Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in California Courts of Appeal
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Defendant was charged with felony counts of sale/transportation/offer to sell a controlled substance (count 1) and possession for sale of a controlled substance (count 2). He pled guilty to count 1, offer to sell oxycodone in exchange for 36 months of formal probation with the service of 180 days in county jail. Count 2 was dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. Defendant’s attorney and the trial court advised him at that time that he would be deported based on his negotiated plea. Seven years later he found himself the subject of deportation proceedings.   The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction. The trial court factually found Defendant's credibility to be “severely lacking,” and his declaration was “deceptively phrased” to mislead the court that counsel had not recommended Defendant meet with an immigration attorney when counsel had, in fact, consulted with Defendant's immigration attorney.   The Second Appellate District affirmed and found that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion. The court explained that the plain and unambiguous language contained in the Felony Disposition Statement states: “If I am not a citizen and am pleading guilty to . . . a controlled substance offense, . . . I will be deported.”  The court explained that even on independent review, Defendant’s contentions fail. At the time of the plea proceeding, Defendant had lived in the United States for approximately seven years with his family. The contemplation of his life in Mexico, contemporaneous with his guilty plea, is persuasive evidence Defendant knew he would be deported. View "P. v. Garcia" on Justia Law

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The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE) entered into a contract with the City of Holtville (City) to detain noncitizens at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility (Facility). The City did not own the Facility, so the City subcontracted its detention responsibilities to the Facility’s owner. The owner did not operate the facility, so the owner subcontracted its responsibilities (with ICE’s approval) to a private operator, real party in interest Management & Training Corporation (Operator). Petitioner Anna Von Herrmann served the Operator with a California Public Records Act (CPRA) request regarding the Facility. Operator refused to comply, reasoning it was not subject to the CPRA because it did not have a contract directly with the City, and, thus, the Facility was not one that “detains a noncitizen pursuant to a contract with a city.” Alternatively, Operator contended several CPRA exemptions applied. Petitioner sought a writ of mandate from the trial court compelling Operator to comply with the CPRA request, but the court agreed with Operator’s interpretation of California Civil Code section 1670.9(c) and denied the petition without reaching Operator’s CPRA exemption claims. The Court of Appeal agreed the trial court construed section 1670.9(c) too narrowly as applying the CPRA only to an entity that contracts directly with a city to detain noncitizens. "[T]he structure of section 1670.9 as a whole, indicate the Legislature intended for the CPRA to apply to immigration detention facilities on a facility-wide basis rather than an entity-specific basis." The Court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the petition and to enter a new order granting it, subject to resolution of Operator’s CPRA exemption claims. View "Von Herrmann v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

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Abdelsalam came to the U.S. in 2017 on a fiance visa. His fiance, Mona, discovered that Abdelsalam had other relationships and was planning to divorce her as soon as he gained citizenship and reported him to immigration authorities. Abdelsalam subsequently physically injured and threatened Mona and burglarized her house. He pled guilty to making criminal threats. The trial court orally told him that, as a result of the conviction, he would be deported. He was also advised in writing that he would be deported. His attorney reviewed the immigration consequences of the plea with Abdelsalam, who orally acknowledged that he understood those consequences, and stated that he would “wait for immigration.”After deportation proceedings were initiated, Abdelsalam claimed he never understood that he would be deported and should be allowed to withdraw his plea. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the motion to withdraw the plea, finding it unsupported by the record. A defendant cannot be told repeatedly that his plea will result in deportation, confirm he understood, present no contrary evidence from the attorney who advised him, and then withdraw the plea with the claim that he did not understand he would be deported. View "People v. Abdelsalam" on Justia Law

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Scarlett was born in Honduras in 2013. Her family moved to the United States in 2015. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services received a referral claiming that her father, Franklin, had attacked her mother, Karen. The Department filed a Welfare and Institutions Code 300(a), (b)(1) petition. The court found true the allegations that, because of multiple instances of domestic violence, and because Franklin had hit Scarlett with a belt, Franklin placed Scarlett at risk of serious physical harm and Karen failed to protect her.Scarlett subsequently filed a request for Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) findings under Code of Civil Procedure 155.1. A child is eligible for SIJ status if: the child is a dependent of a juvenile court, in the custody of a state agency by court order, or in the custody of an individual or entity appointed by the court; the child cannot reunify with one or both parents due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis; and it is not in the child’s best interest to return to his or her home country or the home country of her parents. The juvenile court denied the request, ruling the findings were “discretionary.” The court of appeal reversed. The lower court was required to consider the evidence submitted and Scarlett submitted unimpeached and uncontradicted evidence that required the court to enter an order with the findings Scarlett requested under section 155. View "In re Scarlett V." on Justia Law

