Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The petitioner, Emerson Levi Godoy-Aguilar, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States in 2009 as a permanent resident. In 2015, he was charged and subsequently convicted under California Penal Code (CPC) § 136.1(c)(1) for dissuading a witness by force or threat. He was sentenced to 365 days in Los Angeles County Jail. Following his conviction, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security served him with a Notice to Appear, charging him with removability for having committed an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S), relating to obstruction of justice.An Immigration Judge (IJ) determined that Godoy-Aguilar's conviction under CPC § 136.1(c)(1) constituted an aggravated felony of obstruction of justice and issued a removal order. Godoy-Aguilar appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed the appeal, concluding that the state offense categorically fell within the federal definition of an offense relating to obstruction of justice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court analyzed whether CPC § 136.1(c)(1) is a categorical match for the generic federal offense of an aggravated felony relating to obstruction of justice under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S). The court concluded that CPC § 136.1(c)(1) is indeed a categorical match, as it involves specific intent conduct aimed at obstructing justice, and no pending investigation or proceeding is required. The court found that the elements of the underlying crimes in CPC § 136.1(a)(1)-(2) and (b)(1)-(3) do not sweep more broadly than the generic federal offense. Consequently, the court held that Godoy-Aguilar's conviction and sentence constituted an aggravated felony relating to obstruction of justice and denied the petition for review. View "GODOY-AGUILAR V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Lorenzo Vazquez-Alba, a Mexican citizen, lawfully entered the United States in 1986 and became a legal permanent resident in 1987. In 2008, he was arrested in Dallas, Texas, for using a juvenile as a paid prostitute and supplying her with drugs. He pleaded guilty to aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury and was sentenced to five years of probation. In 2011, he pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault of a child under 14 and was sentenced to eight years in prison for both the 2008 and 2011 offenses. He lost his permanent resident status and was deported to Mexico in 2017. He later unlawfully reentered the U.S. and was arrested in 2022 for driving a stolen vehicle and failing to register as a sex offender.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas indicted Vazquez-Alba for illegal reentry and failure to register as a sex offender. He pleaded guilty to both counts. The presentence investigation report (PSR) calculated an advisory guideline range of 30 to 37 months’ imprisonment. Vazquez-Alba objected to the PSR’s grouping determination and the indictment’s failure to allege a prior aggravated felony. The district court overruled his objections and sentenced him to 45 months’ imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Vazquez-Alba argued that his 2011 conviction was not an aggravated felony and that his counts should be grouped under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2. The court held that his 2011 conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child under 14 constituted an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). The court also found that the district court correctly declined to group the counts and properly treated his state-court sentences separately. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and sentence. View "USA v. Vazquez-Alba" on Justia Law

Vitaliy Chmukh, a native and citizen of Ukraine, came to the United States as a refugee in 2001. In 2017, he was involved in using a stolen vehicle to steal packages from porches, leading to his arrest. He pleaded guilty to possession of a stolen vehicle under RCW § 9A.56.068 and possession of heroin under RCW § 69.50.4013. He was sentenced to 43 months for the stolen vehicle charge and 24 months for the controlled substance charge, serving 38 months in total.The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged Chmukh with removability based on these convictions, alleging that the stolen vehicle conviction was an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) and that the controlled substance conviction violated the Controlled Substances Act. An immigration judge (IJ) found him removable and denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The IJ determined that the stolen vehicle conviction was an aggravated felony and a particularly serious crime, making him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal. The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that Chmukh’s conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle was an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) because it matched the generic federal offense of possession of stolen property, requiring possession, actual knowledge that the property was stolen, and intent to deprive the owner of the property. The court also found that the conviction was a particularly serious crime, barring withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B). The court rejected Chmukh’s arguments that the statute was overbroad and that the agency erred in its analysis. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit denied Chmukh’s petition for review. View "CHMUKH V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Felix Jacobo Salomon-Guillen, a native of El Salvador, entered the United States in 2009 on an O-3 visa as the spouse of Lucia Parker Salomon, a recording artist who later became a naturalized citizen. Salomon-Guillen became a permanent resident and managed his wife's music career. In 2013, he began working as a marketing director for a book publisher and engaged in a fraudulent scheme that cost the company $1.4 million. He was indicted for wire fraud, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to 18 months in prison.The government sought to remove Salomon-Guillen from the country due to his aggravated felony conviction. He conceded removability and applied for adjustment of status and an inadmissibility waiver. The immigration judge denied his applications, finding that he failed to demonstrate that his removal would cause "extreme hardship" to his wife or mother, both U.S. citizens. The judge also concluded that Salomon-Guillen did not merit a waiver or adjustment of status as a matter of discretion due to the severity of his fraud offense.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the immigration judge's decision. The BIA, with Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge Denise G. Brown participating, found that Salomon-Guillen failed to show that his wife would suffer extreme hardship if she accompanied him to El Salvador. The BIA also agreed that he did not merit a waiver or adjustment of status as a matter of discretion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the regulation allowing temporary Board members to serve six-month terms did not preclude their reappointment for additional terms. The court also found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's discretionary denial of the inadmissibility waiver. Consequently, the petition for review was denied in part and dismissed in part. View "Saloman-Guillen v. Garland" on Justia Law

