Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner challenged the BIA's retroactive application of a new rule expanding the types of larceny that qualify as a crime of moral turpitude. The Second Circuit granted the petition for review and reversed the BIA's latest order issued on remand. In this case, the BIA issued Matter of Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 I. & N. Dec. 847 (B.I.A. 2016), on the same day that it dismissed petitioner's appeal. The court considered the factors in Lugo v. Holder, 783 F.3d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 2015), to determine that the BIA could not apply the new rule in Diaz-Lizarraga retroactively. In light of the second and third Lugo factors, the court found that Diaz-Lizarraga was an abrupt departure from BIA precedent and that petitioner relied on the previous rule when pleading guilty. The court then applied the categorical approach and the BIA's pre-Diaz-Lizarraga standard for larceny crimes involving moral turpitude, and held that the BIA erred when it found that petitioner's larceny conviction constituted such a crime. View "Obeya v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Mondragon-Gonzalez was admitted to the U.S. in 2008 on an immigrant visa. In 2015, he pled guilty under Pennsylvania law, which provides: A person commits an offense if he is intentionally in contact with a minor" for specified purposes. He admitted to sending a girl pictures of his penis and was sentenced to a prison term of eight to 23 months. DHS commenced deportation proceedings. An Immigration Judge found that Mondragon-Gonzalez’s conviction fell within 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), which provides that “[a]ny alien who at any time after admission is convicted of . . . a crime of child abuse . . . is deportable.” The BIA dismissed his appeal, comparing the elements of the state conviction and its interpretation of a “crime of child abuse” in Matter of Velazquez-Herrera. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. Given Congress’ intent to make crimes that harm children deportable offenses, the BIA’s interpretation is not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. The Pennsylvania law requires intentional contact with a minor for the purpose of engaging in sexual abuse of children; it meets the generic definitional requirement in section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), that the act constitute maltreatment of a child such that there was a sufficiently high risk of harm to a child’s physical or mental well-being. View "Mondragon-Gonzalez v. Attorney General of the United States" on Justia Law

This case appeal presented a post-conviction relief (PCR) matter in which Petitioner Gregg Taylor, a Jamaican citizen, pled guilty to a drug offense. Petitioner resided in South Carolina for years with his wife and two children, all three of whom were United States citizens. In plea negotiations, Petitioner's primary concern was whether he would be subject to deportation. Plea counsel viewed Petitioner's grave concern with the prospect of deportation as a "collateral" issue, yet provided general assurances to Petitioner that he would not be deported. As a result, Petitioner pled guilty. The drug offense resulted in Petitioner's deportation, and this PCR application followed. The PCR court denied relief. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and reversed: "By focusing on Petitioner's decision-making, it is uncontested that he 'would have rejected any plea leading to deportation.' Because Petitioner's counsel provided deficient representation, we may not avoid a finding of prejudice on the basis of the likelihood of a guilty verdict . . . we are constrained to 'conclude [Petitioner] has demonstrated a 'reasonable probability that, but for [his] counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" View "Taylor v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

This case appeal presented a post-conviction relief (PCR) matter in which Petitioner Gregg Taylor, a Jamaican citizen, pled guilty to a drug offense. Petitioner resided in South Carolina for years with his wife and two children, all three of whom were United States citizens. In plea negotiations, Petitioner's primary concern was whether he would be subject to deportation. Plea counsel viewed Petitioner's grave concern with the prospect of deportation as a "collateral" issue, yet provided general assurances to Petitioner that he would not be deported. As a result, Petitioner pled guilty. The drug offense resulted in Petitioner's deportation, and this PCR application followed. The PCR court denied relief. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and reversed: "By focusing on Petitioner's decision-making, it is uncontested that he 'would have rejected any plea leading to deportation.' Because Petitioner's counsel provided deficient representation, we may not avoid a finding of prejudice on the basis of the likelihood of a guilty verdict . . . we are constrained to 'conclude [Petitioner] has demonstrated a 'reasonable probability that, but for [his] counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" View "Taylor v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

