Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

A Boston police officer witnessed Sylvain engaging in a sexual act with a prostitute. As the officer approached, Sylvain removed plastic baggies from his coat pocket and placed them in his mouth. Believing that the baggies contained "crack" cocaine and fearing overdose, the officer attempted to intercede. Although Sylvain ingested the drugs, a search of his jacket revealed an additional baggie of crack cocaine. The incident took place within 1,000 feet of a child care center. Sylvain, a noncitizen lawfully residing in the U.S., pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance, subjecting him to automatic deportation. After the conviction the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the rule announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) regarding a criminal defendant's right under the Sixth Amendment to accurate advice about the deportation consequences of a guilty plea, was not a "new" rule and applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. Sylvain sought to vacate his guilty plea, arguing that his attorney erroneously advised him that there would be no deportation consequences. The motion was denied. While Sylvain's appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Chaidez v. United States (2013), holding that Padilla did announce a "new" rule and does not apply retroactively to collateral challenges. The Massachusetts Supreme Court remanded, holding that, as a matter of Massachusetts law, the right enunciated in Padilla was not new and, consequently, defendants whose state law convictions were final after April 1, 1997, may attack their convictions collaterally on Padilla grounds. View "Commonwealth v. Sylvain" on Justia Law

Pursuant to the terms of a plea bargain, Defendant, who was an eighteen-year-old citizen of Mexico at the time, pleaded guilty to the sale or transportation of marijuana. After completing his probation, Defendant sought an adjustment in status to lawful permanent residency. Defendant's application was denied because of his conviction, and removal proceedings were initiated against him. Defendant filed a motion to vacate his conviction pursuant to Cal. Penal Code 1016.5, asserting that had he known the immigration consequences of pleading guilty, he would have rejected the plea offer. The only issue adjudicated at the hearing on Defendant's motion was whether he would have received a more favorable outcome had he rejected the plea bargain. The trial court denied the motion without considering the possibility Defendant might have rejected the plea bargain even if it were not reasonably probable he would have received a more favorable outcome. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) relief is available under section 1016.5 if the defendant establishes he would have rejected the existing bargain to accept or attempt to negotiate another; and (2) the trial court applied the incorrect test for prejudice in this case. Remanded. View "People v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Defendant, who was born in Zaire and immigrated to the United States after being granted asylum, pled no contest to two misdemeanors in 2010. Because of credit for time served, Defendant was released from custody on the same day he was sentenced. Defendant subsequently moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, claiming his defense counsel provided ineffective assistance because he did not properly advise Defendant of the immigration consequences of conviction at the time he entered the pleas. The district court denied Defendant's motion, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because Defendant had completed his sentences and had been released from custody. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to decide Defendant's common-law motion to withdraw his pleas because (1) the statutory remedy under Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-1819.02 did not apply and the motion asserted a constitutional issue which was not addressed under the Nebraska Postconviction Act; and (2) the fact that Defendant served his sentences was not relevant to the jurisdictional analysis. Remanded.View "State v. Yuma" on Justia Law

Appellee, an undocumented alien seeking to remain eligible for "cancellation of removal" from the United States, filed a motion to vacate his 1998 deferred-adjudication misdemeanor judgment for possession of less than two ounces of marijuana. The motion alleged that appellee's guilty plea had been involuntary because it was made without an attorney giving appellee advice regarding deportation. After hearing from appellee's current counsel, the trial judge granted the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, pointing to "evidence" that appellee did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. The Supreme Court granted the State Prosecuting Attorney's (SPA's) petition to answer two questions: (1) could counsel's statements be considered "evidence"?; and (2) was appellee's 1998 waiver of counsel constitutionally invalid because he was not informed of the possible deportation consequences of his plea? After a brief note on the nature of the pleading filed here, the Court answered both questions no. Therefore the Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's original judgment.View "Texas v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

