Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Although not all convictions under the Travel Act represent violations related to controlled substances, meaning that the statute is not a categorical match to the removal statute, the Travel Act is divisible in that respect. Petitioner challenged the BIA's finding that he was removable for a controlled substance offense and ineligible for cancellation of removal.The panel denied the petition for review in part and held that petitioner's conviction qualified as a controlled substance offense under the modified categorical approach. The panel held, however, that the BIA's conclusion that petitioner was ineligible for relief under 8 U.S.C. 1229b was not supported by substantial evidence. The panel held that section 1229b states that the relevant time period ends "when the alien is served a notice to appear." In this case, the BIA used the date on which the notice to appear was issued, not the date when it was served on petitioner. Therefore, the panel granted the petition in part and remanded for the BIA to consider petitioner's claim for cancellation of removal. View "Myers v. Sessions" on Justia Law

In 2014, Appellant pled guilty to felony aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of a billy club. He also admitted the allegations in the motion to revoke probation in an earlier case. Appellant was sentenced to three years’ probation and a 180-day county jail term. When he entered his pleas the court explained, and Appellant acknowledged, the possible immigration consequences of his convictions. Counsel stated he had advised Appellant accordingly. Appellant was placed in removal proceedings but was granted cancellation of the removal. In 2015, Appellant was found in possession of methamphetamine for sale, resisted arrest, and attempted to destroy evidence; he was placed on probation for five years. In the new criminal case, Appellant pleaded guilty to resisting arrest and was sentenced to 360 days in the county jail. In 2017, Appellant moved to vacate revocation of probation under Penal Code 1473.7(a)(1), alleging ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the immigration consequences of his admission and sentence. The court of appeal affirmed denial of the motion. Appellant, a convicted felon currently on formal probation, is not entitled to the relief under section 1473.7. He did not establish ineffective assistance; the trial court would not have tolerated any lesser sentence and it is unlikely Appellant would have gone to trial under the circumstances. View "People v. Cruz-Lopez" on Justia Law

Where a state statute contains two layers of disjunctive lists, the analysis outlined in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), for applying the categorical approach, applies to both layers of the statute and must be performed twice. A methamphetamine conviction under California Health & Safety Code 11378 or 11379(a) does not qualify as a controlled substance offense under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's order finding petitioner removable for a controlled substance offense. The panel held that the California definition of methamphetamine was broader than the federal definition. The panel also held that the methamphetamine element applicable to a conviction under sections 11378 or 11379(a) was not divisible, because the different varieties of methamphetamine covered by California law were alternative means of committing a single crime rather than alternative elements of separate crimes. Therefore, the panel did not apply the modified categorical approach. View "Atenia Lorenzo v. Sessions" on Justia Law

California's receipt of stolen property offense is a categorical match for the generic federal crime of receipt of stolen property. The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for attempting to reenter the United States after being deported, holding that defendant's prior California conviction for receipt of stolen property was a felony theft offense that was an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. The panel also held that the district court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment and rejected defendant's remaining claims. View "United States v. Flores" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision finding petitioner ineligible for cancellation of removal and voluntary departure. The panel held that petitioner's convictions for indecent exposure under Wash. Rev. Code 9A.88.010(1) and under Wash. Rev. Code 9A.88.010(2)(b) are not categorically crimes involving moral turpitude. Furthermore, both statutes were indivisible and thus the modified categorical approach was inapplicable. In the absence of a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, petitioner was eligible to apply for cancellation of removal and voluntary departure. The panel remanded for the BIA to consider anew petitioner's request for cancellation of removal and voluntary departure. View "Barrera-Lima v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of deportation after petitioner was convicted of possession for sale of cocaine salt. The panel held that petitioner was deportable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); petitioner's conviction remained a valid ground of deportation despite its expungement under California Penal Code 1203.4; petitioner was not eligible for waiver of deportation under section 212(c); and the BIA did not err in denying deferral of deportation under the Convention Against Torture. View "Lopez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

A conviction for assault with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm or by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury under California Penal Code 245(a)(1), as it was written prior to its amendment in 2011, qualifies as a conviction for a crime of violence within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 16(a). The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for illegal reentry and rejected his collateral attacks on his removal. The panel held that defendant's prior California conviction under section 245(a)(1) required an intentional use of force and was thus a crime of violence. The panel also held that, although the failure to inform defendant that his eligibility for relief could serve as a basis to collaterally attack a removal order, it was not plausible that he would have been granted relief at the time of his removal in this case. View "United States v. Vasquez-Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Raja, a citizen of Pakistan, first entered the U.S. in 1990 without inspection. In 1996, Raja pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance and was sentenced to three-23.5 months’ imprisonment. He served 90 days in a Pennsylvania prison. Nonetheless, in 1998, Raja was granted lawful-permanent-resident status. In 2007, Raja traveled to Pakistan to visit his family. Upon his return, he was detained after officials discovered his conviction. Raja admitted to the conviction and to providing a fraudulent Social Security number to the officers at the time of his 1995 arrest. The government initiated removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). An IJ found Raja removable for a controlled-substance offense and ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility because he had never lawfully adjusted to lawful-permanent-resident status due to his prior conviction. The BIA dismissed Raja’s appeal. The Sixth Circuit denied relief, finding the Pennsylvania statute under which Raja was convicted divisible; the portion of the statute under which he was charged is a categorical match to 21 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) and is a controlled substance offense under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) under the “modified categorical approach.” View "Raja v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Battery committed with the use of a deadly weapon under Nevada Revised Statute 200.481(2)(e)(1) is a crime of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. 16(a). The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for illegal reentry into the United States. The panel held that defendant's prior battery conviction under Nevada law qualified as a crime of violence and thus his initial deportation was not unlawful. View "United States v. Guizar-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision finding petitioner ineligible for cancellation of removal. The panel held that the BIA's determination that witness tampering under Oregon Revised Statutes 162.285 was a crime involving moral turpitude did not warrant deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), because the agency's analysis directly conflicted with circuit precedent, and was inconsistent both internally and with prior BIA decisions.The panel held that Oregon Revised Statutes 162.285 was not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude because the statute captures conduct that was neither fraudulent nor base, vile, or depraved. Although the statute was divisible, the subsection that formed the basis for petitioner's conviction was likewise not a categorical match for a crime involving moral turpitude. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Vasquez-Valle v. Sessions" on Justia Law