Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner is a Salvadoran citizen and national who was a former Salvadoran professional soccer player and then government official. The IJ concluded that petitioner was ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal because there were serious reasons for believing he committed serious nonpolitical crimes in both El Salvador and Guatemala; the IJ found petitioner to be non-credible after concluding that his explanation for failing to report his violent interactions with police in his asylum application was highly implausible; the IJ pointed out that petitioner admitted to having lied to the Salvadoran court, and found that petitioner failed to produce relevant evidence corroborating his story about the attacks; and the IJ held that petitioner has not met his burden under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) because he had neither demonstrated he would likely be tortured in either El Salvador or Guatemala. The BIA thereafter dismissed petitioner's appeal and largely adopted the IJ's reasoning. The court concluded that the agency's credibility determination was valid; the Guatemalan charges provide a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that petitioner is ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal; petitioner's law of the case argument is meritless; and, in regard to the CAT claim, the BIA's order commanding petitioner's removal to Nicaragua stands. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Silva-Pereira v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Bolivia, seeks review of the BIA's decision finding him ineligible for cancellation of removal. The BIA determined that petitioner's Virginia conviction for forging a public record pursuant to Virginia Code Ann. 18.2-168 was an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(R). The court concluded that Virginia forgery is an aggravated felony under the INA because it is a categorical match with the federal generic definition of forgery. Thus, the state and federal forgery crimes necessarily relate to one another. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review and denied the Government's request to remand as moot. View "Alvarez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Putro, a citizen of Latvia, entered the U.S. on a 4-month, foreign-exchange student visa in 1999 and overstayed. She married a U.S. citizen (Zalesky) in 2004 and gained conditional permanent residency, 8 U.S.C. 1186a(1). Her husband died of a drug overdose in 2006, before they could petition jointly to remove the conditions. Putro petitioned on her own; USCIS construed the petition as a request for a discretionary waiver of the joint-petition requirement, denied the waiver, and ordered Putro removed, stating that it had “reason to believe” that she had committed marriage fraud by marrying Zalesky. The Seventh Circuit granted her petition for review. Putro did not need a waiver because her husband’s death during the conditional period exempted her from the joint-filing requirement. In mistakenly evaluating her petition as a request for a waiver, the agency erroneously placed on Putro the burden of proving that the marriage was bona fide. View "Putro v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Shuti, from Albania, entered the U.S. as a permanent resident in 2008 at age 13. In 2014, Shuti and some friends committed a “larceny of marijuana.” Shuti pleaded guilty to felony unarmed robbery, defined as “larceny of any money or other property” accomplished by “force or violence against any person” or “assault[ing] or put[ting] the person in fear.” Mich. Comp. Laws 750.530. Shuti was sentenced to more than two years in prison. DHS initiated removal, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2). A non-citizen convicted of an aggravated felony after admission is ineligible for most discretionary relief; “aggravated felony” is defined as including “a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of Title 18 ....) for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year,” 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F). The cross-referenced definition of “crime of violence” is: an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used. Shuti unsuccessfully applied for discretionary relief, claiming that his attorney “never discussed” the immigration consequences of his plea. The BIA affirmed, stating that unarmed robbery was “categorically a crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. 16(b). Meanwhile, the Supreme Court held the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual definition of “violent felony,” 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), void for vagueness. The BIA concluded that the void-for-vagueness doctrine did not apply to “civil” deportations. The Sixth Circuit vacated the order of removal, concluding that the wide-ranging inquiry required by the two statutory phrases was the same, so the immigration code’s residual clause is also unconstitutionally vague. View "Shuti v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The plaintiff class and the government entered into a settlement agreement in 1997 which “sets out nationwide policy for the detention, release, and treatment of minors in the custody of the INS.” In 2015, the plaintiff class moved to enforce the Settlement, arguing that it applied to all minors in the custody of immigration authorities. The court concluded that the settlement unambiguously applies both to accompanied and unaccompanied minors, but does not create affirmative release rights for parents. The district court erred in interpreting the Settlement to provide release rights to adults. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend on the record before it. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Flores v. Lynch" on Justia Law

When Thomas was a child, he was lawfully admitted to the United States for six months, but he and his parents remained in the country beyond that date. Thomas’s mother later became a naturalized United States citizen and, three days later, Thomas turned eighteen years old. Thomas did not apply to become a lawful permanent resident thereafter but, instead continued living in the United States without a lawful admission for permanent residence. Thomas was subsequently convicted in a Massachusetts state court for armed robbery. An Immigration Judge ordered Thomas removed, finding that Thomas was removable as an alien who had been convicted of an aggravated felony. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Thomas filed a petition for review, arguing that he satisfied the applicable statutory criteria for obtaining derivative citizenship in consequence of his mother’s naturalization. The First Circuit denied the petition, holding that Thomas did not satisfy the criteria set forth in the derivative citizenship statute that was in effect at the time he was still a minor. View "Thomas v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of South Korea, petitioned for review of the BIA's order denying her motion to sua sponte reopen her removal proceedings. Because petitioner has not raised any constitutional claims, the court lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's denial of her motion for sua sponte reopening. Therefore, the court rejected petitioner's arguments and granted the government's motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the petition for review. View "Bukta v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law