Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Sanchez-Arvizu pleaded guilty to illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b)(2). Applying the 2015 Sentencing Guidelines, the probation officer assessed a 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), finding that Sanchez-Arvizu was deported after a conviction for a “crime of violence,” his Texas conviction for indecency with a child by sexual contact, and calculating an advisory Guidelines range of 41-51 months of imprisonment. Under the November 2016 Guidelines, Sanchez-Arvizu’s sentencing range would be 15-21 months. The probation officer arrived at a range of 1-7 months under those Guidelines. The district court stated that “a sentence of 51 months would be entirely appropriate,” but sentenced Sanchez-Arvizu at the low end of the Guidelines range because this was his first conviction for illegal reentry. The court stated that it had considered all of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and sentenced Sanchez-Arvizu to 42 months in prison. The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded because, while this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held that for "statutory rape offenses focused solely on the age of the participants, the generic federal definition of ‘sexual abuse of a minor’ . . . requires the age of the victim to be less than 16.” The statute under which Sanchez-Arvizu was convicted is categorically broader than the generic federal definition, so the court erred by deeming Sanchez-Arvizu’s conviction a crime of violence under Guidelines section 2L1.2. View "United States v. Sanchez-Arvizu" on Justia Law

Alejandro Lujan Jimenez petitioned for review a final order of removal and an order by the Bureau of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) declining to sua sponte reopen removal proceedings. Lujan is a native and citizen of Mexico. He first entered the United States as a child sometime in the 1990s. His most recent entry into the United States occurred in May 2004. In January 2007, Lujan pled guilty in Colorado state court to Criminal Trespass of a Motor Vehicle with the Intent to Commit a Crime Therein, and sentenced to 35 days in jail. The Department of Homeland Security filed a notice charging Lujan as removable. He received three continuances of removal proceedings until April 2009 when he conceded removability. Lujan then applied for adjustment of status and cancellation of removal. He obtained four additional continuances of his removal proceedings. Lujan appeared in immigration court on June 5, 2013, and the IJ granted counsel’s motion to withdraw. Lujan stated that he was attempting to obtain new counsel, but proceeded pro se at the hearing. The IJ denied relief, concluding that Lujan was ineligible for adjustment of status based on his immigration history and that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude—his criminal trespass offense in Colorado. Lujan appealed to the BIA, arguing that the IJ’s denial of a continuance violated his right to due process and that his Colorado conviction was not a crime involving moral turpitude. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s ruling. Lujan then filed an untimely petition for review, which was dismissed. The Tenth Circuit determined it lacked jurisdiction over petition number 17-9527: review of the BIA’s decision declining to sua sponte reopen his removal proceedings. The Court has previously held that “we do not have jurisdiction to consider [a] petitioner’s claim that the BIA should have sua sponte reopened the proceedings . . . because there are no standards by which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.” View "Lujan-Jimenez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant Azael Bedolla-Zarate, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned the Tenth Circuit for review of a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Final Administrative Removal Order (FARO) based upon his having been convicted of an aggravated felony. Bedolla-Zarate was convicted of third-degree sexual abuse of a minor in Wyoming state court in September 2016. He contended that his conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony. The Tenth Circuit found a person convicted under the Wyoming sexual abuse of a minor statute necessarily has committed sexual abuse of a minor under the INA, therefore DHS properly issued a FARO against Bedolla-Zarate for committing an aggravated felony under the INA. The Court denied review. View "Bedolla-Zarate v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal based on petitioner's prior convictions for theft. The court held that the Maryland theft statute was not divisible and the modified categorical approach was inapplicable in this case, and not all of the offenses encompassed under the relevant Maryland statute qualified as crimes involving moral turpitude. Accordingly, the court vacated the BIA's decision and remanded for consideration of petitioner's application for cancellation of removal. View "Leyva Martinez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner's application for cancellation of removal. The panel held that petitioner was ineligible for relief because he was convicted of "Assault of a Child in the Third Degree – Criminal Negligence and Substantial Pain – With Sexual Motivation." The court held that petitioner's conviction was a categorical match for sexual abuse of a minor, which was an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A). The panel reasoned that it was unnecessary to decide whether to look at state law or the line of Supreme Court precedent beginning with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), to determine what elements were part of the offense that petitioner had been convicted of, because the sexual motivation allegation constituted an element under either approach. View "Quintero-Cisneros v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner's application for Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and order of removal. The court held that petitioner's prior violations of two municipal ordinances were misdemeanors that disqualified him from TPS status under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A). The court also held that petitioner suffered no due process prejudice. View "Rubio v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision granting postconviction relief to Defendant on his claim that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel from an immigration attorney when he tried to get a driver’s license, holding that no right to counsel had attached when Defendant went to the driver’s license station.Defendant’s visit to the driver’s license station triggered a criminal investigation and ultimately a conviction for a previously committed fraudulent practice. The district court set aside Defendant’s guilty plea and sentence, holding that Defendant’s counsel, who was representing Defendant in a pending federal immigration case, breached his essential duty to provide necessary advice to Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that neither the right to counsel under Iowa Const. art. I, 10, nor the United States Constitution Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached at the time Defendant’s attorney advised Defendant regarding getting a driver’s license, as this was before any investigation or criminal proceedings had begun. View "Hernandez-Ruiz v. State" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for unlawful procurement of naturalization because he concealed from immigration authorities his past as a guard at a Serbian prison camp. The court held that the district court did not err when it prevented defendant from presenting hearsay statements of foreign witnesses who were unavailable to testify at trial; defendant failed to demonstrate that his constitutional right to present a complete defense was violated under Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); assuming arguendo that the Geneva Convention could be judicially noticed, the district court did not err in determining that its probative value was substantially outweighed by the possibility of confusing the issues and potentially misleading the jury; and the district court did not violate defendant's rights under Chambers when it declined to take judicial notice. View "United States v. Mitrovic" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Appellant’s conviction for marriage fraud in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1325(c), which prohibits knowingly entering into a marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration laws, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Specifically, the Court held (1) the evidence presented in this case amply supported the district court’s conclusion that Defendant duped his wife into marrying him in order to avoid deportation; and (2) the trier of fact could reasonably have concluded that Defendant harbored no intent to establish a life with his wife and instead married her solely to avoid deportation. View "United States v. Akanni" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted respondents' motion to dismiss this appeal as moot and vacated the prior published opinion. In this case, petitioner was removed from the United States and was no longer detained in immigration custody. Both sides agree that the appeal has become moot. View "Sopo v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law