Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Respondents appealed the district court's grant of petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and order that petitioner be granted an individual bond hearing before an immigration judge. The district court found that petitioner's detention was governed by 8 U.S.C. 1226(a) and he was, therefore, entitled to a bond hearing. The court agreed, concluding that the language and structure of the statutes dictate the conclusion that petitioner’s detention during the pendency of his withholding‐only proceedings is detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1226(a). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Guerra v. Shanahan" on Justia Law

AILA submitted Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq., requests for disclosure of records related to complaints about the conduct of immigration judges. The government disclosed thousands of pages of records, but redacted information in those records that it believes is either statutorily exempt from disclosure or non-responsive to the request. The district court upheld both categories of redactions. The court concluded that the government's across-the-board approach of redacting the immigration judges’ names from all of the disclosed records cannot be sustained in light of the variety of privacy and public interests that may be at stake in connection with the disclosure of an immigration judge’s name. Therefore, the court remanded for a more individualized inquiry into the propriety of redacting judges’ names. In this case, the government, after determining that records were responsive to AILA’s request, redacted discrete information within the records on the basis of non-responsiveness even if no statutory exemption shielded the information from disclosure. The court concluded that such an approach cannot be squared with the statutory scheme. Finally, the court agreed with the district court that complaint resolutions fall outside the statute’s affirmative disclosure mandate. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "American Immigration Lawyers v. Exec. Office for Immigration" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, seeks review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's denial of petitioner's motion to reopen his removal proceedings. The court concluded that the BIA abused its discretion by ignoring petitioner's equitable tolling argument and the court declined to determine whether the deadline should be equitably tolled in the instant case. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded with instructions for the BIA to apply the same equitable tolling standard that this court uses in other contexts. Under this standard, “a litigant is entitled to equitable tolling of a statute of limitations only if the litigant establishes two elements: ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.’” View "Lugo-Resendez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

After petitioner, a lawful permanent resident, was convicted of one count of trafficking in counterfeit goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2320(a), USCIS denied petitioner her application for naturalization. USCIS concluded that petitioner had been convicted of an offense involving fraud or deceit with a loss to the victim of over $10,000, an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). The court held that a conviction under section 2320 does not necessarily involve fraud or deceit because a defendant can be convicted of trafficking in counterfeit goods for conduct that is merely likely to cause “mistake” or “confusion.” Therefore, petitioner's conviction was not an aggravated felony under section 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Lifeng Wang v. Rodriquez" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Guatemala, seeks review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The BIA found that the IJ did not clearly err in its findings of fact and provided cogent reasons for the IJ’s credibility determination. Even in light of petitioner's plausible explanations, based on the specific, cogent reasons identified by the IJ, the court concluded that a reasonable adjudicator could reach the same credibility determination as the IJ and BIA. Because petitioner provided the same evidence to support all three claims, and the evidence was insufficient to meet even the burden of proof required for asylum, her remaining claims also fail. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Arevalo-Cortez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Guatemalan national, entered the United States and was placed in removal proceedings. Petitioner cross-applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming both past persecution and fear of future persecution due to his anti-gang political opinion and his membership in a particular social group. An immigration judge denied relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for judicial review, holding that there was no error in the BIA’s determinations and that the BIA's determinations were supported by substantial evidence in the record. View "Alvizures-Gomes v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 1994, Govindbhai Patel, a citizen of India, sought asylum and employment authorization, stating that he arrived in New York as a visitor in 1993. His wife, Vidhyaben, also applied, asserting that she arrived as a visitor in 1994. Both denied traveling through another country before entering the U.S. An immigrant petition for an alien worker was approved for Govindbhai in 2004. He applied for adjustment of status, reiterating that he entered as a visitor. Vidhyaben and their children filed derivative applications, indicating that they entered without inspection. In 2005, Govindbhai stated under oath that he entered, through New York, with a visa . In subsequent interviews, Govindbhai stated under oath that he entered by crossing the border from Mexico with a smuggler and that his family members also used smugglers. In 2008, USCIS denied the applications. DHS initiated removal and charged Govindbhai with seeking to procure an immigration benefit by fraud or by willfully misrepresenting a material fact. Seeking adjustment under 8 U.S.C. 1255, all four Patels testified that they were smuggled into the U.S.: two from Mexico, and two from Canada. The IJ ordered their removal. The BIA dismissed an appeal. The Sixth Circuit rejected an appeal. Govindbhai bore the burden to prove that he satisfied the requirements for adjustment of status. His concession of removability was not sufficient to prove that he satisfies the 8 U.S.C. 1255 requirement of having entered the country without inspection. View "Patel v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty in 2011 to aiding and abetting marriage fraud, 18 U.S.C.1546(a), and was sentenced to three years in prison. Marriage fraud is an aggravated felony if the defendant is sentenced to at least 12 months in prison, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(P); a noncitizen convicted of an aggravated felony is deportable, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and ineligible for cancellation of removal, asylum, or naturalization. The defendant unsuccessfully sought to withdraw his plea, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because he was not warned that pleading guilty would be virtually certain to result in his deportation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the motion, noting that one of the defense attorneys, an immigration specialist, had explained a possible, but barely viable, defense to the deportation that would inevitably follow his conviction, so the defendant had “full knowledge of the great risk that he faced of deportation,” and “actively strategized with his attorneys.” The court noted that the defendant, currently a fugitive, avoided conviction for mortgage fraud by pleading guilty to marriage fraud. He would have been likely to receive a longer prison sentence if convicted after a trial. View "United States v. Chezan" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen and national of Mexico, seeks review of DHS's orders reinstating a removal order and denying petitioner's motion to reopen the reinstatement order. The court found that substantial evidence supports DHS's decision to reinstate petitioner's prior removal order. In this case, petitioner was presented with the Form I-871 stating that he was an alien subject to removal, but he still did not claim compliance or submit any evidence of compliance during the reinstatement proceeding. Instead, he chose not to make a statement. The court also concluded that petitioner failed to establish the prejudice required to establish a due process violation with regard to the reinstatement proceedings, and the court rejected petitioner's argument that DHS’s procedure in deciding to reinstate a removal order rather than issue a notice to appear to petitioner was arbitrary and capricious. Finally, the court concluded that DHS did not erroneously deny petitioner's motion to reopen the reinstatement where he failed to provide sufficient evidence establishing that he complied with his grant of voluntary departure. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Perez-Garcia v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks review of the BIA's order dismissing his appeal of the IJ's order of removal. At issue is whether petitioner became a lawful permanent resident in 2000, when the INS officer signed the I-89 Form certifying that he was eligible for a permanent resident card, or in 2004, when USCIS formally approved his application and actually issued the card. The court agreed with the BIA that petitioner became a permanent resident in 2004, after his eighteenth birthday, when USCIS formally approved his application pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1255(b). Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to citizenship under the Child Citizenship Act of 2009 (CCA), 8 U.S.C. 1431. In the alternative, the court concluded that, pursuant to Robertson-Dewar v. Holder, there is no evidence that the United States purposefully delayed ruling on petitioner's application with the intent of not acting therein until he had aged out of the statute, so there is no evidence of affirmative misconduct. Therefore, the court rejected petitioner's equitable estoppel argument. The court denied the petition. View "Gutierrez v. Lynch" on Justia Law