Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Miguel Cosio-Nava pled guilty in 2014 to the felony offense of domestic battery with traumatic injury, in violation of Idaho Code sections 18-903 and 18-918(2). Cosio was a Mexican citizen who had been in the United States since 1992 as a Legal Permanent Resident (“LPR”). At his sentencing hearing, the court discussed immigration issues with Cosio and his trial counsel. Cosio appealed the district court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that trial counsel provided him ineffective assistance by failing to advise him of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty. After review of the district court record, the Supreme Court found no error in the dismissal of Cosio's petition for relief and affirmed. View "Cosio-Nava v. Idaho" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's determination that petitioner is removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) and 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Petitioner had pleaded guilty to possession with the intent to deliver over ten pounds of marijuana in violation of Ark. Code Ann. 5-64-401(a). Section 5-64-401(a) renders it unlawful for any person to purposely, knowingly, or recklessly manufacture, deliver, or possess with the intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance. At issue is whether petitioner's conviction constitutes “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance,” a phrase that the INA has left undefined. The Supreme Court has instructed that in determining what constitutes a “small” amount of marijuana, courts are to utilize their common sense. In this case, the court explained that common sense dictates that ten pounds of marijuana is no “small amount,” particularly in light of the 1.3 grams of marijuana that the Supreme Court declared “small” in Moncrieffe v. Holder. Therefore, the court held that petitioner was convicted of a state felony that constitutes “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance” such that he is an aggravated felon and is ineligible for relief from removal. The court denied the petition. View "Flores-Larrazola v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Singh, a citizen of India, was admitted as a lawful permanent resident in 2009. He ran convenience stores in Clearfield County, Pennsylvania. In 2011, state troopers searched his stores. Singh was charged with “the manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance,” conspiracy, and “[k]nowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled or counterfeit substance.” A “Negotiated Plea Agreement” described the counts as involving a “PA Counterf[e]it Substance – Non Fed.” At his plea colloquy, Singh pled guilty to “possession with intent to deliver a counterfeit substance under Pennsylvania law but not under federal law” and “criminal conspiracy to commit possession with the intent to deliver … designated a counterfeit substance, under Pennsylvania law but not under federal law. DHS began removal proceedings for being convicted of: an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B); “a violation of . . . any law or regulation of a State … relating to a controlled substance,” 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i); a “crime involving moral turpitude,” 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i); and an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). An IJ found Singh removable. Singh filed a stipulation from the Clearfield County District Attorney, indicating that: the Plea form is a standard form that “do[es] not constitute an admission of any specific facts” and that Singh “plead[ed] only to the delivery of an unidentified counterfeit substance under Pennsylvania law.” The BIA held Singh was removable for being convicted of an aggravated felony, without deciding whether Singh was removable under other sections. The Third Circuit vacated. Singh’s conviction does not sufficiently match the elements of the generic federal offense and was not for an aggravated felony. View "Singh v. Attorney Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

Brayan Alexis Osuna-Gutierrez was arrested in Kansas. He was a passenger in a rental vehicle on a cross-country trip. The police found approximately seven grams of marijuana belonging to Gutierrez that he had legally purchased in Colorado. Police also found approximately three kilograms of methamphetamine in the rear portion of the car. The government charged Gutierrez and his co-defendants with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Gutierrez ultimately pled guilty to “Possession of Marijuana with Intent to Distribute" (the government dropped the methamphetamine charges). The district court sentenced him to time served, approximately seven months. After leaving jail, Gutierrez was immediately transferred to immigration custody and served with Notice of Intent to Issue a Final Administrative Removal Order (the expedited removal process). During the removal process, an officer within DHS concluded that Gutierrez was not a legal permanent resident, having come to the United States from Mexico with his mother when he was one year old without being legally admitted. Further, Gutierrez had pled guilty to an aggravated felony. Gutierrez timely petitioned for review of his removal and was deported back to Mexico. Gutierrez argued his deportation was improper because: (1) the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) expedited removal process is illegal; and (2) in any event, it was improper for DHS to use the expedited removal process on Gutierrez because he pled guilty to a misdemeanor, not a felony. The Tenth Circuit found Gutierrez was wrong on both counts, and denied Gutierrez's petition for review. View "Osuna-Gutierrez v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2012, defendant was charged with burglary for entering and taking jewelry from an unoccupied house. The circuit court appointed a public defender and a Spanish-speaking interpreter. At a pretrial hearing, the parties informed the court that defendant would plead guilty to burglary, a Class 2 felony and would be sentenced to four months in the county jail, with credit for time served. The court admonished defendant in accordance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(a) and, pursuant to the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/113-8), stated that a burglary conviction “may have the consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization under the laws of the United States.” Defendant stated that he understood and still wished to plead guilty. Later, the