Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed an appeal by Evaristo Contreras Silva, a Mexican citizen who was convicted of possession of a firearm by an illegal alien under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5). Silva entered the United States unlawfully and was detained by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2018. He was informed of his illegal status and given an I-94 form. Silva argued that he believed he was lawfully in the U.S. based on the I-94 form and his interactions with immigration officials. In February 2022, Silva was found in possession of a firearm after a domestic violence call from his wife. He was subsequently charged and convicted for firearm possession as an illegal alien.On appeal, Silva argued that the Government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew he was unlawfully in the U.S. when he possessed the firearm. He based his belief on the I-94 form, advice from his immigration attorneys, adherence to his bond conditions, and various applications to change his status after his arrest.However, the court affirmed the conviction, holding that the Government provided sufficient evidence that Silva knew he was in the U.S. unlawfully when he possessed a firearm according to the standard set in Rehaif v. United States. The court considered Silva's unlawful entry, his detention by DHS, his admission of unlawful entry in an application for status adjustment, and the pending status of his immigration applications at the time he possessed the firearm. The court concluded that although there was evidence supporting Silva's belief of lawful presence, it did not justify a judgment of acquittal as the evidence was not definitive and the issue was appropriately presented to the jury. View "United States v. Silva" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the defendant, José Gambino-Ruiz, was convicted and sentenced for illegal re-entry into the U.S. under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Gambino-Ruiz appealed his conviction, arguing that the removal order, which was the basis for his charge, was improper under the Immigration and Nationality Act. He also contested his sentence, claiming that the district judge considered impermissible factors in denying a downward sentencing adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.The Court ruled that Gambino-Ruiz was properly subject to expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) and therefore did not violate his due process rights when he was removed via expedited proceedings in 2013. He was properly convicted of illegal re-entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Furthermore, the Court affirmed his sentence, ruling that Gambino-Ruiz did not demonstrate that his was a rare circumstance where the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility is due after the defendant has proceeded to trial.The facts of the case are as follows: Gambino-Ruiz, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. illegally several times. Each time, he was apprehended by border patrol agents and subsequently deported through expedited removal proceedings. In 2020, he was again found in the U.S. illegally and was charged with illegal re-entry of a removed alien. His motions to dismiss the charges and to suppress his admissions to the border patrol agents were denied, leading to a trial where he was found guilty. At sentencing, Gambino-Ruiz's request for a downward sentencing adjustment for acceptance of responsibility was denied, leading to his appeal. View "USA V. GAMBINO-RUIZ" on Justia Law

The court case involves defendants Juan Alberto Ortiz-Orellana and Minor Perez-Chach, who were convicted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering statute (VICAR). Ortiz and Perez were part of a gang known as MS-13 and were separately charged with murders related to their involvement in the gang in Maryland. Ortiz was also convicted of VICAR conspiracy to commit murder, discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and murder resulting from the same crime. Perez, on the other hand, was also convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, and an alien in possession of a firearm and ammunition. Both defendants appealed their convictions and sentences.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the government seizure of historical cell site location information (CSLI) without a warrant did not violate the defendants' Fourth Amendment rights due to the good faith exception. The court also upheld the use of summary exhibits and denied the defendants' claim that their sentences were substantially unreasonable. The court agreed with Ortiz that his firearm convictions must be vacated because the underlying offenses for each VICAR count could not qualify as a "crime of violence" after a recent ruling. The court also rejected Ortiz's claim that his RICO and VICAR convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. As a result, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for resentencing on certain counts. View "US v. Ortiz-Orellana" on Justia Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, a foreign service officer and a non-citizen were convicted of conspiring to fraudulently obtain U.S. citizenship for the non-citizen and making false statements in the process. The defendants, Laura Anne Gallagher and Andrey Nikolayevich Kalugin, were married in 2015. They were accused of conspiring to achieve naturalization and proof of citizenship for Kalugin by making false statements and submitting fraudulent documents. The jury found them guilty on all counts. On appeal, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support each defendant’s convictions. However, it found that the jury was allowed to consider a legally inadequate theory on one count and an erroneous evidentiary ruling prevented the defendants from offering certain evidence on the remaining two counts. As a result, the court vacated the convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "US v. Gallagher" on Justia Law

In the case reviewed, Mario Gonzalez-Godinez was convicted for attempted illegal entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) after being found near a border fence and admitting to being a Mexican citizen without documentation. After his arrest, a Border Patrol agent read him his Miranda rights as well as his immigration-related administrative rights. Gonzalez waived both sets of rights and then confessed to having been smuggled across the border. Gonzalez argued on appeal that the Miranda warning was inadequate and his conviction should be vacated under the corpus delicti doctrine. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected both arguments.Firstly, the court ruled that the Miranda warning was not inadequate despite also warning Gonzalez that the post-arrest interview may be his only chance to seek asylum. While these two warnings may have posed difficult decisions for Gonzalez, the court found them to be neither contradictory nor confusing. The court held that the government did not need to provide further clarification to the Miranda warning.Secondly, the court held that the corpus delicti doctrine, which requires some evidence to support a confession, did not require vacating Gonzalez's conviction. The court found that sufficient evidence supported Gonzalez’s confession, as he had twice admitted to being a Mexican citizen and his behavior at the border supported his confession. Thus, the court affirmed Gonzalez’s conviction. View "USA V. GONZALEZ-GODINEZ" on Justia Law