In 1991, Valerio, a citizen of Costa Rica, entered the U.S. without inspection. She was apprehended and placed in deportation proceedings but failed to appear. Valerio's then-boyfriend purchased her a birth certificate and social security card in the name of Rosa Hernandez, a U.S. citizen who lived in Puerto Rico. From 1995-2007, Valerio used Hernandez's identity to secure employment, open lines of credit, purchase cars and a home, and defraud the government of over $176,000 in housing assistance, food stamps, and other welfare benefits. In 2006, Hernandez learned about the fraud. Valerio was apprehended and was found guilty of aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A and three counts of mail fraud. 18 U.S.C. 1341. After Valerio served her sentence, DHS reopened Valerio’s deportation proceeding but mistakenly stated that she was subject to removal. An IJ denied her applications for asylum and withholding of removal, finding the conviction for aggravated identity theft a "particularly serious crime" under section 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). Following a remand, the BIA concluded that in deportation and removal proceedings alike, its longstanding multi-factor "Frentescu" framework for determining whether a nonaggravated felony qualifies as a "particularly serious crime" remains the same, and again found Valerio ineligible for withholding. The First Circuit agreed. The nature and circumstances of Valerio's crime were fully and properly considered." View "Valerio-Ramirez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision finding petitioner eligible for deportation under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) for possessing a controlled substance in violation of Oklahoma law. Petitioner challenged both the determination that the Oklahoma schedule of controlled substances was a categorical match to the federal schedule and that in order to terminate his order of removal he was required to show a "realistic probability" that Oklahoma actually prosecutes cases involving substances not included in the federal schedules. The Fifth Circuit has held that the realistic probability test applies whenever the categorical approach is employed. See United States v. Castillo-Rivera, 853 F.3d 218 (5th Cir. 2017) (en banc). The court held that petitioner waived this viable argument under Castillo-Rivera, because he never suggested that the realistic probability test was satisfied in this case. Because petitioner waived his only viable argument, the court denied relief. View "Rodriguez Vazquez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Appellate Court dismissed as moot Petitioner’s appeal from the judgment of the habeas court, which denied his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction of assault in the second degree. The Appellate Court concluded that the habeas appeal was rendered moot by Petitioner’s subsequent deportation to Haiti where any relief provided in relation to Petitioner’s assault conviction would have no effect on his ability to lawfully reenter the United States or to become a citizen. The court specifically ruled that a prior unchallenged conviction of threatening in the second degree in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-62(a), which the court concluded constituted a crime of moral turpitude under the Immigration and Nationality Act, would remain as an impediment to Petitioner’s reentry. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 53a-62(a) is a divisible statute because it lists potential offense elements in the alternative, not all of which constitute crimes of moral turpitude as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) of the Act; and (2) therefore, the Appellate Court improperly determined that Petitioner’s threatening conviction constituted a crime of moral turpitude that rendered moot his habeas appeal challenging his assault conviction. View "St. Juste v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

Correa-Diaz, born in 1986 and a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. as a minor without parole. In 2004, Correa-Diaz, age 18, was arrested, based on a police officer’s observation of his conduct, in an automobile, with a 14-year-old girl. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment on an attempted sexual intercourse charge and six months’ imprisonment a sexual contact charge. The court suspended Correa-Diaz’s sentence. In 2015, Correa-Diaz pleaded guilty to counterfeiting in violation of Indiana law and was charged as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for having been convicted of an aggravated felony, as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A). The Seventh Circuit denied relief, rejecting arguments that the 2004 offenses did not constitute aggravated felonies. Because the Indiana law focused solely on the age of the participants, section 1101(a)(43)(A) requires the age of the victim to be less than 16. That condition was satisfied and “perform[ing] or submit[ing] to sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct” in violation of Indiana law constitutes “sexual abuse,” defined by the BIA “[t]he employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexually explicit conduct or the rape, molestation, prostitution, or other form of sexual exploitation of children.” View "Correa-Diaz v. Sessions" on Justia Law

A California conviction for carjacking under Penal Code section 215(a) does not qualify as a crime of violence. The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review of a final order of removal. The panel held that Nieves-Medrano v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2010), which held that a conviction for carjacking under section 215 is categorically a crime of violence under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), cannot stand in light of Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010), which held that the physical force that a crime of violence entails must be violent force. Because section 215 did not require the use of violent force that Johnson required, the California statute was not a crime of violence. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Solorio-Ruiz v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Williams, a citizen of Guyana and a lawful U.S. permanent resident, immigrated to this country in 1970, when he was 13 months old. He has no family in Guyana; his relatives are all U.S. citizens. In 2006, he pleaded guilty to five counts of first-degree forgery under Georgia Code 16-9-1(a). Williams was charged as removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The IJ denied relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Georgia forgery statute is broader than generic forgery because it criminalizes the use of a fictitious name when signing a document and because the statute does not require a showing of prejudice. The BIA later denied a motion for reconsideration under the Supreme Court’s 2016 "Mathis" decision, arguing that Georgia’s forgery statute is indivisible under Mathis and is overbroad in criminalizing some conduct that does not relate to forgery--false agency endorsements. The Third Circuit denied relief. Employing a “looser categorical approach,” the court considered the “logical connection” between the federal offense the state law and concluded that concerns about the inauthenticity or unauthorized nature of a written instrument establish a logical relationship between common law forgery and false agency endorsement. The intent elements are “directly analogous” and target the “same core criminal conduct.” View "Williams v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law