Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Andre Louis Keller drove to a permanent immigration checkpoint where a Customs & Border Protection (CBP) canine alerted to his vehicle. Upon searching, agents found an alien unlawfully present in the United States concealed under luggage. Keller conditionally pleaded guilty and appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence found in the vehicle.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held a hearing on Keller’s motion to suppress. Testimonies were provided by CBP Agent Jesse Sandoval, Matthew B. Devaney from CBP’s Canine Academy, and Andre Falco Jimenez, a private police dog trainer. The district court denied Keller’s motion, leading to his conditional guilty plea. Keller was sentenced to 20 months in prison and 3 years of supervised release. He then appealed the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that stopping a vehicle for brief questioning at a permanent immigration checkpoint is not a Fourth Amendment search and does not require probable cause. The court found that the canine’s alert provided probable cause to search Keller’s vehicle. The court also concluded that the canine’s actions did not constitute an unlawful search and that the district court did not err in its ruling. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Keller’s motion to suppress. View "United States v. Keller" on Justia Law

Simon Quito-Guachichulca, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty to third-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota law. Following his conviction, the government initiated removal proceedings, arguing that his crime was an "aggravated felony" under federal law, making him deportable. Initially, the government classified the crime as a "crime of violence," but the Supreme Court's decision in Sessions v. Dimaya rendered that classification impermissibly vague. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit vacated the removal order and remanded the case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) for reconsideration.On remand, the government reclassified Quito's crime as "rape," another type of "aggravated felony." Both an immigration judge and the BIA agreed with this classification. Quito then petitioned for review, arguing that the government’s change in theory violated the doctrine of res judicata. The Eighth Circuit found that res judicata did not apply because there was no final judgment on the merits due to the vacated order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed whether Minnesota’s third-degree criminal sexual conduct statute fits the federal definition of "rape" under immigration law. The court applied the categorical approach, examining the statutory elements rather than Quito's actual conduct. The court determined that the federal definition of "rape" in 1996 did not include digital or mechanical penetration, which is covered under Minnesota’s statute. Therefore, the court concluded that there was a categorical mismatch between the state and federal definitions.The Eighth Circuit granted Quito's petition for review, vacated the BIA's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that Minnesota’s third-degree criminal sexual conduct does not qualify as "rape" under federal immigration law. View "Quito-Guachichulca v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 1999, the defendant admitted to sufficient facts to support a finding of guilty for distributing a class A substance. He later sought to withdraw this admission, claiming his plea counsel failed to inform him that it would lead to mandatory deportation. The defendant, a legal permanent resident since 1994, argued that he would have insisted on going to trial had he known the immigration consequences, citing his strong ties to the United States, including his American citizen wife and children, and his consistent employment as a welder.The defendant's initial motion for a new trial was denied due to the absence of an affidavit from his plea counsel. He then filed a renewed motion with the necessary affidavit, which was also denied by a District Court judge after a non-evidentiary hearing. The judge concluded that while the plea counsel was ineffective, the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice. The Appeals Court affirmed this decision.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case, focusing on whether the defendant established prejudice from his counsel's ineffectiveness. The court found that the motion judge improperly assessed the defendant's claim by not applying the reasonable person standard and by making credibility determinations about the defendant's assertion that he would have gone to trial. The court vacated the denial of the renewed motion and remanded the case for further findings on whether the defendant's ties to the United States constituted special circumstances and whether a reasonable person in his situation would have chosen to go to trial if properly advised. View "Commonwealth v. Torres" on Justia Law