judge again admonished defendant that pleading guilty to burglary meant he “could be deported from the country,” a decision that would be “up to the federal government.” Defendant again acknowledged that he understood the potential immigration consequences. The court accepted defendant’s guilty plea. Within 30 days, defendant filed a pro se motion to “open and vacate” his conviction. The circuit court appointed new counsel. Counsel filed an amended motion, alleging that defense counsel failed to inform defendant of the consequences of his plea on his resident alien status. The court denied the motions, stating that any prejudice was cured by the court’s own admonishments. A divided appellate court vacated, citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the denial of the motion. “To accept the defendant’s claim would require us to characterize the court’s lengthy and exhaustive admonitions as merely a perfunctory or ritualistic formality; a characterization we are unwilling to make.” View "People v. Valdez" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Albania, seeks review of the BIA's order upholding the IJ's finding that his conviction for sale of a controlled substance, in violation of Florida Statute 893.13(1)(a)(1), constituted an aggravated felony and therefore rendered him removable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The court concluded that the BIA correctly upheld the IJ's determination that section 893.13(1)(a)(1) is divisible. Therefore, under the modified categorical approach, the court concluded that petitioner's Florida conviction qualifies as an "illicit trafficking" aggravated felony. The court thus denied the petition for review. View "Spaho v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner Constantine Golicov, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order concluding that his Utah state conviction for failing to stop at a police officer’s command rendered him removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The specific provision of the INA that served as grounds for removal provided that an alien is subject for removal if that person commits an "aggravated felony." The INA defined the term "aggravated felony" to include "crimes of violence." Petitioner argued to the Tenth Circuit that "crime of violence" was unconstitutionally vague. After review of the Supreme Court precedent of "Johnson v. United States," (135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015)), and applying that case to the facts of this case, the Tenth Circuit agreed with petitioner that the INA's term was indeed vague. The order of removal was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Golicov v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Six years ago, illegal immigrant Canelas-Amador was charged in Tennessee state court with felony aggravated assault. Canelas-Amador signed a “Waiver of Trial by Jury and Acceptance of Plea of Guilty.” The court approved the agreement. Before the court could enter judgment or pronounce a sentence, immigration authorities took Canelas-Amador into custody, deporting him. When Canelas-Amador failed to appear for a presentence interview, the Tennessee court issued a bench warrant. Canelas-Amador reentered the U.S. illegally, pled guilty to illegal reentry in Texas, and was sentenced to one year of imprisonment. In 2015, he was arrested in Tennessee. He pled guilty to illegal reentry. The district court imposed a sentence of 57 months’ imprisonment, finding that the state court order constituted a “conviction for a felony that is . . . a crime of violence,” mandating a 16-point enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The Guideline does not define “conviction.” The court looked to 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A), which refers to a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and the judge has ordered some punishment, penalty, or restraint. The Sixth Circuit reversed. A plea agreement approved in a form order falls short of “a formal judgment of guilt.” View "United States v. Canelas-Amador" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Ghana and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of three counts of medical assistance fraud in violation of Minn. Stat. 609.466. DHS commenced removal proceedings based on the ground that petitioner was removable because he had been convicted of an aggravated felony pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The BIA agreed and ordered petitioner removed to Ghana. Petitioner seeks review of the BIA's decision. In this case, there is one conviction, and the total loss is directly tied to three specific fraud counts “covered by the conviction.” The court need not decide whether totally unrelated fraud counts in a single conviction may be aggregated. As the BIA recognized, petitioner's three fraud counts of conviction were part of a sufficiently interrelated fraud to warrant aggregation, whether or not the criminal complaint included an express allegation of conspiracy or scheme to defraud. Likewise, the order to pay an aggregated restitution amount demonstrated that petitioner did not commit multiple, unrelated frauds. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Sokpa-Anku v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Reyes entered the U.S. from Mexico, without inspection, in 1994; he became a lawful permanent resident in 1998. Reyes is married and has five children, all U.S. citizens. In 2015, Reyes was charged with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) for “hav[ing] been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude [CMT] not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.” The Notice listed three prior state (Ohio) criminal charges: in 2000, Reyes was convicted of soliciting; in 2003, Reyes was convicted in Hamilton for passing bad checks; in 2005, Reyes was convicted of resisting arrest The IJ found that Reyes’s prior charges for soliciting prostitution and passing bad checks were CIMTs and that solicitation of prostitution was a CIMT because it was “similar to other crimes the Board has previously found to be morally turpitudinous, including renting a room with knowledge that it will be used for prostitution, keeping a house for prostitution, and the act of prostitution.” The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied relief. Although our society’s (and the BIA’s) views regarding prostitution and solicitation of prostitution may continue to “transform,” the BIA’s precedential opinions on prostitution are entitled to Chevron deference and they are not unreasonable. View "JReyes v. Lynch" on Justia Law