Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves an appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Madera County, California, denying Francisco Carrillo's motion to vacate his conviction and sentence under section 1473.7 of the Penal Code. The motion was based on the claim that Carrillo did not meaningfully understand the adverse immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence.Carrillo, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of assault with a firearm following a trial. He was sentenced to serve 301 days in jail and granted formal probation for five years. However, when Carrillo later admitted to a probation violation and received an additional 90 days in jail, his total term of imprisonment exceeded one year, thereby qualifying his conviction as an "aggravated felony" under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), leading to mandatory deportation.Arguing that he did not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence, Carrillo filed a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence under section 1473.7 of the Penal Code. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Carrillo failed to demonstrate that he suffered prejudicial error due to his lack of understanding, as he did not show a reasonable probability that he would have acted differently had he been aware of the immigration consequences.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's order but modified it to be without prejudice. This means that Carrillo could file another motion asserting grounds not raised in his initial motion. The appellate court agreed that Carrillo did not understand the potential immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence. However, it found that Carrillo failed to prove that this misunderstanding prejudiced his decisions at trial or during his sentencing hearing. View "People v. Carrillo" on Justia Law

The case revolves around an appeal by Karnail Singh, who was charged with using a fraudulently procured passport and making false statements to immigration officials. Singh pleaded guilty to using a fraudulently procured passport in exchange for a lower sentencing range and the dismissal of the false-statement count. After his plea, the government initiated proceedings to revoke his citizenship. In response, Singh petitioned for a writ of coram nobis, requesting the district court to set aside his conviction, arguing he would not have pled guilty had he known his plea could affect his citizenship. The district court denied his petition, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court ruled that Singh's plea was knowing and satisfied due process, regardless of whether he understood it could impact his citizenship. They found that the district court complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires the court to inform the defendant that a conviction may have immigration-related consequences.Singh also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing his attorney incorrectly informed him that his plea would only affect his citizenship if he committed another crime. The court rejected this claim, citing lack of evidence that Singh would have chosen to go to trial if he had received different advice from his counsel.Finally, the court rejected Singh's argument that the district court should have held a hearing before ruling on his coram nobis petition, stating that the record clearly showed Singh was not entitled to coram nobis relief. View "United States v. Singh" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) regarding whether a money laundering conspiracy conviction constitutes a "particularly serious crime" that would bar withholding of removal under immigration law.The petitioner, David Annor, a citizen of Ghana and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, had pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, related to a romance fraud scheme. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Annor, who sought withholding of removal and deferral under the Convention Against Torture. The Immigration Judge (IJ) and the BIA both determined that Annor's conviction constituted a "particularly serious crime", thus barring his eligibility for withholding of removal.Upon review, the Fourth Circuit found that the BIA had erred in two ways. Firstly, it had incorrectly applied its own precedent by analysing the elements of the wrong statute, instead of the correct one under which Annor was convicted. Secondly, it failed to consider whether the nature of Annor's offense indicated that he posed a danger to the community, a key factor in determining if a crime is "particularly serious".Consequently, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings in accordance with its opinion. View "Annor v. Garland" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the defendant, Melchor Orozco-Orozco, was appealing his conviction for being a previously removed alien found in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Orozco had previously been removed from the U.S. following a conviction for carjacking under California Penal Code § 215, which had been classified as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).The appellate court examined whether this classification was correct. It found that the California Supreme Court had determined that a person could commit carjacking under § 215 without the intent to steal required by a generic theft offense. This court held that Orozco's carjacking conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony under the INA because § 215 was not a categorical match for a “theft offense.”The appellate court reversed the district court's order denying Orozco's motion to dismiss his indictment in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) and sent the case back to the lower court for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's order denying Orozco's motion to dismiss his indictment on equal protection grounds. View "USA V. OROZCO-OROZCO" on Justia Law

Kwok Sum Wong, a citizen of China and Hong Kong native, petitioned for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming a decision by an Immigration Judge (IJ) that found him removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The IJ had found Wong removable because he had been “convicted” of “two crimes involving moral turpitude.” Wong's offenses were theft by deception under New Jersey law and second-degree forgery under New York law. The BIA determined that a "conviction" under immigration law hinges on whether the offenses were criminal proceedings with “minimum constitutional protections”, including proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and certain rights such as the right to a speedy trial and protection against double jeopardy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the BIA’s interpretation of “conviction” was not arbitrary or capricious and that the “minimum constitutional protections” test to ascertain a “conviction” retroactively applies to Wong’s case. The court further held that second-degree forgery under New York law is a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT), and that the statutory phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” is not unconstitutionally vague. The court thus denied the petition for review. View "Wong v. Garland" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Loing Yar, a native and citizen of South Sudan who entered the United States as a refugee, appealed an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that denied his claim under the Convention Against Torture for deferral of his removal to South Sudan. Yar was convicted of distributing methamphetamine in the United States, which is considered an aggravated felony, leading to the initiation of removal proceedings against him. Yar sought relief from removal, claiming he would be likely tortured if he was returned to South Sudan due to his membership in the minority Nuer tribe and his relationship to his father, an advocate for South Sudanese independence who died under suspicious circumstances.An immigration judge initially granted deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, but the BIA vacated this decision, concluding that the potential harm identified by the immigration judge did not rise to the level of torture, as defined by the law. The BIA further asserted that the likelihood of detention or imprisonment alone does not amount to torture, and the indeterminate "chance" of future upheaval or ethnic cleansing did not meet the legal standard of "more likely than not" under the regulations implementing the Convention.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied Yar's petition for review, affirming the BIA's decision. The court found no error in the BIA's legal conclusion that Yar failed to establish a likelihood of torture upon return to South Sudan. The court agreed with the BIA's interpretation of the Convention Against Torture, emphasizing that the definition of torture is a legal issue and whether a predicted factual outcome meets the definition of "torture" is a question of law. View "Yar v. Garland" on Justia Law

