Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Jose Yanel Sanchez-Perez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, who entered the United States in 1998. In 2009, Sanchez-Perez pleaded guilty to committing misdemeanor domestic assault under Tennessee law. The following day, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him. In 2015, an immigration judge found Sanchez-Perez ineligible for cancellation of removal because he failed to establish that he had been continuously present in the United States for ten years prior to receiving the notice to appear. However, the judge also found that Sanchez-Perez was not statutorily barred from seeking cancellation of removal due to his 2009 domestic-violence conviction.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Sanchez-Perez’s appeal and agreed with the immigration judge’s findings that Sanchez-Perez lacked the requisite continuous physical presence and thus was not eligible for cancellation of removal. In 2018, the immigration judge found that Sanchez-Perez’s 2009 conviction is categorically a crime of violence, and thus Sanchez-Perez was statutorily barred from obtaining cancellation of removal. The BIA dismissed Sanchez-Perez’s appeal from this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA erred in determining that Sanchez-Perez’s 2009 conviction was categorically a crime of violence, and thus Sanchez-Perez was statutorily barred from obtaining cancellation of removal. The court noted that the Tennessee statute at issue criminalizes conduct that does not require the use or threatened use of violent physical force. Therefore, the court granted Sanchez-Perez’s petition for review, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded the case to the BIA for proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Sanchez-Perez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves Francisco Carrillo, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, who was convicted of assault with a firearm in 2002 and sentenced to 301 days in jail. In 2007, Carrillo admitted to a probation violation and was sentenced to an additional 90 days in jail. The combined jail time exceeded one year, making his conviction an aggravated felony under immigration law and subjecting him to mandatory deportation.In 2022, Carrillo filed a motion to vacate his conviction under Penal Code section 1473.7, arguing that he did not meaningfully understand the potential immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Carrillo had not demonstrated that his lack of understanding prejudiced his decision to go to trial or his defense strategy.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found that Carrillo had not shown a reasonable probability that he would have done something differently, such as pursuing an immigration-safe plea or presenting different arguments at sentencing, had he understood the immigration consequences. However, the court modified the trial court's order to allow Carrillo to file a new motion addressing grounds not raised in his original motion. View "People v. Carrillo" on Justia Law

Genaro Medina-Luna, a Mexican national, was charged with attempted reentry by a removed noncitizen, a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, after he was found concealed in the trunk of a car at the Otay Mesa, California Port of Entry. Medina-Luna had been previously removed from the United States five times between 2006 and 2022. He waived his right to a grand jury indictment and pleaded guilty unconditionally. The district court sentenced him to 41 months of imprisonment, a downward variance from the Guideline range of 63–78 months, considering his sincere family reasons for reentry and overcoming methamphetamine addiction.Medina-Luna appealed his sentence, raising two issues: the validity of his waiver of the right to a grand jury indictment and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Medina-Luna waived his right to appeal the validity of his waiver of indictment by entering an unconditional guilty plea. The court overruled a previous decision, United States v. Travis, which characterized any defect in the waiver of indictment as jurisdictional, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Cotton, which held that defects in an indictment do not deprive a court of jurisdiction.Regarding the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, the court found no abuse of discretion. The district court had considered the statutory factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), acknowledged Medina-Luna's sincere family reasons for reentry, and his overcoming of methamphetamine addiction. The court affirmed the 41-month sentence, which was the sentence Medina-Luna himself had requested. The appeal was dismissed in part and affirmed in part. View "United States v. Medina-Luna" on Justia Law

A Nigerian citizen, Okwuchukwu Jidoefor, pleaded guilty to mail fraud. As part of the plea agreement, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Minnesota agreed to send a letter to immigration authorities outlining Jidoefor’s cooperation in prior cases. After the sentencing hearing, the Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) sent the agreed letter to immigration authorities. However, due to an internal mistake, the U.S. Attorney sent a second letter stating the first letter was not the office’s official position. Upon discovering the mistake, the U.S. Attorney sent a third letter retracting the second letter and reaffirming the first one. Jidoefor moved to remedy the government’s breach of the plea agreement, which the district court denied, finding the third letter an adequate remedy. Jidoefor appealed this decision.The District Court for the District of Minnesota found that the government's third letter was an adequate remedy for the breach of the plea agreement. Jidoefor appealed this decision, arguing that the district court erred in not providing a remedy. He also separately appealed the district court’s sentence and its order for restitution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the government's third letter, which retracted the second letter and reaffirmed the first one, was an adequate remedy for the breach of the plea agreement. The court also found that the district court did not err in calculating Nationwide’s losses and imposing the $22,028 restitution obligation. Furthermore, the court dismissed Jidoefor's challenge to the length of his sentence as moot, as he had already served the sentence. View "United States v. Jidoefor" on Justia Law

