Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Florez, a citizen of Honduras and a lawful permanent resident of the U.S., was charged in New York with a variety of offenses. Florez was twice convicted of endangering the welfare of a child, for “knowingly act[ing] in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child less than seventeen years old.” The first conviction, in 2004, arose from Florez’s involvement with a co‐defendant who was charged with “acting in concert with another person” in the rape of a teenage girl. His precise role in the incident was unclear. The second conviction, in 2010, resulted from Florez’s driving under the influence of alcohol while his two children, aged one and nine, were in the car. The Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). The Immigration Judge held that Florez’s convictions each satisfied the generic federal definition of a “crime of child abuse.” The BIA affirmed. The Second Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting an argument that the broad interpretation of the statutory phrase “crime of child abuse” is unreasonable. View "Florez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Mexican national, pled guilty to illegal entry, a misdemeanor offense. After Petitioner had served his 181-day sentence and was released, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) commenced removal proceedings against him. Petitioner conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal, arguing that his removal would cause exceptional hardship to his three citizen children, especially his ten-year-old autistic son. The immigration judge (IJ) dismissed Petitioner’s application, concluding that Petitioner was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal because 8 U.S.C. 1101(f)(7) precludes an alien from establishing good moral character when his offense resulted in 180 days or more of confinement. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, concluding that the applicability of section 1101(f)(&) does not depend upon the type of offense, but rather, the length of incarceration. The Fourth Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part Petitioner’s petition for review, holding (1) this was not one of those “exceptionally rare” instances in which the literal application of a Congressional enactment produces truly absurd results; and (2) the Court lacked jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claim that he was not precluded from establishing good moral character. View "Tiscareno-Garcia v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellant Rodolfo Hernandez pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute at least 1,000 kilograms of a substance containing marijuana, and three counts of possession with intent to distribute at least 100 kilograms of a substance containing marijuana. After Hernandez entered his plea, but before his conviction became final, the Supreme Court decided "Padilla v. Kentucky," holding that counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation. Hernandez later moved to vacate his sentence based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court concluded counsel did not render ineffective assistance and denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The issue this case presented for the Eleventh Circuit's review was whether the district court abused its discretion when it refused that evidentiary hearing. Concluding that it did, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's judgment, and remanded the case with instructions to conduct the evidentiary hearing. View "Hernandez v. United States" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant, a native of Ethiopia, pleaded guilty to petit larceny. At no time did Appellant’s court-appointed attorney advise Appellant of the collateral consequences of the plea and sentence upon his immigration status. Appellant was subsequently informed that he was subject to removal as a result of his conviction. Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. The circuit court sustained the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss the petition, concluding that Appellant was not prejudiced from his counsel’s failure to advise him of the adverse consequences on his immigration status of accepting the plea agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court applied an incorrect standard for determining whether prejudice resulted from the attorney’s failure to advise Appellant of the negative consequences of accepting the plea agreement. View "Zemene v. Clarke" on Justia Law

It was undetermined when petitioner Carlos Jovany Medina-Rosales entered the United States, but he received an adjusted status as a lawful permanent resident (LPR) in late 2001. In 2013, while residing in Oklahoma, he was convicted of grand larceny in Oklahoma state court. Shortly thereafter, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began removal proceedings. The Notice to Appear ordered him to appear before an Immigration Judge (IJ) in Dallas, Texas, even though the issuing officer was in Tulsa, Oklahoma. About two months later Medina-Rosales was issued a Notice of Hearing stating that a master hearing would be held before an IJ in Tulsa. The Dallas-based IJ held video conference hearings with Medina-Rosales and his counsel, who were in Tulsa. The IJ issued an oral decision, ordering Medina-Rosales’ removal and pretermitting and denying his applications for waiver of inadmissibility and adjustment of status. The IJ rejected his argument that Fifth Circuit law applied, deciding, instead, that Tenth Circuit law applied because the case arose in Tulsa, even though the IJ was located in Dallas and proceedings were conducted by video conference. Next, the IJ determined that Medina-Rosales was ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility, and, by extension, adjustment of status, because he had been convicted of the aggravated felony of grand larceny after acquiring LPR status. The BIA dismissed Medina-Rosales’ appeal, and he appealed to the Tenth Circuit. Based on the clear and unambiguous language of 8 U.S.C. 1182(h), the Tenth Circuit concluded that Medina-Rosales was eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for review and remanded this case back to the BIA with instructions to remand to the IJ for further proceedings. View "Medina-Rosales v. Holder" on Justia Law

