Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

In November 2017, Saul Cisneros was charged with two misdemeanor offenses and jailed. The court set Cisneros’s bond at $2,000, and Cisneros’s daughter posted that bond four days later, but the County Sheriff’s Office did not release him. Instead, pursuant to Sheriff Bill Elder’s policies and practices, the Sheriff’s Office notified U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) that the jail had been asked to release Cisneros on bond. ICE then sent the jail a detainer and administrative warrant, requesting that the jail continue to detain Cisneros because ICE suspected that he was removable from the United States. Cisneros was placed on an indefinite “ICE hold,” and remained in detention. During his detention, Cisneros, along with another pretrial detainee, initiated a class action in state court against Sheriff Elder, in his official capacity, for declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the appellate court erred in concluding that section 24-10-106(1.5)(b), C.R.S. (2021), of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (“CGIA”) did not waive sovereign immunity for intentional torts that result from the operation of a jail for claimants who were incarcerated but not convicted. The Supreme Court concluded section 24-10-106(1.5)(b) waived immunity for such intentional torts. "In reaching this determination, we conclude that the statutory language waiving immunity for 'claimants who are incarcerated but not yet convicted' and who 'can show injury due to negligence' sets a floor, not a ceiling. To hold otherwise would mean that a pre-conviction claimant could recover for injuries resulting from the negligent operation of a jail but not for injuries resulting from the intentionally tortious operation of the same jail, an absurd result that we cannot countenance." Accordingly, the judgment of the division below was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Cisneros v. Elder" on Justia Law

In November 2017, Saul Cisneros was charged with two misdemeanor offenses and jailed. The court set Cisneros’s bond at $2,000, and Cisneros’s daughter posted that bond four days later, but the El Paso County Sheriff’s Office did not release Cisneros. Instead, the Sheriff’s Office notified U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) that the jail had been asked to release Cisneros on bond. ICE then sent the jail a detainer and administrative warrant, requesting that the jail continue to detain Cisneros because ICE suspected that he was removable from the United States. Cisneros was then placed on an indefinite “ICE hold,” and remained detained. The jail subsequently advised Cisneros’s daughter that the Sheriff’s Office would not release her father due to the ICE hold, and she ultimately recovered the bond money that she had posted. During his detention, Cisneros, along with another pretrial detainee, initiated a class action in state court against Sheriff Elder, in his official capacity, for declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief. Their complaint alleged that Sheriff Elder did not have the authority under state law to continue to hold pretrial detainees in custody when Colorado law required their release, nor did he have the authority to deprive persons of their liberty based on suspicion of civil violations of federal immigration law. Cisneros also asserted a tort claim against Sheriff Elder, seeking damages for false imprisonment, but he subsequently filed an amended complaint in which he did not reassert that claim, stating that he intended to file the requisite notice of such a claim under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (“CGIA”) and to reassert that claim at the proper time. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the district court erred in concluding that section 24-10-106(1.5)(b), C.R.S. (2021), of the CGIA did not waive sovereign immunity for intentional torts that result from the operation of a jail for claimants who were incarcerated but not convicted. The Supreme Court concluded section 24-10-106(1.5)(b) waived immunity for such intentional torts. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the division below and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cisneros v. Elder" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for cancellation of removal. The court agreed with petitioner that he satisfied his burden of demonstrating his eligibility for cancellation of removal for certain lawful permanent residents because his violation of Fla. Stat. 893.13(6)(a) did not relate to a controlled substance, as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802, and thus did not prevent him from accruing the necessary seven-year period of continuous residence.The court explained that, because a violation of section 893.13(6)(a) did not relate to a controlled substance as defined under federal law, petitioner's conviction under this statute in 2017 did not affect his ability to accrue the required seven years of continuous eligibility necessary for cancellation of removal. Rather, petitioner's residence "clock" stopped in 2019 when he was arrested for fleeing and eluding while lights and sirens were activated. The court explained that, at this point in time, petitioner had lived in the United States continuously for eight years, thereby meeting the residency requirement under INA 240A. View "Fuad Fares Fuad Said v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's determination that petitioner was removeable. The IJ concluded that petitioner's conviction for burglary of an unoccupied dwelling, Fla. Stat. 810.02(3)(b), is a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT).The court explained that Florida has applied section 810.02(3)(b) to a dwelling which was not occupied prior to or after the entry, State v. Bennett, 565 So. 2d 803, 805 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), and that application impacts whether a violation of section 810.02(3)(b) is a CIMT. However, neither the IJ nor the BIA address petitioner's impact of Bennett here. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for the BIA to address Bennett under the realistic probability component of the categorical approach. View "Lauture v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit concluded that, under its precedents, there can be no doubt that a Notice to Appear that omits information regarding the time and date of the initial removal hearing is nevertheless adequate to vest jurisdiction in the Immigration Court, so long as a notice specifying this information is later sent to the alien. The court also concluded that using a false document in connection with petitioner's application for a U.S. passport, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a), requires that an offender make a material misrepresentation with the intent to impair the efficiency and lawful functioning of the government, and thus it is a crime involving moral turpitude that renders petitioner ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's motion to terminate removal proceedings and his application for cancellation of removal. View "Cupete v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part a petition challenging petitioner's removability based on an aggravated felony conviction under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for attempting to launder money in violation of Tennessee law. The court concluded that only two of petitioner's five claims in his petition for review have been exhausted. The court also concluded that Tennessee Code section 39- 14- 903(b)(1) was divisible by subsection in light of Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248–49 (2016). Finally, the court concluded that the BIA did not err in concluding that Subsection (b) was a categorical match with the generic crime of money laundering. View "Fakhuri v. Garland" on Justia Law

