Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Conviction for failing to report murder does not preclude eligibility for withholding of removal. Flores, a Guatemalan native, entered the U.S. illegally. In 2007, she began and ended a relationship Sibrian. Flores returned to South Carolina with a new boyfriend, Perez, in 2008; Sibrian killed Perez. Flores claims she did not report the murder because Sibrian threatened to kill her and her three-year-old daughter. Flores eventually pleaded guilty to accessory after the fact for failing to report the murder. There was no evidence that Flores covered up the homicide, lied to law enforcement, or assisted Sibrian. After serving her prison term, Flores was removed. She re-entered illegally, was arrested for prostitution, and was detained. She stated that she feared returning to Guatemala because: her father wanted to kill her; she had been raped by local gang member following her previous removal; and she feared persecution as a lesbian. The asylum officer determined that Flores had a reasonable fear of persecution. An IJ found that Flores’s accessory conviction rendered her ineligible for withholding of removal and that Flores failed to adequately establish that she would be subjected to torture in Guatemala, as required by the Convention Against Torture. The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit remanded. Flores’s accessory-after-the-fact conviction is not an offense “relating to obstruction of justice,” nor is it an “aggravated felony” or a “particularly serious crime” under the statute; Flores is eligible for withholding of removal. View "Flores v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit denied a petition for review of a final order of removal, concluding that Maryland third degree burglary qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). The Fourth Circuit explained that Maryland's third degree burglary statute, breaking and entering a dwelling of another, with the intent to commit a crime, implicates moral values beyond the duty to obey the law and inherently is base, vile, or depraved. The act of breaking and entering a dwelling, with the intent to commit any crime, necessarily involves conduct that violates an individual's reasonable expectation that her personal living and sleeping space will remain private and secure. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that an individual's expectation that her dwelling will remain private, secure, and free from intruders intending to commit a crime is violated regardless whether the dwelling is occupied at the time of the burglary. View "Uribe v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Panama and admitted to the United States on a B-2 visitor visa, was subjected to expedited removal proceedings because he was not lawfully admitted for permanent residence and his burglary offense was an aggravated felony for purposes of immigration law. Petitioner unsuccessfully sought review in the immigration court, petitioned for review, and was then removed. Following the DHS's subsequent cancellation of petitioner's removal order, the Attorney General moved in this Court to dismiss petitioner's petition for review. The court denied the Attorney General's renewed motion to dismiss, concluding that the court was not stripped of jurisdiction in a pending case simply by writing "cancelled" on a removal order the DHS has sued to remove an alien, and the court declined to dismiss the petition on mootness grounds. The court found that the Attorney General waived his remaining arguments. On the merits, the court concluded that the offense of statutory burglary in Virginia does not constitute an aggravated felony for purposes of immigration law. The court concluded that the Virginia burglary statute is indivisible, and application of the modified categorical approach is inappropriate. Using the categorical approach, the court concluded that the Virginia offense of statutory burglary criminalizes more conduct than the generic federal offense of burglary. Therefore, the DHS erred in classifying petitioner's conviction as an aggravated felony. The court granted the petition for review, vacated, and remanded. View "Castendet-Lewis v. Sessions III" on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen of Jamaica, asserted a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel challenge to his conviction under the criminal counterfeiting statute. The district court determined that, although counsel provided deficient performance, defendant was not prejudice because the district court corrected counsel's deficiencies. In this case, defendant unknowingly pleaded to an aggravated felony that rendered him automatically deportable. Counsel had consulted with an immigration attorney regarding repercussions of defendant's plea to his immigration status, but the immigration attorney gave advice based upon an amended version of the statute that did not apply to defendant's case. Therefore, neither counsel nor the district court informed defendant that he was pleading to a crime that rendered him automatically deportable. The court issued a certificate of appealability and addressed defendant's claim on the merits. The court concluded that defendant received deficient performance under the Sixth Amendment, and that it prejudiced defendant because the district court's warnings, which were general and referenced only a vague "risk" or possibility of deportation, did not cure counsel's deficient performance. The court explained that defendant could demonstrate prejudice by showing a reasonable likelihood that, absent his counsel's error, he could have negotiated a different plea agreement or would have gone to trial instead. Accordingly, the court reversed, vacated, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Swaby" on Justia Law