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On March 4, 2020, Governor Newsom declared a state of emergency due to the spread of COVID-19. On March 16, the Legislature enacted an emergency amendment to the Budget Act, appropriating $500 million, and authorizing additional disbursements for any purpose related to the state of emergency upon order of the Director of Finance, with notice to the Legislature, but without requiring statutory approval of each individual project. On April 15, Governor Newsom announced a $75 million Disaster Relief Fund to “support undocumented Californians impacted by COVID-19 who are ineligible for unemployment insurance and disaster relief, including the CARES Act, due to their immigration status.” Approximately 150,000 undocumented adult Californians would receive a one-time cash benefit of $500 per adult with a cap of $1,000 per household to deal with specific needs arising from the pandemic.On April 29, the plaintiffs filed suit challenging the Project as an unlawful expenditure of public funds (Code Civ. Proc. 526a.), reasoning that federal law provides that undocumented immigrants are not eligible for state public benefits, with exceptions, 8 U.S.C. 1621(a), including the enactment of a state law after the date of the enactment of the federal act. Plaintiffs alleged that the Project was not enacted by a state law and sought a temporary restraining order. The court of appeal dismissed, as moot, an appeal from the denial of a TRO. The spending has already occurred; there is no indication it will be reauthorized. View "Cerletti v. Newsom" on Justia Law

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In the mid-2000s, Carlos Argenis Figueroa Alatorre was working as a car salesperson when he lost his job. Although he knew his brother-in-law, Luis, was involved in something unsavory, Alatorre began working for him, acting as a lookout and a driver for about two months before the United States Department of Justice closed in on Luis’s drug importation ring, arresting Alatorre along with several others at a border patrol checkpoint. In the wake of the arrest, Alatorre was forthcoming about his involvement. He had already been in jail for a year and a half, awaiting his trial, when he was offered a plea deal that would allow him to be released from custody with credit for time served. So in 2008, at the age of 24, he pleaded guilty to his first and only criminal charge: conspiracy to possess cocaine for sale. Alatorre did not know this conviction would render him immediately deportable. He had come to the United States from Mexico when he was just four years old, and lived here as a permanent resident. In 2011, three years after his plea, he attempted to become a naturalized citizen, which had the unintended consequence of alerting immigration authorities to his criminal conviction. Within a few months, he was deported to Mexico. Alatorre lived in Mexicali after that, taking any available work he could find. Although his children, who are both U.S. citizens, were usually able visit him on the weekends, he was separated from his wife and children, parents, four siblings, and dozens of nieces, nephews, and cousins—all of whom lived in the U.S. In early 2020, Alatorre moved to vacate his conviction, only to have the trial court deny it as untimely based on a finding that he did not exercise “reasonable diligence” to become aware of the existence of the statutory remedy after the law became effective. The question posed by this case was how a petitioner’s “reasonable diligence” should be evaluated when the ripening of an unexpected immigration consequence predates the creation of an avenue of relief. After considering the text, history, and purpose of Penal Code section 1473.7, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s ruling, finding that it applied an incorrect legal standard when it assumed Alatorre was obligated to learn about section 1473.7 starting in January 2017, when the section became effective. As to the merits of his request, the Court found he established prejudicial error within the meaning of section 1473.7, and remanded to the trial court with instructions to issue an order granting the motion. View "California v. Alatorre" on Justia Law

