Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Walter Aceituno, a Guatemalan citizen, became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1989. In 2014, he pled guilty to drug-trafficking charges after being arrested in a sting operation involving the purchase of cocaine. His attorneys informed him that he would be deported as a result of his guilty plea, but did not explicitly state that he would be permanently barred from reentering the United States. Aceituno was deported in 2015 and later illegally reentered the U.S. in 2019, leading to further legal issues.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island granted Aceituno's petition for a writ of error coram nobis, allowing him to withdraw his 2014 guilty plea. The district court found that Aceituno's attorneys provided ineffective assistance by failing to inform him of the permanent reentry bar, and that Aceituno acted reasonably in not seeking earlier relief due to his ongoing efforts to reunite with his family through various legal means.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Aceituno's attorneys met the requirements set forth in Padilla v. Kentucky by informing him of the risk of deportation. The court found that the district court erred in concluding that the attorneys were required to inform Aceituno of the permanent reentry bar. Additionally, the appellate court determined that Aceituno's delay in seeking relief was unreasonable and that the equities did not justify the issuance of the writ. The court emphasized the importance of finality in legal proceedings and the lack of compelling circumstances to warrant coram nobis relief. The writ was quashed, and the petition was dismissed. View "Aceituno v. United States" on Justia Law

Monika Kapoor, an Indian citizen, faces extradition from the United States to India to face criminal charges. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York determined that Kapoor was extraditable under the bilateral extradition treaty between the U.S. and India. The Secretary of State issued a surrender warrant, rejecting Kapoor’s claims that she would likely be tortured if returned to India, which would violate the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Kapoor filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the Secretary’s decision, but the district court denied her petition, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4) from the REAL ID Act of 2005, which divested the court of jurisdiction to hear her claim. Kapoor appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court, stating that the Convention is not a self-executing treaty and that courts can review claims under it only as authorized by Congress. The court referenced the Supreme Court’s test in I.N.S v. St. Cyr, noting that Section 1252(a)(4) clearly states that claims under the Convention can only be raised in petitions for review of immigration removal orders and specifically bars judicial review of such claims in habeas proceedings, except in limited circumstances not applicable here.The Second Circuit held that this interpretation does not violate the Suspension Clause in the extradition context due to the longstanding rule of non-inquiry, which precludes American habeas courts from considering the anticipated treatment of an extraditee in the receiving country. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s decision, denying Kapoor’s petition. View "Kapoor v. DeMarco" on Justia Law

A native and citizen of Mexico, Lilia Salinas, who became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 2007, was convicted in North Dakota state court in 2011 for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. She received a suspended sentence of 360 days’ imprisonment. In 2021, she was convicted again in North Dakota state court for two counts of aggravated assault of a victim under 12 years of age, receiving a 10-year sentence with one year suspended. Based on these convictions, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against her in 2022, charging her with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) for a controlled substance violation and 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) for a crime of child abuse.An immigration judge (IJ) found Salinas removable under both charges, applying the categorical approach to determine that her marijuana conviction qualified as a controlled substance offense under federal law. The IJ compared the North Dakota definition of marijuana at the time of her conviction with the federal definition in effect at that time, concluding they were substantially similar. The IJ also pretermitted her application for cancellation of removal, as her 2011 conviction stopped the clock on her period of continuous residence, making her ineligible for relief.Salinas appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing that the IJ should have compared the state statute to the federal definition in effect at the time of her removal proceedings. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing that the appropriate comparison was with the federal definition at the time of conviction and that the state and federal definitions were a categorical match.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA’s decision. The court held that the proper comparison for determining removability under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) is between the state statute at the time of conviction and the federal Controlled Substances Act in effect at that time. The court also rejected Salinas’s argument that the North Dakota definition of marijuana was overbroad compared to the federal definition. Consequently, the petition for review was denied. View "Salinas v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Misael Padron, a Cuban citizen granted asylum in the United States, appealed the denial of his motion to vacate his conviction for carjacking, which he had entered pursuant to a no-contest plea. Padron argued that he did not understand the immigration consequences of his plea, which included mandatory detention, denial of naturalization, and near-certain termination of asylum and deportation. He provided evidence of his mental health challenges related to persecution in Cuba and claimed his defense counsel did not adequately inform him of the immigration consequences.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Padron’s motion, partly because he did not provide a declaration from his defense counsel and had signed a plea form acknowledging potential deportation. The court also noted that there was no alternative, immigration-neutral plea available to Padron.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Padron demonstrated error affecting his ability to understand the immigration consequences of his plea. The court found that Padron’s defense counsel did not adequately advise him of the mandatory immigration consequences, and Padron’s mental health challenges further impaired his understanding. The court also determined that Padron established a reasonable probability he would have rejected the plea had he understood the consequences, given his strong ties to the United States and the severe impact on his asylum status.The Court of Appeal reversed the denial of Padron’s motion and remanded the case with instructions to vacate Padron’s conviction and permit him to withdraw his plea and enter a different plea. View "People v. Padron" on Justia Law

