Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea to one count of reentry after deportation and to dismiss the indictment, holding that the immigration court did not lack jurisdiction.In moving to withdraw his plea and dismiss the indictment, Appellant argued that the removal order underlying his conviction had been rendered null and void. Specifically, Appellant argued that because his notice to appear did not specify the date or time of the removal hearing the immigration court lacked jurisdiction to issue the removal order. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Appellant did not satisfy the prerequisites set forth in 8 U.S.C. 1326(d) for collaterally attacking the removal order. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Goncalves Pontes v. Barr, 938 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2019) controlled, and Appellant's jurisdictional argument failed. View "United States v. Mendoza-Sanchez" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for illegal reentry after removal. Defendant makes a collateral attack on his 2008 removal, arguing that failure to provide him a Spanish interpretation of his Notice of Intent deprived him of the ability to challenge the government's decision to classify him as an aggravated felon, and thus depriving him of the opportunity to seek voluntary departure.The court held that, assuming that defendant was not an aggravated felon, he was not reasonably likely to have received preconclusion voluntary departure at the time of his removal in 2008. Therefore, defendant cannot show prejudice as required by 8 U.S.C. 1326(d)(3), and the district court properly denied his motion to dismiss the indictment. In this case, defendant failed to present compelling positive equities, like close relatives who are United States citizens or legal permanent residents, and defendant failed to reference a single case where an alien convicted of a felony sexual offense has received pre-conclusion voluntary departure. In light of defendant's serious and recent felony convictions and the lack of a sufficiently compelling counter-balancing factor at the time of his removal, the court concluded that it is not reasonably likely that he would have received pre-conclusion voluntary departure. View "United States v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Both the State and respondent-defendant Eswin Figueroa-Lemus petitioned for review of the court of appeals’ judgment affirming the denial of the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was arrested in 2012, and charged with one count each of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving under the influence. In 2013, he pled guilty to the controlled substance count pursuant to a statutorily sanctioned stipulation with the district attorney for the deferral of judgment for a period of two years, pending satisfaction of the conditions of his deferral. At the providency hearing at which his plea was taken, the defendant acknowledged his awareness that his plea could make him deportable, and defense counsel affirmatively stated on the record that he and the defendant had a lengthy conversation about immigration consequences, after which the defendant understood that this drug offense would render him deportable. When expressly asked by the trial court whether plea counsel’s statement was true, the defendant responded affirmatively. Weeks thereafter, the State moved to revoke the deferred judgment, alleging that defendant had been arrested by federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officers and therefore could no longer comply with the requirements of his deferred judgment. Defendant then moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The State challenged the appellate court’s jurisdiction on the grounds that until defendant was actually sentenced and judgment of conviction enters, there could be no final judgment from which an appeal would lie. Defendant challenged the appellate court’s ultimate conclusion on the merits that he was not entitled to an advisement by his counsel to the effect that he would be detained without bond during the pendency of any deportation proceedings initiated against him by the federal government. The Colorado Supreme Court found that because a guilty plea taken pursuant to a statutorily sanctioned stipulation to defer judgment and sentence does not become a final, appealable judgment unless and until the deferral is revoked, sentence is actually imposed, and judgment of conviction enters, defendant was without any immediate right to appeal the denial of his motion, and the court of appeals was therefore not authorized to entertain the defendant’s claim. Choosing, nevertheless, to exercise its original jurisdiction in this case, the Supreme Court found the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion. The court of appeals' judgment was vacated. View "Colorado v. Figueroa-Lemus" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated its decision reversing the lower courts' conclusions that the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) did not preempt Defendant's prosecution for identity theft, holding that, in accordance with the decision of the United States Supreme Court on certiorari in this case, Defendant's prosecution was not preempted by the IRCA.A district court judge found Defendant guilty after denying his motion to dismiss charges based on representations in his W-4 employment form and I-9 form. On appeal, Defendant argued that the IRCA preempted identify theft prosecutions. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that IRCA preempted Defendant's prosecution. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that state law prosecutions for identity theft were not preempted by the IRCA. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed in accordance with the decision of the United States Supreme Court. View "State v. Garcia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated its decision reversing the judgment of both the court of appeals and district court concluding that the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) did not preempt Defendant's prosecution for identity theft and making false information, holding that, in accordance with the decision of the United States Supreme Court on certiorari in this case, Defendant's prosecution was not preempted by the IRCA.A district court judge found Defendant guilty after denying his motion to dismiss charges based on representations in his W-4 employment form. On appeal, Defendant argued that the IRCA preempted identify theft and making false information prosecutions. