Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

A Nigerian citizen who became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 2005 was placed in removal proceedings after being convicted of conspiracy to commit passport fraud. He had lived in the U.S. for many years, had a long-term partner, and was the father of four U.S. citizen children. His conviction stemmed from a scheme to obtain fraudulent U.S. passports for noncitizens, for which he was sentenced to 27 months in prison. After serving his sentence and briefly fleeing to Canada, he was returned to the U.S. and charged as inadmissible for committing a crime involving moral turpitude. In removal proceedings, he applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming past persecution and fear of future harm in Nigeria due to his former union activities and threats from a militia group.An Immigration Judge (IJ) found him inadmissible, denied all forms of relief, and determined that his conviction constituted a particularly serious crime, barring asylum and withholding. The IJ also found his and his partner’s testimony not credible and denied CAT relief, concluding he had not shown a likelihood of torture with government acquiescence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, agreeing with the IJ’s findings and further holding that the absence of an interpreter did not violate due process, that the conviction was a particularly serious crime, and that he was not eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the BIA misapplied the legal standard for determining a particularly serious crime by failing to consider the elements of the underlying substantive offense in the conspiracy conviction. The court also found that the BIA did not properly analyze the CAT claim under the required legal framework and failed to consider eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility. The court denied the due process claim but vacated the BIA’s decision and remanded for further proceedings, ordering a stay of removal pending the outcome. View "Amos v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

Celia Ignacia Esquivel-Bataz, a Mexican citizen, was previously convicted of making a false statement to obtain credit and deported in 2012. In April 2025, she was found by ICE agents at an illegal gambling parlor in Houston. She was indicted for illegal reentry after deportation following a felony conviction, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b). ICE lodged an immigration detainer against her, indicating that she would be taken into custody and removed to Mexico if released.A magistrate judge initially found that Esquivel-Bataz was not a flight risk and ordered her release on bond pending trial. The Government responded with an emergency motion to stay and revoke the release order, which the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted. Esquivel-Bataz then moved for pretrial release, and the district court held an evidentiary hearing. After hearing testimony, including from an ICE officer about the detainer’s effect, the district court denied her motion, finding her to be a flight risk based on her criminal history, Mexican citizenship, prior deportation, and current unlawful presence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order under an abuse-of-discretion standard. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying pretrial release. The Fifth Circuit clarified that the district court did not treat the immigration detainer or potential deportation as flight risk per se, but rather considered the totality of circumstances, including individualized factors required by the Bail Reform Act. The order denying pretrial release was affirmed. View "United States v. Esquivel-Bataz" on Justia Law

Luis Alfredo Lezama-Ramirez, a noncitizen who had previously been removed from the United States, pleaded guilty to unlawfully reentering the country in violation of federal law. After his guilty plea, the Probation Office prepared a presentence report (PSR) that included a list of standard and special conditions for supervised release. At sentencing, Lezama-Ramirez’s counsel indicated there were no objections to the PSR, and the district court adopted it. The court imposed a one-year term of supervised release, referencing compliance with standard and special conditions, but did not read these conditions aloud. The written judgment later included the same conditions as those in the PSR.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana entered the judgment, and Lezama-Ramirez appealed, arguing that there were discrepancies between the oral pronouncement of supervised release conditions at sentencing and those listed in the written judgment. He specifically challenged the imposition of certain standard and special conditions that were not read aloud, as well as differences between the oral and written versions of two particular conditions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that because Lezama-Ramirez had notice of the supervised release conditions through the PSR and did not object at sentencing, there was no reversible error in imposing the conditions that were not read aloud. However, the court found that the written version of one special condition (Special Condition 2) imposed an additional reporting requirement not included in the oral pronouncement, which constituted an impermissible conflict. The Fifth Circuit vacated the imposition of Special Condition 2 and remanded for the district court to conform it to the oral pronouncement, while affirming the remainder of the judgment. View "United States v. Lezama-Ramirez" on Justia Law