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the defendant, William Klensch, appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to one count of transportation of an illegal alien. Klensch argued that he was entitled to a minor-role reduction in his sentencing, contending that he had no knowledge of the full smuggling operation and was paid only a small sum for his part. The district court denied this reduction because Klensch was the one physically transporting the individuals. However, the appellate court ruled that the district court did not apply the correct legal standard in denying a minor-role reduction, as the court did not conduct a proper comparative analysis of Klensch’s conduct. The court noted that the district court's explanation did not indicate it considered the factors required for a minor-role reduction. As such, the appellate court vacated Klensch’s sentence and remanded for resentencing in regard to the minor-role reduction.Additionally, Klensch argued that the district court erred by imposing a dangerous-weapons enhancement because he did not possess the stun gun in his car in connection with his illegal smuggling activity. The appellate court rejected this argument, as Klensch acknowledged having the stun gun within his reach while transporting the two men. The court ruled that even if the district court applied an incorrect standard of proof by not requiring the Government to prove a nexus to the stun gun, this error was harmless. As such, the district court's imposition of the dangerous-weapons enhancement was affirmed. View "USA V. KLENSCH" on Justia Law

Kibambe Mwendapeke, a permanent resident of the United States and a citizen of the Congo, was convicted of complicity to robbery in the first degree under Kentucky law. Later, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Mwendapeke based on his conviction. He appealed, arguing that his conviction should not categorize him as an "aggravated felon," which would render him removable. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that Mwendapeke's conviction is indeed a categorical match for an "aggravated felony."The court applied the categorical approach to determine whether Mwendapeke's crime was a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), a requirement for classification as an "aggravated felony." The court found that Kentucky’s first-degree robbery statute, under which Mwendapeke was convicted, meets the level of force and has the required mens rea, or state of mind, for a "crime of violence" under § 16(a). The court also concluded that Kentucky’s complicity statute is not overbroad with respect to generic aiding-and-abetting liability. Therefore, the court ruled that Mwendapeke's conviction constituted an aggravated felony, making him removable. The court denied his petition for review. View "Mwendapeke v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

Zheng and Wu owned and operated the Tokyo Dragon restaurant, where they employed noncitizens who were working in the U.S. illegally. In 2017, Homeland Security received a tip from a nurse who suspected that they were human trafficking. Agents executed a warrant at Tokyo Dragon and discovered that the business had not filed any government paperwork with respect to the noncitizens’ employment. Four Hispanic men lived in the basement of Zheng and Wu’s home. The owners transported the men to and from work every day and to the grocery store weekly, paying them in cash. Other employees were paid by check. A Mexican citizen testified he began working as a Tokyo Dragon cook in 2015, generally working six or seven days a week for 11-12 hours per day; he did not interact with customers. Zheng instructed the noncitizens that they “should not go outside” the house and should not make noise, to avoid being deported.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Zheng and Wu on four counts of harboring illegal noncitizens for commercial gain, 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). The court rejected arguments that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the meaning of “harboring” by not including a requirement that the defendants acted intentionally and knowingly in shielding the illegal noncitizens from law enforcement and invaded the province of the jury by giving examples of “harboring.” View "United States v. Zheng" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks a review of an April 20, 2022, decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming a decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordering her removal and denying her application for cancellation of removal after determining she had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”). That conviction, for abuse of a corpse in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated (“ACA”) Section 5-60-101, stemmed from concealing her child’s body in a closet after he was murdered. In her petition for review, Petitioner argued that the BIA and IJ erred because her conviction under ACA Section 5-60-101 is not categorically a CIMT.   The Second Circuit granted the petition, vacated the BIA’s order of removal and remanded. The court explained that the language of ACA Section 5-60-101(a)(1) allows someone to be convicted if he or she knowingly “removes” or “disinters” a corpse, no matter the reason and without regard to whether it is done in a manner offensive to a person of reasonable sensibilities. The court explained that the broad language makes it clear that one can be convicted under the statute for conduct that is not “inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in general.” Thus, because ACA Section 5-60-101 criminalizes conduct that is not invariably vile or depraved, a conviction under the statute cannot categorically be considered a CIMT. The BIA did not conduct an elements-based categorical inquiry. Instead, it applied an inapposite “realistic probability” test. View "Giron-Molina v. Garland" on Justia Law

The San Bernardino County District Attorney (the District Attorney) appealed a trial court order granting Karla Coca’s petition under Penal Code section 1473.7 to vacate a misdemeanor conviction. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded Coca failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that “the conviction . . . being challenged is currently causing or has the potential to cause removal or the denial of an application for an immigration benefit, lawful status, or naturalization.” The Court accordingly reversed the order. View "California v. Coca" on Justia Law