Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a Mexican citizen, petitioned for habeas relief after being held in immigration detention for over a year without a bond hearing. A district court judge granted Petitioner’s petition for relief and ordered the Government to provide her with a bond hearing on statutory grounds, relying on Casas-Castrillon v. Department of Homeland Security, 535 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2008). The Government appealed on the ground that Casas-Castrillon is no longer good law.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of habeas relief and remand for consideration of Petitioner’s remaining constitutional argument. The court explained that t Jennings’s reasoning is “clearly irreconcilable” with Casas-Castrillon’s detention-shifting framework and held that Jennings abrogated this portion of Casas-Castrillon. Next, the panel explained that Subsection A provides the Government with authority to detain noncitizens “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States” and that Jennings provides that Subsection C authorizes detention during the same period as Subsection A, but does not define that period. The panel looked to Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2008), and held that detention authority under Subsection A continues through judicial review. The panel held that the authority under Subsection C likewise continues through judicial review. Finally, the district court declined to reach Petitioner’s alternative argument that she was entitled to habeas relief as a matter of due process. The panel remanded to the district court to consider this question in the first instance. View "LEXIS HERNANDEZ AVILEZ V. MERRICK GARLAND, ET AL" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming Petitioner's order of removal and denying his application for adjustment of status, holding that a conviction under Mass. Gen. Laws (MGL) ch. 269, 11C is not categorically a firearm offense, as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(c).Petitioner, a citizen of El Salvador, pleaded guilty in Massachusetts state court to defacing or receiving a firearm with a defaced serial number in violation of MGL ch. 269, 11C. The Department of Homeland Security later initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner charging him with removal based solely on his Massachusetts state court conviction. Petitioner moved to terminate the proceedings on the grounds that his Massachusetts conviction did not qualify as a removable firearm offense. The immigration judge sustained the removability charge and denied Petitioner's ensuing application to adjust his status. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit vacated the BIA's opinion and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that MGL ch. 269, 11C was facially overbroad when compared to its federal counterpart. View "Portillo v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for panel rehearing and denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc in a case in which the panel held that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the discretionary determination that a particular noncitizen in immigration detention poses a danger to the community, and so is not entitled to release on bond. Judge Berzon, joined by Chief Judge Murguia and Judges Wardlaw, W. Fletcher, Paez, Christen, Hurwitz, Koh, Sung, Mendoza, and Desai, disagreed with the Court’s refusal to reconsider the panel opinion en banc. View "JAVIER MARTINEZ V. LOWELL CLARK, ET AL" on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen of Mexico, was indicted for illegally reentering the United States following prior removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. Section 1326. He successfully moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that Section 1326 violates the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment and is, therefore, facially invalid.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court wrote that Defendant did not carry his burden of proving that Section 1326 was enacted with the intent to be discriminatory towards Mexicans and other Central and South Americans. The court held that the district court erred factually and legally in holding otherwise. Further, the court reasoned that Defendant’s equal protection challenge fails even under the usual test for assessing such claims set forth in Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the panel declined to address whether immigration laws should be evaluated through a more deferential framework. As drafted, Section 1326 is facially neutral as to race. The panel, therefore, turned to the question of whether Defendant carried his burden of showing that racial discrimination was a motivating factor in enacting Section 1326. The panel disagreed with Defendant’s argument that a Senate Report, the basis for the 1952 legislation, is replete with racism. The panel held that the district court clearly erred when it relied on Congress’s decision to override President Truman’s veto of the INA as evidence that Section 1326 was enacted in part by discriminatory animus. View "USA V. GUSTAVO CARRILLO-LOPEZ" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for attempted illegal reentry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. Section 1326. He contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss his information for violations of the Speedy Trial Act.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in excluding periods of delay resulting from ends-of-justice continuances granted due to events caused by the global COVID-19 pandemic. The panel concluded that the district court complied with the applicable statutory requirements. First, the district court’s finding that the ends of justice were best served by granting continuances during the period from August 14, 2020, until December 1, 2020, was timely because the district court put this finding on the record during the July 12, 2021, hearing on Defendant’s motion to dismiss under 18 U.S.C. Section 3162(a)(2). The continuances were also specifically limited in time to successive 30-day periods. Next, the district court made the requisite findings under Section 3161(h)(7)(A). The panel rejected Defendant’s argument that the district court erred by not dismissing his information on the ground that 8 U.S.C. Section 1326 violates the Equal Protection Clause. View "USA V. ARMANDO OROZCO-BARRON" on Justia Law

