Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

When a stay has been issued, an immigrant is not held pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1231(a) because he is not in the "removal period" contemplated by statute until his appeal is resolved by this court. The Second Circuit reversed the district court's determination that petitioner was detained under 8 U.S.C. 1231, holding that petitioner was detained under 8 U.S.C. 1226(c). In light of the uncertainty surrounding this area of detention after the Supreme Court's decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018), the court remanded to the district court for reconsideration of the habeas petition under the correct statutory provision. View "Hechavarria v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision determining petitioner's conviction of online solicitation of a minor was an aggravated felony that subjected him to removal. The court held that Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017), abrogated the court's previous definition of a minor in this context. Esquivel-Quintana established an age requirement that rendered petitioner's statute of conviction overbroad and did not qualify as sexual abuse of a minor for purposes of removability. Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the BIA and remanded for further proceedings. View "Shroff v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and voluntary departure. The court held that the record contained sufficient facts to support the BIA's conclusion that petitioner's prior conviction under North Dakota law for unlawful entry into a vehicle was an aggravated felony attempted theft as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(U) and (G). View "Ahmed v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of an order of removal based on petitioner's conviction for possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree in violation of New York Penal Law. The court rejected petitioner's argument that 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(T) did not set forth the elements of the generic federal crime for failure to appear, because the agency's interpretation, which was contrary to petitioner's interpretation, was entitled to deference; petitioner's related mens rea argument was also without merit; a conviction for failure to appear was an aggravated felony; and thus the BIA did not err in finding that petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal. View "Perez Henriquez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of an order of removal based on petitioner's conviction for possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree in violation of New York Penal Law. The court rejected petitioner's argument that 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(T) did not set forth the elements of the generic federal crime for failure to appear, because the agency's interpretation, which was contrary to petitioner's interpretation, was entitled to deference; petitioner's related mens rea argument was also without merit; a conviction for failure to appear was an aggravated felony; and thus the BIA did not err in finding that petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal. View "Perez Henriquez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Ramirez, a citizen of El Salvador, first entered the U.S. in 1996 at age 17. Nearly 20 years later, Ramirez was placed in removal proceedings, charged with being present without being admitted or paroled under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Ramirez applied for special rule cancellation of removal under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), 111 Stat. 2160, 2196–2199 (1997), which allows certain nationals from designated countries to apply for suspension of deportation or special rule cancellation of removal and adjust their status to permanent residency. To qualify under NACARA, an alien ordinarily must establish at least seven years of continuous presence in the U.S. but an applicant who is inadmissible or removable for having committed a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) must establish at least 10 years of continuous presence after becoming inadmissible or removable. In 2012, Ramirez was convicted of petit larceny and obstruction of justice. The Board of Immigration Appeals found him ineligible for NACARA relief. The Fourth Circuit vacated the order of removal, holding that obstruction of justice under Virginia law is not a CIMT because it may be committed without fraud, deception, or any other aggravating element that shocks the public conscience. The court directed the government to facilitate Ramirez’s return to the United States to participate in further proceedings. View "Ramirez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Defendant Magdiel Sanchez-Urias pleaded guilty to illegally reentering the country after being deported. The court imposed a sentence that included a $1,000 fine. Defendant appealed, arguing that he could not afford the fine. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: defendant bore the burden to show that he lacked the assets to pay the fine. But he refused to provide financial information at his presentence interview, and the district court did not clearly err in finding on the record before it that Defendant had not established his inability to pay. View "United States v. Sanchez-Urias" on Justia Law

Dimaya, a lawful U.S. permanent resident has two convictions for first-degree burglary under California law. An Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals held that California first-degree burglary is a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), so that Dimaya was deportable under 8 U.S.C. 1229b. While Dimaya’s appeal was pending the Supreme Court held that a similar clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)—defining “violent felony” as any felony that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” was unconstitutionally “void for vagueness” (Johnson decision). Relying on Johnson, the Ninth Circuit held that section 16(b), as incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act, was also unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme Court affirmed. Section 16(b) has the same two features as ACCA’s residual clause—an ordinary-case requirement and an ill-defined risk threshold—combined in the same constitutionally problematic way. The combination of “indeterminacy about how to measure the risk posed by a crime [and] indeterminacy about how much risk it takes for the crime to qualify as a violent felony,” result in “more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause tolerates,” Three textual discrepancies between ACCA’s residual clause and section 16(b) do not relate to those features that Johnson found to produce impermissible vagueness or otherwise makes the statutory inquiry more determinate. View "Sessions v. Dimaya" on Justia Law

Gutierrez, a citizen of Bolivia, has been a U.S. Lawful Permanent Resident since her 1980 admission. In 2012, she pleaded guilty to credit card theft, Virginia Code 18.2-192(1). She had prior convictions for petty larceny and for prescription fraud, DHS initiated removal under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), based on her convictions for petty larceny and prescription fraud, as crimes involving moral turpitude. Gutierrez applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a). DHS argued statutory ineligibility because she had been convicted of an aggravated felony in 2012, triggering 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G). An IJ concluded that Gutierrez was ineligible for relief. The BIA employed the categorical approach; found Virginia Code 18.2-192(1) overbroad because the statute contained at least one subdivision, under which “a person can be convicted . . . absent proof of an ‘intent to deprive’ the rightful owner of the property.” The BIA then determined that the section was divisible because its subdivisions “criminalize[d] diverse acts, committed with different mental states." The BIA reasoned, given that the evidence that the 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(3) “aggravated felony bar ‘may apply’,” applied 8 C.F.R. 1240.8(d) and required Gutierrez to “prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the bar [was] inapplicable.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Where an alien was convicted under a divisible criminal statute and the record is inconclusive as to whether the conviction was for an aggravated felony, such inconclusiveness defeats the alien’s eligibility for relief. View "Gutierrez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Jose Maria Garcia-Martinez was a lawful permanent resident at the time of his convictions, and the BIA found him removable, under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), for having been convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMT), not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. He was granted review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision, arguing the BIA erred in concluding that Garcia’s Oregon theft convictions were CIMTs. The Ninth Circuit noted that the Oregon theft offenses for which Garcia was convicted did not require a permanent taking of property. Therefore, the panel concluded that, at the time Garcia committed the offenses, they were not crimes involving moral turpitude because for many decades the BIA had required a permanent intent to deprive in order for a theft offense to be a crime involving moral turpitude. "In short, Garcia’s thefts were not CIMTs, and his removal order must be set aside. ... the BIA has changed or updated or revised its rule for the future. Nevertheless, that rule should not be applied to Garcia, who pled and was convicted while the old rule was extant." View "Garcia-Martinez v. Sessions" on Justia Law