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that IRCA preempted Defendant's prosecutions. The United State Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that state law prosecutions for identity theft and making false information were not preempted by the IRCA. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed in accordance with the decision of the United States Supreme Court. View "State v. Morales" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's decision finding petitioner removable under Section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and denying petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The Fifth Circuit held that petitioner failed to show a realistic probability that his conviction for possession of cocaine under the Texas statute criminalizes a broader range of conduct than the federal generic definition for cocaine. The court also held that petitioner failed to demonstrate error in the BIA's denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review of the final order of removal and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the petition for review of his eligibility for relief and protection. View "Alexis v. Barr" on Justia Law

A conviction for being under the influence of a controlled substance, in violation of California Health and Safety Code 11550(a), is divisible with respect to controlled substance such that the modified categorical approach applies to determining whether a conviction under the statute is a controlled-substance offense as defined by federal law.The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's dismissal of petitioner's appeal from the IJ's decision finding him removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) for having been convicted of a controlled-substance offense as defined by federal law. The panel explained that, where, as here, the controlled-substance requirement of a state statute is divisible and where, as here, the relevant substance is shown by application of the modified categorical approach to be federally controlled, then there is "a direct link between an alien's crime of conviction and a particular federally controlled drug" such that section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) is satisfied. Furthermore, the divisibility of the actus reus element of Section 11550(a) is irrelevant, because under the modified categorical approach a conviction for using or being under the influence of amphetamine relates to a federally controlled substance. View "Tejeda v. Barr" on Justia Law

In Penal Code section 1473.7, the Legislature broadened the standards to challenge guilty pleas involving advisements concerning immigration consequences. Defendant appealed an order denying her recent motion to vacate her 1991 conviction for possession for sale of cocaine base following her no contest plea pursuant to Penal Code 1473.7. Defendant claimed that her counsel did not advise her that a mandatory consequence of her plea would make her "permanently ineligible to ever become a legal resident of the United States."The Court of Appeal held that defendant may pursue her current motion to vacate the conviction. The court held that, although defendant had filed an earlier unsuccessful motion to vacate the conviction in 2017, the prior motion did not bar the current motion because it was based on a different ground and on an earlier version of section 1473.7. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions. The court noted that the changes the Legislature made in 2019 were intended to retroactively target convictions based on the type of inadequate immigration advisements that occurred in this case. View "People v. Ruiz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by failing to summarily deny the applications for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus submitted by Petitioners, Carlos Chavez and Luis Lopez, for its consideration in this case.A sheriff entered into an agreement with the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement pursuant to section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1357, that certified deputies to perform specific immigration enforcement functions, including the detention of undocumented aliens. Petitioners, who were being held in pretrial detention pursuant to immigration-related arrest warrants and detainers, filed petitions seeking the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The trial court issued writs of habeas corpus. The court of appeals vacated the trial court orders, concluding that the trial court lacks jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus for alien petitions not in state custody and held under federal authority. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that state judicial officials acting in counties in which the sheriff has entered into a 287(g) agreement with the federal government do not have the authority to grant applications for the issuance of writs of habeas corpus for and to order the release of individuals held pursuant to immigration-related arrest warrants and detainers. View "Chavez v. McFadden" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's determination that petitioner's conviction for felony vehicular flight from a pursuing police car while driving against traffic, in violation of California Vehicle Code section 2800.4, is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude that made him removable.The panel applied the two-step process in determining whether California Vehicle Code section 2800.4 is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude by first reviewing the elements of the statute de novo and then by deferring, to some extent, to the BIA's conclusion that a crime involves moral turpitude. The panel concluded that it need not decide the appropriate level of deference because, even affording only minimal deference, the BIA's interpretation was correct. View "Lepe Moran v. Barr" on Justia Law