Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

A Jamaican national entered the United States on a tourist visa in 2004 and remained beyond his authorized stay. He was arrested by U.S. authorities in 2009 and charged as removable. Following his marriages to two U.S. citizens—both ending in divorce—he sought various forms of immigration relief, including adjustment of status and asylum. His immigration history was complicated by criminal convictions for making false statements and misrepresenting a Social Security number when applying for a U.S. passport, as well as allegations of marriage fraud. After several procedural delays and changes in representation, he eventually filed applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, claiming fear of gang violence in Jamaica due to his brother’s work as a police officer.The Immigration Judge in Boston, Massachusetts, denied all applications. The judge found the petitioner ineligible for adjustment of status due to his criminal convictions and lack of a valid waiver, and further determined that even if eligible, the relief would be denied as a matter of discretion. The judge also found the asylum application untimely, not excused by changed or extraordinary circumstances, and lacking merit. The judge made an adverse credibility finding against the petitioner and concluded that his proposed social group was not legally cognizable. The judge denied withholding of removal and CAT protection on similar grounds. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the judge’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of adjustment of status and the agency’s determination that the asylum application was untimely without excusing circumstances. The court dismissed the petition as to those claims. On the remaining claims, the court denied the petition, upholding the adverse credibility finding and the ruling that the proposed social group was not cognizable. View "Bromfield v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A citizen of El Salvador entered the United States illegally in 2015 and later applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). He settled near Baltimore, worked in construction, started a family, but encountered legal trouble, including a conviction for conspiracy to commit armed robbery. The government initiated removal proceedings, and he conceded removability. He argued that, due to his tattoos, criminal history, and a Salvadoran indictment linking him to gang activity, he would face torture in El Salvador, either from the government or gangs, and thus sought CAT relief.An Immigration Judge found the petitioner not credible, denied all forms of relief, and ordered removal. The judge concluded that the poor prison conditions in El Salvador did not amount to torture and found insufficient evidence that the petitioner would be singled out for torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision, and the petitioner challenged only the denial of CAT relief to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. While his petition was pending, the Third Circuit lifted a stay of removal, resulting in his deportation to El Salvador, where he was detained.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dismissed the petition as moot. The court held that, because the petitioner had already been removed and was incarcerated abroad, there was no longer any removal to defer, and thus no effectual relief could be provided. The court further concluded that the collateral consequences of removal, such as a bar on reentry, were not redressable by granting CAT relief, since CAT relief does not disturb the underlying removal order. The court also found that the government’s policy of facilitating returns did not apply to the petitioner’s circumstances. View "Mejia-Henriquez v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

Several cities, counties, and local agencies across the United States challenged new conditions imposed by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Department of Transportation (DOT) on federal grants they had already been awarded. These new conditions, added after the grants were awarded, required recipients to certify compliance with federal antidiscrimination laws for all their programs (not just those funded by the grants), acknowledge that such certifications are material for purposes of the False Claims Act, refrain from using grant funds to promote “gender ideology,” “elective abortions,” or “illegal immigration,” and verify the immigration status of individual grant recipients.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington considered the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The district court found that the new conditions went beyond merely enforcing existing legal requirements and exceeded the agencies' statutory authority. It enjoined the agencies from enforcing all of the challenged conditions, from withholding grant funds based on those conditions, from requiring certifications of compliance, and from refusing to process grant agreements because of the litigation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the agencies’ imposition of these grant conditions was lawful under the relevant statutes. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction in large part. The court held that: (1) the conditions requiring compliance with antidiscrimination laws are unlawful to the extent they apply to programs or activities not receiving federal funds, but are permissible as to federally funded programs; (2) the conditions making compliance certifications “material” for False Claims Act purposes are not authorized by statute; (3) the restrictions on the use of grant funds for promoting certain ideas or activities exceed statutory authority; and (4) the requirement to use a specific immigration verification system is unauthorized. The appellate court remanded with instructions to narrow the injunction to allow antidiscrimination conditions for federally funded programs, but otherwise affirmed the district court’s injunction. View "COUNTY OF KING V. TURNER" on Justia Law