In this case, Jamie Avila Reyes, the appellant, appealed his 15-year prison sentence for crimes including homicide by vehicle in the first degree and driving under the influence of alcohol. Reyes, an undocumented immigrant, contended that the trial court improperly considered his immigration status during sentencing, violating his due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Reyes also argued that OCGA § 17-10-1.3, a Georgia statute that allows a trial court to consider potential deportation when determining whether to probate a convicted person's sentence, is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to him.The Supreme Court of Georgia held that OCGA § 17-10-1.3 is constitutional. The court found that the statute survived rational basis review because it bears a rational relationship to the legitimate governmental interest in ensuring the complete execution of judicial sentences. The court also held that the trial court did not violate Reyes' due process or equal protection rights when it applied the statute and declined to probate any portion of his sentence due to his impending deportation. The court noted that there was no evidence the trial court based its sentence on discriminatory animus towards undocumented noncitizens. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "REYES v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Israeil Guzman-Maldonado, a lawful permanent resident of the United States and a citizen of Mexico, was convicted of three counts of armed robbery under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 13-1904(A) in 2019. He was sentenced to concurrent eight-year terms for the first two counts and two years of probation for the third. In 2022, an immigration judge ordered Guzman's removal because he had been convicted of an aggravated felony theft offense and two crimes involving moral turpitude not arising from a single scheme. Guzman appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which dismissed his appeal, prompting him to petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The Ninth Circuit denied Guzman's petition for review, concluding that a conviction for armed robbery under A.R.S. § 13-1904(A), for which the term of imprisonment imposed is at least one year, is categorically an aggravated felony theft offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), thereby giving rise to removability. Applying the categorical approach, the court compared the elements of the generic federal crime and of Arizona armed robbery and concluded that Guzman’s conviction under A.R.S. § 13-1904(A) necessarily required proof of each element of generic theft. The court rejected Guzman's arguments that the Arizona statute encompasses "consensual" takings or the theft of services, both of which would have made it broader than generic theft. View "GUZMAN-MALDONADO V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Yahye Herrow, a member of the minority Bandabow Tribe in Somalia, sought review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) denial of his claims for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Herrow, who had been granted asylum in 2000, was ordered to be removed following his 2018 conviction for Conspiracy to Commit Mail Fraud and Wire Fraud. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the BIA's determination that "Repatriated Minority Somalis" did not constitute a cognizable social group for the purpose of withholding of removal. However, the court found that the BIA had failed to consider evidence favorable to Herrow's CAT claim, which contended that he was likely to face torture upon return to Somalia and that the Somali government would acquiesce to such torture. The court granted Herrow's petition in part and remanded the case to the BIA for a more comprehensive review of the evidence related to his CAT claim. View "Herrow v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed an appeal by Evaristo Contreras Silva, a Mexican citizen who was convicted of possession of a firearm by an illegal alien under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5). Silva entered the United States unlawfully and was detained by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2018. He was informed of his illegal status and given an I-94 form. Silva argued that he believed he was lawfully in the U.S. based on the I-94 form and his interactions with immigration officials. In February 2022, Silva was found in possession of a firearm after a domestic violence call from his wife. He was subsequently charged and convicted for firearm possession as an illegal alien.On appeal, Silva argued that the Government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew he was unlawfully in the U.S. when he possessed the firearm. He based his belief on the I-94 form, advice from his immigration attorneys, adherence to his bond conditions, and various applications to change his status after his arrest.However, the court affirmed the conviction, holding that the Government provided sufficient evidence that Silva knew he was in the U.S. unlawfully when he possessed a firearm according to the standard set in Rehaif v. United States. The court considered Silva's unlawful entry, his detention by DHS, his admission of unlawful entry in an application for status adjustment, and the pending status of his immigration applications at the time he possessed the firearm. The court concluded that although there was evidence supporting Silva's belief of lawful presence, it did not justify a judgment of acquittal as the evidence was not definitive and the issue was appropriately presented to the jury. View "United States v. Silva" on Justia Law