Andre Louis Keller drove to a permanent immigration checkpoint where a Customs & Border Protection (CBP) canine alerted to his vehicle. Upon searching, agents found an alien unlawfully present in the United States concealed under luggage. Keller conditionally pleaded guilty and appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence found in the vehicle.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held a hearing on Keller’s motion to suppress. Testimonies were provided by CBP Agent Jesse Sandoval, Matthew B. Devaney from CBP’s Canine Academy, and Andre Falco Jimenez, a private police dog trainer. The district court denied Keller’s motion, leading to his conditional guilty plea. Keller was sentenced to 20 months in prison and 3 years of supervised release. He then appealed the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that stopping a vehicle for brief questioning at a permanent immigration checkpoint is not a Fourth Amendment search and does not require probable cause. The court found that the canine’s alert provided probable cause to search Keller’s vehicle. The court also concluded that the canine’s actions did not constitute an unlawful search and that the district court did not err in its ruling. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Keller’s motion to suppress. View "United States v. Keller" on Justia Law

Simon Quito-Guachichulca, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty to third-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota law. Following his conviction, the government initiated removal proceedings, arguing that his crime was an "aggravated felony" under federal law, making him deportable. Initially, the government classified the crime as a "crime of violence," but the Supreme Court's decision in Sessions v. Dimaya rendered that classification impermissibly vague. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit vacated the removal order and remanded the case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) for reconsideration.On remand, the government reclassified Quito's crime as "rape," another type of "aggravated felony." Both an immigration judge and the BIA agreed with this classification. Quito then petitioned for review, arguing that the government’s change in theory violated the doctrine of res judicata. The Eighth Circuit found that res judicata did not apply because there was no final judgment on the merits due to the vacated order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed whether Minnesota’s third-degree criminal sexual conduct statute fits the federal definition of "rape" under immigration law. The court applied the categorical approach, examining the statutory elements rather than Quito's actual conduct. The court determined that the federal definition of "rape" in 1996 did not include digital or mechanical penetration, which is covered under Minnesota’s statute. Therefore, the court concluded that there was a categorical mismatch between the state and federal definitions.The Eighth Circuit granted Quito's petition for review, vacated the BIA's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that Minnesota’s third-degree criminal sexual conduct does not qualify as "rape" under federal immigration law. View "Quito-Guachichulca v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 1999, the defendant admitted to sufficient facts to support a finding of guilty for distributing a class A substance. He later sought to withdraw this admission, claiming his plea counsel failed to inform him that it would lead to mandatory deportation. The defendant, a legal permanent resident since 1994, argued that he would have insisted on going to trial had he known the immigration consequences, citing his strong ties to the United States, including his American citizen wife and children, and his consistent employment as a welder.The defendant's initial motion for a new trial was denied due to the absence of an affidavit from his plea counsel. He then filed a renewed motion with the necessary affidavit, which was also denied by a District Court judge after a non-evidentiary hearing. The judge concluded that while the plea counsel was ineffective, the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice. The Appeals Court affirmed this decision.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case, focusing on whether the defendant established prejudice from his counsel's ineffectiveness. The court found that the motion judge improperly assessed the defendant's claim by not applying the reasonable person standard and by making credibility determinations about the defendant's assertion that he would have gone to trial. The court vacated the denial of the renewed motion and remanded the case for further findings on whether the defendant's ties to the United States constituted special circumstances and whether a reasonable person in his situation would have chosen to go to trial if properly advised. View "Commonwealth v. Torres" on Justia Law