A family of four, natives and citizens of Brazil, entered the United States without authorization in October 2021 and were subsequently charged with removability. Through counsel, they conceded removability and sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, claiming persecution by Brazilian military police due to their association with Cristiana’s brother, who was a gang leader and imprisoned. The alleged harm included threats, intimidation, and witnessing violence against family members at Cristiana’s mother’s house, but neither Cristiana nor her husband suffered direct physical harm or arrest. After the mother’s death, Cristiana feared she would be targeted as her brother’s only remaining family in Brazil.An Immigration Judge from the U.S. Department of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review denied their applications in December 2023, finding their testimony credible but insufficient to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ concluded that the harm experienced was indirect and limited, primarily occurring at the mother’s house, and could have been avoided by not visiting there. The IJ also found the applicants failed to show objective evidence of ongoing threats or that internal relocation within Brazil would be unreasonable. The IJ’s denial of relief was affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which also dismissed arguments based on the asylum grant to Cristiana’s sister, Poliana, distinguishing her circumstances as involving direct physical harm.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions under the substantial evidence standard. The court held that the applicants did not demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, nor did they show they were similarly situated to Poliana. The petitions for review were denied, and the disposition affirmed the decisions of the BIA and IJ. View "Pereira Alves v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A woman who immigrated to the United States as a child and later became a lawful permanent resident was convicted in North Carolina state court of two counts of common-law forgery and, in a separate proceeding, possession of marijuana. Years after serving her sentences, she was placed in removal proceedings when reentering the U.S. after a trip to Mexico. She conceded that her convictions made her inadmissible but sought a discretionary waiver that could allow her to remain in the country. While her removal case was pending, she successfully moved in state court to have her marijuana conviction vacated and the charge dismissed.The Immigration Judge denied her application for a waiver, concluding, among other things, that she could not show her marijuana offense involved 30 grams or less, did not prove extreme hardship, and was not entitled to relief as a matter of discretion. The judge did, however, grant her voluntary departure. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) independently determined that, under its established framework from Matter of Pickering, a conviction vacated for reasons other than substantive or procedural defect—such as to avoid immigration consequences—still counts for immigration purposes. The BIA found her vacated conviction still disqualified her from a waiver and denied her motion to remand for further proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision de novo. The court held that, under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i), a person whose state conviction has been vacated and the charge dismissed is not an “alien convicted of” that offense for immigration purposes. The court rejected the BIA’s Pickering framework as inconsistent with the statute. The petition for review was granted in part regarding the vacated conviction but denied as to the challenge to voluntary departure regulations, which the court found reasonable. View "Piedra v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A lawful permanent resident originally from Trinidad and Tobago was convicted in a Florida state court of robbery by sudden snatching, along with several drug offenses. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, charging him as removable for committing an aggravated felony, specifically a theft offense for which the term of imprisonment was at least one year. The individual sought cancellation of removal but was found removable by an Immigration Judge (IJ) based on his convictions. The IJ also held that his robbery by sudden snatching conviction qualified as an aggravated felony theft offense, rendering him ineligible for cancellation of removal.The individual appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing that the Florida statute was broader than the generic federal definition of theft because it permitted conviction for temporary takings and for depriving a non-owner victim, and did not require proof of nonconsent. The BIA dismissed his appeal, agreeing with the IJ that the Florida offense matched the generic definition of theft under federal law.He then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit for review, raising new arguments about the breadth of the Florida statute. After the case was initially remanded to the BIA for further consideration, the BIA reaffirmed its decision and again dismissed the appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision de novo and held that Florida robbery by sudden snatching is not broader than the generic definition of theft for aggravated felony purposes under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The court concluded that the statute’s intent and consent elements, as interpreted by Florida courts and reflected in jury instructions, were consistent with generic theft, and that the statute did not criminalize a broader range of conduct. The court denied the petition for review. View "Ramdial v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

