Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Efrain Leonides-Seguria, a Mexican citizen without legal status in the United States, was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on June 15, 2021, for illegal reentry. Six days later, ICE referred him for criminal prosecution. On June 23, federal prosecutors filed a criminal complaint, and a magistrate judge issued an arrest warrant. Leonides-Seguria remained in immigration custody until June 28, when he was arrested on the criminal complaint. He later waived prosecution by indictment, consenting to the filing of a criminal information on July 27.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied Leonides-Seguria’s motions to dismiss the federal charge, arguing that the government violated the Speedy Trial Act and that 8 U.S.C. § 1326 is unconstitutional. He pled guilty but reserved the right to appeal these denials. The district court sentenced him to 51 months’ imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Leonides-Seguria argued that the Speedy Trial Act was violated because the criminal information was filed more than 30 days after his apprehension. He urged the court to recognize a "ruse exception," where civil detention by immigration authorities is used to delay criminal prosecution. The Seventh Circuit declined to resolve the legal question of the ruse exception, finding that the facts did not support its application. The court found no evidence of collusion between ICE and federal prosecutors to circumvent the Speedy Trial Act. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and upheld the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, consistent with precedent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v Leonides-Seguria" on Justia Law

Eugenia Bautista Chavez, a native and citizen of Mexico, challenged the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order of removal based on her 2011 conviction for petit larceny under section 18.2-96 of the Virginia Code. The Board held that petit larceny categorically qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude, rendering Chavez ineligible for cancellation of removal. Chavez argued that a defendant in Virginia could be convicted of larceny for taking property that he or she sincerely but unreasonably believed was abandoned, which falls short of the requisite mental state for a crime involving moral turpitude. She also contended that petit larceny for taking property of de minimis value does not constitute sufficiently reprehensible conduct to make out a crime involving moral turpitude.The Immigration Judge ruled for the government, reasoning that he was required to find that petit larceny was a crime involving moral turpitude under the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Hernandez v. Holder. Chavez appealed to the Board, arguing that Virginia petit larceny did not require a culpable mental state and did not involve reprehensible conduct. The Board dismissed Chavez’s appeal, concluding that the offense required a culpable mental state and involved reprehensible conduct. Chavez then moved the Board to reconsider its decision, but a temporary Board member denied her motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and denied Chavez’s petition. The court held that Virginia petit larceny is a crime involving moral turpitude because it requires an intent to permanently deprive the owner of property, which satisfies the culpable mental state requirement. The court also found that the offense involves reprehensible conduct, regardless of the value of the property taken. Additionally, the court rejected Chavez’s challenge to the authority of the temporary Board member who decided her reconsideration motion, citing its previous decision in Salomon-Guillen v. Garland. View "Chavez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Jordan Pulido developed an online relationship with a 14-year-old Croatian girl, I.G., and, with the help of his father, Roberto Jimenez, traveled to Croatia to have sex with her. They later brought her to the United States, where Pulido continued to have sex with her. Pulido was indicted on multiple counts, including using the internet to entice a minor, traveling with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct, and transporting a minor for sexual activity. Jimenez was indicted for conspiring to transport a minor for sexual activity.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied Pulido's pre-trial motions to dismiss the indictment, suppress evidence, and exclude testimony. Both defendants were convicted on all counts after a nine-day trial. Post-trial motions for acquittal, a new trial, and a mistrial were also denied. Jimenez received sentence enhancements for exercising undue influence and having custody or supervisory control over I.G.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decisions on most counts but vacated Pulido's conviction on the enticement count, finding the indictment duplicitous. The court held that the enticement count was not harmless and remanded for resentencing. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of Pulido's motion to suppress evidence from his electronic devices, holding that the border search exception applied. Additionally, the court found no fundamental unfairness in the translation irregularities during I.G.'s mother's testimony.For Jimenez, the court affirmed the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal, finding sufficient evidence of his intent to transport I.G. for sexual activity. The court also upheld the denial of his motion for a mistrial based on Agent Garcia's testimony about his immigration status, concluding that the curative instruction mitigated any potential prejudice. Finally, the court affirmed the application of the sentencing enhancements for undue influence and custody or supervisory control. View "U.S. v. Pulido" on Justia Law

