Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of a final order of removal following the dismissal of petitioner's appeal by the BIA. Petitioner was convicted of communication with a minor for immoral purposes in violation of Revised Code of Washington 9.68A.090, and an IJ found that petitioner's conviction constituted a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years of admission to the United States. Therefore, petitioner was removeable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).The panel held that, in assessing the constitutional status of the phrase "crime involving moral turpitude," it was bound by the Supreme Court's decision in Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951), which held that the phrase was not unconstitutionally vague. The panel also held that the Supreme Court's more recent decisions in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), and Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), did not reopen inquiry into the constitutionality of the phrase. Furthermore, petitioner's alternate claim that communicating with a minor for immoral purposes was not a crime of moral turpitude was foreclosed by the panel's decision in Morales v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2007). View "Islas-Veloz v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted in part a petition for panel rehearing, vacated the prior opinion in this case, and substituted the following opinion. Petitioner sought review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal.The court held that substantial evidence supported the BIA's finding that petitioner was convicted under Fla. Stat. 893.13(1)(a) (possession with intent to deliver), and not section 893.13(6)(a) (simple possession). Therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction under Immigration and Nationality Act section 242 to grant petitioner relief on this claim and dismissed the petition for review in part.The court held that DHS was not required to file a cross-appeal to advance its controlled substance argument on appeal to the BIA, and the BIA did not err in considering that argument. The court also held that Flunitrazepam is a controlled substance, and the BIA did not err in denying petitioner's motion for a remand to pursue a section 212(h) waiver. Accordingly, the court denied the petition in part. View "Bula Lopez v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence of 111 days and 3 years of supervised release after he pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful use of identification documents. The court held that the district court's decision to impose supervised release was both consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines and an appropriate exercise of the district court's wide latitude in determining a sentence. In this case, the conditions of defendant's supervised release specified if he were removed or deported, he could not reenter the United States without permission, but he would not be on active supervision while he was outside the country. View "United States v. Hernandez-Loera" on Justia Law

Molina, born in El Salvador, grew up in an area where the “18th Street” gang was active. The gang attempted to recruit Molina. Molina claims that his uncle was murdered in 2008 for refusing to join the gang. Molina moved to San Vicente, which was in MS-13 gang territory. MS-13 pressured Molina to join and beat him up several times when he refused. In 2012, at age 15, Molina illegally entered the United States. He was granted permanent resident status in 2014 as a Special Immigrant Juvenile, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J), 1255(h). In March 2016, Molina pled guilty to assault with intent to rob, unarmed. Removal proceedings (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)) were initiated, alleging that Molina had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) within five years of his admission for which a sentence of at least one year could be imposed. Molina’s conviction was vacated because he did not receive the constitutionally-required advice about the immigration consequences of his plea. He then pled guilty to felonious assault. The IJ denied Molina’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The BIA sustained the CIMT removal charge. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Molina reasonably relied on Sixth Circuit precedent holding that the Michigan felonious assault statute is not categorically a CIMT. Molina’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT are moot. View "Hernandez v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

In 2007, Oscar Almanza-Vigil pleaded guilty in Colorado state court to “selling or distributing” methamphetamine in Colorado, for which he received a four-year prison sentence. In 2009, when the state paroled him, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) initiated expedited removal proceedings against him, declaring that he had committed an aggravated felony. With that designation, he had no right to an administrative hearing before an immigration judge. Within the week, the Department of Homeland Security had issued a final administrative removal order, and ICE agents had sent Almanza-Vigil back across the border to Mexico. Six years later, border-patrol agents found Almanza-Vigil in the New Mexico desert. Charged with illegal reentry, Almanza-Vigil moved to dismiss the indictment by collaterally attacking his previous removal order and arguing, for the first time, that he never committed an aggravated felony. The Tenth Circuit determined Almanza-Vigil’s Colorado felony did not fit the Immigration and Naturalization Act's (INA) definition of an aggravated felony. But the Court also concluded he failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of avoiding removal but for the erroneous classification of his conviction. Therefore, the Court affirmed Almanza-Vigil's conviction. View "United States v. Almanza-Vigil" on Justia Law

