Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Lucas was arrested on suspicion that he had reentered the U.S. illegally. As part of the investigation, the arresting officer requested Lucas’s alien file (A-file) which contained a signed warrant of deportation. A signed warrant indicates that the attesting witness observed the deportee leaving the country. The district court denied Lucas’s pretrial motion to suppress the warrant. At trial, the government introduced the contents of Lucas’s A-file into evidence, including the warrant of deportation which indicated that he had been deported in 2005, under an order of removal. The court rejected an argument that the admission of the warrant violated Lucas’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. The jury found Lucas guilty of illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). The court sentenced him to time served with no supervised release to follow. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to admission of the warrant. View "United States v. Lorenzo-Lucas" on Justia Law

Cano, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. without authorization in 2002. He pled guilty in Wisconsin state court in 2011 to operating a vehicle to flee or elude a police officer. About a year later, the Department of Homeland Security served him with a Notice to Appear and charged him with inadmissibility as a person present without being admitted or paroled and as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Cano conceded removability. He later sought reconsideration of the immigration judge’s determination that he is removable as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, and he requested cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b). The immigration judge concluded that the Wisconsin conviction was for a crime involving moral turpitude, so Cano was not eligible for cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied review. Citing the statute’s requirement that to be convicted a person must “knowingly” flee or attempt to elude an officer after receiving an officer’s signal, the court found the Board’s determination reasonable. Knowingly fleeing or attempting to elude an officer is an act wrong in itself and therefore a crime involving moral turpitude. View "Cano v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2013, Vigil pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to illegal re-entry into the United States. A pre-sentence calculated a base offense level of 8. The PSR then applied a 16-level enhancement, finding that a previous conviction for sexual battery under Louisiana Revised Statute § 14.43.1 constituted a "crime of violence" under USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). After a 2-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Vigil's total offense level was 22. Combined with a Criminal History Category of II, the PSR calculated a Guidelines range of 46 to 57 months imprisonment. Vigil objected that the government had not presented competent evidence to support the 16-level enhancement and that even if properly supported, the Louisiana conviction was not a "crime of violence." The district court applied the 16-level enhancement required by the Guidelines when there has been a prior conviction for a crime of violence. After granting the Government's motion for an additional 1-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the district court calculated a Guidelines range of 41 to 51 months imprisonment and sentenced Vigil to 41 months. The Fifth Circuit affirmed imposition of the enhancement. View "United States v. Vigil" on Justia Law

Rodriguez is a citizen of Mexico. He obtained an Iowa identification card using the name Ramon Rodriguez (the name of his brother, also a Mexican citizen) and presented: a Missouri identification card, a social security card, a falsified U.S. birth certificate, and an employee identification card. Although the original Iowa application did not require him to disclose his citizenship, the completed application that he signed indicated that he was a U.S. citizen. He used that card and the same falsified U.S. birth certificate to apply for a U.S. passport. The passport application that he signed stated that he was a “citizen or non-citizen national of the United States.” Rodriguez was convicted of making a false claim to U.S. citizenship, 18 U.S.C. 911, and aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1). The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. View "United States v. Rodriguez-Ayala" on Justia Law

