Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

On March 4, 2020, Governor Newsom declared a state of emergency due to the spread of COVID-19. On March 16, the Legislature enacted an emergency amendment to the Budget Act, appropriating $500 million, and authorizing additional disbursements for any purpose related to the state of emergency upon order of the Director of Finance, with notice to the Legislature, but without requiring statutory approval of each individual project. On April 15, Governor Newsom announced a $75 million Disaster Relief Fund to “support undocumented Californians impacted by COVID-19 who are ineligible for unemployment insurance and disaster relief, including the CARES Act, due to their immigration status.” Approximately 150,000 undocumented adult Californians would receive a one-time cash benefit of $500 per adult with a cap of $1,000 per household to deal with specific needs arising from the pandemic.On April 29, the plaintiffs filed suit challenging the Project as an unlawful expenditure of public funds (Code Civ. Proc. 526a.), reasoning that federal law provides that undocumented immigrants are not eligible for state public benefits, with exceptions, 8 U.S.C. 1621(a), including the enactment of a state law after the date of the enactment of the federal act. Plaintiffs alleged that the Project was not enacted by a state law and sought a temporary restraining order. The court of appeal dismissed, as moot, an appeal from the denial of a TRO. The spending has already occurred; there is no indication it will be reauthorized. View "Cerletti v. Newsom" on Justia Law

In the mid-2000s, Carlos Argenis Figueroa Alatorre was working as a car salesperson when he lost his job. Although he knew his brother-in-law, Luis, was involved in something unsavory, Alatorre began working for him, acting as a lookout and a driver for about two months before the United States Department of Justice closed in on Luis’s drug importation ring, arresting Alatorre along with several others at a border patrol checkpoint. In the wake of the arrest, Alatorre was forthcoming about his involvement. He had already been in jail for a year and a half, awaiting his trial, when he was offered a plea deal that would allow him to be released from custody with credit for time served. So in 2008, at the age of 24, he pleaded guilty to his first and only criminal charge: conspiracy to possess cocaine for sale. Alatorre did not know this conviction would render him immediately deportable. He had come to the United States from Mexico when he was just four years old, and lived here as a permanent resident. In 2011, three years after his plea, he attempted to become a naturalized citizen, which had the unintended consequence of alerting immigration authorities to his criminal conviction. Within a few months, he was deported to Mexico. Alatorre lived in Mexicali after that, taking any available work he could find. Although his children, who are both U.S. citizens, were usually able visit him on the weekends, he was separated from his wife and children, parents, four siblings, and dozens of nieces, nephews, and cousins—all of whom lived in the U.S. In early 2020, Alatorre moved to vacate his conviction, only to have the trial court deny it as untimely based on a finding that he did not exercise “reasonable diligence” to become aware of the existence of the statutory remedy after the law became effective. The question posed by this case was how a petitioner’s “reasonable diligence” should be evaluated when the ripening of an unexpected immigration consequence predates the creation of an avenue of relief. After considering the text, history, and purpose of Penal Code section 1473.7, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s ruling, finding that it applied an incorrect legal standard when it assumed Alatorre was obligated to learn about section 1473.7 starting in January 2017, when the section became effective. As to the merits of his request, the Court found he established prejudicial error within the meaning of section 1473.7, and remanded to the trial court with instructions to issue an order granting the motion. View "California v. Alatorre" on Justia Law

