Ortiz-Santiago, a Mexican citizen, has continuously resided in the U.S. without legal status since 1999. In 2015, he was arrested for driving without a license. He was served with a “Notice to Appear” for removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 1229(a), that did not include a time or date for Ortiz-Santiago’s hearing but referred to a date and time “to be set.” This omission violated 8 U.S.C. 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Shortly thereafter, the Immigration Court sent Ortiz-Santiago a “Notice of Hearing,” setting his hearing for November 12, 2015 at 10:30 a.m. In 2006, the Seventh Circuit expressly approved this two-step procedure. During proceedings before the Immigration Judge in August 2016, Ortiz-Santiago sought cancellation of removal. The IJ found that Ortiz-Santiago failed to show the requisite hardship to his stepfather or his own good moral character. While his appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided "Pereira," which held that a Notice that lacked the statutorily-required time-and-date information did not trigger the stop-time rule, which dictates the end-point of the non-citizen’s qualifying U.S. residence for certain immigration benefits. The Court stated that “[a] document that fails to include such information is not a ‘notice to appear under section 1229(a).” The BIA denied Ortiz-Santiago’s motion to remand and affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied his petition for review, rejecting an argument that the Notice was so defective that it did not establish the Immigration Court’s jurisdiction. The Notice was procedurally defective, but the omission is not “jurisdictional.” View "Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's pretermission of his application for cancellation of removal. The panel held that petitioner's continuous residency did not commence with his 1997 parole, but with his 2000 adjustment to LPR status. The panel held that petitioner has not shown that his 1997 parole constitutes an "admission in any status" as that term is used in 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(2); petitioner is not entitled to any relief because the administrative record does not include his 1997 parole document; and petitioner has not shown that the BIA erred in concluding that he had not challenged the IJ's denial of relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). At the parties' mutual request, the panel remanded petitioner's asylum application for the fact-finding necessary to determine the viability of petitioner's proposed social group. View "Alanniz v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit joined the BIA and a unanimous chorus of other circuits that have considered and rejected the argument that a notice to appear that, like petitioner's, does not contain the time and place of removal proceeding is not valid. The court rejected petitioner's claim that a court utilizing such a notice fails to obtain subject matter jurisdiction at its inception and so the entire proceedings and any subsequent removal order are invalid. Determining that it had jurisdiction over the petition for review, the court held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying petitioner's motion to reopen. The court explained that the BIA need not list every possible argument for and against its decision, and it need not write an exegesis on every contention. Furthermore, the BIA's opinion in this case makes clear that it heard and considered petitioner's arguments. Finally, the court rejected petitioner's due process and equal protection challenges. View "Ali v. Barr" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that the government's decision to rescind the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy (and its changes to policies governing the use of information provided by DACA applicants) violates the Fifth Amendment, as well as the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and common law principles of estoppel. The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that plaintiffs' challenges were subject to judicial review and that the government's decision to rescind DACA did not require notice and comment under the APA. However, the court held that the decision violated the APA because—on the administrative record before the court—it was not adequately explained and thus was arbitrary and capricious. The court also held that the district court erred in ordering the government to comply with its policies promulgated in 2012 on the use of information provided by DACA applicants and enjoining it from altering those policies. The court declined, under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, to decide whether plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment rights were violated. The court also declined to address plaintiffs' remaining arguments. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, dismissed in part, and remanded. View "Casa De Maryland v. DHS" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit held that the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) was not impermissibly retroactive as applied to petitioner, because no adjustment-application was pending at the time of the reinstatement order, and his previous adjustment application was denied due to his failure to prosecute. The court held that petitioner's contention that his entry was lawful because he was allegedly waved through at an entry checkpoint was foreclosed by precedent. