Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Alma Gonzalez was convicted of fraudulently obtaining public assistance benefits based upon a no contest plea that she entered pursuant to a plea agreement. Over two years after her sentencing, Gonzalez filed a motion to withdraw her plea, alleging that she had received ineffective assistance of counsel because her attorney had not explained that her plea would result in automatic deportation. The district court overruled the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) procedurally, Gonzalez was permitted to move for withdrawal of her plea; but (2) Gonzalez failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that withdrawal of her plea was necessary to prevent a manifest injustice.View "State v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Appellant Two Jinn, Inc. appealed a district court's decision that affirmed a magistrate's denial of its motion to set aside a bond forfeiture. Two Jinn argued that it demonstrated a defense of impossibility of performance based on the deportation of Rosendo Arriago Navarro (Navarro). Two Jinn also argued that the district court abused its discretion in failing to recognize that justice did not require enforcement of the forfeiture in this case under former Idaho Criminal Rule 46(e)(4). Navarro was arrested for driving without privileges. Navarro was released from custody when Two Jinn dba Aladdin Bail Bonds/Anytime Bail Bonds posted his $500 bail. After pleading guilty, Navarro was ordered to appear in court for sentencing. Navarro failed to appear for his sentencing hearing, the bond was ordered forfeited, and a bench warrant was issued for Navarro’s arrest. 175 days after the bond had been forfeited, Two Jinn filed a motion to set aside that forfeiture and exonerate it from its liability on the bond, arguing that Navarro had been deported to Mexico and that it was, therefore, entitled to relief under the contract law doctrine of impossibility of performance. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in denying Two Jinn’s requested bond exoneration. Therefore, the Court affirmed the district court decision upholding the magistrate court decision. View "Idaho v. Two Jinn, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Mark Denisyuk, a noncitizen, pleaded guilty to a deportable offense. Petitioner later filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting that defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to notify him of the deportation risks of his guilty plea. The postconviction court held that Petitioner was prejudiced by defense counsel's failure to provide proper advice concerning immigration consequences. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that deportation was a collateral consequence of a criminal conviction and therefore did not fall within the scope of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. Two days later, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky, which held that it is ineffective assistance to disadvise, or fail to advise, a client that deportation is a likely consequence of the guilty plea. On review, the Court of Appeals vacated the court of special appeals, holding (1) Padilla applies to postconviction claims arising from guilty pleas obtained after the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996; and (2) in this case, defense counsel's failure to advise Petitioner of the deportation consequence of his guilty plea was constitutionally deficient, and counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Petitioner. Remanded for a new trial. View "Denisyuk v. State" on Justia Law

While defendant Carlos Montes-Mata was held in county jail on drug-related charges, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him for violation of his right to a speedy trial. The district court granted the motion, dismissing the pending charges because defendant had been held approximately 111 days when his motion was heard, exceeding the 90-day statutory speedy trial limit. The court of appeals affirmed. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed. At issue was whether an I-247 form the county sheriff received from the federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) that informed the sheriff about the possibility of ICE formal proceedings against defendant tolled the 90-day requirement in Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3402(1). The Supreme Court concluded that the district judge properly discharged defendant from further liability for trial on the crimes charges, holding that the I-247 form did not constitute a present custodial claim on defendant and therefore did not affect the speedy trial question under the statute.View "State v. Montes-Mata" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the denial of his second motion for a new trial in which he sought to vacate guilty pleas he entered in 2005, on the ground that he was deprived of his right of effective assistance of counsel, as that right had recently been explicated in Padilla v. Kentucky. At issue was whether Padilla applied retroactively to defendant's collateral challenge to his convictions and, if so, whether he had demonstrated that he was prejudiced by counsel's shortcomings. The court held that Padilla did apply retroactively on collateral review of guilty pleas obtained after the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546. The court also held that defendant had made an insufficient showing that had he been properly informed of the immigration consequences of his guilty pleas, there was a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion for a new trial.View "Commonwealth v. Clarke" on Justia Law

Moncrieffe, a Jamaican citizen legally in the U.S., was found with 1.3 grams of marijuana in his car. He pleaded guilty under Georgia law to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, a noncitizen convicted of an “aggravated felony” is deportable, 8 U.S.C. 227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and ineligible for discretionary relief. The INA lists as an “aggravated felony” “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance,” including conviction of an offense that the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) makes punishable as a felony (by more than one year’s imprisonment). A state conviction is a felony punishable under the CSA only if it involves conduct punishable as a felony under federal law. Possession of marijuana with intent to distribute is a CSA offense, 21 U.S.C. 841(a), punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment. An Immigration Judge ordered Moncrieffe removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting reliance on section 841(b)(4), which makes marijuana distribution punishable as a misdemeanor if the offense involves a small amount for no remuneration. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. If a noncitizen’s conviction for marijuana distribution fails to establish that the offense involved either remuneration or more than a small amount of marijuana, it is not an aggravated felony under the INA. The Court employed the “categorical approach,” examining what the state conviction necessarily involved and not the facts underlying the case, and presuming that the conviction involved the least of the acts criminalized. Conviction under Georgia’s statute, alone, does not reveal whether either remuneration or more than a small amount was involved, so Moncrieffe’s conviction could correspond to either the CSA felony or the CSA misdemeanor. The Court rejected an argument that section 841(b)(4) was merely a mitigating sentencing factor, not an element of the offense. The government’s proposal that noncitizens be allowed, during immigration proceedings, to demonstrate that their convictions involved only a small amount of marijuana and no remuneration is inconsistent with the INA’s text and the categorical approach and would burden immigration courts and the noncitizens involved. Escaping aggravated felony treatment does not necessarily mean escaping deportation, because any marijuana distribution offense renders a noncitizen deportable as a controlled substances offender, but with an opportunity seek relief from removal.View "Moncrieffe v. Holder" on Justia Law

