Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Arrazabal , a Salvadoran, entered the U.S. in 1995 at age 19, and became a lawful permanent resident alien because his mother and sister were naturalized citizens. He became involved with the Los Angeles chapter of the MS-13 gang, which has members in El Salvador. He was imprisoned for illegal gun possession and, later, for possessing cocaine. In prison he obtained prominent MS-13 tattoos. In 2001 Arrazabal’s status was revoked. His application for asylum was denied; he was removed. Years later, Arrazabal attempted to reenter illegally and was charged under 8 U.S.C. 1326. He again sought asylum, claiming that he feared he would be killed if returned to El Salvador because he wanted to quit MS-13, but his tattoos made him a target. The officer found that Arrazabal had shown reasonable probability that he had been tortured in El Salvador and that these police beatings created a reasonable possibility that he would be tortured if returned. Because his 2001 removal order made him ineligible for asylum, Arrazabal applied for withholding of removal and CAT protection, which were denied for lack of credibility. The judge did not believe that Arrazabal had refrained from criminal activity while active in MS-13, that he had been framed by U.S. police officers twice, that the IJ who ordered him removed was racist, that he suffered abuse by Salvadoran police, or that he had received death threats from fellow gang members. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that the IJ overlooked key evidence. View "Arrazabal v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen of Burma, pleaded guilty to one count of failing to depart because he willfully failed or refused "to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary" for his departure after the BIA held that he was removable. Reviewing defendant's due process challenges de novo, the court concluded that the IJ did not violate due process by proceeding without an affirmative waiver of counsel from defendant where defendant waived his right to representation. Furthermore, defendant suffered no prejudice from not having been told of his right to appeal. The court rejected defendant's contention that he was given no reasonable opportunity to examine evidence against him because he did not receive a translated copy of the 2011 State Department report on human rights in Burma used to reject his request for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Finally, the court concluded that the district court committed no error precluding defendant from raising a coercion defense because the evidentiary predicate for a successful coercion defense is lacking. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Yan Naing" on Justia Law

Bašić, a Balkan native, came to the U.S. in 1994 as a refugee to escape the civil war that was tearing Yugoslavia apart. She settled in Kentucky and became a naturalized citizen. She is now accused in Bosnia, one of Yugoslavia’s successor states, of crimes committed against ethnic Serbs during the war while Bašić was a member of the Croatian army. Bosnia asked the U.S. to extradite Bašić for trial. The Department of State filed a Complaint for Extradition in 2011. A Magistrate Judge certified the complaint, concluding that Bašić was extraditable under a 1902 treaty between the U.S. and the Kingdom of Serbia, 32 Stat. 1890. Direct appeal is not available in extradition proceedings, so Bašić filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial, rejecting arguments that the Treaty prohibits extradition of U.S. citizens to Bosnia and that the Bosnian government failed to produce a warrant for Bašić’s arrest as required by the Treaty. View "Bašic v. Steck" on Justia Law

For aliens who have committed certain criminal or terrorist offenses, removal proceedings are mandatory under 8 U.S.C. 1226(c). Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident, committed such offenses. After being released from criminal custody, Petitioner was detained under section 1226(c) pending immigration removal proceedings without bond and without an individualized showing that he posed a flight risk or danger to society. After eight months of detention, Petitioner filed a class action on behalf of himself and similarly situated noncitizens held for more than six months. The district court granted the habeas petition, concluding that section 1226(c) contains an implicit reasonableness requirement and that any detention under section 1226(c) is presumptively unreasonable after six months. The court found that Petitioner’s specific detention had become unreasonable and ordered bond hearings for all class members. The First Circuit (1) vacated the judgment as to the class members, holding that section 1226(c) does contain an implicit reasonableness requirement, but an individualized reasonableness inquiry adheres more closely to legal precedent than a bright-line six-month rule; and (2) affirmed the district court’s individualized holding with respect to Petitioner’s particular habeas petition. Remanded. View "Reid v. Donelan" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Hiram Marceleno pleaded guilty to one count of reentry of a removed alien. In this direct appeal, Marceleno claimed the district court erred by denying his request to withdraw his guilty plea. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial. View "United States v. Marceleno" on Justia Law

