Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Sine Phimmady, a Laotian refugee admitted to the U.S. in 1979, was convicted of multiple assault-related crimes in 1992 and 1993. He served five years in prison and was subsequently placed in removal proceedings by the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS). An Immigration Judge (IJ) found him deportable based on his convictions, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal. After being released from INS custody in 2000, Phimmady rebuilt his life, maintaining steady employment and starting a family. In 2022, he successfully vacated his 1993 convictions due to a lack of proper immigration warnings during his plea hearings.Phimmady requested the BIA to reopen his removal proceedings sua sponte, citing the vacatur of his convictions. The BIA denied his motion, stating that he had not demonstrated an exceptional situation warranting reopening, particularly noting his delay in seeking post-conviction relief. Phimmady filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the BIA had a settled practice of granting reopening in cases where convictions were vacated due to defects in the criminal proceedings. The BIA denied the reconsideration, emphasizing the need to consider the specific facts and circumstances of each case, including Phimmady's delay and the nature of his convictions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the BIA does not have a settled practice of granting sua sponte reopening solely based on the vacatur of convictions. The court found that the BIA's decisions often consider the totality of circumstances, including the noncitizen's diligence in seeking post-conviction relief. Therefore, the court denied Phimmady's petition for review, upholding the BIA's decision. View "Phimmady v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Javi Porter, a lawful permanent resident of the United States and a native of Jamaica, was convicted under Virginia law for possessing with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) classified this conviction as an aggravated felony and initiated removal proceedings against him. Porter sought review of the final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed an immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his motion to terminate removal proceedings and found him removable as an aggravated felon.The IJ denied Porter’s motion to terminate the removal proceedings, concluding that DHS had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Porter was convicted of an aggravated felony. The IJ sustained the charge of removability and denied Porter’s subsequent motion for reconsideration. The IJ later issued a final summary order finding Porter removable as charged. Porter appealed to the BIA, arguing that the IJ erred in denying his motion to terminate the removal proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Porter’s Virginia drug-trafficking conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The court found that the Virginia statute under which Porter was convicted is divisible by the identity of the controlled substance and applied the modified categorical approach. The court concluded that possession with intent to distribute any amount of methamphetamine is a federal felony under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Therefore, Porter’s conviction under Virginia law is a categorical match to a felony offense under the CSA, rendering him removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The court denied Porter’s petition for review. View "Porter v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Javier Chavez Dominguez, a Mexican citizen, was arrested in North Carolina in August 2022 on state drug charges. After confirming his identity and criminal history, he was charged with Illegal Reentry after Removal Subsequent to Conviction for Aggravated Felony under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a), (b)(2). Dominguez pleaded guilty and received a 48-month prison sentence followed by three years of supervised release. He appealed the sentence, presenting new arguments not raised in the district court.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina handled the initial proceedings. Dominguez faced both state and federal charges, first pleading guilty to state charges and receiving a 10 to 21-month sentence. Upon release, he was detained by ICE and later charged federally. He pleaded guilty to the federal charge without filing any motions and did not object to the presentence investigation report (PSR), which calculated his advisory Guidelines range as 30 to 37 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. Dominguez raised four main challenges: the classification of his 2015 Arizona conviction as an aggravated felony, the constitutionality of his prior removal proceedings, the calculation of his Sentencing Guidelines range, and the substantive reasonableness of his upward variant sentence. The court found no reversible error in the district court's decisions. It held that Dominguez's guilty plea waived his right to challenge the constitutionality of his prior removals and that the district court did not plainly err in its Guidelines calculation or in imposing the upward variant sentence. The court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "US v. Dominguez" on Justia Law

