Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, sought review of the BIA's decision finding him removeable based on his no contest plea to a methamphetamine-related crime. Petitioner was charged with sale of methamphetamine under California Health and Safety Code section 11379(a) but pleaded to - and was convicted of - a “lesser included/reasonably related offense” to the charge under section 11377. The court applied the modified categorical approach and held that there is clear and convincing evidence in the documents permissible for review that petitioner pleaded to - and was convicted of - possession of methamphetamine. Therefore, petitioner is removable as an aggravated felon. The court denied the petition. View "Ruiz-Vidal v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of the Philippines, sought review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal of the IJ's order of removal. The BIA concluded that petitioner's conviction under Cal. Penal Code 417.26 for "unlawful laser activity" was a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). Petitioner used a laser device in the hallway of a county criminal courthouse. The court concluded that section 417.26 can be violated with conduct that bears a striking resemblance to non-turpitudinous simple assault, and little similarity to turpitudinous terrorizing acts. Therefore, a violation of section 417.26 is not categorically a CIMT. Applying the categorical approach, the court concluded that it was not satisfied. Accordingly, the court granted the petition. View "Coquico v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Mellouli, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor offense under Kansas law, the possession of drug paraphernalia “to . . . store [or] conceal . . . a controlled substance,” consisting of a sock in which he had placed four unidentified orange tablets. An Immigration Judge ordered him deported under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), which authorizes the deportation of an alien “convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (defined in section 802 of Title 21).” Section 802 limits “controlled substance” to a “drug or other substance” included in federal schedules. Kansas defines “controlled substance” according to its own schedules, without reference to Section 802, and included substances not on the federal lists. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review. The Supreme Court reversed. Mellouli’s Kansas conviction for concealing unnamed pills in his sock did not trigger removal. Under the categorical approach, a state conviction triggers removal only if, by definition, the underlying crime falls within a category of removable offenses defined by federal law. The BIA’s reasoning, that there is no need to show that the type of controlled substance involved in a paraphernalia conviction is one defined in section 802, leads to the anomalous result of treating less grave paraphernalia possession misdemeanors more harshly than drug possession and distribution offenses. The Court rejected the government’s argument that aliens who commit any drug crime in states whose drug schedules substantially overlap the federal schedules are deportable, because the state statutes are laws “relating to” federally controlled substances. To trigger removal under 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), the government must connect an element of the alien’s conviction to a drug defined in section 802. View "Mellouli v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Galvez pleaded guilty pursuant to a FastTrack plea agreement to illegal reentry following an aggravated-felony conviction, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b)(2), waiving the right to appeal his conviction and sentence. Finding that Galvez had previously been deported after a conviction for a felony that was a "crime of violence," (assault with a deadly weapon) the district court applied a 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 37–46 months' imprisonment, and sentenced Galvez to 37 months' imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit dismissed an appeal. Nothing in the government's evidence or argument that contradicted the parties' factual stipulation or otherwise breached the plea agreement; the appeal waiver was valid and enforceable. View "United States v. Galvez-Quebedo" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2241 habeas corpus petition, challenging the district court's conclusion that his detention by immigration authorities never constitutes "official detention" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 3585(b), the statute governing the calculation of a term of imprisonment. Petitioner was detained by ICE prior the commencement of his criminal sentence of illegal reentry. The court held that when immigration officials detain an alien pending potential prosecution, the alien is entitled under section 3585(b) to credit toward his criminal sentence; an alien is entitled to credit for all time spent in ICE detention subsequent to his indictment or the filing of formal criminal charges against him; and where a factual dispute exists, the district court must hold an evidentiary hearing as to whether an alien’s detention by ICE prior to the date of his indictment or the filing of criminal charges against him constituted detention pending prosecution. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to determine in the first instance whether and when during the pre-indictment period petitioner's detention status changed from detention pending deportation to detention pending potential prosecution. On remand, the government has the burden of proving that the pre-indictment detention was for the purpose of deportation rather than potential prosecution. View "Zavala v. Ives" on Justia Law