A court cannot terminate a person's rights unless the State proves by clear and convincing evidence that the parent engaged in certain proscribed conduct, as specified in the Family Code, and that termination is in the best interest of the children. In this case, an immigrant convicted in another state of unlawful conduct with a minor and given a probated sentence years before his children were born was later deported to Mexico. The State relied on these facts in petitioning to terminate this father's parental rights, yet put on no evidence concerning the offense committed years earlier, nor the circumstances of his deportation. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment in part, holding that the evidence was legally insufficient to support termination of this father's parental rights under these facts. Remanded.View "In re E.N.C." on Justia Law

In June 2005, police discovered Defendant Juan Pablo Santos naked and in bed with a fourteen-year-old girl. He was arrested and, after receiving "Miranda" warnings, admitted that he lived with the girl and that they had an ongoing sexual relationship. Santos was indicted by a grand jury on one count of second-degree sexual assault and one count of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child. The State proposed a plea agreement under which Santos would plead guilty to third-degree endangering the welfare of a child in exchange for the State’s agreement to drop the sexual assault charge and recommend that his term of imprisonment be limited to time served. After consulting with his attorney , Defendant decided to accept the deal. Less than three weeks after Defendant was sentenced according to the terms of the plea agreement he negotiated with the State, the United States Department of Homeland Security removed him to Mexico based on this criminal conviction. Defendant illegally reentered the United States. He was found and removed again to Mexico. In 2009, Defendant filed a post-conviction relief petition alleging that he had not read, and his attorney had not explained, the plea form before he signed it, and that his plea lacked an adequate factual basis. The PCR court determined that Defendant's allegations were sufficient to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and that Defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing, which the court scheduled. Before the hearing, Defendant filed a motion seeking leave to testify telephonically from Mexico. The State opposed the motion, pointing out that telephonic testimony would deny the court the opportunity to evaluate Defendant's demeanor and assess his credibility. The court granted Defendant's motion and turned to examine the mechanics of how Defendant's testimony would be taken. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the grant of an evidentiary hearing in which Defendant was to be permitted to provide telephonic testimony must be reversed and the matter remanded for full reconsideration by the post-conviction relief (PCR) court as to whether Defendant could meet the standard for entitlement to an evidentiary hearing. View "New Jersey v. Santos" on Justia Law