Romio Villagomez, a native and citizen of the Federated States of Micronesia, was convicted of felony battery resulting in substantial bodily harm under Nevada Revised Statutes § 200.481(2)(b). Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security sought to remove him, arguing that his conviction qualified as a crime of violence under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).An Immigration Judge determined that Villagomez’s conviction was indeed a crime of violence and ordered his removal. Villagomez appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which dismissed his appeal. He then petitioned for review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The Ninth Circuit reviewed whether Villagomez’s conviction under Nevada law qualified as a crime of violence. The court noted that a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) requires the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force capable of causing physical pain or injury. The court referenced its previous decision in United States v. Fitzgerald, which held that the attempt version of the same Nevada statute is categorically a crime of violence.Villagomez argued that the Nevada statute criminalizes mere unwanted touching and allows for conviction where substantial bodily harm occurs recklessly. The court rejected these arguments, holding that causing substantial bodily harm in Nevada necessarily requires Johnson-level force, which is force capable of causing physical pain or injury. The court also held that Nevada law requires intentional conduct for battery resulting in substantial bodily harm, and thus, the statute does not encompass injuries caused by reckless deployments of force.The Ninth Circuit concluded that Nevada felony battery resulting in substantial bodily harm is categorically a crime of violence and affirmed the Board’s removability determination. The petition for review was denied. View "VILLAGOMEZ V. MCHENRY" on Justia Law

The defendants, Namrata Patnaik and Kartiki Parekh, served as the chief executive officer and human resources manager of a semiconductor chip design consulting and staffing company, respectively. They were charged with submitting fraudulent H-1B visa applications by falsely stating that the visa applicants would be working on internal projects on-site, while in reality, they were contracted out to other companies. The government alleged that these false statements were material misrepresentations that could influence the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in granting the visas.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the indictment, accepting the defendants' argument that the false statements could not be materially false because it was unlawful for the government to ask for such information. The district court relied on the ITServe All., Inc. v. Cissna decision and a USCIS memorandum that suggested USCIS could not require details about specific projects or work assignments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that lying on H-1B visa applications constitutes visa fraud even if the government asked questions it was not legally entitled to ask, as long as the misrepresentations could have influenced USCIS at the time they were made. The court emphasized that the government may protect itself against fraud regardless of whether it had the right to ask the questions. The case was remanded for reinstatement of the criminal charges against the defendants. View "USA V. PATNAIK" on Justia Law

A Kenyan national, lawfully admitted to the United States, was convicted in 2014 and 2019 of felony vehicular fleeing or attempting to elude a pursuing police officer under Pennsylvania law. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged him with removability based on these convictions, arguing they constituted crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs). The Immigration Court and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the removal orders.In 2017, DHS charged the petitioner with removability based on his 2014 fleeing-or-eluding conviction and 2016 simple assault convictions. The Immigration Judge found that simple assault did not constitute a CIMT and terminated the proceedings. However, the judge noted that the fleeing-or-eluding conviction could be a CIMT if combined with another CIMT. In 2019, after the petitioner’s second fleeing-or-eluding conviction, DHS again charged him with removability. The Immigration Judge rejected the petitioner’s res judicata defense and concluded that both fleeing-or-eluding convictions were CIMTs, sustaining the charge of removability. The BIA affirmed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA misapplied the categorical approach by relying on a realistic-probability analysis to determine that the fleeing-or-eluding convictions were CIMTs. The court held that the Pennsylvania statute under which the petitioner was convicted is divisible and that one of the felony subsections does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. Consequently, the court granted the petition for review, concluding that the petitioner’s convictions did not qualify as CIMTs under the categorical approach, and thus, he was not removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). View "Ndungu v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Emerson Levi Godoy-Aguilar, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States in 2009 as a permanent resident. In 2015, he was charged and subsequently convicted under California Penal Code (CPC) § 136.1(c)(1) for dissuading a witness by force or threat. He was sentenced to 365 days in Los Angeles County Jail. Following his conviction, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security served him with a Notice to Appear, charging him with removability for having committed an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S), relating to obstruction of justice.An Immigration Judge (IJ) determined that Godoy-Aguilar's conviction under CPC § 136.1(c)(1) constituted an aggravated felony of obstruction of justice and issued a removal order. Godoy-Aguilar appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed the appeal, concluding that the state offense categorically fell within the federal definition of an offense relating to obstruction of justice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court analyzed whether CPC § 136.1(c)(1) is a categorical match for the generic federal offense of an aggravated felony relating to obstruction of justice under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S). The court concluded that CPC § 136.1(c)(1) is indeed a categorical match, as it involves specific intent conduct aimed at obstructing justice, and no pending investigation