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Terrazas-Hernandez v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's order dismissing petitioner's appeal of the denial of her motion to reopen. The court rejected petitioner's contention that she was entitled to reopen the in absentia removal order because she never received notice despite having satisfied her statutory obligation to provide an address to receive notice. The court held that 8 U.S.C. 1229(a)(1)(F)(i)—like its predecessor, 8 U.S.C. 1252b(a)(1)(F)(i)—requires an alien who is physically in the United States and subject to removal from the United States to provide a United States address to receive notice by mail. Applying this interpretation of section 1229(a)(1)(F)(i), the court held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the appeal and in rejecting the argument that a Guatemalan address was sufficient. Even assuming arguendo that an alien may satisfy her obligation to provide an address under section 1229(a)(1)(F)(i) by providing a foreign address, petitioner could not prevail because there was no realistic possibility that, absent the errors, the BIA would have reached another outcome than to dismiss the appeal. View "Luna-Garcia v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner's appeal of the IJ's determinations that petitioner was removable and ineligible for asylum. The IJ determined that petitioner's prior California felony conviction for possession of marijuana was an "aggravated felony" and an offense "relating to a controlled substance" that rendered her removable. However, petitioner argued that the conviction was no longer a predicate to removal because it was recalled and reclassified as a misdemeanor under California's Proposition 64. The panel held that valid state convictions retain their immigration consequences even when modified or expunged for reasons of state public policy. Therefore, the panel agreed with the BIA that petitioner's initial conviction retained its immigration consequences and rendered her removable. View "Prado v. Barr" on Justia Law

Villa, a citizen of Mexico, originally entered the U.S. in 1988 without inspection. He adjusted his status to that of a lawful permanent resident in 1995. Approximately nine years later, he was convicted of possession of cocaine and sentenced to a year in prison. In 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because he had been convicted of an aggravated felony. The Notice listed an address for the hearing “on a date to be set,” and “at a time to be set.” The Immigration Court later served on him a Notice of the date and time. He appeared; the immigration judge entered an order of removal. Villa waived his right to appeal and was removed to Mexico. He reentered the U.S. sometime in 2007, on foot at an unspecified location. In 2018, DHS served him with a Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate Prior Order of Removal, 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5), which stated that Villa could contest the determination that he was removable under the prior order by oral or written statement but that he was not entitled to a hearing. The Seventh Circuit dismissed his petition for review for lack of jurisdiction, rejecting an argument that the 2005 Order was void because it was entered ultra vires and that the 2005 proceedings were never properly initiated because the original “Notice” was legally deficient. View "Serrano v. Barr" on Justia Law

Lopez-Aguilar went to the Indianapolis Marion County Courthouse for a hearing on a misdemeanor complaint charging him with driving without a license. Officers of the Sheriff’s Department informed him that an ICE officer had come to the courthouse earlier that day looking for him. He alleges that Sergeant Davis took him into custody. Later that day, Lopez-Aguilar appeared in traffic court and resolved his misdemeanor charge with no sentence of incarceration. Sergeant Davis nevertheless took Lopez-Aguilar into custody. He was transferred to ICE the next day. Neither federal nor state authorities charged Lopez-Aguilar with a crime; he did not appear before a judicial officer. ICE subsequently released him on his own recognizance. An unspecified “immigration case” against Lopez-Aguilar was pending when he sued county officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Following discovery, the parties settled the case. The district court approved the Stipulated Judgment over the objection of the federal government and denied Indiana’s motion to intervene to appeal. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The state’s motion to intervene was timely and fulfilled the necessary conditions for intervention of right. The district court was without jurisdiction to enter prospective injunctive relief. The Stipulated Judgment interferes directly and substantially with the use of state police power to cooperate with the federal government in the enforcement of immigration laws. View "Lopez-Aguilar v. Indiana" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's order of removal based on petitioner's conviction for an aggravated felony. The court held that petitioner's conviction for conspiracy in the second degree to commit a felony -- murder in the second degree in this case -- under New York law was an aggravated felony. The court applied the categorical approach and held that second degree murder is clearly an aggravated felony within the federal definition. View "Santana-Felix v. Barr" on Justia Law