Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Jamaica, sought review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's order of removability. The court concluded that the record supports the BIA's determination that petitioner's conviction of a controlled substance offense remains a removable offense even after the state court vacated the conviction under ARS 13-907 because she sought and obtained vacatur solely for rehabilitative reasons and to avoid adverse immigration consequences. Consequently, petitioner's conviction remains valid for federal immigration purposes. The court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Sutherland v. Holder" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the mandatory detention provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1226(c), which provides that the Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who has committed certain predicate crimes “when the alien is released.” The general rule under section 1226 is that aliens arrested and charged with removal may be released on bond pending removal proceedings. Aliens subject to mandatory detention, however, are generally ineligible for bail. Petitioners, two aliens, committed a predicate crime listed in section 1226(c) but were not taken into custody by the Attorney General until years after being released from state custody. Petitioners filed separate petitions for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that their detention without opportunity for release on bond was unauthorized by law. The district court granted habeas corpus relief in each case. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Petitioners were not subject to mandatory detention under section 1226(c) because they were not timely detained under any reasonable interpretation of the statute. View "Castaneda v. Souza" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal from the IJ's order of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Petitioner argued that his Florida state conviction for aggravated fleeing was not an aggravated felony. The court concluded that, under relevant Florida law and considering the factual circumstances of the proceedings related to petitioner's aggravated fleeing offense, the probation revocation and resentencing resulted in a prison term of at least one year, in satisfaction of the aggravated felony statute, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F). Further, the Florida state conviction was a crime of violence where, by fleeing from law enforcement, defendant has already resorted to an extreme measure to avoid arrest, signaling that he is likely prepared to resort to the use of physical force. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Dixon v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, born in Mexico, appealed the BIA's decision affirming the denial of his application for cancellation of removal for victims of domestic violence. The IJ found petitioner ineligible for relief due to a prior narcotics conviction. The court concluded that the government was not required to charge petitioner's narcotics conviction in the notice to appear for that conviction to serve as a ground of inadmissibility for Special Rule Cancellation; the BIA did not err in concluding that the IJ lacked authority to waive petitioner's narcotics-related grounds of inadmissibility; and petitioner's marijuana conviction makes him inadmissible under INA 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), which is a disqualifying ground for Special Rule Cancellation of Removal for victims of domestic violence. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review.View "Rodriguez-Benitez v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Vietnam, petitioned for review of a BIA decision dismissing his appeal from an order of removal entered by an IJ. The court concluded that the BIA did not err in determining that petitioner was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude where petitioner was convicted of misuse of a passport to facilitate an act of international terrorism and misuse of a passport to facilitate an act of international terrorism is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. The court also concluded that petitioner was more likely than not to be tortured if he is removed to Vietnam. Therefore, the court granted the petition with respect to petitioner's Convention Against Torture (CAT) claim and remanded with instructions to grant him deferral of removal under the CAT. View "Nguyen v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Jamaica, sought review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's finding of removal based on her convictions for multiple crimes involving moral turpitude and an aggravated felony as defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G). Petitioner argued that, although she was convicted of a theft offense, the BIA erred in finding that the term of imprisonment for that offense was at least one year. The court held that petitioner's conviction constituted an aggravated felony theft offense for which the term of imprisonment was at least one year because it is the actual sentence imposed, including any recidivist enhancements applied, that is considered. The court extended to its interpretation of the phrase "term of imprisonment" in the INA the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Rodriquez, that the phrase "maximum term of imprisonment" in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924, includes any applicable recidivist sentence enhancement. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review.View "Dawkins v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2006, Appellant pled guilty to attempted possession of a controlled substance. In 2012, Appellant filed a motion seeking to withdraw his 2006 plea, alleging that neither his counsel nor the court had advised him of the immigration consequences of his plea prior to entry of the plea. The district court dismissed Appellant’s motion for lack of jurisdiction, concluding (1) the decision in Padilla v. Kentucky did not apply retroactively to Appellant’s 2006 plea and conviction; and (2) the court did not have jurisdiction because Appellant had completed his sentence and was no longer in the State’s custody. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that Padilla v. Kentucky did not apply retroactively to Appellant’s 2006 plea-based conviction; but (2) the district court had jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea under the remedy provided in Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-1819.02(2) without regard to whether Appellant had completed his sentence.View "State v. Chojolan" on Justia Law

Albu, a Romanian citizen, applied for asylum in 2003. His application would have been deficient in a number of ways, but at the prompting of his attorney (who was subsequently convicted of asylum fraud) he engaged in deception, lying about religious persecution, his date of entry, and his home address. When his lies came to light, he was subject to 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(6), which makes any person who files a frivolous asylum application permanently ineligible for any immigration benefits. He was placed in removal proceedings. Both the Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration Appeals applied the statutory bar and denied him cancellation of removal. The Seventh Circuit denied an appeal.View "Albu v. Holder" on Justia Law

Toviave immigrated to the U.S. in 2001, and, using false immigration documents, later brought four young relatives from Togo to live with him. He made the children cook, clean, and do laundry. He occasionally made the children babysit for his girlfriend and relatives. Toviave would beat the children if they misbehaved or failed to follow rules. Toviave provided for the children by working two jobs and did yard work. Toviave bought the children sports equipment and let them play soccer. The children exercised with him and went on family trips together. Toviave emphasized education; many of his punishments stemmed from problems related to schoolwork. He hired a tutor to teach the children English. He imposed mandatory study periods. The children always attended school. Teachers began to suspect abuse. Michigan authorities investigated. The children were removed from the house. The Department of Homeland Security obtained a warrant and discovered false immigration documents in Toviave’s home. Toviave pled guilty to visa and mail fraud charges, and the government dropped a human trafficking charge. Toviave was convicted of four counts of forced labor, 18 U.S.C. 1589. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that Toviave’s treatment of the children was “reprehensible,” but was not forced labor.View "United States v. Toviave" on Justia Law

After a sting operation involving two confidential informants and substantial audio and video surveillance, federal law enforcement officers caught Jesus Cabral-Ramirez ("Mr. Cabral") and Defendant-Appellant Maria Gutierrez de Lopez ("Ms. Gutierrez") attempting to transport an undocumented alien from El Paso, Texas to Denver, Colorado. A federal grand jury indicted Ms. Gutierrez on one count of conspiring to transport undocumented aliens. At trial, the Government elicited testimony from Border Patrol Agent Brian Knoll about the immigration status of the individual Ms. Gutierrez allegedly conspired to smuggle. Agent Knoll also provided expert testimony that transporting undocumented aliens away from U.S./Mexico border regions to the interior of the United States significantly reduced the odds of apprehension by law enforcement. The confidential government informants testified anonymously about several conversations they had with Ms. Gutierrez tending to support the charges against her. Although the Government provided the defense with the informants’ general criminal backgrounds, compensation records from federal agencies, and immigration status, it did not disclose their actual identities. Defense counsel cross-examined both witnesses in light of the disclosures provided by the Government, but was unable to conduct adequate independent pre-trial investigation. The jury convicted Ms. Gutierrez as charged, and the district court sentenced her to three years of probation. She appealed, arguing: (1) Agent Knoll’s testimony about the smuggled individual’s immigration status introduced inadmissible testimonial hearsay in violation of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Confrontation Clause; (2) Agent Knoll’s expert testimony about the alien-smuggling trade was not helpful to the jury under Federal Rule of Evidence 702(a); and (3) the Government’s use of anonymous testimony violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Gutierrez De Lopez" on Justia Law