Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Bonds posted a $200,000 bail bond for Quinones-Arias. North was the surety and guaranteed the defendant’s appearance. Quinones-Arias did not appear at a plea hearing on December 17, 2018. The court declared the bond forfeited and issued a $200,000 bench warrant. A notice of forfeiture was mailed to the companies, advising that the forfeiture would become final on July 14, 2019 (180 days plus five days for mailing) unless the defendant is surrendered. On July 8, 2019, Bonds moved to toll the 180-day period based on temporary disability (Pen. Code 1305(e)), or alternatively to extend the time to return Quinones-Arias to court. (1305.4), arguing that Quinones-Arias’s detention and deportation constituted a temporary disability. A bail agent is entitled to tolling during a period of disability and for a reasonable time thereafter. The prosecutor stated that the Department of Homeland Security indicated that Quinones-Arias was not deported but voluntarily departed. The court denied the motion, finding that Quinones-Arias had voluntarily left the country and the bail agent had made no effort to return or surrender Quinones-Arias, or request his extradition.The court of appeal reversed, noting the state’s concession that Quinones-Arias was under a temporary disability when he failed to appear and the disability continued throughout the 180-day appearance period. View "People v. North River Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Defendant believes that the statute criminalizing reentry into this country after removal violates his equal-protection rights. See 8 U.S.C. Section 1326(a), (b). He did not raise this issue before the district court. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and denied the pending motion for judicial notice.   The court explained that even constitutional arguments can be forfeited. Forfeiture occurs when a party has an argument available but fails to assert it in time. The court wrote that failure to raise an equal-protection challenge before the district court is a classic example of forfeiture. During the six months before he pleaded guilty, Defendant filed more than a dozen motions raising all sorts of issues, but not one of them questioned the constitutionality of the illegal-reentry statute or mentioned equal protection. Had he done so, the district court would have had an opportunity to potentially correct or avoid the alleged] mistake in the first place.   The court explained that under these circumstances, Defendant’s constitutional argument receives, at most, plain-error review. Here, to succeed, Defendant’ had to show, among other things, that there was a clear or obvious error under current law. In this case, there is one district court case on his side, see Carillo-Lopez, 555 F. Supp. 3d at 1001, but at most it shows that the issue is subject to reasonable dispute. The court explained that picking one side of a reasonable dispute cannot be clearly or obviously wrong. View "United States v. Salvador Nunez-Hernandez" on Justia Law

The United States appealed from the district court’s dismissal of an indictment charging Defendant with illegal reentry after removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. Section 1326. According to the district court, defects in the notice to appear (“NTA”)—which initiated the immigration proceedings against Defendant resulting in his eventual removal from the United States— deprived the immigration court of subject matter jurisdiction to effect the removal in the first place, rendering the entire immigration proceeding “void ab initio.”   The Ninth Circuit held, consistent with precedent and that of every other circuit to consider this issue, that the failure of an NTA to include time and date information does not deprive the immigration court of subject matter jurisdiction, and thus the defendant’s removal was not “void ab initio,” as the district court determined.   The court explained that hat 8 C.F.R. Section 1003.14(a)—a regulation by which the Attorney General purported to condition the “jurisdiction” of immigration courts upon the filing of a charging document, including NTAs—is a claim-processing rule not implicating the court’s adjudicatory authority. The en banc court read Section 1003.14(a)’s reference to “jurisdiction” in a purely colloquial sense. The en banc court wrote that although the statutory definition of an NTA requires the date and time of the removal hearing, 8 U.S.C. Section 1229(a)(1)(G)(i), this provision chiefly concerns the notice the government must provide noncitizens regarding their removal proceedings, not the authority of immigration courts to conduct those proceedings. View "USA V. JUAN BASTIDE-HERNANDEZ" on Justia Law

In 2014, Defendant was convicted of one count of injuring a cohabitant resulting in a traumatic condition under Penal Code section 273.5 after he entered a guilty plea to the offense. Shortly after his conviction, Defendant sought to revoke his plea on the ground that he wanted to secure an "immigration safe" plea, as he was fearful that a felony conviction would impact his status as a lawful permanent resident. The court denied Defendant's request.Subsequently, Defendant filed another motion to vacate under Penal Code section 1473.7, claiming that he would not have taken the plea had he known about the immigration consequences. Despite the prosecution agreeing to offer Defendant a misdemeanor in lieu of a felony, the court rejected Defendant's request. Defendant appealed.The Second Appellate District reversed. Section 1473.7 permits a court to grant a motion to vacate based on prejudicial error that doesn't necessarily rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court held that Defendant demonstrated prejudicial error under Penal Code 1473.7 based on 1.) counsel's failure to advise him of the immigration consequences of his plea, 2.) counsel's failure to defend against deportation, and 3.) Defendant's subjective understanding of the consequences of his plea. Thus, the lower court erred in denying Defendant's motion to vacate. View "P. v. Manzanilla" on Justia Law