The district court entered a preliminary injunction concerning four provisions of Arizona S. B. 1070, enacted in 2010: Section 3 makes failure to comply with federal alien-registration requirements a state misdemeanor; 5(C)makes it a misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to seek or engage in work in Arizona; 6 authorizes state and local officers to arrest without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe a person has committed any offense that makes the person removable from the U.S.; and 2(B) requires officers conducting a stop, detention, or arrest to attempt, in some circumstances, to verify immigration status. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, holding that Sections 3, 5(C), and 6 preempted. Section 3 intrudes on the field of alien registration, in which Congress has left no room for even complementary state laws. Section 5(C)’s criminal penalty is an obstacle to the federal regulatory system. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 makes it illegal for employers to knowingly hire, recruit, refer, or employ unauthorized workers, 8 U. S. C. 1324a(a)(1)(A),(a)(2); requires employers to verify prospective employees' status; and imposes criminal and civil penalties on employers, but only imposes civil penalties on aliens who seek, or engage in, unauthorized employment. Congress decided against criminal penalties on unauthorized employees. Section 6 creates an obstacle to federal law by attempting to provide state officers with additional arrest authority, which they could exercise with no instruction from the federal government. Generally, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain in the U.S. It was improper to enjoin section 2(B) before state courts construed it and without some showing that its enforcement actually conflicts with federal law. The mandatory nature of the status checks does not interfere with the federal scheme. Consultation between federal and state officials is an important feature of the immigration system. It is not clear yet that 2(B), in practice, will require state officers to delay release of detainees for no reason other than to verify immigration status. That would raise constitutional concerns and would disrupt the federal framework, but the section could be read to avoid these concerns. View "Arizona v. United States" on Justia Law

Sanchez, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the U.S. without inspection in 1989. Sanchez is now 47, married to a lawful permanent resident, and has four children, all U.S. citizens. Sanchez sought asylum and withholding of removal and applied for special rule cancellation of removal under the Nicaraguan Adjustment & Central American Relief Act (NACARA), 111 Stat. 2160, 2644 and under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b), based on exceptional hardship to his children. While removal proceedings were pending, the government submitted evidence that Sanchez was not eligible for NACARA relief because he had assisted in the persecution of others while serving in the El Salvador military. Sanchez asked for a continuance. At Sanchez’s next hearing, in August 2009, Sanchez stated that he had been arrested in 2008 for leaving the scene of an accident where serious bodily injury occurred. The government argued that Sanchez’s conduct constituted a crime involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i). Sanchez submitted a docket sheet showing that he was charged with a Class D felony, although the court entered the conviction as a misdemeanor and imposed a sentence of 365 days in jail with 363 days suspended. Sanchez claimed that, because of weather conditions, he thought that he had merely hit “a post or a small object” and only learned that he had hit a person when police arrived at his residence the next day. The IJ ordered removal; the BIA dismissed an appeal. The Seventh Circuit remanded, stating that the Board did not properly conduct the three-step inquiry prescribed in Matter of Silva-Trevino. View "Sanchez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for criminal reentry, collaterally attacking his underlying removal order. The court concluded that defendant's attorney in the immigration proceedings provided ineffective assistance of counsel by erroneously conceding to his removability based on defendant's prior conviction under Missouri Revised Statutes 195.211 and by failing to appeal the removal order to the BIA and failing to petition the Seventh Circuit for review. The court held that defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel throughout his immigration proceedings, he was deprived of his right to due process, the proceedings were fundamentally unfair, and the indictment for criminal reentry must be dismissed. View "United States v. Lopez-Chavez" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, appealed the IJ's determination that he was ineligible to apply for cancellation of removal to the BIA. The BIA dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the IJ that petitioner's auto-burglary conviction, as a conviction for an aggravated felony, rendered him ineligible to apply for cancellation of removal. The court made explicit what was dictum in Lopez-Elias v. Reno and joined its sister circuits in holding that a conviction for unauthorized entry of a vehicle with intent to commit a theft therein constituted a conviction for an attempted theft offense, which, under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(U) and 1229b(a)(3), rendered petitioner ineligible to apply for cancellation of removal. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Garcia v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law