot and vacated the prior published opinion. In this case, petitioner was removed from the United States and was no longer detained in immigration custody. Both sides agree that the appeal has become moot. View "Sopo v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

When a stay has been issued, an immigrant is not held pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1231(a) because he is not in the "removal period" contemplated by statute until his appeal is resolved by this court. The Second Circuit reversed the district court's determination that petitioner was detained under 8 U.S.C. 1231, holding that petitioner was detained under 8 U.S.C. 1226(c). In light of the uncertainty surrounding this area of detention after the Supreme Court's decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018), the court remanded to the district court for reconsideration of the habeas petition under the correct statutory provision. View "Hechavarria v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision determining petitioner's conviction of online solicitation of a minor was an aggravated felony that subjected him to removal. The court held that Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017), abrogated the court's previous definition of a minor in this context. Esquivel-Quintana established an age requirement that rendered petitioner's statute of conviction overbroad and did not qualify as sexual abuse of a minor for purposes of removability. Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the BIA and remanded for further proceedings. View "Shroff v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in an action arising from a property insurance policy that Lexington issued to LWL to insure construction equipment that LWL leased from Sierra. The court held that the equitable lien doctrine did not apply to Sierra, who was not a party to the insurance policy, and Sierra did not have standing to sue Lexington. In this case, the agreement between Sierra and LWL did not require that LWL obtain insurance with a loss payable clause to Sierra, and the Lexington policy did not contain such a clause. View "Sierra Equipment, Inc. v. Lexington Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and voluntary departure. The court held that the record contained sufficient facts to support the BIA's conclusion that petitioner's prior conviction under North Dakota law for unlawful entry into a vehicle was an aggravated felony attempted theft as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(U) and (G). View "Ahmed v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit withdrew its prior opinion in order to eliminate reference to United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc), given that decision's abrogation by the Supreme Court in Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018). The court upheld Senate Bill 4 (SB4), a Texas law that forbids "sanctuary city" policies throughout the state, and held that SB4's provisions, with one exception, did not violate the Constitution. The court held that none of SB4's provisions conflict with federal law where the assistance-cooperation, the status-inquiry, and the information-sharing provisions were not conflict preempted. The court affirmed the district court's injunction against enforcement of Section 752.053(a)(1) only as it prohibits elected officials from "endors[ing] a policy under which the entity or department prohibits or materially limits the enforcement of immigration laws." The court held that plaintiffs failed to establish that every seizure authorized by the ICE-detainer mandate violated the Fourth Amendment; the "materially limits" phrase had a clear core and was not void for vagueness; and plaintiffs' "commandeering" argument failed. Accordingly, the court vacated in large part the district court's preliminary injunction and remanded with instructions to dismiss the vacated provisions. View "City of El Cenizo v. Texas" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's holding that 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5) deprived the immigration court of jurisdiction to resolve petitioner's motion to reopen. 8 U.S.C. 1229a(b)(5) authorizes immigration judges to order non-citizens removed from the country in absentia. 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5) applies to non-citizens who (1) are ordered removed, (2) leave the United States while under the order of removal, and (3) reenter the country illegally. Determining that it had jurisdiction over the petition, the panel held that section 1231(a)(5) does not bar immigration judges from entertaining a motion to reopen an in absentia removal order under section 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). The panel also held that an individual placed in reinstatement proceedings under section 1231(a)(5) cannot as a general rule challenge the validity of the prior removal order in the reinstatement proceeding itself, she retains the right, conferred by section 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii), to seek rescission of a removal order entered in absentia, based on lack of notice, by filing a motion to reopen "at any time." Therefore, the panel remanded so that the agency could decide petitioner's motion to reopen on the merits. View "Miller v. Sessions" on Justia Law