Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

A noncitizen who arrived in the United States from Cambodia as a child and later became a lawful permanent resident was convicted in Rhode Island state court in 1996 of a controlled substance offense. This conviction led to deportation proceedings, and an immigration judge found him deportable in 1998. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal in 1999. Over twenty years later, the Rhode Island prosecutor dismissed his conviction in 2020, citing equitable reasons. The noncitizen then unsuccessfully filed his first motion to reopen his removal proceedings with the BIA, which denied it as untimely and found no substantive or procedural defect in the original conviction.Following this, the noncitizen obtained a consent order from the Rhode Island Superior Court in 2023, vacating his prior plea and sentence based on a violation of Rule 11 of the Rhode Island Rules of Criminal Procedure, which relates to due process in plea colloquies. In April 2024, he filed a second motion to reopen his removal proceedings with the BIA, this time invoking the BIA’s sua sponte authority. The BIA again denied reopening, treating the motion as statutory, finding it time and number barred, and concluding he failed to demonstrate due diligence or a defect in the conviction.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that the BIA committed legal error by mischaracterizing the second motion as statutory rather than sua sponte. The appellate court held that sua sponte motions are not subject to the same time and number limitations or equitable tolling standards as statutory motions. The court also found that the BIA erred by overlooking the Superior Court's order, which clearly indicated the conviction was vacated due to a procedural defect. The First Circuit granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kim v. Blanche" on Justia Law

After entering the United States in 2018 without inspection, Jaciel Cirrus Rojas, a Mexican national, was arrested by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2025. Initially, DHS detained him under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, and an immigration judge found he was neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk, ordering his release on bond pending removal. However, DHS changed its position based on new agency guidance, asserting that Rojas should instead be detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which mandates detention without bond for certain “applicants for admission.” Rojas sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.DHS appealed the bond order to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which adopted the agency’s new interpretation and reversed the immigration judge’s bond order. Rojas remained in custody as DHS stayed the bond order pending appeal. He then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The district court agreed with DHS’s interpretation and denied the habeas petition, concluding Rojas must be detained pending his removal proceedings. Rojas appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and first found that the appeal was not moot, as DHS had stated its intention to re-detain Rojas if the BIA reversed his bond release. The court then held that Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to “applicants for admission” who are also “seeking admission,” interpreting “seeking admission” according to its ordinary meaning. Because Rojas did not seek admission but applied for forms of relief that do not constitute admission, the court ruled he is not subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A). Instead, he falls under Section 1226 and is eligible for a bond hearing. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of habeas relief and remanded with instructions to grant the writ. View "Rojas v Olson" on Justia Law

A group of noncitizens who entered the United States without inspection and were apprehended within the country challenged a new federal immigration policy. Historically, such individuals, though removable, were eligible for release on bond while their removal proceedings were pending. This practice continued after the 1996 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), with unadmitted aliens in the interior detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which allows for bond. In 2025, the government changed course, issuing guidance that these individuals were now subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which does not permit bond. This policy shift resulted in many detained individuals filing habeas corpus petitions seeking bond hearings.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington certified a class of such detainees and granted summary judgment in their favor, holding they were not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The government appealed, arguing that, as “applicants for admission,” all such individuals were “seeking admission” and thus subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that, based on statutory text, context, and longstanding practice, § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to aliens seeking entry at the border, not to those apprehended in the interior. The court found that § 1226(a) governs detention for unadmitted aliens present in the interior, allowing for bond. The Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s new interpretation, noting it conflicted with prior practice, created statutory redundancies, and lacked clear congressional authorization for such a significant change. The court thus affirmed that these individuals remain eligible for bond hearings under § 1226(a). View "VAZQUEZ V. BOSTOCK" on Justia Law