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In 1997, with the help of an interpreter, defendant Estaban Bravo pleaded guilty to, and was convicted on, a plea bargain agreement of: a felony violation of domestic violence (count 1); and felony violation of child cruelty (count 2). The trial court sentenced defendant to two years’ incarceration, suspended, and placed him on formal probation for 36 months on terms and conditions including 25 days’ custody, for which he was granted time served. In 2018, defendant moved to vacate the judgment pursuant to Penal Code sections 1016.5 and 1473.7. In 2019, the trial court denied the motion. In late 2020, following defendant’s appeal of the trial court’s decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed. In March 2021, the California Supreme Court granted review, and in May issued California v. Vivar, 11 Cal.5th 510 (2021), disapproving of the appellate court’s opinion in Bravo. The Supreme Court transferred the appeal in Bravo back to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate the decision and reconsider the matter in light of Vivar. Defendant stated that the immediate advantage of his plea was that he would be released from custody that same day so that he could return to his construction job without being fired and could therefore support his spouse and their child. Defendant stated he was informed by counsel and the prosecution that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) would conduct a sweep of the county jail where he was being held by the next morning; being released that afternoon allowed him to avoid the ICE sweep and likely deportation as a result of that encounter. Before the Court of Appeal, defendant contended that at the time he executed the plea agreement, he was unaware of future immigration consequences of his plea, and had he known, he would not have executed the agreement. After reconsideration, the Court of Appeal found that notwithstanding its sufficiency to meet the statutory language of section 1016.5, the advisement on defendant’s 1997 plea agreement was inadequate to advise him of the mandatory immigration consequences of his plea. "In such cases, '[d]efendants must be advised that they will be deported, excluded, and denied naturalization as a mandatory consequence of the conviction." However, "a defendant's self-serving statement - after trial, conviction and sentence... must be corroborated independently by objective evidence." Here, notably, defendant offered no statement or declaration by his trial counsel or any other contemporaneous evidence other than the statements in his declaration to support that claim. Accordingly, there was no supportable reason for defendant to believe the court would accept an immigration-neutral alternative charge. The Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's section 1473.7 application; judgment was therefore affirmed. View "California v. Bravo" on Justia Law

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S.H.R. petitioned the superior court for the appointment of a guardian of his person and for judicial findings that would enable him to petition the USCIS to classify him as a special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) under federal immigration law. The superior court denied both petitions.The Court of Appeal concluded that S.H.R. had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts supporting SIJ status. Because the trial court found his evidence did not support the requested findings, S.H.R. has the burden on appeal of showing that he is entitled to the SIJ findings as a matter of law. In this case, S.H.R. has failed to meet his burden by failing to prove parental abandonment or neglect and that reunification was not viable. Therefore, the court affirmed the superior court's denial of the SIJ petition. The denial of the SIJ petition rendered the guardianship petition moot, and thus the court also affirmed the denial of that petition. View "S.H.R. v. Rivas" on Justia Law

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In 2005, Rodriguez pleaded no contest to the charge of possession for sale of methamphetamine. She was placed on probation. She brought her Penal Code 1473.7 motion soon after she was detained by federal authorities, facing deportation. She submitted declarations of her own and from the law office that represented her, stating that her conviction was legally invalid because a prejudicial error damaged her ability to meaningfully understand the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of her no contest plea. She stated that she had come to the U.S. when she was an infant and that her family, including her two young children, her parents, and her five sisters, all live in the U.S. The trial court rejected her motion, noting that she appeared to be on probation in another case and that she failed to show there was a reasonable probability that she would not have entered her plea if she had been fully informed of its adverse immigration consequences.The court of appeal reversed the denial of Rodriguez’s motion. Rodriguez's probation status in a separate case did not bar her motion. She showed it was reasonably probable that she would not have entered her plea if she had known its adverse immigration consequences. View "People v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

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Defendant Sigifredo Zendejas Lopez (Lopez) brought a motion pursuant to California Penal Code section 1018 to vacate his 2019 guilty plea on three felony counts, one of which would have lead to almost certain deportation under federal law. Lopez, who was a lawful permanent resident of the United States at the time of his conviction, argued his retained trial counsel failed to provide accurate and affirmative advice about the immigration consequences of the proposed plea. Lopez’s trial counsel testified at the hearing on the motion that he was not aware of the specific immigration consequences of the individual charges Lopez was facing. Therefore, he could not have provided accurate and affirmative advice as to the consequences of a guilty plea to any particular count. Moreover, trial counsel testified that he tried to negotiate a plea bargain to one misdemeanor count, which was rejected by the prosecution. Had he known the immigration consequences of the specific felony counts, there was some possibility that he could have negotiated an immigration-neutral plea offer the prosecution was more likely to accept. But as he admitted, he did not know those consequences. The Court of Appeal determined Lopez was prejudiced by this course of events. He submitted evidence that he would have taken his chances at trial if he had known and fully understood the immigration consequences of the plea agreement trial counsel negotiated. Because Lopez was not accurately and affirmatively advised, and because there was not an effort to negotiate an acceptable plea bargain with the relevant immigration consequences in mind, the Court reversed the trial court’s order denying the motion to withdraw Lopez’s guilty plea in the interests of justice. View "California v. Lopez" on Justia Law