Pola, a Canadian citizen born in Iraq, was living in Louisville with his wife and children, all U.S. citizens, as a lawful permanent resident, when he was charged with intentionally possessing with the intent to distribute oxycodone, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). Pola entered an Alford plea and was sentenced to 46 months’ incarceration. About two months after judgment was entered, Pola filed a notice of appeal pro se. The Sixth Circuit dismissed it as untimely, noting that he could move to vacate or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, based upon his allegation that counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a notice of appeal upon his request. Pola did so. A magistrate ordered a ordered U.S. Marshals to transport Pola for an October 17, 2012 hearing, but Pola had been released on September 4, and transferred to ICE custody. On September 11, Pola, without counsel, declined a hearing and conceded removability. On September 19, ICE removed Pola. He could not attend the hearing. Pola and the government filed affidavits. The court denied Pola’s request for an evidentiary hearing and his motion, finding the attorney’s performance not deficient. The Sixth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction, that the court should have granted an evidentiary hearing to develop the ineffective-assistance claim, and vacated. View "Pola v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, appealed the BIA's decision finding that his conviction for weapons possession, enhanced for sentencing purposes for gang activity, constituted a crime of moral turpitude. The court held that petitioner's sentence enhancement under California Penal Code 186.22(b)(1) does not categorically elevate a crime to a crime involving moral turpitude because the offense of weapons possession with a gang enhancement has none of the characteristics of moral turpitude the court has identified, and because California cases demonstrate that there is a realistic probability, not just a theoretical possibility, that California does in fact apply the gang enhancement that does not involve moral turpitude. Therefore, a conviction under California's gang enhancement statute does not change the crime of moral turpitude status of the predicate offense. The court held that application of the gang enhancement under section 186.22(b)(1) does not render petitioner's conviction for weapons possession under California Penal Code 12020 a crime of moral turpitude. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hernandez-Gonzalez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, who had pled guilty to arson under Maryland's arson-in-the-first-degree statute, sought review of the BIA's dismissal of her appeal from the IJ's ruling that the arson conviction qualified as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(E), and order of removal. Applying Chevron deference, the court concluded that petitioner's state arson conviction unambiguously qualifies as an aggravated felony under section 1101(a)(43)(E), and even if an ambiguity existed, the BIA's interpretation was reasonable. The court rejected as meritless petitioner's alternative arguments that the BIA should have applied the rule of lenity and that the BIA's application of Matter of Bautista was impermissibly retroactive. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Espinal-Andrades v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Honduras, sought review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal of the IJ's order of removal. The BIA determined that petitioner was removable based on his past conviction under Virginia Code 18.2-102 for the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. The court concluded, however, that the Virginia offense did not constitute an "aggravated felony," where the full range of conduct covered by the Virginia crime of "unauthorized use" does not qualify as a "theft offense," as that term has been defined by the BIA. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and vacated the order of removal. View "Castillo v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned pro se for review of the BIA's finding that his prior offense of public lewdness under Texas Penal Code 21.07 was categorically a crime involving moral turpitude and that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1). The court concluded that petitioner's offense under the statute is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude because section 21.07 is divisible into discrete subsections of turpitudinous acts and non-turpitudinous acts. Therefore, the IJ and the BIA erred in declining to review petitioner's record of conviction under the modified approach to determine whether he was convicted under a subsection that describes a crime involving moral turpitude. The court granted the petition for review. View "Cisneros-Guerrerro v. Holder" on Justia Law