Defendant, a Canadian citizen, pleaded guilty to a drug possession charge. Defendant filed a motion to withdraw the plea on grounds of mistake or ignorance. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that it was insufficient because Defendant had received the standard statutory advisement that a criminal conviction may have the consequences of deportation. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that receipt of the standard statutory advisement that a criminal conviction “may” have adverse immigration consequences does not bar a noncitizen defendant from seeking to withdraw a guilty plea on that basis. Remanded to permit the trial court to determine whether Defendant has shown good cause for withdrawing his plea. View "People v. Patterson" on Justia Law

Chavez-Alvarez, a citizen of Mexico, became a lawful permanent resident in 1989, then served in the U.S. Army. In 2000, Chavez-Alvarez penetrated the vagina of an intoxicated platoon member with his fingers and performed oral sex without consent. He initially denied the allegations, but later admitted the assault and was convicted under the Code of Military Justice: 10 U.S.C. 907, 925, and 934 for making false official statements; sodomy; and adultery and indecent assault. He was discharged and confined for 18 months. Chavez-Alvarez was charged as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227, having been convicted of an aggravated felony with a term of imprisonment of at least one year and of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme. An IJ determined he was ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility. Following a remand, the BIA concluded that Chavez-Alvarez was removable under the moral-turpitude provision, rejecting his argument that he was only convicted of sodomy, a constitutionally protected activity under Supreme Court precedent. The BIA disagreed, reasoning that Chavez-Alvarez’s crime was subject to a sentence enhancement, having been committed forcibly, which was the “functional equivalent” of a conviction for forcible sodomy, a crime involving moral turpitude, and that his two false-statements convictions were separate crimes of moral turpitude. The Third Circuit reversed, rejecting the BIA’s reasoning that “for immigration purposes a sentence enhancement can serve as the functional equivalent of an ‘element’ of an offense.” View "Chavez-Alvarez v. Attorney General , United States" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of illegally reentering the United States and sentenced to 51 months in prison. The court concluded that the occupant of the apartment where defendant was found voluntarily consented to entry; articulable facts warranted the agents' lawful protective sweep where the agents knew that defendant had a prior conviction for aggravated assault on a police officer and that he may be present in the apartment; the totality of the circumstances demonstrated that defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his bedroom; and defendant's requests for suppression of all evidence was without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Ortega-Montalvo" on Justia Law

Petitioners Hernandez-Martinez and Dominguez-Herrera, non-permanent residents of the United States and a married couple, sought review of the denial of their consolidated applications for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1). The court concluded that petitioners failed to meet their burden under the REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(4), to establish their eligibility for cancellation of removal where both petitioners have committed a crime involving moral turpitude. In this case, Hernandez-Martinez had been convicted of theft in the municipal court of Hutchinson, Kansas, and Dominguez-Herrera had been convicted of theft in the municipal court of Great Bend, Kansas, which was a criminal offense, and the crimes were punishable by a year or more in prison. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Dominguez-Herrera v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for attempted illegal reentry and noted that the district court's instruction at trial failed to properly inform the jury of the essential elements of the offense. Petitioner frequently earned money washing car windows at the Mariposa port of entry into the United States. Petitioner was arrested by border patrol agents one day when he was washing windows. The court concluded that the lack of instruction to the jury that petitioner had to have a conscious desire to reenter the United States free from official restraint to be found guilty of the crime of attempted illegal reentry was plain error. In this case, if properly instructed on the official restraint doctrine, no rational jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner was free from official restraint in the pre-inspection area, or that he intended to be simply by entering that area. Likewise, there was insufficient evidence in the record to support petitioner's guilt on the theory that he intended to go beyond the pre-inspection area so as to be free to go at large and at will within the United States. Accordingly, the court vacated the conviction and remanded for a judgment of acquittal View "United States v. Vazquez-Hernandez" on Justia Law

USCIS denied plaintiff's application for naturalization based on her conviction of conspiracy to commit false or altered lottery tickets. USCIS reasoned that plaintiff's conviction, an aggravated felony, permanently prevented her from demonstrating good moral character and thus from being naturalized. Plaintiff argues that the Louisiana statute implementing the first-offender pardon demonstrates that this is a full pardon such that it falls within the regulation. Given that Louisiana does not consider the automatic first-offender pardon to restore "a status of innocence," as does a gubernatorial pardon, the court concluded that USCIS's interpretation that an automatic first-offender pardon is not a "full and unconditional executive pardon" is permissible. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. View "Nguyen v. USCIS" on Justia Law