Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Ethiopia, seeks review of the BIA's decision upholding the IJ's denial of his application for asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1158 and 1231(b)(3). Petitioner testified that he had been tortured by the Ethiopian government because it suspected he and his family members supported a terrorist organization called the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). The court concluded that the IJ and the BIA failed to consider several factors essential to determining whether one central reason for the Ethiopian government’s maltreatment of petitioner was persecution on account of a protected ground. Accordingly, the court remanded for consideration. View "Sealed Petitioner v. Sealed Respondent" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mongolia, seeks review of the BIA's decision to deny his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner asserts that his whistleblowing activities constituted a political opinion for which he was persecuted with either the consent or acquiescence of government actors. The court adopted the analytical framework of Matter of N–M– for the purpose of identifying whether an applicant has established the required factual nexus between any purported political whistleblowing and actual persecution. Under this framework, the court concluded that substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that petitioner failed to present evidence that his purported persecutors were motivated by his anticorruption beliefs, or that the corruption was even connected to government actors. In this case, petitioner failed to establish that his whistleblowing amounted to political opinion as a protected ground, or that he was persecuted by or at the acquiescence of government officials. In regard to CAT relief, the court agreed with the Board that it was unlikely that petitioner would face torture at the hands of the government if returned to Mongolia. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Lkhagvasuren v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner was deported to El Salvador following a misdemeanor firearms conviction. Petitioner subsequently reentered the United States without inspection and then filed a motion to reopen, his second, on the ground that his original lawyer did not properly advise him how to adjust his status after he married a United States citizen. After the Supreme Court announced a change in law that placed in question the legality of the original deportation, petitioner supplemented his motion to reopen. The court concluded that petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling and denied review as to the adjustment of status issue; the court agreed with every circuit that has squarely addressed the issue, and held that it has authority to review refusals to reopen sua sponte to the limited degree that the refusal was based on legal error; and, because the court concluded that the Board’s decision in this case was based on a legally erroneous premise, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the Board’s denial, and remanded to the Board to exercise its broad discretionary authority as to sua sponte reopening against the correct legal backdrop. View "Bonilla v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner conceded removeability, but cancellation as a nonpermanent resident under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1). At issue is whether petitioner's conviction for a prior Texas misdemeanor assault qualifies as a "crime of moral turpitude" that makes him ineligible for cancellation. The Supreme Court held in Mathis v. United States that, under the modified categorical approach, a court may look to certain documents, including the indictment and the judgment, to narrow an offense that otherwise would not be a categorical match with an enumerated offense. With Mathis holding that a statute like Texas’s assault offense that merely offers alternative means of committing an offense does not allow application of the modified categorical approach, the court is back to the general categorical inquiry about which the parties, the immigration judge, and the Board agree. Texas’s assault statute can be committed by mere reckless conduct and thus does not qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude, which requires a more culpable mental state. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded for reconsideration. View "Gomez-Perez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an ethnic Hutu and a native and citizen of Rwanda, seeks review of the BIA's denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the agency’s ultimate conclusion that petitioner assisted or participated in the Rwandan genocide. Consequently, the agency correctly determined that petitioner is barred from receiving asylum or withholding of removal. Furthermore, substantial evidence supports the denial of petitioner's request for CAT protection where the record amply supports the agency’s finding that petitioner is likely to be held in civilian prison and tried in civilian courts. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Munyakazi v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 2010, Respondent, a citizen of Ecuador, pled not guilty on an agreed statement of facts and was found guilty of second-degree child abuse. In 2013, Respondent filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to advise him regarding the immigration consequences he could face as a result of conviction. The coram nobis court denied the petition. The Court of Special Appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that Respondent established that trial counsel did not provide him with the correct “available advice” about the risk of deportation. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that trial counsel did not perform in a constitutionally deficient manner in advising Respondent as to the immigration consequences of a conviction for second-degree child abuse. View "State v. Sanmartin Prado" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Barbados, and lawful permanent resident of the United States, seeks review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for cancellation of removal. Petitioner was found deportable under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) on the basis of a prior conviction in 1997 under Title 35 of the Pennsylvania Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act 780‐113(a)(30) (1997), which was determined to be a conviction that related to a federal controlled substance. The court concluded that, because a conviction under 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. 780‐113(a)(30) is categorically a conviction under a law relating to a federal controlled substance under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), the court lacked jurisdiction to review the removability order. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review. View "Collymore v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 1984, during the crackdown on the Solidarity movement in Poland, Koszelnik traveled to the U.S. on a nonimmigrant tourist visa, then applied for political asylum. He was assigned an “A-number.” Koszelnik’s asylum application was denied and deportation proceedings were initiated. An IJ denied his application for relief from deportation and granted him voluntary departure. Koszelnik remained in the U.S. The voluntary departure order became a final deportation order. After residing in the U.S. for approximately 10 years, Koszelnik applied for a diversity visa through the lottery program. Koszelnik failed to include his A-number on his application and incorrectly answered questions about deportation proceedings. Unaware of the prior deportation proceedings, the INS issued Koszelnik a new A-number and, in 1995, granted him permanent resident status. Under 8 U.S.C. 1256(a), despite the error, the statute of limitations for re-examining that status adjustment lapsed after five years, in 2000.. In 2012, Koszelnik applied for naturalization, again failing to provide his original A-number and incorrectly answering questions about removal. The government discovered its earlier error and denied his application, finding that failure to disclose his prior removal order and his original A-number meant that he had failed to demonstrate that he was lawfully admitted for permanent residence under 8 U.S.C. 1429 and that he was ineligible for naturalization. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the government: Koszelnik failed to meet his burden of showing that he was lawfully admitted and was therefore not eligible for naturalization. View "Koszelnik v. Sec'y, Dept. of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

Saliba obtained U.S. Temporary Protected Status (TPS) in 1992 by providing falsified documents indicating that he was a citizen of Lebanon. Saliba was a citizen of Syria, a country whose citizens at that time were not eligible for TPS. In 2001, Saliba was able to adjust his status to that of a legal permanent resident, although his fraudulent procurement of TPS should have rendered him statutorily “inadmissible” under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). When Saliba applied for naturalization in 2006, USCIS discovered the fraud and denied his application for naturalization, stating that Saliba’s apparent fraud precluded a finding that he had been “lawfully admitted” as a permanent resident as required for naturalization under 8 U.S.C. 1427(a). The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting Saliba's argument that his decision to submit falsified Lebanese documents was involuntary and made under duress, due to his fear of the war-time conditions plaguing the Middle East at the time . Saliba’s fraudulent procurement of TPS in 1992 made him inadmissible for Legal Permanent Resident status, and, because he had not been “lawfully admitted” for permanent residence, he cannot be naturalized. View "Saliba v. Att'y Gen. of United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Nigeria, seeks review of the BIA's denial of her motion to reopen her removal proceedings to apply for asylum. Petitioner filed a motion to reopen her removal proceedings to seek asylum based on fear of harm in Nigeria because of allegedly new, widespread violence from the terrorist group Boko Haram. The court held that petitioner's motion to reopen was untimely due to her inability to show a material change in country conditions in Nigeria, which would have excused her from the 90-day time limitation for filing the motion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the BIA's judgment and denied the petition for review. View "Zeah v. Lynch" on Justia Law