In 1997, with the help of an interpreter, defendant Estaban Bravo pleaded guilty to, and was convicted on, a plea bargain agreement of: a felony violation of domestic violence (count 1); and felony violation of child cruelty (count 2). The trial court sentenced defendant to two years’ incarceration, suspended, and placed him on formal probation for 36 months on terms and conditions including 25 days’ custody, for which he was granted time served. In 2018, defendant moved to vacate the judgment pursuant to Penal Code sections 1016.5 and 1473.7. In 2019, the trial court denied the motion. In late 2020, following defendant’s appeal of the trial court’s decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed. In March 2021, the California Supreme Court granted review, and in May issued California v. Vivar, 11 Cal.5th 510 (2021), disapproving of the appellate court’s opinion in Bravo. The Supreme Court transferred the appeal in Bravo back to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate the decision and reconsider the matter in light of Vivar. Defendant stated that the immediate advantage of his plea was that he would be released from custody that same day so that he could return to his construction job without being fired and could therefore support his spouse and their child. Defendant stated he was informed by counsel and the prosecution that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) would conduct a sweep of the county jail where he was being held by the next morning; being released that afternoon allowed him to avoid the ICE sweep and likely deportation as a result of that encounter. Before the Court of Appeal, defendant contended that at the time he executed the plea agreement, he was unaware of future immigration consequences of his plea, and had he known, he would not have executed the agreement. After reconsideration, the Court of Appeal found that notwithstanding its sufficiency to meet the statutory language of section 1016.5, the advisement on defendant’s 1997 plea agreement was inadequate to advise him of the mandatory immigration consequences of his plea. "In such cases, '[d]efendants must be advised that they will be deported, excluded, and denied naturalization as a mandatory consequence of the conviction." However, "a defendant's self-serving statement - after trial, conviction and sentence... must be corroborated independently by objective evidence." Here, notably, defendant offered no statement or declaration by his trial counsel or any other contemporaneous evidence other than the statements in his declaration to support that claim. Accordingly, there was no supportable reason for defendant to believe the court would accept an immigration-neutral alternative charge. The Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's section 1473.7 application; judgment was therefore affirmed. View "California v. Bravo" on Justia Law

S.H.R. petitioned the superior court for the appointment of a guardian of his person and for judicial findings that would enable him to petition the USCIS to classify him as a special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) under federal immigration law. The superior court denied both petitions.The Court of Appeal concluded that S.H.R. had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts supporting SIJ status. Because the trial court found his evidence did not support the requested findings, S.H.R. has the burden on appeal of showing that he is entitled to the SIJ findings as a matter of law. In this case, S.H.R. has failed to meet his burden by failing to prove parental abandonment or neglect and that reunification was not viable. Therefore, the court affirmed the superior court's denial of the SIJ petition. The denial of the SIJ petition rendered the guardianship petition moot, and thus the court also affirmed the denial of that petition. View "S.H.R. v. Rivas" on Justia Law

In 2005, Rodriguez pleaded no contest to the charge of possession for sale of methamphetamine. She was placed on probation. She brought her Penal Code 1473.7 motion soon after she was detained by federal authorities, facing deportation. She submitted declarations of her own and from the law office that represented her, stating that her conviction was legally invalid because a prejudicial error damaged her ability to meaningfully understand the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of her no contest plea. She stated that she had come to the U.S. when she was an infant and that her family, including her two young children, her parents, and her five sisters, all live in the U.S. The trial court rejected her motion, noting that she appeared to be on probation in another case and that she failed to show there was a reasonable probability that she would not have entered her plea if she had been fully informed of its adverse immigration consequences.The court of appeal reversed the denial of Rodriguez’s motion. Rodriguez's probation status in a separate case did not bar her motion. She showed it was reasonably probable that she would not have entered her plea if she had known its adverse immigration consequences. View "People v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Defendant Sigifredo Zendejas Lopez (Lopez) brought a motion pursuant to California Penal Code section 1018 to vacate his 2019 guilty plea on three felony counts, one of which would have lead to almost certain deportation under federal law. Lopez, who was a lawful permanent resident of the United States at the time of his conviction, argued his retained trial counsel failed to provide accurate and affirmative advice about the immigration consequences of the proposed plea. Lopez’s trial counsel testified at the hearing on the motion that he was not aware of the specific immigration consequences of the individual charges Lopez was facing. Therefore, he could not have provided accurate and affirmative advice as to the consequences of a guilty plea to any particular count. Moreover, trial counsel testified that he tried to negotiate a plea bargain to one misdemeanor count, which was rejected by the prosecution. Had he known the immigration consequences of the specific felony counts, there was some possibility that he could have negotiated an immigration-neutral plea offer the prosecution was more likely to accept. But as he admitted, he did not know those consequences. The Court of Appeal determined Lopez was prejudiced by this course of events. He submitted evidence that he would have taken his chances at trial if he had known and fully understood the immigration consequences of the plea agreement trial counsel negotiated. Because Lopez was not accurately and affirmatively advised, and because there was not an effort to negotiate an acceptable plea bargain with the relevant immigration consequences in mind, the Court reversed the trial court’s order denying the motion to withdraw Lopez’s guilty plea in the interests of justice. View "California v. Lopez" on Justia Law

