Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Under 8 U.S.C. 1226(c), the government must detain noncitizens who are removable because they committed certain specified offenses or have connections with terrorism, and it must hold them without bond pending their removal proceedings. In 2012, the plaintiffs filed a habeas petition on behalf of a putative class of noncitizens who are detained under section 1226(c) in New Jersey, contending that it violates due process to mandatorily detain noncitizens who have substantial defenses to removal and that the procedure for conducting “Joseph” hearings is constitutionally inadequate.The Third Circuit held that section 1226(c) is constitutional even as applied to noncitizens who have substantial defenses to removal. For those detainees who contend that they are not properly included within section 1226(c) and are therefore entitled to a Josepth hearing, the government has the burden to establish the applicability of section 1226(c) by a preponderance of the evidence and the government must make available a contemporaneous record of the hearing, consisting of an audio recording, a transcript, or their functional equivalent. Section 1252(f)(1) does not authorize classwide injunctions, so the court reversed the district court’s order in part. View "Gayle v. Warden Monmouth County Correctional Institution" on Justia Law

Singh, a native of India,arrived in the U.S. in 1991, without travel documents or proof of identity. He falsely claimed that his name was Davinder Singh. Singh failed to appear at his immigration hearing and was ordered deported in absentia. Singh filed an asylum application under the name Baljinder Singh and married a U.S. citizen. Singh successfully petitioned to adjust his status to lawful permanent resident without disclosing his immigration history. When Singh later sought naturalization, he again failed to disclose his immigration history. In 2006, he became a U.S. citizen. In 2011, he pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin, MDMA, and marijuana. Singh’s citizenship was revoked, 8 U.S.C. 1451(a), because he illegally procured naturalization.An IJ held Singh removable both for having been convicted of an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(U), conspiracy to commit a controlled substances offense, and for having been convicted of a controlled substances offense. The BIA dismissed his appeal. The Ninth Circuit remanded. The pertinent statutory provisions permit removal only of individuals who were “aliens” at the time of their criminal convictions. The court rejected an argument that Singh should be treated as if he had never been naturalized and was actually an “alien” at the time he was convicted. View "Singh v. Attorney General of the United States" on Justia Law

In 2005, Rodriguez pleaded no contest to the charge of possession for sale of methamphetamine. She was placed on probation. She brought her Penal Code 1473.7 motion soon after she was detained by federal authorities, facing deportation. She submitted declarations of her own and from the law office that represented her, stating that her conviction was legally invalid because a prejudicial error damaged her ability to meaningfully understand the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of her no contest plea. She stated that she had come to the U.S. when she was an infant and that her family, including her two young children, her parents, and her five sisters, all live in the U.S. The trial court rejected her motion, noting that she appeared to be on probation in another case and that she failed to show there was a reasonable probability that she would not have entered her plea if she had been fully informed of its adverse immigration consequences.The court of appeal reversed the denial of Rodriguez’s motion. Rodriguez's probation status in a separate case did not bar her motion. She showed it was reasonably probable that she would not have entered her plea if she had known its adverse immigration consequences. View "People v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted in part and denied in part a petition challenging the BIA's finding that petitioner's conviction for theft of a vehicle under California Vehicle Code 10851(a) is an aggravated felony, which renders him ineligible for certain forms of relief. The panel has held, and the parties do not dispute, that section 10851(a) is overbroad because it criminalizes a broader swath of conduct than the generic theft offense.Applying the framework described in Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248–49 (2016), the panel held that section 10851(a) is indivisible in its treatment of accessories after the fact. Because section 10851(a) does not categorically match the generic theft offense, a conviction under section 10851(a) is not an aggravated felony. The panel overruled Duenas-Alvarez v. Holder, 733 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2013), on the ground that it was irreconcilable with Mathis. Therefore, in petitioner's case, he has not been convicted of an aggravated felony and the panel remanded for consideration of his requests for asylum and cancellation of removal. In a concurrently filed memorandum, the panel denied petitioner's requests for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. View "Lopez-Marroquin v. Garland" on Justia Law