A noncitizen from the Democratic Republic of the Congo was detained in New York pending removal proceedings and was ordered released on bond, which he could not pay. He then brought a class action and habeas petition on behalf of similarly situated noncitizens, challenging government bond-hearing procedures as violating due process. Specifically, he argued that the procedures wrongly placed the burden of proof on detainees, failed to consider ability to pay, and did not require consideration of alternatives to detention.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York initially certified the class and issued a preliminary injunction requiring changes to bond-hearing procedures, with the government complying for nearly two years. After the Supreme Court decided Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, which held that lower courts lack jurisdiction to issue class-wide injunctive relief under certain immigration statutes, the district court vacated the injunction. It then decertified the class entirely, concluding that neither class-wide injunctive nor declaratory relief was appropriate, and dismissed the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in decertifying the class for injunctive relief, as lower courts lack authority for such relief post-Aleman Gonzalez. However, it found that the district court erred by decertifying the class for declaratory relief based on factors irrelevant to the Rule 23(b)(2) class-certification analysis. The Second Circuit clarified that while injunctive relief is unavailable, district courts retain authority to grant class-wide declaratory relief in these cases. Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Onosamba-Ohindo v. Ball" on Justia Law

A native and citizen of Guatemala, the petitioner entered the United States in 2007 after fleeing an intrafamilial land dispute in which his great uncle, motivated by a conflict over inheritance and, to a lesser extent, political differences, threatened his family. In 2011, he was stopped by an Ohio police officer for littering. The officer suspected him of possessing false identification and obstructing official business, leading the Department of Homeland Security to initiate removal proceedings. The petitioner conceded removability but sought relief on several grounds, arguing that his stop was racially motivated, and that his removal would expose him to persecution or torture in Guatemala due to his membership in particular social groups or political opinions.An Immigration Judge denied the petitioner’s motion to suppress evidence, finding no constitutional or regulatory violations, and rejected his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The judge determined the asylum application was time-barred and, on the merits, found no nexus between the alleged harm and any protected ground. The judge also found insufficient evidence of likely torture upon return to Guatemala. The petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decisions and denied as untimely his later motion to terminate or remand the proceedings based on alleged defects in his notice to appear.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s final order. The court held that the denial of the motion to suppress was proper because the initial stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, and no egregious Fourth Amendment violation occurred. The court further held that the petitioner’s claims-processing challenge to the notice to appear was untimely, and substantial evidence supported the findings that there was no nexus for withholding of removal and no likelihood of torture for CAT relief. The petition for review was denied. View "Perez-Hernandez v. Blanche" on Justia Law

Two naturalized U.S. citizens, who previously obtained lawful status through the Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) program after state courts found parental abuse, neglect, or abandonment, sought to confer immigration benefits to their noncitizen mothers. Both mothers’ applications were denied by United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), invoking an exclusion clause in the SIJ statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(II), and an implementing regulation prohibiting parents of SIJ recipients from receiving immigration benefits based on parentage. The plaintiffs challenged both USCIS’s interpretation of the exclusion clause and the constitutionality of the clause, arguing it violated equal protection.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, ruled in favor of USCIS. The court held that the regulation was consistent with the plain text of the exclusion clause and rejected the equal protection claim, concluding that plaintiffs lacked a direct constitutional injury and, in the alternative, that the exclusion survived rational basis review. Plaintiffs appealed, maintaining their APA and equal protection challenges.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that the exclusion clause’s plain text establishes a permanent bar, preventing any parent of an SIJ recipient from receiving immigration benefits based solely on parentage, regardless of whether the parent was abusive or not. The court also held that USCIS’s regulation is consistent with the statute. On the equal protection claim, the Fourth Circuit found differential treatment but determined that the exclusion clause survives rational basis review, as it is rationally related to protecting children from harm. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Fuentes v. Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law

An Indian national entered the United States on a J-1 exchange visa for a postdoctoral fellowship at Georgetown University. He and his wife, a U.S. citizen of Palestinian descent, lived in Virginia and publicly opposed the war in Gaza. Following their social media activity and associations, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) detained him under a new program targeting foreign nationals thought to support designated terror groups based on online speech. After his arrest, he was quickly transferred between several detention facilities in Virginia, Louisiana, and Texas, often without notice to his family or counsel, and was held under allegedly punitive and harmful conditions.He filed a habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which was where he lived, was first detained, and initially held. The government moved to dismiss, arguing that the court lacked habeas jurisdiction because he was no longer detained in Virginia. The district court denied the motion, finding it had jurisdiction under the “unknown custodian” exception and the exception articulated in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in *Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, since the petitioner’s location and custodian were unknown due to government actions. The district court also declined to transfer venue and enjoined the government from removing the petitioner while his habeas case was pending, later ordering his release on bail.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s orders. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court had habeas jurisdiction under both the unknown custodian exception and the exception for government conduct thwarting access to the courts. The court further held that no provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, including 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g), 1252(b)(9), or 1252(a)(5), stripped the district court of jurisdiction over the habeas petition. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying transfer or by invoking the All Writs Act to preserve its jurisdiction. View "Suri v. Trump" on Justia Law