Hernandez and his mother entered the U.S. unlawfully when he was a small child. They adjusted their status to that of lawful permanent residents in 1989, when Hernandez was seven. His mother became a naturalized citizen when he was 16, but her naturalization did not confer citizenship on him automatically. Both of his parents would have had to naturalize before he turned 18, or they would have had to legally separate. Neither happened. Over the next 15 years, Hernandez was convicted for three controlled-substance violations, two retail thefts, and as a felon-in-possession of a firearm. In 2015 the government instituted removal proceedings based on his criminal history, under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i); (A)(iii); (C); and (A)(ii), At his hearing, the IJ informed Hernandez of his right to representation and asked whether he wanted a continuance. Hernandez did not respond, but explained that he thought he was a citizen. The IJ determined that Hernandez never obtained citizenship and asked Hernandez whether he feared being harmed if he were returned to Mexico, offering to continue the case to allow him to apply for asylum. Hernandez again declined. After the IJ entered an order of removal, Hernandez obtained counsel. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied his petition for review, rejecting an argument that Hernandez was denied representation by counsel. View "Estrada-Hernandez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Maslenjak, an ethnic Serb and native of Bosnia, came to the U.S. in 2000 as a refugee fleeing the civil war in the former Yugoslavia. Maslenjak claimed she and her family feared persecution in Bosnia because her husband had evaded conscription into the Serbian army during the war. In fact, Maslenjak’s husband had not only been in the Serbian militia during the war but had served as an officer in a unit implicated in war crimes. Maslenjak was granted refugee status and ultimately obtained her naturalization. Based on her misrepresentations during the immigration process, she was later convicted of knowingly procuring her naturalization contrary to law, 18 U.S.C. 1425(a) and of knowingly using an unlawfully issued certificate of naturalization, 18 U.S.C. 1423. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court improperly instructed the jury that her false statements need not be material in order to convict Maslenjak of procuring her naturalization contrary to law or erroneously instructed the jury that it could also convict Maslenjak if the jury found that she lacked good moral character. View "United States v. Maslenjak" on Justia Law

Defendant Adan Humberto Dominguez-Rodriguez pleaded guilty to one count of illegally reentering the United States after having previously been deported. Prior to sentencing, the probation office recommended that the district court impose a sixteen-level enhancement to Dominguez-Rodriguez’s base offense level because Dominguez-Rodriguez was previously deported after having been convicted in federal court of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Dominguez-Rodriguez objected to the proposed sixteen-level enhancement. At sentencing, the district court sustained Dominguez-Rodriguez’s objection, imposed an eight-level enhancement, and sentenced Dominguez-Rodriguez to six months’ imprisonment. The government appealed, arguing that the district court erred in failing to impose the sixteen-level enhancement. After review of the parties' arguments on appeal ,the Tenth Circuit agreed with the government and consequently remanded this case with instructions to vacate Dominguez-Rodriguez’s sentence and resentence. View "United States v. Dominguez-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Defendant, who is not a citizen of the United States, pleaded guilty to one count of possession of cocaine. Defendant was subsequently placed in a removal proceeding. Defendant filed a motion to vacate his guilty plea, claiming that he received ineffective assistance from his plea counsel when counsel provided erroneous advice that Defendant would not be subject to deportation. The motion was denied. The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that Defendant received ineffective assistance of plea counsel and remanded the matter for additional findings relating to the issue of prejudice. On remand, the judge allowed Defendant’s motion to vacate his guilty plea and ordered a new trial. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing Defendant’s motion for a new trial; and (2) the affidavits of Defendant and his plea counsel provided a sufficient basis to conclude that, but for counsel’s errors, Defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have decided instead on going to trial. View "Commonwealth v. Sylvain" on Justia Law

Petitioner Fabian Rangel-Perez challenged the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) characterization of his Utah misdemeanor conviction as an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). The BIA concluded that Rangel-Perez’s Utah conviction for unlawful sexual activity with a minor fell within the INA’s category of “aggravated” felonies that includes “sexual abuse of a minor” offenses. Rangel-Perez argued that his prior Utah conviction is not an “aggravated felony” under the INA because the INA’s generic “sexual abuse of a minor” offense required proof of both mens rea and a four-year age differential between the victim and the perpetrator, yet neither was an element of the Utah statute under which he was convicted. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with Rangel-Perez that the INA’s category of “aggravated” felonies for “sexual abuse of a minor” included only offenses that require proof of at least a “knowing” mens rea or scienter. Therefore, Rangel-Perez’s Utah conviction was not a “sexual abuse of a minor” offense under the INA. Thus, the Court reversed the BIA’s decision to treat Rangel-Perez’s prior conviction as an “aggravated felony” and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Rangel-Perez v. Holder" on Justia Law