Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Shenisa Mohammed, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 2010. In 2020, she pleaded guilty to arson under Virginia Code § 18.2-77. The Department of Homeland Security charged her as removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), alleging her arson conviction qualified as an aggravated felony. Mohammed sought cancellation of removal, but the immigration judge (IJ) concluded that her arson conviction was an aggravated felony, making her removable and ineligible for discretionary relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, and Mohammed petitioned for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court confirmed its jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of removal, limited to constitutional claims or questions of law. The court reviewed de novo whether Mohammed’s state conviction for arson qualified as an aggravated felony under the INA.The court applied the categorical approach to determine if the Virginia arson statute matched the federal arson statute under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). The Virginia statute criminalizes maliciously burning or aiding and abetting the burning of certain properties. The federal statute criminalizes maliciously damaging or destroying property used in interstate commerce by fire or explosives. The court found that both statutes prohibit malicious burning, and the federal statute implicitly includes aiding and abetting liability through 18 U.S.C. § 2.The court concluded that the Virginia arson statute is not broader than the federal arson statute, as aiding and abetting is considered an alternative theory of liability under federal law. Therefore, Mohammed’s state arson conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony. The Sixth Circuit denied Mohammed’s petition for review. View "Mohammed v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Lau, a native and citizen of China, was charged with third-degree trademark counterfeiting in New Jersey. While awaiting trial, he left the United States and upon his return, he was paroled for deferred inspection by immigration authorities. Lau was later convicted and sentenced to probation. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings against him, asserting he was inadmissible due to his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT).An Immigration Judge (IJ) found Lau inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) and ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). The IJ concluded that Lau’s conviction constituted a CIMT, did not qualify as a petty offense, and that he was properly classified as an applicant for admission upon his return. The IJ also determined that Lau did not meet the continuous residency requirement for a 212(h) waiver. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing with the findings and dismissing Lau’s appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that DHS improperly classified Lau as an applicant for admission when he returned to the United States while his criminal charge was pending. The court found that a pending charge does not provide clear and convincing evidence of a CIMT necessary for DHS to consider an LPR an applicant for admission. Consequently, the court granted Lau’s petition for review, vacated the final order of removal, and remanded the case to the agency with instructions to terminate removal proceedings against Lau based on his inadmissibility under section 1182(a), without prejudice to any future deportation proceedings. View "Lau v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Breion Woodson was convicted in Wisconsin state court on charges of firearm and drug possession and sentenced to 19 years in prison. During sentencing, the government presented a video from social media showing men with guns and drugs, which the judge used to assess Woodson's character and danger to the community. Woodson argued that he was misidentified in the video, but the judge denied his motion for a new sentencing hearing. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed, stating Woodson failed to prove he was not the man in the video.Woodson then filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, introducing booking photos from the time of his sentencing that suggested he was not the man in the video. However, the district court ruled it could not consider the photos since they were not presented in state court and denied his petition, finding the state appellate court's decision reasonable based on the evidence it had.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), habeas relief is unavailable unless the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of facts. The court found that Woodson's claim was not procedurally defaulted and that the actual innocence exception did not apply to his case. The court also ruled that it could not consider the new evidence (booking photos) under AEDPA's strict limitations. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Woodson's habeas petition. View "Woodson v Mlodzik" on Justia Law

Edgar Murillo-Chavez, a lawful permanent resident (LPR) from Mexico, entered the United States as a child without being admitted or paroled. He was granted special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status in 2010 and became an LPR in 2011. In 2016, he pleaded no contest to unlawful possession of a firearm in Oregon. In 2018, he was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon and first-degree criminal mistreatment, both in Oregon.An Immigration Judge (IJ) found Murillo removable for a firearms offense and for committing two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs). The IJ also determined that Murillo was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he committed a CIMT within seven years of being admitted. Murillo appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed his appeal, agreeing with the IJ that his 2018 convictions were CIMTs and that he was admitted when he became an LPR in 2011. Murillo then filed a motion to reopen, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, which the BIA denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Murillo's 2016 conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm was a removable offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C). The court also agreed with the BIA that Murillo was not "admitted" when he obtained SIJ status but when he became an LPR in 2011. Consequently, his 2018 conviction for first-degree criminal mistreatment, which occurred within seven years of his LPR admission, was a CIMT, making him ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court denied Murillo's petitions for review. View "MURILLO-CHAVEZ V. BONDI" on Justia Law