A lawful permanent resident from Mexico pleaded guilty in Oregon state court to two counts of felony fourth-degree assault for physically assaulting his wife in the immediate presence of their minor children. The events occurred in 2013, and the charges were brought under Oregon Revised Statutes § 163.160(1)(a), (3)(c), which enhances misdemeanor assault to a felony when committed in the presence of a minor child. He was sentenced to two years in prison, followed by probation.After his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security charged him with removability from the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), arguing his conviction constituted a “crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment.” An Immigration Judge found him removable on this ground, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed that decision. The individual then petitioned for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the Oregon statute was overbroad and indivisible, and thus not a categorical match to the federal offense.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that, although the Oregon statute covered conduct unrelated to children and was therefore overbroad, it was divisible into alternative elements. Applying the modified categorical approach, the court determined that the petitioner’s conviction was specifically for assault in the presence of his minor children. The court held that this offense matched the definition of a “crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment” under federal law, as interpreted in Leon-Briviesca v. Blanche, because committing assault in a child’s presence places the child at real risk of bodily or mental harm and requires at least criminal negligence. The Ninth Circuit therefore denied the petition for review. View "DIAZ-BOYZO V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

A native and citizen of Mexico applied for cancellation of removal, claiming that his removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his U.S.-citizen son and daughter, as well as his lawful permanent resident parents. At the time of the immigration judge’s decision, his son was 20 years old, just under the statutory age cutoff for qualifying as a “child” under the relevant immigration law. The applicant lived with his family, worked as an auto mechanic, and provided significant financial support. His mother had several health issues, but received assistance from her daughter.An Immigration Judge denied the application, finding that, although removal would cause emotional and financial hardship, it would not rise to the level required by statute. The judge noted that family members could visit the applicant in Mexico and maintain relationships, and that his mother would continue to have access to medical care. The applicant appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). While the appeal was pending, his son turned 21. The BIA determined it could no longer consider hardship to the son, since he had aged out, and affirmed the denial based on insufficient hardship to the other qualifying relatives.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the petition for review. The court held that under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D), qualifying relatives must be assessed at the time of the agency’s final adjudication, meaning a child who turns 21 during an appeal to the BIA ceases to be a qualifying relative. The court also concluded that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination that the petitioner failed to establish the required level of hardship to his remaining qualifying relatives, and denied the petition. View "TORRES-CASAS V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a lawful permanent resident originally from the West Bank, lived in Vermont and was pursuing graduate studies at Columbia University. Following his vocal participation in student demonstrations protesting military actions in Gaza, he was arrested at a USCIS facility in April 2025 by Homeland Security agents, who commenced removal proceedings against him. The Notice to Appear cited a determination by the Secretary of State that his presence or activities posed potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences, referencing his alleged rhetoric and conduct at protests. The government also presented prior allegations related to firearm purchases and drug possession, which the petitioner denied or had resolved.After his arrest, the petitioner’s attorney filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, alleging that the government targeted him for removal based on constitutionally protected speech. The petition sought to invalidate the Secretary of State’s determination, bar removal based on advocacy for Palestinian rights, and obtain his release. The district court granted his release pending review of the petition, finding a likelihood of success on the First Amendment claim and determining it had jurisdiction despite statutory provisions that restrict judicial review in immigration matters.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the appeal. Applying a de novo standard for subject matter jurisdiction, the court concluded that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) channels judicial review of questions arising from removal actions to the administrative process and ultimately to a petition for review of a final order of removal in the circuit courts. The court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the habeas petition because the petitioner’s claims were intertwined with the removal proceedings. The court vacated the district court’s release order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Mahdawi v. Trump" on Justia Law