The defendant, a noncitizen, was charged in Los Angeles County with carjacking, second degree robbery, and resisting an executive officer. The jury found him guilty of carjacking and found true the allegation that he personally used a deadly weapon, but acquitted him of robbery. He had previously pleaded guilty to resisting an executive officer. He was sentenced to a total of 12 years in prison. Years later, after being released from criminal custody, the defendant faced removal proceedings in immigration court based on his conviction, and he sought to vacate his conviction under Penal Code section 1473.7, arguing he had not understood the immigration consequences of going to trial or accepting a plea.The defendant filed a motion in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to vacate his conviction, providing evidence of indigency and making a prima facie showing for relief. He requested appointment of counsel for the hearing. The trial court denied his request, relying on People v. Fryhaat, and reasoning that appointed counsel was only required if the moving party was in federal immigration custody and unable to attend the hearing. The court proceeded with an evidentiary hearing and ultimately denied the motion, finding no evidence that an immigration-neutral plea offer had been made.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the trial court’s denial of appointed counsel. The appellate court held that the right to appointed counsel in section 1473.7 proceedings attaches when an indigent defendant makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief and the court proceeds to an evidentiary hearing, regardless of whether the defendant is in federal immigration custody. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of the request for appointed counsel and a new hearing on the merits of the section 1473.7 motion. View "P. v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

In August 2022, law enforcement officers in Sterling, Virginia, stopped a Ford Explorer as part of an operation to execute an arrest warrant for a suspected armed robber. Herbert Murillo-Lopez was driving the vehicle. During the stop, officers recovered a firearm from a satchel worn by Murillo-Lopez. He admitted to being an undocumented non-citizen. Subsequent investigation confirmed he was born in El Salvador, had no lawful status in the United States, and had no record of legal entry.A grand jury indicted Murillo-Lopez for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), which prohibits possession of a firearm by an undocumented non-citizen. He moved to suppress the evidence from the stop, arguing the stop and search were unconstitutional, but the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied the motion. Shortly before trial, he moved to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds, but the district court found the motion untimely and unpersuasive. After a jury found him guilty, the district court denied his motion for judgment of acquittal and sentenced him to eight months in prison and three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Murillo-Lopez knew he was unlawfully present in the United States. The court also found the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion that Murillo-Lopez might be the subject of the arrest warrant, and that the search of his satchel was consensual. Finally, the court rejected his Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(5)(A), holding that existing circuit precedent remains valid after recent Supreme Court decisions. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Murillo-Lopez" on Justia Law

