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Petitioner challenged the Board's determination that he was subject to removal as an alien who has been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMT) pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), and that he was ineligible for a waiver of removal under former INA 212(c). The Fourth Circuit held that petitioner's 1995 conviction for unlawful possession of marijuana with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell constitutes a conviction of both an aggravated felony and a CIMT. Therefore, the court did not have jurisdiction to review petitioner's challenges to the BIA's decision, except to the extent they raised constitutional or legal issues. The court also held that petitioner was ineligible for relief under former INA 212(c) because his convictions in 2000 for felony larceny and felony breaking and entering constitute convictions of CIMTs that were not waivable under section 212(c), which was repealed in 1996. Furthermore, petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal under INA 240A(a) because such relief was not available to any alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony. Accordingly, the court dismissed petition number 17-1833, and dismissed in part and denied in part petition number 16-2434. View "Guevara-Solorzano v. Sessions" on Justia Law

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At issue was whether the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) erred in concluding that Petitioner had not suffered past persecution nor had a well-founded fear of future persecution if he returned to Ecuador on account of his indigenous Quiche ethnicity. The First Circuit vacated the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the immigration judge’s (IJ) decision denying Petitioner’s asylum application. The Court held (1) Petitioner’s case should be analyzed in light of the fact that he was a minor during the time he suffered abuse, harm, and mistreatment in Ecuador; (2) the IJ and BIA erred as a matter of law in failing to apply the child-specific standard for asylum claims; and (3) the case must be remanded for a finding of whether what Petitioner suffered in Ecuador, viewed from a child’s perspective, amounted to severe mistreatment and, if so, whether the the abuse amounted to government inaction, a requisite for a finding of past persecution. View "Santos-Guaman v. Sessions" on Justia Law

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The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for unlawful procurement of naturalization because he concealed from immigration authorities his past as a guard at a Serbian prison camp. The court held that the district court did not err when it prevented defendant from presenting hearsay statements of foreign witnesses who were unavailable to testify at trial; defendant failed to demonstrate that his constitutional right to present a complete defense was violated under Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); assuming arguendo that the Geneva Convention could be judicially noticed, the district court did not err in determining that its probative value was substantially outweighed by the possibility of confusing the issues and potentially misleading the jury; and the district court did not violate defendant's rights under Chambers when it declined to take judicial notice. View "United States v. Mitrovic" on Justia Law

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Ramos-Braga's São Paulo neighborhood was controlled by a gang (PCC), which tried to recruit him and attacked him many times. Police did not help but beat him when he made reports. After a beating hospitalized him for two weeks, Ramos-Braga stopped attending college and spent months moving around. When he returned home, a PCC member shot him. Months later, Ramos-Braga was admitted to the U.S. on a student visa. He married a U.S. citizen, but Ramos-Braga estimated that his wife physically abused him over 100 times. Seven years after he arrived, Ramos-Braga was charged as removable, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B). He sought special-rule cancellation of removal for battered spouses and withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3) and the Conviction Against Torture. Meanwhile, Ramos-Braga and his wife got into a fight. He was convicted of battery and, after asking his wife not to testify, witness intimidation. DHS added a charge under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) for having been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. The BIA affirmed a removal order. During his appeal, his attorney ended the representation. Ramos-Braga continued pro se. After his petition was denied, Ramos-Braga, still pro se, moved the BIA to reopen proceedings. The motion was denied as untimely, but Ramos-Braga maintains he never received notice of this decision. Ramos-Braga filed a second pro se motion to reopen, which was denied as untimely and successive. The BIA rejected arguments that equitable tolling for ineffective assistance of counsel and changed conditions in the country of removal excused his noncompliance. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that neither exception applied. View "Ramos-Braga v. Sessions" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed Appellant’s conviction for marriage fraud in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1325(c), which prohibits knowingly entering into a marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration laws, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Specifically, the Court held (1) the evidence presented in this case amply supported the district court’s conclusion that Defendant duped his wife into marrying him in order to avoid deportation; and (2) the trier of fact could reasonably have concluded that Defendant harbored no intent to establish a life with his wife and instead married her solely to avoid deportation. View "United States v. Akanni" on Justia Law

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The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision upholding the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court held that petitioner's conviction for criminal sexual conduct in the third degree in violation of Minn. Stat. Sec. 609.344, subdiv.1(b) was an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The court explained that a person who has been convicted under the statute has necessarily committed sexual abuse of a minor under the Act and was both removable and ineligible for asylum. View "Garcia-Urbano v. Sessions" on Justia Law

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The Eleventh Circuit granted respondents' motion to dismiss this appeal as moot and vacated the prior published opinion. In this case, petitioner was removed from the United States and was no longer detained in immigration custody. Both sides agree that the appeal has become moot. View "Sopo v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

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When a stay has been issued, an immigrant is not held pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1231(a) because he is not in the "removal period" contemplated by statute until his appeal is resolved by this court. The Second Circuit reversed the district court's determination that petitioner was detained under 8 U.S.C. 1231, holding that petitioner was detained under 8 U.S.C. 1226(c). In light of the uncertainty surrounding this area of detention after the Supreme Court's decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018), the court remanded to the district court for reconsideration of the habeas petition under the correct statutory provision. View "Hechavarria v. Sessions" on Justia Law

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The Fifth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision determining petitioner's conviction of online solicitation of a minor was an aggravated felony that subjected him to removal. The court held that Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017), abrogated the court's previous definition of a minor in this context. Esquivel-Quintana established an age requirement that rendered petitioner's statute of conviction overbroad and did not qualify as sexual abuse of a minor for purposes of removability. Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the BIA and remanded for further proceedings. View "Shroff v. Sessions" on Justia Law

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The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in an action arising from a property insurance policy that Lexington issued to LWL to insure construction equipment that LWL leased from Sierra. The court held that the equitable lien doctrine did not apply to Sierra, who was not a party to the insurance policy, and Sierra did not have standing to sue Lexington. In this case, the agreement between Sierra and LWL did not require that LWL obtain insurance with a loss payable clause to Sierra, and the Lexington policy did not contain such a clause. View "Sierra Equipment, Inc. v. Lexington Insurance Co." on Justia Law