Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Odeh was charged under 18 U.S.C. 1425(a), which provides that “[w]hoever knowingly procures or attempts to procure, contrary to law, the naturalization of any person” shall be fined or imprisoned. On her 1994 immigrant visa application and her 2004 naturalization application, Odeh stated that she had continuously lived in Amman since 1948 and answered “No” in response to questions of whether she had “ever been arrested, convicted, or ever been in a prison,” been convicted of “a crime involving moral turpitude,” or been “convicted of 2 or more offenses for which the aggregate sentences were 5 years or more.” Odeh lived in Israel and Lebanon before moving to Jordan in 1983. In 1969-1970, Odeh was convicted for her role in a bombing in a supermarket that killed two civilians and wounded others, and for her role in an attempted bombing of the British Consulate. One conviction related to her membership in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which was designated a “foreign terrorist organization” by the Secretary of State in 1997. After her conviction, the court revoked Odeh’s citizenship and sentenced her to 18 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit vacated, based on the exclusion of Odeh’s witness, an expert in post-traumatic stress disorder, from testifying about why Odeh did not know that her statements were false due to alleged torture in an Israeli prison. Such testimony is not categorically inadmissible to negate a defendant’s knowledge of the falsity of a statement. View "United Syayes v. Rasmieh Odeh" on Justia Law

Esquivel-Quintana was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 2000. In 2009, he pleaded guilty to unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor in California. Esquivel-Quintana moved to Michigan. DHS initiated removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), which states that an alien can be removed if he is convicted of an aggravated felony such as “sexual abuse of a minor,” An immigration judge ruled that Esquivel-Quintana’s conviction under California Penal Code section 261.5(c) constituted “sexual abuse of a minor” and ordered him removed to Mexico. The BIA and Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the term “sexual abuse of a minor” was permissibly interpreted to include the conviction. The BIA employed a categorical approach and held that the age differential in California’s statute—which requires an age gap of more than three years— was meaningful. View "Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen of Eritrea, has been a lawful U.S. permanent resident since 1981. In 1988, police witnessed a hand-to-hand exchange involving defendant. As the men ran away, an officer saw defendant reach into his waistband and drop a loaded handgun and throw a plastic baggie that contained rocks of cocaine base, weighing a total of 2.34 grams. An officer found a glass pipe with cocaine residue on top of defendant’s wallet, which did not contain a large amount of cash. Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine base for sale and admitted the firearm allegation. He was not advised of the immigration consequences. In 1992, defendant admitted violating probation by failing to maintain contact with his probation officer and testing positive for cocaine. In 2004, defendant returned to the U.S. after an overseas trip and was “not admitted” based on the conviction, but was allowed to remain in the U.S. Defendant was detained in 2013. Defendant filed an unsuccessful Penal Code 1016.5 motion to vacate the convictions and to withdraw his pleas. The court found that he “had failed to show prejudice.” The court of appeal remanded for determination of whether defendant made the required showing of reasonable diligence. View "People v. Asghedom" on Justia Law

Vivas-Ceja, a citizen of Mexico, was removed from the U.S. on three occasions. In 2013, he was arrested at an airport in Madison, Wisconsin, for illegally reentering the country. He pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after removal, 8 U.S.C. 1326. The maximum sentence for a defendant with a prior conviction for an aggravated felony can be up to 20 years. The definition of “aggravated felony” is supplied by the definition of “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. 16(b), which includes “any … offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” The district court concluded that Vivas-Ceja’s Wisconsin conviction for fleeing an officer was a crime of violence, and imposed a sentence of 21 months. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding section 16(b)’s definition of “crime of violence” unconstitutionally vague in light of the 2015 decision, Johnson v. United States. In Johnson the Supreme Court found the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), unconstitutionally vague. Section 16(b) is materially indistinguishable from the ACCA’s residual clause. View "United States v. Vivas-Ceja" on Justia Law

Wilber Ernesto Castillo, a citizen of El Salvador, appeals his sentence for violating 8 U.S.C. 1326, which prohibits reentry into the United States by a previously removed alien. In 2004, Castillo was convicted in California state court for second-degree robbery, a violation of California Penal Code section 211. He was removed from the United States in 2007. In July 2009, Castillo reentered the United States without inspection. Castillo was convicted in 2011 for shoplifting and in 2014 for disorderly conduct. After his 2014 arrest, agents from Immigration and Customs Enforcement interviewed Castillo. Based on his admissions that he had been removed from the United States and then reentered without inspection, the government charged Castillo with a violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. Castillo argued on appeal to the Tenth Circuit that his sentence was miscalculated because the district court incorrectly considered the California robbery conviction to be a “crime of violence” for purposes of a sentencing enhancement under section 2L1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court correctly considered Castillo’s California robbery conviction to be a crime of violence, it affirmed. View "United States v. Castillo" on Justia Law