or proceeding is required. The court found that the elements of the underlying crimes in CPC § 136.1(a)(1)-(2) and (b)(1)-(3) do not sweep more broadly than the generic federal offense. Consequently, the court held that Godoy-Aguilar's conviction and sentence constituted an aggravated felony relating to obstruction of justice and denied the petition for review. View "GODOY-AGUILAR V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Lorenzo Vazquez-Alba, a Mexican citizen, lawfully entered the United States in 1986 and became a legal permanent resident in 1987. In 2008, he was arrested in Dallas, Texas, for using a juvenile as a paid prostitute and supplying her with drugs. He pleaded guilty to aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury and was sentenced to five years of probation. In 2011, he pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault of a child under 14 and was sentenced to eight years in prison for both the 2008 and 2011 offenses. He lost his permanent resident status and was deported to Mexico in 2017. He later unlawfully reentered the U.S. and was arrested in 2022 for driving a stolen vehicle and failing to register as a sex offender.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas indicted Vazquez-Alba for illegal reentry and failure to register as a sex offender. He pleaded guilty to both counts. The presentence investigation report (PSR) calculated an advisory guideline range of 30 to 37 months’ imprisonment. Vazquez-Alba objected to the PSR’s grouping determination and the indictment’s failure to allege a prior aggravated felony. The district court overruled his objections and sentenced him to 45 months’ imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Vazquez-Alba argued that his 2011 conviction was not an aggravated felony and that his counts should be grouped under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2. The court held that his 2011 conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child under 14 constituted an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). The court also found that the district court correctly declined to group the counts and properly treated his state-court sentences separately. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and sentence. View "USA v. Vazquez-Alba" on Justia Law

Vitaliy Chmukh, a native and citizen of Ukraine, came to the United States as a refugee in 2001. In 2017, he was involved in using a stolen vehicle to steal packages from porches, leading to his arrest. He pleaded guilty to possession of a stolen vehicle under RCW § 9A.56.068 and possession of heroin under RCW § 69.50.4013. He was sentenced to 43 months for the stolen vehicle charge and 24 months for the controlled substance charge, serving 38 months in total.The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged Chmukh with removability based on these convictions, alleging that the stolen vehicle conviction was an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) and that the controlled substance conviction violated the Controlled Substances Act. An immigration judge (IJ) found him removable and denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The IJ determined that the stolen vehicle conviction was an aggravated felony and a particularly serious crime, making him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal. The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that Chmukh’s conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle was an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) because it matched the generic federal offense of possession of stolen property, requiring possession, actual knowledge that the property was stolen, and intent to deprive the owner of the property. The court also found that the conviction was a particularly serious crime, barring withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B). The court rejected Chmukh’s arguments that the statute was overbroad and that the agency erred in its analysis. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit denied Chmukh’s petition for review. View "CHMUKH V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Felix Jacobo Salomon-Guillen, a native of El Salvador, entered the United States in 2009 on an O-3 visa as the spouse of Lucia Parker Salomon, a recording artist who later became a naturalized citizen. Salomon-Guillen became a permanent resident and managed his wife's music career. In 2013, he began working as a marketing director for a book publisher and engaged in a fraudulent scheme that cost the company $1.4 million. He was indicted for wire fraud, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to 18 months in prison.The government sought to remove Salomon-Guillen from the country due to his aggravated felony conviction. He conceded removability and applied for adjustment of status and an inadmissibility waiver. The immigration judge denied his applications, finding that he failed to demonstrate that his removal would cause "extreme hardship" to his wife or mother, both U.S. citizens. The judge also concluded that Salomon-Guillen did not merit a waiver or adjustment of status as a matter of discretion due to the severity of his fraud offense.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the immigration judge's decision. The BIA, with Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge Denise G. Brown participating, found that Salomon-Guillen failed to show that his wife would suffer extreme hardship if she accompanied him to El Salvador. The BIA also agreed that he did not merit a waiver or adjustment of status as a matter of discretion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the regulation allowing temporary Board members to serve six-month terms did not preclude their reappointment for additional terms. The court also found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's discretionary denial of the inadmissibility waiver. Consequently, the petition for review was denied in part and dismissed in part. View "Saloman-Guillen v. Garland" on Justia Law