The Government removed Appellant from the United States. Back in his home country, Appellant filed a habeas petition, arguing that his removal was unlawful. The district court dismissed Appellant’s petition. It concluded that habeas proceedings are available only to those in government custody. Because Appellant did not file his petition until he was back home and out of custody, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear his case. Appellant appealed to the DC Circuit.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that an alien may seek judicial review of an expedited removal order in “habeas corpus proceedings.” And habeas corpus proceedings are available only to those in custody. Here, Appellant was not in custody. So the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider his habeas petition. Further, the court noted that it cannot adopt an extreme-circumstances exception because it has no statutory basis. The court wrote that creating exceptions to jurisdictional rules is a job for Congress, not the courts. View "I.M. v. United States Customs and Border Protection" on Justia Law

Banuelos-Jimenez, a native and citizen of Mexico, arrived in the U.S. in 1999. DHS began removal proceedings in 2010. Those proceedings were administratively closed and re-calendared at the Department’s request. In 2017, Arkansas police arrested Banuelos-Jimenez following a “screaming” incident with his wife. He pleaded guilty to, third-degree assault on a family or household member. DHS re-initiated removal proceedings.Banuelos-Jimenez applied for cancellation of removal. An IJ denied his application, concluding that the Arkansas statute was a crime of violence: Banuelos-Jimenez acted at least recklessly and that “crimes of violence” encompass not only crimes that require specific intent but also reckless conduct. The BIA affirmed. Despite the Supreme Court’s 2021 “Borden” holding that a crime of violence does not encompass reckless conduct, the BIA concluded that Banuelos-Jimenez’s conviction was a crime of violence—his conduct was also purposeful and necessarily involved a threat of force capable of causing physical pain or injury. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. The Arkansas conviction is categorically a crime of violence because it involves the “threatened use of force against the person of another,” 18 U.S.C. 16(a). While the statute may not require the perpetrator to intend actual harm, he still intends to threaten harm. View "Banuelos-Jimenez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Caldera-Torres, a citizen of Mexico in the U.S. without permission, sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(4), 1229b(b)(1). To be eligible for that relief an alien must show that he has not been convicted of a crime of domestic violence. Caldera-Torres has a Wisconsin conviction for battery, arising from an attack on the mother of his daughter. An IJ and the BIA concluded that this conviction makes Caldera-Torres ineligible.The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting Caldera-Torres’s argument that, although Wis. Stat. 940.19(1) qualifies as a federal “crime of violence,” it is not a crime of domestic violence, because the victim’s identity is not an element of the offense. Section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) does not say or imply that the “protected person” aspect of the definition must be an element of the crime. It is enough that the victim’s status as a “protected person” be established. A “crime of domestic violence” is a generic “crime of violence” plus the victim’s status as a “protected person.” All other circuits that have addressed section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) recently have held that the victim’s status as a “protected person” need not be an element of the crime of conviction. It is irrelevant how Wisconsin classified Caldera-Torres’s conviction for its own purposes. View "Caldera-Torres v. Garland" on Justia Law

Appellants are both citizens of Venezuela. They were both admitted to the United States as nonimmigrant visitors and remained in the United States beyond the expiration of their authorization to remain. Appellants filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. Section 2241 following their criminal convictions. The district courts granted both Petitions. However, Appellants challenged the denial of attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that since “a habeas corpus proceeding is neither a wholly criminal nor a wholly civil action, but rather a hybrid action that is unique, a category unto itself,” it is not purely a civil action, and the EAJA does not authorize attorney’s fees for successful 28 U.S.C. Section 2241 motions. Accordingly, the court wrote that it does not need to reach the issue of whether the Government was substantially justified in its actions. View "Castro Balza v. Garland" on Justia Law

Appellants are both citizens of Venezuela. They were both admitted to the United States as nonimmigrant visitors and remained in the United States beyond the expiration of their authorization to remain. Appellants filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. Section 2241 following their criminal convictions. The district courts granted both Petitions. However, Appellants challenged the denial of attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that since “a habeas corpus proceeding is neither a wholly criminal nor a wholly civil action, but rather a hybrid action that is unique, a category unto itself,” it is not purely a civil action, and the EAJA does not authorize attorney’s fees for successful 28 U.S.C. Section 2241 motions. Accordingly, the court wrote that it does not need to reach the issue of whether the Government was substantially justified in its actions. View "Gomez Barco v. Witte" on Justia Law