USCIS determined that because Juan Reyes-Soto had violated South Carolina Code 16-23-410, South Carolina’s “Pointing firearm at another person” statute, he had committed an aggravated felony and thus could not establish “good moral character.” The district court affirmed. The court held that section 16-23-410 cannot be violated without the “threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” Thus, violation of section 16-23-410 is categorically a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(a) and constitutes an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F). Because Reyes-Soto has an aggravated felony conviction, he is not considered to be “a person of good moral character” as required by section 1427(a), and the district court properly denied his petition for naturalization. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Reyes-Soto v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jose Ramon Cespedes, a native and citizen of Venezuela, entered the United States as a nonimmigrant tourist in 2011. His status was adjusted to conditional lawful permanent resident in 2012. Later he was charged in Utah state court with domestic violence; and in 2013, that court issued a protective order against him under Utah’s Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act. In late 2013, Cespedes pleaded guilty to attempted violation of a protective order. He did not dispute that he was convicted of violating a protective order entered under the Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act or that the provision of the order that he was convicted of violating was the provision stating that “the defendant shall not contact . . . the protected party.” A few months later, the Department of Homeland Security brought a charge to remove Cespedes under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). In a hearing before an immigration judge (IJ), Cespedes argued that his violation of the protection order did not come within the federal statute. The IJ rejected his argument and ordered him removed from the United States. He appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the IJ. The issue presented for the Tenth Circuit’s review was whether violation of an order prohibiting contact with a potential victim satisfied the statute. The Tenth Circuit held that it did, and affirmed the BIA. View "Cespedes v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Singh, a citizen of India, was granted asylum in 1993, and adjusted to lawful permanent resident status in 1994. In 2000, Singh was convicted of conspiracy to counterfeit passports, counterfeiting and using visas, and mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371; unlawful possession of forged, counterfeited, altered, and falsely-made non-immigrant U.S. visas, 18 U.S.C. 1546. Singh departed the U.S. and re-entered in 2003. In 2009, he applied for admission as a lawful permanent resident. He was instead detained and served with a notice of removal charging him as inadmissible because he had committed a crime involving moral turpitude: his 2000 counterfeiting conviction. Singh appeared before the Immigration Court, acknowledged proper service, admitted all of the factual allegations, and conceded the sole charge of removability. Singh sought cancellation of removal, and indicated that he would not be seeking any alternative forms of relief. The IJ denied Singh’s application because Singh had not accrued the requisite seven years of continuous residence required by 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a). The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. Singh’s continuous residency clock stopped in 2000 when he committed his crime involving moral turpitude and could never re-start. View "Singh v. Attorney Gen., United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's finding of removeability and determination that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b). The court affirmed the BIA’s finding that petitioner's violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 205.690(2) and 199.480, possession of a credit card or debit card without the consent of the cardholder, is a categorical CIMT. Further, petitioner is not entitled to a petty offense exception in section 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii) because the exception is only available to aliens whose CIMT conviction did not have a maximum possible penalty of imprisonment for a year or more. The court concluded that a conspiracy conviction under Nev. Rev. Stat. 199.480 is a gross misdemeanor potentially punishable by one year imprisonment, and is covered by section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Although petitioner was not sentenced to a year imprisonment, the court deferred to the BIA’s reasonable approach of considering the sentence that could have been imposed, not the actual sentence. Finally, the court concluded that petitioner's reliance on the Fourth Circuit decision in Soliman v. Gonzales is unavailing. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review. View "Mancilla-Delafuente v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, pled guilty to a single count of grant larceny. Petitioner was subsequently served with a notice to appear for removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus asserting that her trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance because he failed to advise her of the immigration consequences of her plea. After a hearing, the circuit court denied the petition, finding (1) trial counsel adequately advised Petitioner of the immigration consequences of her guilty plea, and (2) alternatively, Petitioner failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance test under Strickland v. Washington because she did not show that she would have pled not guilty and proceeded to trial if she had received competent advice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, on the facts of this case, the performance of Petitioner’s counsel satisfied the constitutional standard of reasonableness. View "Fuentes v. Clarke" on Justia Law