Mohamed Lamine Kouyate, a 36-year-old native and citizen of Guinea, entered the United States on a tourist visa in 2014 due to concerns about political unrest in Guinea. He overstayed his visa and was later convicted in Maryland for identity fraud involving over $100,000, resulting in a 15-year prison sentence. Following his release on parole, the Department of Homeland Security charged him with removability for overstaying his visa. Kouyate applied for asylum, withholding of removal under the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming he would be persecuted or tortured if returned to Guinea due to his father's political notoriety.An immigration judge (IJ) denied Kouyate's applications, ruling that his identity fraud conviction constituted a "particularly serious crime," making him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal under the INA and CAT. The IJ also denied his application for deferral of removal under the CAT, finding insufficient evidence that he would likely be tortured if returned to Guinea. The IJ noted that the political climate in Guinea had changed, and Kouyate's fears were speculative and based on generalized concerns of violence.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Kouyate's appeal, deeming his challenge to the IJ's particularly serious crime ruling waived and affirming the IJ's denial of deferral of removal under the CAT. The BIA agreed with the IJ's assessment that Kouyate's fears were speculative and not supported by sufficient evidence of a particularized risk of torture.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed both the IJ's and BIA's decisions, finding no reversible error. The court upheld the BIA's determination that Kouyate had not exhausted his administrative remedies regarding the particularly serious crime ruling and affirmed the denial of deferral of removal under the CAT, concluding that substantial evidence supported the BIA's decision. The petition for review was denied. View "Kouyate v. Garland" on Justia Law

In October 2022, Jose Guadalupe Hernandez Velasquez was found unlawfully present in the United States for the fifth time. Previously, in 2019, he had signed a written stipulation waiving his rights and agreeing to his removal, which led to his deportation. Upon his reentry in 2022, he was charged with illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Hernandez Velasquez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that his waiver of rights in the 2019 removal was unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary, making the removal order fundamentally unfair.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied his motion to dismiss, placing the burden on Hernandez Velasquez to prove the invalidity of his waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. The court found that he did not meet this burden and also failed to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement of § 1326(d)(1).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that when the government produces a written and signed stipulation and waiver, the burden rests on the defendant to prove its invalidity. The court found that the district court's burden allocation was proper and that Hernandez Velasquez's waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The court also noted that even if the burden had been on the government, the outcome would not have changed, as the evidence overwhelmingly supported the validity of the waiver. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Hernandez Velasquez" on Justia Law

Andre Bowyer, a Jamaican national, pleaded guilty to re-entering the United States without permission after being previously removed. During his sentencing, Bowyer attempted to highlight his ties to a family he had formed in the U.S. The district judge interrupted him frequently, characterizing Bowyer's account as lacking insight and unconvincing. Bowyer received a below-guidelines sentence.Bowyer appealed, arguing that his right to make his own statement at sentencing was violated. He conceded that he did not object during the district court proceedings, so the review was limited to the plain-error standard. Bowyer did not specify what additional arguments he would have made if given more time. The district court had read a letter from Bowyer detailing his background and his relationship with the family, but the judge found this information irrelevant to the sentencing factors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that while the district judge's interruptions were frequent, they did not completely prevent Bowyer from speaking. The judge also solicited further comments from Bowyer at the end of the allocution. The court found that even if there was an error, it was not plain because there was no unambiguous case law against such interruptions. Additionally, Bowyer's arguments were already considered by the judge, and there was no indication that further allocution would have led to a different sentence.The Seventh Circuit concluded that Bowyer did not meet the plain-error test for reversal and affirmed the district court's decision. View "USA v. Bowyer" on Justia Law