Aguirre-Zuniga’s family immigrated from Mexico to the U.S. when he was three years old. He is now raising his own six-year-old daughter, an American citizen in Indiana. He became a lawful permanent resident 15 years ago. His primary language is English, and he has visited Mexico only three times since emigrating. In 2018, he pled guilty to the delivery of methamphetamine in Indiana. DHS concluded that his conviction was an aggravated felony subjecting him to deportation, and the Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals agreed.The Seventh Circuit vacated. The Indiana law prohibiting the delivery of methamphetamine criminalizes more conduct than the corresponding federal law given that Indiana defines “methamphetamine” in a way federal law does not. When a state statute is broader than its federal counterpart, a conviction under that statute cannot trigger a noncitizen’s deportation. View "Aguirre-Zuniga v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner was detained under 8 U.S.C. Section 1226(c), which provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens with certain criminal convictions. After Petitioner filed a habeas petition, the district court ordered that he receive a bond hearing, reasoning that his prolonged mandatory detention violated due process. An IJ denied bond, and the BIA affirmed. The district court asserted jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claims but denied habeas relief.   Affirming in part and vacating in part the Ninth Circuit held that: 1) federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the discretionary determination of whether a particular noncitizen poses a danger to the community such that he is not entitled to bond; and 2) the district court correctly denied Petitioner’s claims that the BIA erred or violated due process in denying bond.   The court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the determination that Petitioner posed a danger to the community, concluding that dangerousness is a discretionary determination covered by the judicial review bar of 8 U.S.C. Section 1226(e). In concluding that the dangerousness determination is discretionary, the court observed that the only guidance as to what it means to be a “danger to the community” is an agency-created multifactorial analysis with no clear, uniform standard for what crosses the line into dangerousness. As to Petitioner’s remaining claims, the court concluded that the district court had jurisdiction to review them as constitutional claims or questions of law not covered by Section1226(e), but agreed with the district court that they must be denied. View "JAVIER MARTINEZ V. LOWELL CLARK" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with felony counts of sale/transportation/offer to sell a controlled substance (count 1) and possession for sale of a controlled substance (count 2). He pled guilty to count 1, offer to sell oxycodone in exchange for 36 months of formal probation with the service of 180 days in county jail. Count 2 was dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. Defendant’s attorney and the trial court advised him at that time that he would be deported based on his negotiated plea. Seven years later he found himself the subject of deportation proceedings.   The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction. The trial court factually found Defendant's credibility to be “severely lacking,” and his declaration was “deceptively phrased” to mislead the court that counsel had not recommended Defendant meet with an immigration attorney when counsel had, in fact, consulted with Defendant's immigration attorney.   The Second Appellate District affirmed and found that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion. The court explained that the plain and unambiguous language contained in the Felony Disposition Statement states: “If I am not a citizen and am pleading guilty to . . . a controlled substance offense, . . . I will be deported.”  The court explained that even on independent review, Defendant’s contentions fail. At the time of the plea proceeding, Defendant had lived in the United States for approximately seven years with his family. The contemplation of his life in Mexico, contemporaneous with his guilty plea, is persuasive evidence Defendant knew he would be deported. View "P. v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to 36 months in prison to be followed by five years of supervised release after pleading guilty to illegal reentry. As a special condition of release, the district court required that Defendant be turned over to immigration authorities upon his release and that he be deported to Mexico. If immigration authorities were unwilling to take Defendant, the court required he self-deport.Defendant challenged the special condition of release requiring he self-deport. The government conceded that the district court committed plain error. The Fifth Circuit remanded for entry of a new written judgment without the special condition requiring Defendant to depart the United States. View "USA v. Badillo" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted in Texas state court of the felony offense of injury to a child, in violation of Texas Penal Code Section 22.04(a)(3). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear (NTA), charging him with removability under 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), as an alien who, at any time after admission, was convicted of a crime of child abuse. After a hearing, the IJ denied Petitioner’s request for cancellation of removal, ordered him removed, and denied his request for voluntary departure. The BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal, denied his requests for cancellation of removal or voluntary departure, and ordered his removal. Petitioner then submitted a petition for review to the Fifth Circuit.   The Fifth Circuit denied in part Petitioner’s petition. Petitioner’s motion to terminate “squarely presented” the issue of the statute’s divisibility. Thus, the court held that the BIA did not err in rejecting Petitioner’s claim that the IJ impermissibly ruled on the divisibility issue. Further, based on Section 22.04(a)’s text, relevant state court cases, Texas’ pattern jury instructions, and the record of prior conviction itself, the court held that Section 22.04(a) is divisible as to victim class. Because the statute is divisible, the court applied the modified categorical approach to see which offense, under Section 22.04(a), is the crime of conviction. In so doing, the court looked to Petitioner’s indictment and the judicial confession entered on his guilty plea. Reviewing those documents, it is apparent that Petitioner was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, causing bodily injury to a child. View "Monsonyem v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1349. He was sentenced to one year and one day of imprisonment and ordered to pay $229,717.30 in restitution.   The government served Petitioner with a notice to appear, charging him with removability pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony. Specifically, the government invoked Section 1101(a)(43)(M) & (U), alleging that Petitioner was convicted of “an offense that involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000,” and “an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described in section 101(a)(43)(M) of the Act.” Petitioner applied for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).   Petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA found no error in the IJ’s decision and dismissed the appeal. The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition in part and dismissed in part.   The court explained Pursuant to Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.” Section 1101(a)(43)(M) defines an “aggravated felony” as “an offense that—(i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000,” and § 1101(a)(43)(U) extends the definition of “aggravated felony” to “an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described in this paragraph.” Here, Petitioner’s order of restitution for $229,717.30—which reflects the amount owed within the judgment for his fraud conspiracy conviction— provides clear and convincing evidence of the losses to his victims. View "Osei Fosu v. Garland" on Justia Law