Matias, a native of El Salvador, unlawfully entered the U.S. in 2014. El Salvadoran authorities considered him a member of MS-13, a violent gang. In Maryland, Matias pleaded guilty to assault in the first degree after being involved in a shooting that authorities determined was retaliation for MS-13 gang activity, and identified Matias as an MS-13 “affiliate.” ICE detained Matias in 2018. Matias requested to be housed with a gang aligned with MS-13. An IJ denied him bond and later denied Matias relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and ordered him removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal. The Ninth Circuit denied his petition for review in 2021.Matias moved the BIA to reopen his case so that it could consider “new developments” regarding his request for CAT relief: claimed political changes in El Salvador and an alleged text from an MS-13 gang member labeling him a “snitch” and saying he will be killed if he returns to El Salvador. The BIA denied his request for an emergency stay. Matias filed a habeas petition, asking the court to enjoin the government from removing him until the BIA ruled on his motion to reopen. The district court denied his motion. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court, which denied Matias’s motion for a temporary restraining order, determining that 8 U.S.C. 1252(g)’s jurisdictional limits barred his claims. View "Rauda v. Jennings" on Justia Law

Yaasin Isxaaq appealed a district court order denying his applications for post-conviction relief, in which he sought to withdraw his guilty pleas in three underlying criminal cases. Isxaaq was charged with theft in June 2016, and pleaded guilty to an amended charge of disorderly conduct later that month. Isxaaq was later charged with misdemeanor sexual assault in February 2017 and pleaded guilty in March 2017. Isxaaq was then charged with misdemeanor theft, and pleaded guilty in January 2020. All three charges were class B misdemeanors. Isxaaq was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), pending deportation proceedings, on January 29, 2020. In all three cases, Isxaaq argued his guilty pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily made because he had not been properly advised on adverse immigration consequences, and because an interpreter was not used when he communicated with his attorneys. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in denying Isxaaq’s applications for post-conviction relief. View "Isxaaq v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

A conviction under Fla. Stat. 790.23(1)(a)—which makes it unlawful for a convicted felon to "own or to have in his or her care, custody, possession, or control any firearm, ammunition, or electric weapon or device, or to carry a concealed weapon, including a tear gas gun or chemical weapon or device"—does not constitute a "firearm offense" within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(C), and its cross-reference to 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3).The Eleventh Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's final order of removal and vacated the BIA's decision deeming petitioner removable under section 1227(a)(2)(C) of the INA, based on his conviction for a violation of Fla. Stat. 790.23(1)(a). Applying the categorical approach, the court explained that the prohibited items for the possession and concealed carrying offenses in section 790.23(1)(a) are means of committing those crimes, and not elements of separate crimes. View "Simpson v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's decision concluding that petitioner is removeable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) because his two prior convictions for violating Hawaii’s fourth degree theft statute, Haw. Rev. Stat. 708-833(1), constitute crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs).The panel applied the categorical approach and held that section 708-833(1), a petty misdemeanor involving property valued at less than $250, is overbroad with respect to the BIA's definition of a CIMT. The panel explained that Hawaii's definition of "theft" does not always require the government to prove the defendant acted with an intent to permanently deprive or substantially erode the owner’s property rights. Furthermore, section 708-833(1) is indivisible because it proscribes one crime that can be committed eight different ways, not eight distinct crimes. Accordingly, the BIA erred in concluding that petitioner's section 708-833(1) convictions were CIMTs rendering him removable. View "Maie v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision concluding that petitioner was removeable and denial of his request for a form of cancellation of removal available to children who have been battered by parents who are lawful permanent residents. The court concluded that petitioner failed to exhaust his claim that the BIA engaged in improper fact finding, the issue is not before the court, and the issue will not be considered. Although the court has jurisdiction to review the predicate legal question whether the Board properly applied the law in determining eligibility, the court lacked jurisdiction to review an ultimate decision denying cancellation of removal as a matter of discretion. View "Mencia-Medina v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying cancellation of removal to petitioner.The panel incorporated by reference the factual and procedural background of Marinelarena I that conspiracy under California Penal Code 182(a)(1) is overbroad but divisible as to the target crime, and that sale and transport of a controlled substance under California Health and Safety Code 11352, is overbroad and divisible as to controlled substance. The panel concluded that Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754 (2021), is consistent with Marinelarena I, and that Petitioner failed to establish that her conviction did not involve a federally controlled substance. In regard to divisibility, the panel noted that no developments in the California Supreme Court since Marinelarena I undermined the panel's earlier divisibility analysis, and that the jury instructions relating to the conspiracy offense, as well as petitioner's underlying statute of conviction, support divisibility. In regard to the burden of proof, the panel explained that Marinelarena I is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Pereida and that petitioner failed to establish that her conviction did not involve a federally controlled substance. The panel declined petitioner's invitation to remand to present additional evidence. Finally, the panel reaffirmed its conclusion that a conviction expunged under CPC 1203.4 remains a "conviction" for federal immigration purposes. View "Marinelarena v. Garland" on Justia Law