Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner pleaded guilty in the District Court of Stafford County to petit larceny and three misdemeanor tampering charges. After Petitioner’s sentences expired, Petitioner was detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) authorities. In a Notice to Appear, the ICE charged that Petitioner was subject to removal because his petit larceny conviction subjected Petitioner to removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A). While in federal custody, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Stafford County, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because the attorney representing him in the petit larceny case incorrectly informed him that his guilty plea would not have negative immigration consequences. The circuit court dismissed the petition, concluding that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the petition because Petitioner was not in custody pursuant to the challenge conviction and because the petition was untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a Virginia circuit court does not have jurisdiction to provide habeas corpus relief to a petitioner being detained by federal authorities because of immigration issues arising as a consequence of a state conviction after the sentence for the state conviction has expired. View "Escamilla v. Superintendent, Rappahannock Reg’l Jail" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her conviction for illegal reentry in the United States as a previously removed alien. The court rejected defendant's claim that the IJ’s failure to make an express determination of voluntariness constituted a due process violation and concluded that such failure did not render her proceedings fundamentally unfair. Further, the court rejected defendant's contention that an ICE agent's misinformation about the possibility of obtaining relief rendered her waiver unknowing and involuntary because the court's precedent precludes defendant from demonstrating plain error. Therefore, defendant has not carried her burden of showing that the agent’s advice rendered her proceedings fundamentally unfair. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Cordova-Soto" on Justia Law

Defendant, a noncitizen, admitted into the United States as a refugee. Defendant entered a guilty plea to a complaint charging him with, among other counts, assault by means of a dangerous weapon. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the charge of assault by means of a dangerous weapon on the basis that his attorney did not make a reasonable inquiry regarding Defendant’s citizenship and therefore did not learn that he was a refugee. The motion judge concluded that counsel’s performance was deficient but that Defendant was not prejudiced by the attorney’s deficient performance. The motion judge denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial and motions for reconsideration, holding (1) constitutionally effective representation of a criminal defendant requires defense counsel to make a reasonable inquiry to determine whether the defendant is a citizen of the United States and, if not, to make a reasonable inquiry into the defendant’s immigration status, including whether the defendant was admitted into this country as a refugee; and (2) in determining whether a defendant suffered prejudice from counsel’s deficient performance, “special circumstances” regarding immigration consequences, including a defendant’s status as a refugee or asylee, should be given substantial weight in determining whether the defendant suffered prejudice. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko" on Justia Law

Mowlana, a native of Somalia, was admitted to the United States as a refugee in 2000 and became a lawful permanent resident in 2002. He was ordered removed from the U.S. after the Board of Immigration Appeals concluded that he had been convicted of an aggravated felony. The Board cited Mowlana’s prior conviction under 7 U.S.C. 2024(b), which forbids the knowing use, transfer, acquisition, alteration, or possession of benefits in a manner contrary to the statutes and regulations of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (food stamps). The Eighth Circuit dismissed his petition for review, agreeing that his offense was an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). View "Mowlana v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2011, Petitioner pled guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud, bank fraud, and identity fraud. The federal district court ordered Petitioner to pay restitution and to serve a term of probation but did not impose any incarcerative sentence. As a result of this conviction, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner. An Immigration Judge ordered Petitioner removed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals upheld that decision. At issue before the First Circuit was whether an individual must serve a “term of imprisonment” to have committed an “aggravated felony” as that term is defined in section 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43). the First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that a federal or state conviction may constitute an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43) even when it is not accompanied by a term of imprisonment. View "Levesque v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty for being a removed immigrant found in the United States and subsequently appealed his 27-month sentence. The parties jointly requested a fast-track departure but the district court did not grant the requests. The court held that the fast-track departure is purely discretionary, such that a joint request does not necessitate departure under the Guidelines. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentencing and judgment because defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Rosales-Gonzales" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Kefelegne Alemu Worku was an Ethiopian man who entered the United States after assuming the identity of an Eritrean man, Habteab Berhe Temanu. Using Berhe's identity, Worku lived in the Denver area for years and eventually became a U.S. citizen. Immigration authorities learned that Worku was using a false identity and suspected that he had tortured Ethiopian prisoners in the 1970s. After an investigation and trial, Worku was convicted of: (1) unlawful procurement of citizenship or naturalization; (2) fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other documents, and (3) aggravated identity theft. Worku was sentenced to 22 years, relying in part on a finding that he had committed these crimes to conceal violations of human rights in Ethiopia. On appeal, Worku argued (1) the immigration-related convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause; (2) the conviction for aggravated identify theft was improper because Worku had permission to use Berhe's identity; (3) the sentence was procedurally unreasonable because there was no evidence that Worku had come to the United States to conceal violations of human rights and the witnesses identifying him as an Ethiopian torturer had done so because of improperly suggestive photo arrays; and (4) the sentence was substantively unreasonable. Finding no merit to any of these contentions, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Worku" on Justia Law

Zuniga entered the U.S. unlawfully from Mexico in 1989. In 1991, he was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Zuniga, 30 years old, was in a consensual relationship with a 15-year-old girl. Illinois law criminalizes “sexual conduct with a victim who is at least 13 years of age but under 17 years of age [if] the person is at least 5 years older than the victim.” He and the girl maintained their relationship and had four children together. After his conviction, Zuniga was deported. He returned, again unlawfully, and remained, without incident until 2007, when he was arrested following an altercation with his eldest child. In 2013, Zuniga pleaded guilty to illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). According to the plea agreement, Zuniga would receive two criminal-history points and a 16-level upward adjustment because he was previously deported after a “crime of violence” and a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. With a guidelines range of 41 to 51 months, the court sentenced him to 41 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the categorical approach requires a narrower understanding of the generic definitions of “sexual abuse of a minor” and “statutory rape,” two crimes of violence enumerated under the guidelines, and that the 16-level increase overstated the seriousness of the conviction. View "United States v. Zuniga-Galeana" on Justia Law

When Meza-Rodriguez, a citizen of Mexico, was arrested in August 2013, he was carrying a .22 caliber cartridge and did not have documentation showing that he is lawfully in the United States, which made his possession of the cartridge a crime under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5). Meza-Rodriguez moved to dismiss the indictment arguing that section 922(g)(5) impermissibly infringed on his rights under the Second Amendment. The district court denied his motion on the broad ground that the Second Amendment does not protect unauthorized aliens. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the lower court’s rationale swept too far, but that the Second Amendment does not preclude certain restrictions on the right to bear arms, including the one imposed by section 922(g)(5). View "United States v. Meza-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Romero was arrested in Kansas City for multiple traffic offenses. Officers identified Romero as a citizen of Mexico who had not been admitted or paroled for entry into the U.S. The immigration judge found that Romero was not eligible for cancellation of removal because he had been convicted in 1993 of violating California Penal Code 472, which criminalizes forgery and related conduct. The BIA agreed that section 472 is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude that carries a potential sentence of one year or more in prison, so that Romero was ineligible for cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2). The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting Romero’s argument that section 472 criminalizes both acts requiring a specific intent to defraud and acts without this mens rea. The court held that that conviction under section 472 always includes the element of a specific intent to defraud. View "Miranda-Romero v. Lynch" on Justia Law