In connection with his leading role in a Chinese construction company in 2010-2016, Zhong was convicted of forced-labor conspiracy 18 U.S.C. 1594(b); forced labor, section 1589(a) and (b); concealing passports and immigration documents in connection with forced labor, section 1592(a); alien smuggling conspiracy, 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I); and visa fraud conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371.The Second Circuit vacated in part. The district court committed evidentiary errors that may have affected the jury’s decision to convict Zhong on the three forced-labor counts. The court allowed testimony about 2001-2002 preindictment conduct, preventing Zhong’s attempts to impeach a witness by offering evidence of the witness’s reputation for truthfulness, and permitting expert witness testimony that exceeded its proper scope. .Those errors were unconnected to Zhong’s other two counts. The government presented sufficient evidence to allow a jury to convict him on the alien smuggling and visa fraud counts. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give an “adverse but legitimate consequences” jury instruction regarding threats made to the workers. View "United States v. Zhong" on Justia Law

In 2019, the Fifth Circuit affirmed Fuentes-Rodriguez’s sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to illegal reentry into the U.S. following deportation and having been previously convicted of an aggravated felony. The court held that his prior Texas conviction qualified as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16. While his petition was pending, the Supreme Court decided in "Borden" that a crime capable of commission with “a less culpable mental state than purpose or knowledge,” such as “recklessness,” cannot qualify as a “violent felony” under 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(I), the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).On remand from the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit vacated. Fuentes-Rodriguez’s underlying Texas conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony only through 18 U.S.C. 16(a), which defines a “crime of violence” almost identically to the ACCA’s “violent felony” provision at issue in Borden. Fuentes-Rodriguez should not have been sentenced under 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)(2) because Texas’s family-violence assault can be committed recklessly. His conviction falls within 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)(1), which covers illegal reentry after conviction for a non-aggravated felony. The district court’s judgment should be reformed because section 1326(b)(2) is associated with worse collateral consequences than section 1326(b)(1). Remanding the case for entry of an amended judgment, reflecting that Fuentes-Rodriguez was convicted and sentenced under 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)(1) as an “Alien Unlawfully Found in the United States after Deportation, Having Previously Been Convicted of a Felony,” will reduce the risk of future confusion. View "United States v. Fuentes-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Chamu, born in Mexico, entered the U.S. without inspection in 1990. In 2003, he was pleaded guilty to cocaine possession under Florida law; 14 years later, in removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(I), Chamu applied for cancellation of removal, alleging that his mother and children would suffer exceptional hardship.Cancellation is unavailable for those who have been convicted of a state offense “relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21)” of the U.S. Code, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C), 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Section 802 defines “controlled substance” as any substance included in federal controlled substance schedules. Chamu unsuccessfully sought to have his Florida cocaine possession conviction vacated, then argued that the Florida statute was too broad to bar his cancellation request. The IJ and BIA rejected his argument, reasoning that Chamu had not shown a realistic probability that the Florida statute would be enforced more broadly than the federal statutes. The Eleventh Circuit agreed. Florida’s definition of cocaine may not be completely consistent with the federal definition but Chamu failed to prove that it covers more substances. No illicit-nature mens rea is necessary to trigger removal consequences for offenses listed under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) and 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). View "Chamu v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit dismissed a petition for review of the BIA's decision finding petitioner subject to removal because he committed two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs) under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). After determining that res judicata does not bar the proceedings, the court concluded that petitioner's conviction for deadly conduct qualified as a CIMT because reckless offenses may constitute CIMTs and deadly conduct, which requires an offender to take actions creating imminent danger or serious physical injury, is categorically a CIMT. The court also concluded that petitioner's 2005 adjustment to lawful permanent resident status constitutes the operative admission for purposes of this removal proceeding under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). Therefore, because petitioner's convictions for deadly conduct and evading arrest occurred after he adjusted his status, he has been convicted of two CIMTs after admission to the United States. View "Diaz Esparza v. Garland" on Justia Law