Mohamed Lamine Kouyate, a 36-year-old native and citizen of Guinea, entered the United States on a tourist visa in 2014 due to concerns about political unrest in Guinea. He overstayed his visa and was later convicted in Maryland for identity fraud involving over $100,000, resulting in a 15-year prison sentence. Following his release on parole, the Department of Homeland Security charged him with removability for overstaying his visa. Kouyate applied for asylum, withholding of removal under the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming he would be persecuted or tortured if returned to Guinea due to his father's political notoriety.An immigration judge (IJ) denied Kouyate's applications, ruling that his identity fraud conviction constituted a "particularly serious crime," making him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal under the INA and CAT. The IJ also denied his application for deferral of removal under the CAT, finding insufficient evidence that he would likely be tortured if returned to Guinea. The IJ noted that the political climate in Guinea had changed, and Kouyate's fears were speculative and based on generalized concerns of violence.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Kouyate's appeal, deeming his challenge to the IJ's particularly serious crime ruling waived and affirming the IJ's denial of deferral of removal under the CAT. The BIA agreed with the IJ's assessment that Kouyate's fears were speculative and not supported by sufficient evidence of a particularized risk of torture.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed both the IJ's and BIA's decisions, finding no reversible error. The court upheld the BIA's determination that Kouyate had not exhausted his administrative remedies regarding the particularly serious crime ruling and affirmed the denial of deferral of removal under the CAT, concluding that substantial evidence supported the BIA's decision. The petition for review was denied. View "Kouyate v. Garland" on Justia Law

In October 2022, Jose Guadalupe Hernandez Velasquez was found unlawfully present in the United States for the fifth time. Previously, in 2019, he had signed a written stipulation waiving his rights and agreeing to his removal, which led to his deportation. Upon his reentry in 2022, he was charged with illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Hernandez Velasquez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that his waiver of rights in the 2019 removal was unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary, making the removal order fundamentally unfair.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied his motion to dismiss, placing the burden on Hernandez Velasquez to prove the invalidity of his waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. The court found that he did not meet this burden and also failed to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement of § 1326(d)(1).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that when the government produces a written and signed stipulation and waiver, the burden rests on the defendant to prove its invalidity. The court found that the district court's burden allocation was proper and that Hernandez Velasquez's waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The court also noted that even if the burden had been on the government, the outcome would not have changed, as the evidence overwhelmingly supported the validity of the waiver. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Hernandez Velasquez" on Justia Law

Andre Bowyer, a Jamaican national, pleaded guilty to re-entering the United States without permission after being previously removed. During his sentencing, Bowyer attempted to highlight his ties to a family he had formed in the U.S. The district judge interrupted him frequently, characterizing Bowyer's account as lacking insight and unconvincing. Bowyer received a below-guidelines sentence.Bowyer appealed, arguing that his right to make his own statement at sentencing was violated. He conceded that he did not object during the district court proceedings, so the review was limited to the plain-error standard. Bowyer did not specify what additional arguments he would have made if given more time. The district court had read a letter from Bowyer detailing his background and his relationship with the family, but the judge found this information irrelevant to the sentencing factors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that while the district judge's interruptions were frequent, they did not completely prevent Bowyer from speaking. The judge also solicited further comments from Bowyer at the end of the allocution. The court found that even if there was an error, it was not plain because there was no unambiguous case law against such interruptions. Additionally, Bowyer's arguments were already considered by the judge, and there was no indication that further allocution would have led to a different sentence.The Seventh Circuit concluded that Bowyer did not meet the plain-error test for reversal and affirmed the district court's decision. View "USA v. Bowyer" on Justia Law

Manuel Antonio Suquilanda was convicted of unlawfully reentering the United States after being deported, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He challenged his conviction on two grounds: first, that the initial removal proceedings were invalid because the Notice to Appear (NTA) he received lacked the place of hearing and address-of-filing information, thus stripping the Immigration Court of jurisdiction; and second, that § 1326 is unconstitutional as it discriminates against Latin Americans, violating the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Suquilanda’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The court held that any defect in the NTA did not deprive the Immigration Court of jurisdiction, referencing the Second Circuit’s precedent in Banegas Gomez v. Barr. The court also concluded that the address-of-filing requirement was a non-jurisdictional, claim-processing rule. On the constitutional challenge, the court found that while the 1929 Act had discriminatory intent, Suquilanda failed to show that the 1952 reenactment of § 1326 was motivated by racial animus.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the missing hearing information in the NTA was cured by a subsequent notice, and the address-of-filing requirement was non-jurisdictional. On the constitutional issue, the court applied the Arlington Heights framework and found that Suquilanda did not demonstrate that racial discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor in the 1952 enactment of § 1326. Consequently, the court concluded that § 1326 does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee. View "United States v. Suquilanda" on Justia Law