Defendant Deicy Urena Ortiz appealed a district court's denial of her motion to withdraw her plea and vacate her misdemeanor conviction. On appeal, she contended her plea was not knowing because the court did not advise her of its potential adverse immigration consequences. Defendant had been a lawful resident of the United States since 2002. In 2007, she was charged with the class A misdemeanor of shoplifting. She appeared before the district court and entered a plea of nolo contendere. She was not represented by counsel. Defendant signed a standard acknowledgment and waiver of rights form, which, at the time, contained no acknowledgment of the potential adverse immigration consequences of entering either a guilty or nolo plea. During the plea colloquy, the court did not advise Defendant that her plea could result in adverse immigration consequences. In 2011, the federal government commenced removal proceedings against Defendant, contending that her shoplifting conviction constituted "a crime involving moral turpitude," a deportable offense. In response, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw her plea and vacate her conviction. In her motion, she argued that her plea was not “knowing” because: (1) the court failed to inform her "that a conviction could subject her to deportation"; and (2) she "was affirmatively misled (albeit innocently) [by the prosecutor] that there would be no such consequences." The State objected. Acknowledging that it did not advise Defendant of the possible immigration consequences of her plea, the court concluded that Defendant raised a "pure issue of law," and, therefore, there was "no need for a hearing on the factual basis for [her] request." The court was not persuaded by Defendant’s argument that "Padilla v. Kentucky" (130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010)) supported her appeal. Accordingly, the court denied the motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because immigration consequences are collateral, the court’s failure here to advise Defendant of them did not render her nolo contendere plea unknowing. View "New Hampshire v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, the Supreme Court considered whether "Padilla v. Kentucky" (130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010)) could be applied retroactively on collateral review, and whether defendants' attorneys were ineffective under "State v. Nunez-Valdez" (200 N.J. 129 (2009)). In 2004, Defendant Frensel Gaitan was indicted for multiple possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) and distribution charges. He pled guilty to the charge of third-degree distribution of a CDS within one thousand feet of a school in 2005, and was sentenced to five years’ probation. Gaitan did not file a direct appeal. In 2008, based on the drug conviction, a removable offense, Gaitan was removed. He thereafter filed a PCR petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Although Gaitan had responded "yes" to Question 17 on the plea form, which asked "Do you understand that if you are not a United States citizen or national, you may be deported by virtue of your plea of guilty," he asserted that counsel failed to warn him that his plea carried with it potential immigration consequences. In 2007, Defendant Rohan Goulbourne was indicted on multiple CDS possession and distribution charges. He agreed to plead guilty to one count of possession of a CDS with intent to distribute within one thousand feet of a school. The prosecutor, in return, recommended a sentence of three years' imprisonment with a fifteen-month period of parole ineligibility. At a March 2008 plea hearing, both defense counsel and the court informed Goulbourne that he "may very well" be deported as a result of the plea. The court also noted that Goulbourne answered all the questions on the plea form, which included Question 17, and that he signed the form after reviewing it with his attorney. Satisfied that Goulbourne knowingly and voluntarily was pleading guilty, the court accepted the plea. The court imposed the recommended sentence, and Goulbourne did not appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that "Padilla" represented a new constitutional rule of law that for Sixth Amendment purposes, was not entitled to retroactive application on collateral review. Although "Nunez-Valdez" governs the standard of attorney performance in these cases, the Court concluded Defendants were not entitled to relief under that decision because neither was affirmatively misadvised by their counsel, nor did they establish prejudice. View "New Jersey v. Gaitan" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, the Supreme Court considered whether "Padilla v. Kentucky" (130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010)) could be applied retroactively on collateral review, and whether defendants' attorneys were ineffective under "State v. Nunez-Valdez" (200 N.J. 129 (2009)). In 2004, Defendant Frensel Gaitan was indicted for multiple possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) and distribution charges. He pled guilty to the charge of third-degree distribution of a CDS within one thousand feet of a school in 2005, and was sentenced to five years’ probation. Gaitan did not file a direct appeal. In 2008, based on the drug conviction, a removable offense, Gaitan was removed. He thereafter filed a PCR petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Although Gaitan had responded "yes" to Question 17 on the plea form, which asked "Do you understand that if you are not a United States citizen or national, you may be deported by virtue of your plea of guilty," he asserted that counsel failed to warn him that his plea carried with it potential immigration consequences. In 2007, Defendant Rohan Goulbourne was indicted on multiple CDS possession and distribution charges. He agreed to plead guilty to one count of possession of a CDS with intent to distribute within one thousand feet of a school. The prosecutor, in return, recommended a sentence of three years' imprisonment with a fifteen-month period of parole ineligibility. At a March 2008 plea hearing, both defense counsel and the court informed Goulbourne that he "may very well" be deported as a result of the plea. The court also noted that Goulbourne answered all the questions on the plea form, which included Question 17, and that he signed the form after reviewing it with his attorney. Satisfied that Goulbourne knowingly and voluntarily was pleading guilty, the court accepted the plea. The court imposed the recommended sentence, and Goulbourne did not appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that "Padilla" represented a new constitutional rule of law that for Sixth Amendment purposes, was not entitled to retroactive application on collateral review. Although "Nunez-Valdez" governs the standard of attorney performance in these cases, the Court concluded Defendants were not entitled to relief under that decision because neither was affirmatively misadvised by their counsel, nor did they establish prejudice. View "New Jersey v. Goulbourne" on Justia Law

Servio Diaz, a Honduran disaster refugee with authorization to reside in the U.S., pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to misdemeanor charges of attempted possession of a controlled substance, cocaine, and driving while intoxicated. Diaz subsequently filed a motion for a writ of error coram nobis, seeking relief on the basis that his counsel was ineffective when counsel failed to advise Diaz of potential deportation consequences he would face when he entered his guilty plea. The district court determined that Diaz had not established entitlement to relief and denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, concluding that the error asserted by Diaz was not an appropriate basis for relief by a writ of error coram nobis.View "State v. Diaz" on Justia Law