In 2007, Juan Rodriguez, a non-citizen, entered a plea agreement in San Diego County that avoided any adverse immigration consequences. After the plea was entered, but before sentencing, Rodriguez was arrested and jailed for another crime in Riverside County. As a result of that arrest, Rodriguez did not appear at the scheduled sentencing hearing. He later agreed to be sentenced in absentia, and the court imposed a sentence subjecting Rodriguez to deportation. Deportation proceedings were initiated after Rodriguez’s release from custody and remain ongoing. In 2019, after amendments to Penal Code section 1473.7, Rodriguez moved to vacate his conviction on the grounds that he had not been sufficiently advised of the immigration consequences he faced. After an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the motion. Rodriguez challenged that decision, asserting the court erred by finding he meaningfully understood he would become deportable as a result of the plea. The Court of Appeal concluded the evidence supported Rodriguez’s motion. The Court thus reversed and remanded with directions to the trial court to grant Rodriguez’s motion to vacate the conviction. View "California v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Manish and Priyanka married in June 2014. The marriage was dissolved in September 2018. The court of appeal upheld the trial court’s order granting Priyanka’s request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO), Family Code section 6344,2, as supported by substantial evidence based on Priyanka’s allegations of stalking and unwanted contact. The court of appeal reversed an order rescinding a prior award of attorney fees. The trial court rescinded the order based on new evidence, rather than the evidence presented at the original proceeding. By so doing, the court in effect improperly granted a new trial, a result which lies outside its inherent powers. The court of appeal affirmed the judgment of dissolution; the trial court utilized the appropriate standard of proof in denying Manish’s petition for nullity after finding that, though Priyanka’s immigration status may have played some indeterminate role in the marriage, it was not enough to establish fraud “go[ing] to the very essence of the marriage relation.” View "Marriage of Ankola" on Justia Law

In Penal Code section 1473.7, the Legislature broadened the standards to challenge guilty pleas involving advisements concerning immigration consequences. Defendant appealed an order denying her recent motion to vacate her 1991 conviction for possession for sale of cocaine base following her no contest plea pursuant to Penal Code 1473.7. Defendant claimed that her counsel did not advise her that a mandatory consequence of her plea would make her "permanently ineligible to ever become a legal resident of the United States."The Court of Appeal held that defendant may pursue her current motion to vacate the conviction. The court held that, although defendant had filed an earlier unsuccessful motion to vacate the conviction in 2017, the prior motion did not bar the current motion because it was based on a different ground and on an earlier version of section 1473.7. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions. The court noted that the changes the Legislature made in 2019 were intended to retroactively target convictions based on the type of inadequate immigration advisements that occurred in this case. View "People v. Ruiz" on Justia Law

O.C., a 14-year-old refugee from Guatemala, asked the superior court to make the required Special immigrant juvenile findings, a necessary first step under the federal immigration law that allowed abandoned, unaccompanied minors living in the United States to apply for status as permanent legal residents (SIJ findings). A mandatory Judicial Council form was created for this purpose. Items 4(b), 5, and 6 on the form required the superior court to detail its findings, citing California law. The Court of Appeal determined the superior court failed to cite California statutory or case law in items 4(b) and 6, and did not check the box in item 5 to indicate O.C. could not reunify with her mother, who was deceased. Treating O.C.'s appeal as a petition for a writ of mandate, the Court of Appeal granted the petition and ordered the probate court to vacate its SIJ findings and issue new findings for items 4(b) and 6 of the mandatory Judicial Council form baed on state law, as proposed by O.C. and in compliance with federal rules and regulations. View "O.C. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law