Christian Lopez, a native and citizen of Mexico, was brought to the United States by his mother at the age of two to escape domestic violence from his father. Lopez lived in the U.S. without lawful status for thirteen years before obtaining T-5 nonimmigrant status in 2013. In 2017, he inadvertently allowed his T-5 status to expire. In 2019, Lopez was arrested and later convicted of multiple offenses, including four counts of petit larceny under the Reno Municipal Code (RMC) § 8.10.040. Following his release from prison, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings against him.An immigration judge (IJ) found Lopez removable for committing crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs) and denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The IJ determined that Lopez's asylum application was untimely and that he failed to demonstrate a nexus between his fear of future harm and any protected ground. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, concluding that Lopez's municipal convictions involved CIMTs and that he did not qualify for an exception to the asylum filing deadline.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and denied Lopez's petition for review. The court held that Lopez's petit larceny convictions under RMC § 8.10.040 are CIMTs, making him removable. The court also concluded that the BIA's interpretation of the statute regarding CIMTs was entitled to respect under Skidmore v. Swift & Co. Additionally, the court found that the lack of availability of a pardon for a conviction does not render the conviction an improper basis for removal. Finally, the court determined that substantial evidence supported the denial of withholding of removal, as Lopez did not demonstrate that he would face future persecution in Mexico based on his identity as his mother's son. View "LOPEZ V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Edson Pires Rosa, a citizen of Cape Verde, entered the U.S. on a visitor visa in 2015, which expired later that year. His mother, a lawful permanent resident, filed a petition for him, which was approved, but his subsequent application for adjustment of status was denied. In 2019, Rosa was accused of participating in a sexual assault, leading to a police report and a pending criminal charge. Despite his denial of the allegations, he was placed in removal proceedings for overstaying his visa. Rosa applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and voluntary departure.The Immigration Judge (IJ) initially denied Rosa's asylum and withholding of removal applications but granted voluntary departure. Rosa appealed the denial of asylum and withholding of removal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which remanded the case to consider his adjustment of status application after his mother became a U.S. citizen. On remand, a new IJ denied his adjustment of status and voluntary departure requests, citing the pending criminal charge as a significant negative factor. Rosa appealed to the BIA, which upheld the IJ's decision, finding no error in the reliance on the police report and pending charge.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA erred in deeming Rosa's challenge to the voluntary departure denial as waived and vacated the BIA's decision on both adjustment of status and voluntary departure. The court remanded the case to the BIA to reconsider these issues, particularly whether the police report and pending charge alone could justify the denial of discretionary relief without corroborating evidence, as required by precedent. View "Rosa v. Garland" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1990. In 1999, she was convicted of possession for sale of methamphetamine in California. In 2015, upon returning from a trip to Mexico, she was detained and later charged with inadmissibility due to her drug conviction. She sought cancellation of removal and later moved to terminate the removal proceedings.The Immigration Judge (IJ) sustained the charges of removability and denied her relief, ordering her removal to Mexico. The petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), requesting remand to the IJ to pursue derivative U visa status based on her husband's pending U visa application. She also moved for administrative closure of her removal proceedings. The BIA dismissed her appeal and denied both motions, finding it speculative whether she would receive U visa relief and noting the need for an inadmissibility waiver due to her conviction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of the petitioner’s motions for remand and administrative closure due to the criminal jurisdiction bar under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). The court found that the petitioner’s motions merged with her final order of removal and that judicial review does not extend to factual challenges to the final removal order. The court also noted that the decision did not disturb the result in Alvarez-Santos v. INS, which requires an agency determination of removability based on a covered conviction for the criminal alien bar to apply. The petition for review was dismissed. View "CORIA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law