Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of illegal entry in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1325 and illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326, predicated on his expedited removal in 2012. The court concluded that defendant had no Fifth Amendment due process right to hire counsel in the expedited removal proceeding and that he was not prejudiced by the government’s failure to inform him of the possibility of withdrawal relief. Because defendant's 2012 removal was not fundamentally unfair, the court affirmed the section 1326 conviction and sentence for illegal reentry. Because the revocation of defendant's revocation of his supervised release was premised on the section 1326 conviction, the court also affirmed the district court's revocation. View "United States v. Peralta-Sanchez" on Justia Law

Swaby, a citizen of Jamaica, entered the U.S. on a tourist visa in 1996 and adjusted to lawful permanent resident status in 2010. In 2013, Swaby pled nolo contendere in Rhode Island to three counts of manufacturing, delivering, or possessing with intent to distribute marijuana. Swaby was charged with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), which authorizes removal of an alien convicted of a violation of any federal or state law "relating to a controlled substance,” defined as a "drug or other substance" included in one of the five federal drug schedules, 21 U.S.C 802(6). Swaby initially appeared pro se and accepted an order of removal, waiving his right to appeal. In 2015, represented by counsel, Swaby moved to reopen and terminate removal proceedings, arguing that under the Supreme Court’s 2015 holding, Mellouli v. Lynch, his convictions did not qualify as removable offenses. The IJ reopened, but denied Swaby's request for cancellation of removal. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit dismissed in part and denied relief in part. Under the modified categorical approach, the plea documents make clear that Swaby's convictions were for the manufacturing, delivering, or possessing with intent to distribute marijuana and "relat[e] to a controlled substance (as defined in [the federal drug schedules])," as section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) requires. View "Swaby v. Yates" on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks review of the IJ and BIA's conclusion that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal, and order of removal. Petitioner's removal was based on his 1998 conviction for delivery of a controlled substance (heroin) under Oregon Revised Statutes 475.992(1)(a). The court concluded that section 475.992(1)(a) is overbroad in its definition of “delivery,” and the modified categorical approach may not be applied because section 475.992(1)(a) is indivisible with respect to whether an “attempt” is accomplished by solicitation. Therefore, the court held that a conviction for delivering heroin under section 475.992(1)(a) is not an aggravated felony. The court granted the petition for review and remanded. View "Sandoval v. Yates" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for illegal reentry after deportation, arguing that the district court erred in determining that his prior New Jersey conviction for endangering the welfare of a child is a crime of violence (COV). The court concluded that even if his conviction was not for sexual abuse of a minor and does not qualify as an aggravated felony, he has also been convicted of illegal reentry and that conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Solano-Hernandez" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Belarus, seeks review of the BIA's final order of removal based on petitioner's Virginia involuntary manslaughter offense, which the agency deemed a categorical crime involving moral turpitude. The court explained that an involuntary manslaughter conviction can be secured in Virginia without proving a conscious disregard of risks attendant to the offender’s conduct; such a conviction can be predicated on proof that the offender failed to appreciate or be aware of the risks emanating from his conduct. Therefore, the court concluded that Virginia’s involuntary manslaughter offense is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and vacated, remanding for further proceedings. View "Sotnikau v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Mateo-Medina, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, was deported in 2012 after serving five months for unlawfully obtaining a U.S. passport. Shortly after his deportation, his common-law wife, Rasuk, a U.S. citizen with whom Mateo-Medina had lived for 15 years, was diagnosed with terminal cancer. Rasuk had two adult sons from a prior marriage, both drug addicts. One lived with the couple; the couple was raising the young child (Angel) of her other son. When Mateo-Medina learned of the diagnosis, he returned to the U.S. to care for Rasuk, who died in 2014. Mateo-Medina became Angel’s sole caretaker. Rasuk’s son reported Mateo-Medina to immigration authorities. He pled guilty to reentry after removal, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a); (b)(2). Mateo-Medina’s PSR calculated a sentence of eight-to-14 months’ imprisonment. Mateo-Medina had a 2000 DUI conviction, the 2012 fraudulent passport conviction, and six arrests that did not lead to conviction. The PSR did not contain any information about the conduct underlying those arrests. The court departed downward one level; the prosecutor and the defense argued for a sentence of time served (six months), the lower end of the Guidelines range. The court sentenced Mateo-Medina to 12 months plus one day. The Third Circuit vacated the sentence, finding that the court mischaracterized Mateo-Medina’s criminal history in a way that affected his sentence. View "United States v. Mateo-Medina" on Justia Law

Urena, a citizen of Mexico, was convicted as an alien found in the U.S. after having been deported, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and was sentenced to 100 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release. Urena was directed, at the end of his prison sentence, to surrender to the Homeland Security Department for a determination of deportability. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the district court’s refusal to exclude evidence of Urena’s seven prior removals under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and denial of Urena’s Motion for a Mistrial after the prosecution published to the jury an exhibit that included the fact of Urena’s prior conviction for “Felony Class 4 Cocaine Possession.” The district court found a specific non‐propensity purpose for the evidence of prior removals and was in the best position to find that the jury’s attention had not been drawn to the prior conviction information on the exhibit because the court itself had not noticed it until it was brought to its attention. View "United States v. Urena" on Justia Law

This was an appeal of a judgment against a bail bondsman who revoked a bail bond for an illegal alien at the request of an agent of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The district court awarded damages in the amount of the bail bond premiums, and the appellants contended on appeal that they were entitled to additional damages. The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the district court's judgment and affirmed. View "Garcia v. Absolute Bail Bonds" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, seeks review of the BIA's decision finding him removable based on his conviction for “Third Degree Sex Offense” under Maryland Criminal Law Article 3-307. The court concluded that the BIA erred as a matter of law, and held that petitioner's conviction does not constitute the aggravated felony of “sexual abuse of a minor” under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A), because Maryland Criminal Law Article 3-307 proscribes more conduct than does the generic federal offense. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the order of removal, and ordered his immediate release from DHS custody. View "Larios-Reyes v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Defendant, a legal resident of the United States, was indicted on two counts of robbery. Defendant admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt in order to enroll in a diversion program. Defendant later moved to vacate his plea, arguing that his admission of guilt operated as a conviction under federal law and that the trial court erred by failing to provide him the advisement contained in Ohio Rev. Code 2943.031(A), which requires courts to alert noncitizens that a guilty plea or no-contest plea may affect their immigration status. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 2943.031(A) required the trial court to advise Defendant that his admission of guilt made for purposes of entering into the pretrial diversion program may affect his immigration status; and (2) because the trial court failed to give that advisement, the trial court must vacate the dismissal of the case against Defendant and vacate the admission of guilt executed as part of the pretrial diversion program process. Remanded. View "State v. Kona" on Justia Law