A Mexican citizen, Ismael Vazquez-Garcia, was sentenced to 48 months for illegal reentry after being found by Border Patrol agents in New Mexico. He had previously been removed from the U.S. following a 2018 child-abuse conviction. At sentencing, the district court questioned him about the child-abuse conviction, which involved allegations of molestation. The court then imposed an 18-month upward variance from the recommended sentencing range of 24 to 30 months.The U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico had adopted the unobjected-to allegations in the presentence report (PSR) about the child-abuse offense and varied upwards based on his criminal history. Vazquez-Garcia appealed, arguing that his sentence was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. He contended that the district court erred by relying on the PSR's allegations and by varying upwards based on his criminal history, which he claimed was already accounted for in the Guidelines range.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Vazquez-Garcia had not shown his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because he did not object to the PSR's allegations, and the district court was permitted to adopt those unobjected-to facts. The court also found that the district court did not err by considering his criminal history for the upward variance. Additionally, the court ruled that the sentence was substantively reasonable, as the district court's focus on the child-abuse conviction was relevant to multiple sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentence, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the 48-month sentence. View "United States v. Vazquez-Garcia" on Justia Law

Jose Trinidad Martinez Santoyo was sought for extradition to Mexico to face charges of intentional aggravated homicide. In January 2014, a Mexican judge issued an arrest warrant for Santoyo, alleging he shot a man twice in the head after an argument. Mexico requested his provisional arrest in November 2018, and the United States filed a complaint in August 2021. Santoyo was arrested in May 2022 and released on bail in November 2022. Mexico formally requested his extradition in July 2022, providing various supporting documents. A magistrate judge certified the extradition in February 2023, and Santoyo challenged this certification via a habeas corpus petition.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied Santoyo's habeas corpus petition. Santoyo argued that the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico incorporated the Sixth Amendment's Speedy Trial Clause, contending that the delay between the 2014 arrest warrant and the 2022 extradition request violated his speedy trial rights. The district court rejected this argument, holding that the treaty's "lapse of time" provision referred only to statutes of limitations, not to the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial protections.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the "lapse of time" language in the extradition treaty does not incorporate the Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause. The court emphasized that extradition proceedings are not criminal prosecutions and that the treaty's language refers to statutes of limitations rather than the constitutional right to a speedy trial. The court also noted that the judiciary's role in extradition is limited and that issues of delay are more appropriately addressed by the Secretary of State. View "SANTOYO V. BOYDEN" on Justia Law