Muhammad Masood, a licensed physician from Pakistan, came to the United States in 2018 on a non-immigrant visa to work as an unpaid medical researcher. In 2019, he became radicalized by Islamic extremist content and planned to join ISIS. In March 2020, he was arrested at the Minneapolis airport with plans to travel to ISIS-controlled territory. A search revealed military and medical supplies, computers, and digital storage devices containing extremist propaganda. Masood pleaded guilty to attempting to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota adopted the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) and sentenced Masood to 216 months imprisonment, varying downward from the statutory maximum of 240 months. Masood appealed, arguing procedural errors in applying the terrorism enhancement, considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, and alleged violations of his due process rights and right to allocution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found no procedural error in applying the terrorism enhancement, as the evidence supported that Masood's offense was intended to promote terrorism. The court also found that the district court adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors and provided a sufficient explanation for the sentence. Additionally, the court determined there was no violation of Rule 32(i) or the Due Process Clause, as Masood and his counsel were given opportunities to argue and allocute before the final sentence was imposed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Masood" on Justia Law

Walter Aceituno, a Guatemalan citizen, became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1989. In 2014, he pled guilty to drug-trafficking charges after being arrested in a sting operation involving the purchase of cocaine. His attorneys informed him that he would be deported as a result of his guilty plea, but did not explicitly state that he would be permanently barred from reentering the United States. Aceituno was deported in 2015 and later illegally reentered the U.S. in 2019, leading to further legal issues.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island granted Aceituno's petition for a writ of error coram nobis, allowing him to withdraw his 2014 guilty plea. The district court found that Aceituno's attorneys provided ineffective assistance by failing to inform him of the permanent reentry bar, and that Aceituno acted reasonably in not seeking earlier relief due to his ongoing efforts to reunite with his family through various legal means.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Aceituno's attorneys met the requirements set forth in Padilla v. Kentucky by informing him of the risk of deportation. The court found that the district court erred in concluding that the attorneys were required to inform Aceituno of the permanent reentry bar. Additionally, the appellate court determined that Aceituno's delay in seeking relief was unreasonable and that the equities did not justify the issuance of the writ. The court emphasized the importance of finality in legal proceedings and the lack of compelling circumstances to warrant coram nobis relief. The writ was quashed, and the petition was dismissed. View "Aceituno v. United States" on Justia Law

Monika Kapoor, an Indian citizen, faces extradition from the United States to India to face criminal charges. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York determined that Kapoor was extraditable under the bilateral extradition treaty between the U.S. and India. The Secretary of State issued a surrender warrant, rejecting Kapoor’s claims that she would likely be tortured if returned to India, which would violate the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Kapoor filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the Secretary’s decision, but the district court denied her petition, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4) from the REAL ID Act of 2005, which divested the court of jurisdiction to hear her claim. Kapoor appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court, stating that the Convention is not a self-executing treaty and that courts can review claims under it only as authorized by Congress. The court referenced the Supreme Court’s test in I.N.S v. St. Cyr, noting that Section 1252(a)(4) clearly states that claims under the Convention can only be raised in petitions for review of immigration removal orders and specifically bars judicial review of such claims in habeas proceedings, except in limited circumstances not applicable here.The Second Circuit held that this interpretation does not violate the Suspension Clause in the extradition context due to the longstanding rule of non-inquiry, which precludes American habeas courts from considering the anticipated treatment of an extraditee in the receiving country. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s decision, denying Kapoor’s petition. View "Kapoor v. DeMarco" on Justia Law

