Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit held that the BIA erred in finding that petitioner's conviction for child abuse and neglect under Nevada law was categorically a "crime of child abuse" under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). The panel held that it was bound by this circuit's opinion in Martinez-Cedillo v. Sessions, No. 14-71742, 2018 WL 3520402 (9th Cir. July 23, 2018), which deferred to the BIA's interpretation, in Matter of Soram, 25 I. & N. Dec. 378 (BIA 2010), that the generic crime of child abuse includes acts and omissions that create at least a "reasonable probability" that a child will be harmed. In this case, the Nevada statute was broader than the federal generic crime and there was a realistic probability that Nevada could prosecute conduct under its statute that fell outside the scope of the federal generic crime. Therefore, the panel granted the petition for review of the BIA's determination that petitioner was removable. View "Alvarez-Cerriteno v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision and held that the Board correctly determined that petitioner was convicted of a conspiracy related to the distribution of a controlled substance; the conviction rendered him inadmissible under the Controlled Substance Provision; and he was subject to removal under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(A). The court also held that section 1229a(c)(3)(B) did not prohibit the Board from considering petitioner's indictment. Finally, the court was without jurisdiction to address a new argument to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence because petitioner did not raise it before oral argument. View "Shaw v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed defendant's conviction for unlawful reentry into the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. The panel held that defendant's prior 2008 and 2011 removals were fundamentally unfair and thus could not serve as a predicate removal for purposes of section 1326.The panel held that because the 2008 removal proceeding was in absentia, defendant satisfied the exhaustion and deprivation-of-judicial-review requirements for bringing a collateral attack on the validity of that removal. Furthermore, it was error to remove defendant for a crime of domestic violence under Immigration and Nationality Act 237(a)(2)(E)(i) based on his California battery conviction because circuit precedent established that California battery was not a categorical crime of violence. The panel also held that the due process defects in the 2008 removal proceeding infected the 2011 expedited removal for presenting invalid entry documents. In this case, the 2011 expedited removal order was also fundamentally unfair because it violated the process due to lawful permanent residents. View "United States v. Ochoa-Oregel" on Justia Law

In 2002, Morales pleaded no contest to a drug offense. He served his sentence, voluntarily departed the U.S., and reentered the country. In 2017, while residing in the U.S., he moved to vacate this conviction under the newly enacted Penal Code section 1473.71, hoping to obtain legal status via a “U visa.” Morales contended that but for his conviction, his assistance in a 2009 law enforcement investigation would have made him eligible for that visa, and that he pleaded no contest only because of the ineffective assistance of his counsel, who failed to tell him his conviction would result in his deportation and inability to ever legally reenter the U.S.. The superior court denied his motion without prejudice based on its interpretation of section 1437(b), which addresses the timeliness and due diligence required of motions filed in the face of removal proceedings. The court of appeal reversed. The lower court ignored the plain terms of section 1473.7(a)(1); interpreting subdivision (b) to prevent noncitizens from seeking relief until and unless they are subject to removal proceedings would turn a provision about timeliness and due diligence into one that guarantees delay and renders section 1473.7 ineffectual in many cases. View "People v. Morales" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's determination that petitioner's conviction for felony child endangerment constituted a crime of child abuse that rendered him removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). Petitioner's conviction of felony child endangerment under California Penal Code 273a(a) was for driving under the influence with a child in his car who was not wearing a seat belt. The panel held that the Board's interpretation of a crime of child abuse, neglect or abandonment in Matter of Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503 (BIA 2008), and Matter of Soram, 25 I. & N. Dec. 378 (BIA 2010), was entitled to Chevron deference. Applying that definition in this instance, the panel held that petitioner's California conviction was a categorical match to the crime of child abuse, neglect, or abandonment. Furthermore, the Board's interpretation applied retroactively to Martinez-Cedillo's 2008 conviction, which occurred before the Board's decisions in Velazquez-Herrera and Soram. View "Martinez-Cedillo v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Manuel Chavez-Morales appeared before the district court following his fifth conviction for an illegal reentry offense. At sentencing, he argued that higher wages in the United States motivated his decision to illegally reenter the United States. Focusing heavily on Chavez-Morales’s criminal history and noting that none of the earlier sentences deterred Chavez-Morales from reoffending, the district court imposed an upward variant sentence of thirty-six months’ imprisonment. The district court also imposed a three-year term of supervised release. On appeal, Chavez-Morales challenged the procedural reasonableness of his term of imprisonment. Specifically, he argued the district court did not meaningfully consider his argument that economic opportunities motivated his decision to illegally reenter the United States and thereby mitigated the seriousness of his offense. Furthermore, Chavez-Morales argued the district court committed plain error by imposing a term of supervised release without acknowledging or considering United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) section 5D1.1(c), which stated a court “ordinarily” should not impose a term of supervised release when “the defendant is a deportable alien who likely will be deported after imprisonment.” The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. With respect to the prison term, the Court found the transcript of the sentencing hearing established that, on three occasions, the district court addressed the economic motivation argument. As to the imposition of a term of supervised release, while the district court erred by not acknowledging and considering U.S.S.G. 5D1.1(c), Chavez- Morales did not carry his burden on the third prong of the plain error analysis. View "United States v. Chavez-Morales" on Justia Law

After defendant pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 1425(a), which prohibits knowingly procuring citizenship contrary to law, the district court revoked his citizenship as part of his sentence. While defendant's appeal was pending the Supreme Court issued Maslenjak v. United States, 582 U.S. —, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017), in which it (1) clarified the Government's burden of proof in a Section 1425(a) prosecution and (2) held that qualification for citizenship, notwithstanding any materially false statement, is a complete defense to prosecution. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment, holding that, even post-Maslenjak, the indictment and factual resume provided a sufficient factual basis for defendant's plea and for all statutory elements of Section 1425(a), the offense of conviction. In the alternative, even if the court assumed that the district court's acceptance of the plea was plain error, defendant failed to show that the error affected his substantial rights. View "United States v. Nepal" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of a decision finding petitioner removable from the United States. The court held that the BIA did not err by concluding that petitioner was removable for committing a controlled substance and an aggravated felony. In this case, petitioner's prior Missouri conviction for possession of a controlled substance in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. Sec. 195.202 made him removable. View "Bueno-Muela v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of a decision finding petitioner removable from the United States. The court held that the BIA did not err by concluding that petitioner was removable for committing a controlled substance and an aggravated felony. In this case, petitioner's prior Missouri conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. Sec. 195.211 made him removable. View "Martinez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

During the Rwandan Genocide, the United States admitted a limited number of refugees with priority given to those who were in the most danger, including, in 1998, Ngombwa and purported members of his family. In 1998, DHS received information from prosecutors in Rwanda that Ngombwa had twice been convicted in absentia by Rwandan tribal courts for participation in the Genocide and had been named in an indictment in the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The government proved at trial that his admission, status, and eventual naturalization were based on material falsehoods. At sentencing, the government proved to the district court’s satisfaction that the falsehoods were used to conceal Ngombwa’s participation in the Genocide. The Eighth Circuit affirmed his convictions for unlawful procurement of naturalization and conspiracy to commit the same, 18 U.S.C. 1425, 371, and his above-Guidelines sentence of 180 months. Rejecting Ngombwa’s claim his counsel was ineffective for failing to contact and interview five of his family members, the court reasoned that counsel made a strategic decision to avoid more detrimental evidence. View "United States v. Ngombwa" on Justia Law