Sine Phimmady, a Laotian refugee admitted to the U.S. in 1979, was convicted of multiple assault-related crimes in 1992 and 1993. He served five years in prison and was subsequently placed in removal proceedings by the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS). An Immigration Judge (IJ) found him deportable based on his convictions, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal. After being released from INS custody in 2000, Phimmady rebuilt his life, maintaining steady employment and starting a family. In 2022, he successfully vacated his 1993 convictions due to a lack of proper immigration warnings during his plea hearings.Phimmady requested the BIA to reopen his removal proceedings sua sponte, citing the vacatur of his convictions. The BIA denied his motion, stating that he had not demonstrated an exceptional situation warranting reopening, particularly noting his delay in seeking post-conviction relief. Phimmady filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the BIA had a settled practice of granting reopening in cases where convictions were vacated due to defects in the criminal proceedings. The BIA denied the reconsideration, emphasizing the need to consider the specific facts and circumstances of each case, including Phimmady's delay and the nature of his convictions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the BIA does not have a settled practice of granting sua sponte reopening solely based on the vacatur of convictions. The court found that the BIA's decisions often consider the totality of circumstances, including the noncitizen's diligence in seeking post-conviction relief. Therefore, the court denied Phimmady's petition for review, upholding the BIA's decision. View "Phimmady v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Javi Porter, a lawful permanent resident of the United States and a native of Jamaica, was convicted under Virginia law for possessing with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) classified this conviction as an aggravated felony and initiated removal proceedings against him. Porter sought review of the final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed an immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his motion to terminate removal proceedings and found him removable as an aggravated felon.The IJ denied Porter’s motion to terminate the removal proceedings, concluding that DHS had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Porter was convicted of an aggravated felony. The IJ sustained the charge of removability and denied Porter’s subsequent motion for reconsideration. The IJ later issued a final summary order finding Porter removable as charged. Porter appealed to the BIA, arguing that the IJ erred in denying his motion to terminate the removal proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Porter’s Virginia drug-trafficking conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The court found that the Virginia statute under which Porter was convicted is divisible by the identity of the controlled substance and applied the modified categorical approach. The court concluded that possession with intent to distribute any amount of methamphetamine is a federal felony under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Therefore, Porter’s conviction under Virginia law is a categorical match to a felony offense under the CSA, rendering him removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The court denied Porter’s petition for review. View "Porter v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Javier Chavez Dominguez, a Mexican citizen, was arrested in North Carolina in August 2022 on state drug charges. After confirming his identity and criminal history, he was charged with Illegal Reentry after Removal Subsequent to Conviction for Aggravated Felony under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a), (b)(2). Dominguez pleaded guilty and received a 48-month prison sentence followed by three years of supervised release. He appealed the sentence, presenting new arguments not raised in the district court.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina handled the initial proceedings. Dominguez faced both state and federal charges, first pleading guilty to state charges and receiving a 10 to 21-month sentence. Upon release, he was detained by ICE and later charged federally. He pleaded guilty to the federal charge without filing any motions and did not object to the presentence investigation report (PSR), which calculated his advisory Guidelines range as 30 to 37 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. Dominguez raised four main challenges: the classification of his 2015 Arizona conviction as an aggravated felony, the constitutionality of his prior removal proceedings, the calculation of his Sentencing Guidelines range, and the substantive reasonableness of his upward variant sentence. The court found no reversible error in the district court's decisions. It held that Dominguez's guilty plea waived his right to challenge the constitutionality of his prior removals and that the district court did not plainly err in its Guidelines calculation or in imposing the upward variant sentence. The court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "US v. Dominguez" on Justia Law