A native and citizen of Mexico, Lilia Salinas, who became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 2007, was convicted in North Dakota state court in 2011 for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. She received a suspended sentence of 360 days’ imprisonment. In 2021, she was convicted again in North Dakota state court for two counts of aggravated assault of a victim under 12 years of age, receiving a 10-year sentence with one year suspended. Based on these convictions, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against her in 2022, charging her with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) for a controlled substance violation and 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) for a crime of child abuse.An immigration judge (IJ) found Salinas removable under both charges, applying the categorical approach to determine that her marijuana conviction qualified as a controlled substance offense under federal law. The IJ compared the North Dakota definition of marijuana at the time of her conviction with the federal definition in effect at that time, concluding they were substantially similar. The IJ also pretermitted her application for cancellation of removal, as her 2011 conviction stopped the clock on her period of continuous residence, making her ineligible for relief.Salinas appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing that the IJ should have compared the state statute to the federal definition in effect at the time of her removal proceedings. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing that the appropriate comparison was with the federal definition at the time of conviction and that the state and federal definitions were a categorical match.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA’s decision. The court held that the proper comparison for determining removability under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) is between the state statute at the time of conviction and the federal Controlled Substances Act in effect at that time. The court also rejected Salinas’s argument that the North Dakota definition of marijuana was overbroad compared to the federal definition. Consequently, the petition for review was denied. View "Salinas v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Misael Padron, a Cuban citizen granted asylum in the United States, appealed the denial of his motion to vacate his conviction for carjacking, which he had entered pursuant to a no-contest plea. Padron argued that he did not understand the immigration consequences of his plea, which included mandatory detention, denial of naturalization, and near-certain termination of asylum and deportation. He provided evidence of his mental health challenges related to persecution in Cuba and claimed his defense counsel did not adequately inform him of the immigration consequences.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Padron’s motion, partly because he did not provide a declaration from his defense counsel and had signed a plea form acknowledging potential deportation. The court also noted that there was no alternative, immigration-neutral plea available to Padron.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Padron demonstrated error affecting his ability to understand the immigration consequences of his plea. The court found that Padron’s defense counsel did not adequately advise him of the mandatory immigration consequences, and Padron’s mental health challenges further impaired his understanding. The court also determined that Padron established a reasonable probability he would have rejected the plea had he understood the consequences, given his strong ties to the United States and the severe impact on his asylum status.The Court of Appeal reversed the denial of Padron’s motion and remanded the case with instructions to vacate Padron’s conviction and permit him to withdraw his plea and enter a different plea. View "People v. Padron" on Justia Law

A Mexican citizen, Ismael Vazquez-Garcia, was sentenced to 48 months for illegal reentry after being found by Border Patrol agents in New Mexico. He had previously been removed from the U.S. following a 2018 child-abuse conviction. At sentencing, the district court questioned him about the child-abuse conviction, which involved allegations of molestation. The court then imposed an 18-month upward variance from the recommended sentencing range of 24 to 30 months.The U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico had adopted the unobjected-to allegations in the presentence report (PSR) about the child-abuse offense and varied upwards based on his criminal history. Vazquez-Garcia appealed, arguing that his sentence was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. He contended that the district court erred by relying on the PSR's allegations and by varying upwards based on his criminal history, which he claimed was already accounted for in the Guidelines range.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Vazquez-Garcia had not shown his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because he did not object to the PSR's allegations, and the district court was permitted to adopt those unobjected-to facts. The court also found that the district court did not err by considering his criminal history for the upward variance. Additionally, the court ruled that the sentence was substantively reasonable, as the district court's focus on the child-abuse conviction was relevant to multiple sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentence, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the 48-month sentence. View "United States v. Vazquez-Garcia" on Justia Law

Jose Trinidad Martinez Santoyo was sought for extradition to Mexico to face charges of intentional aggravated homicide. In January 2014, a Mexican judge issued an arrest warrant for Santoyo, alleging he shot a man twice in the head after an argument. Mexico requested his provisional arrest in November 2018, and the United States filed a complaint in August 2021. Santoyo was arrested in May 2022 and released on bail in November 2022. Mexico formally requested his extradition in July 2022, providing various supporting documents. A magistrate judge certified the extradition in February 2023, and Santoyo challenged this certification via a habeas corpus petition.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied Santoyo's habeas corpus petition. Santoyo argued that the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico incorporated the Sixth Amendment's Speedy Trial Clause, contending that the delay between the 2014 arrest warrant and the 2022 extradition request violated his speedy trial rights. The district court rejected this argument, holding that the treaty's "lapse of time" provision referred only to statutes of limitations, not to the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial protections.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the "lapse of time" language in the extradition treaty does not incorporate the Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause. The court emphasized that extradition proceedings are not criminal prosecutions and that the treaty's language refers to statutes of limitations rather than the constitutional right to a speedy trial. The court also noted that the judiciary's role in extradition is limited and that issues of delay are more appropriately addressed by the Secretary of State. View "SANTOYO V. BOYDEN" on Justia Law