Indiana’s Bureau of Motor Vehicles will not register or transfer a vehicle title unless the buyer furnishes a Social Security number. For corporations and similar entities, it requires a federal employer identification number (EIN). It is possible to obtain an EIN without having a Social Security number. Aliens whose visas do not allow them to work in the U.S. and aliens who lack authority to be in the U.S. can get an EIN. Defendants established a business that obtained an EIN, registered a limited liability company, and submitted the required paperwork and fees, using clients’ real names and addresses. Clients paid $350, which included fees for the BMV. Defendants were convicted of conspiracy (8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I)), to violate 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) and (iv) by shielding unauthorized aliens from detection and encouraging them to reside in the U.S. and conspiracy to commit mail or wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349. The Seventh Circuit reversed and vacated. The Count One convictions could be sustained only if provision of any service—food, medicine, transportation—to an unauthorized alien is a felony. To convict of mail or wire fraud, the false statements must have deprived a victim of “money or property.” There was no allegation that title papers and licenses are Indiana’s “property.” View "United States v.Reyes" on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally plead guilty to illegal reentry after having been removed and subsequently appealed his conviction, contending that his expedited removal proceedings did not comport with due process where, among other things, the immigration officer who entered the removal order failed to provide defendant with notice of the charge against him and an opportunity to respond. The court concluded that defendant exhausted all available administrative remedies and was deprived of the opportunity for judicial review; the Supreme Court has categorically declared that once an individual has entered the United States, he is entitled to the protection of the Due Process Clause; in this case, there is no dispute that defendant had entered the United States before he was apprehended and he was entitled to expedited removal proceedings that conformed to the dictates of due process; any failure to inform defendant of the charge against him and to provide him the opportunity to review the sworn statements constituted a violation of his due process rights; defendant's due process rights to notice and an opportunity to respond were violated during his expedited removal proceedings; the court rejected the Government's argument that it should have been obvious to defendant that he was scrutinized for his presence in the United States without valid documentation; and, because defendant could plausibly been granted relief in the form of withdrawal of his application for admission, his removal order is invalid and cannot serve as the predicate for his conviction. Accordingly, the court reversed defendant's motion to dismiss the information and his conviction. View "United States v. Raya-Vaca" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision affirming a final order of removal, holding that petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). Petitioner was convicted under California Vehicle Code 10851(a), which criminalizes the act of driving or taking a vehicle not one's own. The California statute proscribes both conduct that does not amount to a CIMT (temporary taking) and conduct that would constitute a CIMT (permanent taking). Therefore, petitioner's conviction is not categorically a CIMT. The court also concluded that the modified categorical approach is not applicable because the California statute is not divisible, and the BIA erred in its application of the modified categorical approach. In light of Moncrieffe v. Holder, the court concluded that the record is inconclusive as to whether petitioner was convicted for intending to permanently or temporarily take a vehicle, the court must presume that he was convicted of joyriding, which is not a crime of moral turpitude. The circuit's precedent in Young v. Holder is clearly irreconcilable with Moncrieffe. Accordingly, the court granted the petition and remanded to the BIA for further proceedings. View "Almanza-Arenas v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, sought review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal of a final order of removal. Petitioner pled guilty to felony endangerment and misdemeanor driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor under Arizona law. Applying Chevron deference, the court held that the BIA reasonably determined that felony endangerment in Arizona is a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). Although the crime requires only reckless conduct, the level of harm resulting from the conduct is grave. The court agreed with the BIA that the creation of a substantial, actual risk of imminent death is sufficiently reprehensible, or in terms of the court's case law "base, vile, and depraved," to establish a CIMT, even though no actual harm need occur. The court held that excessive voluntary intoxication combined with the conduct at issue - creation of a substantial, actual risk of imminent death of another person - constitutes morally turpitudinous conduct. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Leal v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Sudan, sought review of the BIA's order of removal based on his conviction of two crimes involving moral turpitude. Petitioner was convicted under state law in 2010 for sexual battery and in 2011 for failing to register as a sex offender. The court did not defer to the BIA's decision in Matter of Tobar-Lobo because the BIA erroneously based its conclusion on the registration statute's purpose and not the nature of a conviction under the statute. The court concluded that, because petitioner's failure to register conviction was not a crime involving moral turpitude, the BIA erred as a matter of law in relying on that conviction as a basis to order petitioner's removal under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and reversed the BIA's decision, remanding with instructions. View "Mohamed v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Italy, sought review of the BIA's order determining that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) for the unlawful possession of ammunition qualifies as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii). Petitioner argued that his conviction for the unlawful possession of ammunition does not constitute an offense "relating to firearms." The BIA held, however, that the "relating to" parenthetical in section 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii) was purely descriptive and not restrictive, classifying only a subset of the crimes defined in section 922(g)(1) as aggravated felonies. The court concluded that the BIA's descriptive reading of section 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii) is reasonable because it harmonized the broader structure of section 1101(43) and judicial precedent. Under Chevron deference, the court concluded that the BIA's ruling is a permissible construction of the statute. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Oppedisano v. Holder" on Justia Law