Salazar was convicted in Missouri state court of possessing and trafficking a controlled substance and was deported to Mexico. Salazar subsequently returned to Missouri. After learning that Salazar had reentered, the United States charged him with illegal reentry following a deportation and conviction of an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b)(2). Salazar pleaded guilty. The Guidelines range for his offense was 70 to 87 months' imprisonment. Salazar did not object to the calculated Guidelines range; his counsel sought a downward variance to 36 months' imprisonment because Salazar "supported his family," would "have to start his life over after being deported," and was unable to participate in a "FastTrack" program. The court considered his counsel's arguments, and all other relevant sentencing factors, including the nature of the offense and Salazar's lengthy criminal history and multiple convictions for drug-related offenses. The district court imposed and the Eighth Circuit affirmed a sentence of 70 months. View "United States v. Ruiz-Salazar" on Justia Law

Martinez is a native of Guatemala. He became a lawful permanent resident in 2007. In 2011, he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to knowingly transfer a false identification document, 18 U.S.C. 1028(f). In 2013, the government commenced removal proceedings for having committed a crime of moral turpitude within five years after admission, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). Martinez admitted the allegations, but requested a continuance because he had filed a motion to set aside and vacate his conviction. He also argued that he was eligible for a stand-alone waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). The IJ ordered that Martinez be removed because he had not demonstrated good cause for a continuance and was ineligible for a waiver. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Pending collateral attack is not good cause because its tentative nature does not affect the finality of the conviction for immigration purposes. Martinez admitted that he waived any claim to ineffective assistance of counsel, that he understood his guilty plea could affect his immigration status, and that his attorney advised him of this. View "Palma-Martinez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In November 2011, defendant was arrested. While in state custody, he was told by a federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement agent that ICE had placed “a hold” on him. If he posted bail, he would be seized by ICE and taken into immigration detention. He was in pretrial detention on state charges until October 2012, when he was convicted on a state obstruction of justice charge. He was detained by the state for 17 months, then taken into custody by ICE and detained while his immigration case was adjudicated. On September 19, 2013, the immigration judge ordered his removal. Defendant withdrew his appeal. On October 17, 2013, defendant was indicted for illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. 1326) and taken into federal criminal custody. He pled guilty to that charge, arguing that a below-guideline sentence would be appropriate, noting that he would not receive credit for the time served in immigration custody. The court imposed a within-guidelines sentence of 57 months. The Seventh Circuit remanded. The court should have addressed defendant’s argument that the court should have reduced his sentence because the delay in charging him effectively denied him the ability to receive credit toward his federal criminal sentence for the months he spent in state custody and in immigration custody. View "United States v. Estrada-Mederos" on Justia Law

Rony Alexander Paz Calix, a native and citizen of Honduras, entered the United States in December 1997 as a lawful permanent-resident alien. He was convicted in February 2001 for possession of marijuana and in July 2007 for possession of cocaine. Paz Calix sought review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ ruling that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal under the “stop-time rule.” The government argued that the Fifth Circuit could not consider his claim because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the claim. On the merits, the Court agreed with the BIA’s holding that Paz Calix was ineligible for cancellation of removal. View "Paz Calix v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner Drew Walker, a citizen of Jamaica, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1990. In 2001, Walker pleaded no contest to three counts of uttering a forged instrument in Florida. One of the counts involved an amount over $10,000. In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings against Walker. The Department alleged that Walker was removable because he committed a crime involving deceit or fraud in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000. The Department later alleged that Walker was also removable because he had been convicted of multiple crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. Walker admitted his convictions but argued that they did not qualify as removable offenses. An immigration judge ruled that Walker was removable on both grounds. Walker appealed that decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which held that Walker’s convictions were aggravated felonies and crimes of moral turpitude. The Board dismissed Walker’s appeal. After its review, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the offense of uttering a forged instrument necessarily involves an act of deceit. It was both an aggravated felony offense and a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court, therefore, denied Walker’s petition for review. View "Walker v. Holder" on Justia Law