A native of Hong Kong and citizen of China, the petitioner was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1979. He was later convicted in federal court of conspiracy to import heroin, but received a waiver of deportation. Subsequently, he pleaded guilty in New Jersey Superior Court to theft by deception, a disorderly persons offense, and was fined $200. He also pleaded guilty in New York Supreme Court to forgery in the second degree, receiving probation and a fine. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, asserting that he was removable for having been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude not arising from a single scheme.An Immigration Judge denied his motion to terminate proceedings, finding both state offenses constituted crimes involving moral turpitude and that the New Jersey theft by deception offense qualified as a “conviction” under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed, and after various remands to address specific issues—including whether the New York offense categorically qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude—the BIA again dismissed his appeal. The petitioner sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which initially denied relief by deferring to the BIA’s interpretation under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. The Supreme Court then vacated that judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which held courts must independently interpret statutes without deferring to agency interpretations.On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a “conviction” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) requires a formal judgment of guilt resulting from a criminal proceeding with minimum constitutional protections and culminating in a criminal sentence. Applying this standard, the court found the petitioner’s New Jersey offense met these criteria and denied his petition for review. View "Wong v. Blanche" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge brought by several houses of worship from Quaker, Sikh, and Cooperative Baptist Fellowship religious traditions to a new policy adopted by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in January 2025. This policy rescinded longstanding guidelines that limited immigration enforcement actions at or near houses of worship, replacing them with a directive that left the decision to conduct enforcement actions largely to the discretion of immigration officers without specific guidelines or required supervisory approval. The plaintiffs alleged that the new policy has already caused, and will continue to cause, a decline in attendance at their worship services and ministries, thereby impeding their ability to exercise their religion communally and to minister to immigrant communities.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, ordering DHS to follow its prior 2021 guidelines that limited immigration enforcement at or near the plaintiffs’ houses of worship. The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing and were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and that they would suffer irreparable harm without interim relief.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had met the requirements for standing, including injury-in-fact, traceability, and redressability, based on evidence of actual and likely future declines in attendance linked to the new policy. The court further concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their RFRA claim, as the new policy substantially burdened their religious exercise. The government’s arguments under strict scrutiny were found to be waived, as they were not properly raised below. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction. View "Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

A Canadian couple moved to Massachusetts with their two young children after both were granted E-2 non-immigrant visas to work at a family business expanding into the United States. Their move was described as a trial, intended to assess whether they liked living in the U.S. and to help launch the business. They left most possessions in Canada and maintained financial and familial ties there. After selling their Canadian home, they bought a condominium in Massachusetts. Over time, the spouses developed differing intentions about making the United States their permanent home. The father struggled to adapt to life in Massachusetts and expressed his desire to return to Canada, while the mother wished to stay. In August 2024, after the father traveled to Canada, the mother withdrew funds from joint accounts, changed the locks on the home, and refused to let the children visit their father in Canada.Subsequently, the mother filed for divorce in Massachusetts, and the father counterclaimed for custody and removal of the children to Canada. Temporary custody arrangements were made. The father then filed applications under the Hague Convention in both Canada and the United States, alleging wrongful retention of the children. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held a hearing and concluded that the mother’s actions amounted to wrongful retention under the Hague Convention, finding that the children’s “habitual residence” remained Canada. The court ordered the children returned to Canada.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision, applying clear error review to the findings of fact. The court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly identified Canada as the children’s habitual residence as of the date of wrongful retention. The court also rejected the mother’s defenses of “now-settled,” consent, and acquiescence, finding no clear error in the district court’s determinations. The judgment ordering the return of the children to Canada was affirmed. View "Giguere v. Tardif" on Justia Law

A lawful permanent resident from Haiti was admitted to the United States in 2016. He later pleaded guilty to smuggling goods, specifically exporting fifty firearms to Haiti without the required license, in violation of federal law. These firearms were concealed in vehicles shipped from Colorado to Florida, and then sent to Haiti. Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, charging him as removable for engaging in activity to violate U.S. laws prohibiting the export of goods.An Immigration Judge with the U.S. Department of Justice sustained the charges of removability and denied his request for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The judge found his testimony lacking in candor and determined that he failed to demonstrate it was more likely than not he would be tortured if removed to Haiti. The judge noted that threats against him were speculative, not linked to government action or acquiescence, and that his relatives in Haiti remained safe. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision, rejected his argument that the removal provision should apply only to explicit national security threats, and concluded that his conviction for illegal exportation satisfied the statutory grounds for removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court denied the petition for review, holding that the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(A)(i) covers any activity to violate laws prohibiting the export of goods, not just acts involving national security threats. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the denial of CAT deferral, as the petitioner failed to show a particularized risk of torture or government acquiescence, and that no due process violation had occurred. View "Olibris v. Blanche" on Justia Law