Ku, a citizen of Taiwan, was admitted to the U.S. in 1997 and became a lawful permanent resident in 2002. In 2014, Ku was charged with a single count of wire fraud. Ku waived her right to an indictment and was charged by information, which alleged that Ku was managing the finances of her in-laws and defrauded her in-laws by making personal use of their accounts. The BIA determined that Ku had committed an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) because that prior conviction constituted an offense involving fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victims exceeded $10,000 and that the conviction constituted a “crime involving moral turpitude” under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) such that, without a waiver, she is ineligible for an adjustment of status. The BIA reversed the Immigration Judge, who had granted Ku a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. 1182(h)(1)(B) based on the extreme hardship that her deportation would cause her U.S.-citizen children. The Third Circuit rejected Ku’s petition for review. The loss to the victims, over $10,000, was sufficiently tethered to Ku’s conviction that the conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony; wire fraud constitutes a crime of moral turpitude. The court noted that it lacked jurisdiction to review the discretionary waiver of admissibility. View "Ku v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

United States Border Patrol agents found Defendant-appellant John Hargrove, his girlfriend Janelle Richter, and Edgar Silvas-Hinojos in the desert near the border between Arizona and New Mexico. They were all in Hargrove’s truck, along with nearly 300 pounds of marijuana and two firearms. Hargrove was charged with: (1) conspiracy to distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana; and (2) possession with the intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of marijuana, and aiding and abetting said possession. Hargrove was convicted by jury on both charges and sentenced to sixty months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Hargrove argued: (1) the district court erred in failing to grant him a mistrial after the prosecutor elicited testimony that the district court had previously barred; and (2) the district court erred in failing to grant him safety-valve relief under section 5C1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court in all respects. View "United States v. Hargrove" on Justia Law

Beltran-Aguilar, a citizen of Mexico, applied for cancellation of removal. The BIA affirmed the denial of his application. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Beltran-Aguilar’s conviction for Wisconsin battery involving domestic abuse was a crime of domestic violence, rendering him ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C). A “crime of violence” is “an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” 18 U.S.C. 16(a). The elements of the crime for which a defendant was convicted, not his underlying conduct, are determinative. Beltran-Aguilar was convicted under Wisconsin Statute 940.19(1), which prohibits “caus[ing] bodily harm to another by an act done with intent to cause bodily harm to that person or another without the consent of the person so harmed.” “Bodily harm” means “physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” Rejecting an argument that certain types of non-qualifying conduct theoretically might be prosecuted under the statute, the court stated that there must be “a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility," that the state would prosecute conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime. Beltran-Aguilar has not identified any case in which Wisconsin’s definition of “bodily harm” has been applied in a way that does not accord with precedent defining crimes of violence. View "Beltran-Aguilar v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit filed 1) an order granting a petition for panel rehearing, amending the opinion filed on September 14, 2017, which was previously withdrawn, and denying a petition for rehearing en banc; and 2) an amended opinion denying a petition for review of the BIA's decision.In the amended opinion, the panel held that petitioner's conviction for class one misdemeanor domestic violence assault under Arizona Revised Statutes 13-1203 and 13-3601 was a crime of domestic violence under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E) that rendered him removable. The panel held that the statute was divisible and, under the modified categorical approach, there was a sufficient factual basis to support that petitioner intentionally or knowingly caused any physical injury to another person. Furthermore, the domestic relationships enumerated under Arizona's domestic violence provision, Arizona Revised Statutes 3-3601(A), were coextensive with the domestic relationships described in section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). Therefore, petitioner's misdemeanor domestic violence conviction was a crime of domestic violence under section 1227(a)(2)(E), and he was removeable. View "Cornejo-Villagrana v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

Retroactivity analysis under Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1982), is only applicable when an agency consciously overrules or otherwise alters its own rule or regulation, or expressly considers and openly departs from a circuit court decision. The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision finding petitioner removable because he committed two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMT) when he was convicted of felony endangerment under Arizona Revised Statutes 13-1201 and facilitation to commit unlawful possession of marijuana for sale.Applying Montgomery Ward to this case, the panel held that there was no change in law raising retroactivity concerns. Therefore, the BIA did not err by applying Leal I, In re Leal, 26 I. & N. Dec. 20 (B.I.A. 2012), to conclude that Arizona endangerment is a CIMT. Finally, the panel rejected petitioner's claim regarding Leal II, claims under In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. 687 (A.G. 2008), preclusion claims, and an 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) claim. View "Olivas-Motta v. Whitaker" on Justia Law