A lawful permanent resident of the United States, originally from Mexico, was convicted for purchasing firearms in the United States and reselling them in Mexico without a license, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A). As a result of these unlicensed sales, he was sentenced to 78 months in prison. Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, alleging that his conviction constituted an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), specifically as “illicit trafficking in firearms.”An immigration judge determined that the conviction qualified as an aggravated felony and ordered his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed this decision, agreeing that the conviction under § 922(a)(1)(A) matched the generic definition of “illicit trafficking in firearms” as used in the INA. The petitioner then sought review of the BIA’s order, arguing that the statute of conviction criminalized a broader range of conduct than the generic aggravated felony and thus was not a categorical match.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether a conviction under § 922(a)(1)(A) categorically constitutes “illicit trafficking in firearms.” The court held that the plain meaning of “illicit trafficking in firearms” is “unlawful trading or dealing in firearms,” and that the statute of conviction fits within this definition. The court rejected the petitioner’s arguments regarding overbreadth and found no ambiguity in the statutory language. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review, holding that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) qualifies as an aggravated felony for “illicit trafficking in firearms” under the INA. View "Alvarez Ronquillo v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The defendant, a Mexican citizen, was first brought to the United States as a child. He was discovered by federal officials in Texas in 2015 and deported later that year. In 2020, he was again found in the United States and arrested on outstanding warrants. He was convicted in state court for drug-related offenses and sentenced to five years in prison. While serving this sentence, he was screened by immigration authorities and subsequently indicted for illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). In 2024, he pleaded guilty to the federal charge without a plea agreement. The district court sentenced him to 24 months in prison and one year of supervised release, adopting special conditions recommended in the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), including requirements to report to immigration authorities and seek work authorization.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas confirmed at sentencing that the defendant and his counsel had reviewed the PSR, which contained the special conditions. The court orally adopted the PSR and its appendix, imposed the recommended conditions, and provided the defendant an opportunity to object. The defendant’s counsel objected only to the relationship between the federal and state offenses, not to the special conditions. The written judgment included all the conditions from the PSR. The defendant appealed, arguing that the written judgment conflicted with the oral pronouncement regarding the special conditions of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case for plain error, as the defendant had notice and an opportunity to object at sentencing but did not do so. The court held that the district court satisfied the oral-pronouncement requirement by adopting the PSR and providing notice and opportunity to object. Therefore, there was no conflict between the written judgment and the oral pronouncement, and the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v. Quezada-Atayde" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of the Dominican Republic and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was ordered removed after being convicted of sexual abuse in the second degree under New York Penal Law (NYPL) § 130.60(2). This conviction was deemed an "aggravated felony" under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(A) and 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because it constituted "sexual abuse of a minor." Approximately a year later, the petitioner moved to reopen his removal proceedings, but the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied the motion as untimely and concluded that he did not warrant equitable tolling.An Immigration Judge (IJ) initially determined that the petitioner’s conviction was an aggravated felony, rendering him removable and ineligible for asylum and cancellation of removal. The IJ also found the conviction to be a "particularly serious crime," barring withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and denied the petitioner’s motion to remand for consideration of new evidence regarding his mental health and diabetes diagnosis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed the petition challenging the removal order, citing its recent decision in Debique v. Garland, which held that a conviction under NYPL § 130.60(2) is categorically an aggravated felony. The court rejected the petitioner’s arguments that Debique was not binding and that the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo undermined its precedential force. The court also denied the petition challenging the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen, finding that the BIA had a reasonable basis for concluding that the petitioner failed to show due diligence for the entire period between the expiration of the 90-day deadline and the filing of the motion. View "Garcia Pinach v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Ismael Adan Ortiz-Rodriguez, a non-citizen, was removed from the United States in 2017 following expedited removal proceedings initiated by DHS. In 2023, he was convicted of illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Before trial, Ortiz-Rodriguez moved to dismiss his indictment by collaterally attacking his 2017 deportation order under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), arguing that his expedited removal involved an unknowing and involuntary waiver of judicial review and violated his due process rights. The district court denied his motion.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas found Ortiz-Rodriguez guilty and sentenced him to fifty-one months of imprisonment. He appealed the decision, arguing that his 2017 expedited removal proceedings were fundamentally unfair and deprived him of judicial review. The district court also revoked his supervised release from a prior § 1326 prosecution, sentencing him to an additional fourteen months of imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Ortiz-Rodriguez did not satisfy the requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) because he failed to show that the 2017 expedited removal proceedings deprived him of the opportunity for judicial review or that the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair. The court noted that Ortiz-Rodriguez had the right to appeal his expedited removal but did not do so, and his waiver of the right to appeal was considered and intelligent. Additionally, the court found that changes in substantive law after his removal did not render the proceedings fundamentally unfair or procedurally deficient. View "United States v. Ortiz-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Edin Anael Solis-Rodriguez, an illegal alien, brandished firearms in two separate incidents at local restaurants in Charlotte, North Carolina. In the second incident, he shot a patron, Chris Silva, at point-blank range, causing severe injuries. Solis-Rodriguez was charged with two counts of possessing a firearm as an illegal alien under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5). He pled guilty to both counts.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina accepted his guilty plea and sentenced him to a total of 180 months' imprisonment, with 120 months for the first count and 60 months for the second count, to be served consecutively. The court considered the presentence report, which included a 4-level enhancement for using a firearm in connection with attempted murder, resulting in a guidelines range of 151 to 188 months. Solis-Rodriguez's objections to the enhancement and the argument that the two offenses should be considered one continuing offense were rejected.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. Solis-Rodriguez challenged the Rule 11 colloquy as plainly erroneous and his sentence as procedurally unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit assumed, without deciding, that there was a plain error in the Rule 11 colloquy but found that it did not affect Solis-Rodriguez’s substantial rights. The court also held that the district court adequately considered and explained the sentencing factors, including Solis-Rodriguez’s age and lack of violent criminal history, and found the sentence procedurally reasonable. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Solis-Rodriguez" on Justia Law