The case in question involves a defendant, Saba Rosario Ventura, who was initially detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) after the District Court ordered his release on bail pending his criminal trial. The District Court later dismissed the indictment against Ventura, arguing that ICE had detained him in bad faith, aiming to circumvent the bail order. The case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which previously remanded the case to the District Court to clarify whether it had found that ICE's detention of Ventura was a direct violation of a federal court order releasing him under the Bail Reform Act.On remand, the District Court reasserted its claim that ICE's detention of Ventura was pretextual and in bad faith, not for removal, but to detain him pending his criminal trial. However, the Court of Appeals disagreed, finding no substantial evidence to support the District Court's assertion. The Court of Appeals noted that the District Court's finding was based on legal arguments rather than factual evidence. It also noted that, even if ICE disagreed with the District Court's assessment of Ventura's risk of flight, it was not enough to prove that ICE's detention was pretextual.The Court of Appeals ultimately reversed the District Court's orders, concluding that the finding of ICE's pretextual and bad faith detention of Ventura was clearly erroneous, given the lack of factual evidence. View "United States v. Ventura" on Justia Law

Carlos Gomez-Ruotolo, a native citizen of Venezuela, was brought to the United States in 2001 and became a lawful permanent resident. He was convicted twice in Virginia for crimes involving minors: once for attempted sexual battery and another for electronic solicitation of a minor. Based on these convictions, he was found removable as a noncitizen convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude and was denied relief by the Board of Immigration Appeals. Gomez-Ruotolo appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, arguing that his crimes were not morally turpitudinous and that he should receive protection against removal under the Convention Against Torture.The court disagreed. It held that attempted sexual battery and electronic solicitation of a minor both involved moral turpitude, thus making Gomez-Ruotolo deportable under immigration law. The court also affirmed the agency's decision to deny Gomez-Ruotolo protection under the Convention Against Torture, agreeing that he had not shown he was more likely than not to face torture in Venezuela. Therefore, the court denied Gomez-Ruotolo's petition for review. View "Gomez-Ruotolo v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves an appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Madera County, California, denying Francisco Carrillo's motion to vacate his conviction and sentence under section 1473.7 of the Penal Code. The motion was based on the claim that Carrillo did not meaningfully understand the adverse immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence.Carrillo, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of assault with a firearm following a trial. He was sentenced to serve 301 days in jail and granted formal probation for five years. However, when Carrillo later admitted to a probation violation and received an additional 90 days in jail, his total term of imprisonment exceeded one year, thereby qualifying his conviction as an "aggravated felony" under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), leading to mandatory deportation.Arguing that he did not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence, Carrillo filed a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence under section 1473.7 of the Penal Code. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Carrillo failed to demonstrate that he suffered prejudicial error due to his lack of understanding, as he did not show a reasonable probability that he would have acted differently had he been aware of the immigration consequences.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's order but modified it to be without prejudice. This means that Carrillo could file another motion asserting grounds not raised in his initial motion. The appellate court agreed that Carrillo did not understand the potential immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence. However, it found that Carrillo failed to prove that this misunderstanding prejudiced his decisions at trial or during his sentencing hearing. View "People v. Carrillo" on Justia Law

The case revolves around an appeal by Karnail Singh, who was charged with using a fraudulently procured passport and making false statements to immigration officials. Singh pleaded guilty to using a fraudulently procured passport in exchange for a lower sentencing range and the dismissal of the false-statement count. After his plea, the government initiated proceedings to revoke his citizenship. In response, Singh petitioned for a writ of coram nobis, requesting the district court to set aside his conviction, arguing he would not have pled guilty had he known his plea could affect his citizenship. The district court denied his petition, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court ruled that Singh's plea was knowing and satisfied due process, regardless of whether he understood it could impact his citizenship. They found that the district court complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires the court to inform the defendant that a conviction may have immigration-related consequences.Singh also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing his attorney incorrectly informed him that his plea would only affect his citizenship if he committed another crime. The court rejected this claim, citing lack of evidence that Singh would have chosen to go to trial if he had received different advice from his counsel.Finally, the court rejected Singh's argument that the district court should have held a hearing before ruling on his coram nobis petition, stating that the record clearly showed Singh was not entitled to coram nobis relief. View "United States v. Singh" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) regarding whether a money laundering conspiracy conviction constitutes a "particularly serious crime" that would bar withholding of removal under immigration law.The petitioner, David Annor, a citizen of Ghana and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, had pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, related to a romance fraud scheme. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Annor, who sought withholding of removal and deferral under the Convention Against Torture. The Immigration Judge (IJ) and the BIA both determined that Annor's conviction constituted a "particularly serious crime", thus barring his eligibility for withholding of removal.Upon review, the Fourth Circuit found that the BIA had erred in two ways. Firstly, it had incorrectly applied its own precedent by analysing the elements of the wrong statute, instead of the correct one under which Annor was convicted. Secondly, it failed to consider whether the nature of Annor's offense indicated that he posed a danger to the community, a key factor in determining if a crime is "particularly serious".Consequently, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings in accordance with its opinion. View "Annor v. Garland" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the defendant, Melchor Orozco-Orozco, was appealing his conviction for being a previously removed alien found in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Orozco had previously been removed from the U.S. following a conviction for carjacking under California Penal Code § 215, which had been classified as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).The appellate court examined whether this classification was correct. It found that the California Supreme Court had determined that a person could commit carjacking under § 215 without the intent to steal required by a generic theft offense. This court held that Orozco's carjacking conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony under the INA because § 215 was not a categorical match for a “theft offense.”The appellate court reversed the district court's order denying Orozco's motion to dismiss his indictment in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) and sent the case back to the lower court for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's order denying Orozco's motion to dismiss his indictment on equal protection grounds. View "USA V. OROZCO-OROZCO" on Justia Law