Romio Villagomez, a native and citizen of the Federated States of Micronesia, was convicted of felony battery resulting in substantial bodily harm under Nevada Revised Statutes § 200.481(2)(b). Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security sought to remove him, arguing that his conviction qualified as a crime of violence under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).An Immigration Judge determined that Villagomez’s conviction was indeed a crime of violence and ordered his removal. Villagomez appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which dismissed his appeal. He then petitioned for review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The Ninth Circuit reviewed whether Villagomez’s conviction under Nevada law qualified as a crime of violence. The court noted that a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) requires the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force capable of causing physical pain or injury. The court referenced its previous decision in United States v. Fitzgerald, which held that the attempt version of the same Nevada statute is categorically a crime of violence.Villagomez argued that the Nevada statute criminalizes mere unwanted touching and allows for conviction where substantial bodily harm occurs recklessly. The court rejected these arguments, holding that causing substantial bodily harm in Nevada necessarily requires Johnson-level force, which is force capable of causing physical pain or injury. The court also held that Nevada law requires intentional conduct for battery resulting in substantial bodily harm, and thus, the statute does not encompass injuries caused by reckless deployments of force.The Ninth Circuit concluded that Nevada felony battery resulting in substantial bodily harm is categorically a crime of violence and affirmed the Board’s removability determination. The petition for review was denied. View "VILLAGOMEZ V. MCHENRY" on Justia Law

The defendants, Namrata Patnaik and Kartiki Parekh, served as the chief executive officer and human resources manager of a semiconductor chip design consulting and staffing company, respectively. They were charged with submitting fraudulent H-1B visa applications by falsely stating that the visa applicants would be working on internal projects on-site, while in reality, they were contracted out to other companies. The government alleged that these false statements were material misrepresentations that could influence the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in granting the visas.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the indictment, accepting the defendants' argument that the false statements could not be materially false because it was unlawful for the government to ask for such information. The district court relied on the ITServe All., Inc. v. Cissna decision and a USCIS memorandum that suggested USCIS could not require details about specific projects or work assignments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that lying on H-1B visa applications constitutes visa fraud even if the government asked questions it was not legally entitled to ask, as long as the misrepresentations could have influenced USCIS at the time they were made. The court emphasized that the government may protect itself against fraud regardless of whether it had the right to ask the questions. The case was remanded for reinstatement of the criminal charges against the defendants. View "USA V. PATNAIK" on Justia Law

A Kenyan national, lawfully admitted to the United States, was convicted in 2014 and 2019 of felony vehicular fleeing or attempting to elude a pursuing police officer under Pennsylvania law. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged him with removability based on these convictions, arguing they constituted crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs). The Immigration Court and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the removal orders.In 2017, DHS charged the petitioner with removability based on his 2014 fleeing-or-eluding conviction and 2016 simple assault convictions. The Immigration Judge found that simple assault did not constitute a CIMT and terminated the proceedings. However, the judge noted that the fleeing-or-eluding conviction could be a CIMT if combined with another CIMT. In 2019, after the petitioner’s second fleeing-or-eluding conviction, DHS again charged him with removability. The Immigration Judge rejected the petitioner’s res judicata defense and concluded that both fleeing-or-eluding convictions were CIMTs, sustaining the charge of removability. The BIA affirmed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA misapplied the categorical approach by relying on a realistic-probability analysis to determine that the fleeing-or-eluding convictions were CIMTs. The court held that the Pennsylvania statute under which the petitioner was convicted is divisible and that one of the felony subsections does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. Consequently, the court granted the petition for review, concluding that the petitioner’s convictions did not qualify as CIMTs under the categorical approach, and thus, he was not removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). View "Ndungu v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law