Shenisa Mohammed, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 2010. In 2020, she pleaded guilty to arson under Virginia Code § 18.2-77. The Department of Homeland Security charged her as removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), alleging her arson conviction qualified as an aggravated felony. Mohammed sought cancellation of removal, but the immigration judge (IJ) concluded that her arson conviction was an aggravated felony, making her removable and ineligible for discretionary relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, and Mohammed petitioned for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court confirmed its jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of removal, limited to constitutional claims or questions of law. The court reviewed de novo whether Mohammed’s state conviction for arson qualified as an aggravated felony under the INA.The court applied the categorical approach to determine if the Virginia arson statute matched the federal arson statute under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). The Virginia statute criminalizes maliciously burning or aiding and abetting the burning of certain properties. The federal statute criminalizes maliciously damaging or destroying property used in interstate commerce by fire or explosives. The court found that both statutes prohibit malicious burning, and the federal statute implicitly includes aiding and abetting liability through 18 U.S.C. § 2.The court concluded that the Virginia arson statute is not broader than the federal arson statute, as aiding and abetting is considered an alternative theory of liability under federal law. Therefore, Mohammed’s state arson conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony. The Sixth Circuit denied Mohammed’s petition for review. View "Mohammed v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Lau, a native and citizen of China, was charged with third-degree trademark counterfeiting in New Jersey. While awaiting trial, he left the United States and upon his return, he was paroled for deferred inspection by immigration authorities. Lau was later convicted and sentenced to probation. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings against him, asserting he was inadmissible due to his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT).An Immigration Judge (IJ) found Lau inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) and ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). The IJ concluded that Lau’s conviction constituted a CIMT, did not qualify as a petty offense, and that he was properly classified as an applicant for admission upon his return. The IJ also determined that Lau did not meet the continuous residency requirement for a 212(h) waiver. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing with the findings and dismissing Lau’s appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that DHS improperly classified Lau as an applicant for admission when he returned to the United States while his criminal charge was pending. The court found that a pending charge does not provide clear and convincing evidence of a CIMT necessary for DHS to consider an LPR an applicant for admission. Consequently, the court granted Lau’s petition for review, vacated the final order of removal, and remanded the case to the agency with instructions to terminate removal proceedings against Lau based on his inadmissibility under section 1182(a), without prejudice to any future deportation proceedings. View "Lau v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Breion Woodson was convicted in Wisconsin state court on charges of firearm and drug possession and sentenced to 19 years in prison. During sentencing, the government presented a video from social media showing men with guns and drugs, which the judge used to assess Woodson's character and danger to the community. Woodson argued that he was misidentified in the video, but the judge denied his motion for a new sentencing hearing. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed, stating Woodson failed to prove he was not the man in the video.Woodson then filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, introducing booking photos from the time of his sentencing that suggested he was not the man in the video. However, the district court ruled it could not consider the photos since they were not presented in state court and denied his petition, finding the state appellate court's decision reasonable based on the evidence it had.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), habeas relief is unavailable unless the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of facts. The court found that Woodson's claim was not procedurally defaulted and that the actual innocence exception did not apply to his case. The court also ruled that it could not consider the new evidence (booking photos) under AEDPA's strict limitations. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Woodson's habeas petition. View "Woodson v Mlodzik" on Justia Law

Edgar Murillo-Chavez, a lawful permanent resident (LPR) from Mexico, entered the United States as a child without being admitted or paroled. He was granted special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status in 2010 and became an LPR in 2011. In 2016, he pleaded no contest to unlawful possession of a firearm in Oregon. In 2018, he was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon and first-degree criminal mistreatment, both in Oregon.An Immigration Judge (IJ) found Murillo removable for a firearms offense and for committing two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs). The IJ also determined that Murillo was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he committed a CIMT within seven years of being admitted. Murillo appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed his appeal, agreeing with the IJ that his 2018 convictions were CIMTs and that he was admitted when he became an LPR in 2011. Murillo then filed a motion to reopen, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, which the BIA denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Murillo's 2016 conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm was a removable offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C). The court also agreed with the BIA that Murillo was not "admitted" when he obtained SIJ status but when he became an LPR in 2011. Consequently, his 2018 conviction for first-degree criminal mistreatment, which occurred within seven years of his LPR admission, was a CIMT, making him ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court denied Murillo's petitions for review. View "MURILLO-CHAVEZ V. BONDI" on Justia Law