Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Mayorga, a native of El Salvador, entered the U.S. as a teenager in 1988 because of the then on-going civil war in El Salvador. He applied for asylum in 1995, and has had work authorization since then. He married a U.S. citizen and has five children under the age of 15, all U.S. citizens. In 2010, Mayorga pled guilty to engaging in the unlicensed business of firearms dealing, 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2), and was sentenced to 46 months in prison. When he was released, the Department of Homeland Security served Mayorga with notice of removal proceedings, alleging two grounds: under 8 U.S.C. 1182 (a)(6)(A)(i), as an alien present in the U.S. without having been admitted or paroled, and having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). At his hearing Mayorga contested his removability for having been convicted of a CIMT and applied for cancellation of removal, voluntary departure, asylum, withholding of removal, and withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The IJ denied each application, reasoning that if Mayorga’s crime was not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, he would likely be ineligible for cancellation of removal under the “person of good moral character” requirement, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(B). The BIA upheld the decision. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that Mayorga would suffer a serious adverse consequence if his crime were found to be a categorical CIMT, and that his challenge was therefore justiciable. Mayorga’s crime was not categorically a CIMT.View "Mayorga v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S." on Justia Law

In 1999, Petitioner admitted to a single count of shoplifting in Massachusetts state court. In 2012, Petitioner admitted to an amended charge of larceny by inducement. The following year, Petitioner was charged with removability as an alien who has been convicted of or admits to having committed "a crime involving moral turpitude.” Petitioner applied for special rule cancellation, arguing that he fell within the petty offense exception because his shoplifting conviction was not a crime involving moral turpitude. The Immigration Judge denied Petitioner’s application. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Petitioner’s appeal, concluding that the IJ properly found that Petitioner’s shoplifting conviction was, in addition to the larceny conviction, a crime involving moral turpitude, making him ineligible for the petty offense exception. The First Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that the BIA did not provide a comprehensive analysis to support its conclusion Petitioner’s shoplifting conviction was also a crime involving moral turpitude, and therefore, the case must be remanded to the BIA for further proceedings. View "Mejia v. Holder" on Justia Law

Castro, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. without inspection when he was 14 years old. He was convicted of 11 offenses while he was in the U.S. between 1979 and 2001, six times for drug trafficking-related offenses. He was convicted twice of illegal entry. Castro was removed in 1980, 1981, 1984, 1989, 1990, 1994, 1997 and 1998. He reentered illegally after his last removal and has used 23 identities in encounters with law enforcement. In 2013, he was found as part of a Fugitive Operations program that uses public records to locate illegal aliens. He pleaded guilty to illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). A probation officer assigned a base offense level of 8 and a 16-level enhancement under Guideline 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), because Castro had been convicted of a drug trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed exceeded 13 months’ imprisonment. He had 13 criminal history points, placing him in category VI. His advisory sentencing range was 77–96 months’ imprisonment. Castro argued that his criminal history occurred many years ago and that he had rehabilitated himself, as demonstrated by his family circumstances and work history. The court imposed a 77-month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court erred by not expressly addressing his “fast-track disparity” argument at sentencing and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable in light of his proffered mitigation factors.View "United States v. Castro-Alvarado" on Justia Law

Petitioner was denied special rule cancellation of removal under section 203 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), Pub. L. No. 105-100, 203(a)(1), 111 Stat. 2160, 2196, because the BIA considered his 1992 Virginia conviction for "carnal knowledge of a child between thirteen and fifteen years of age" an aggravated felony as defined by the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A). The court concluded that petitioner's conviction under the Virginia statute necessarily means that he also has been convicted of the generic offense of sexual abuse of a minor, an aggravated felony within the INA. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Contreras v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner Enrique Garcia-Mendoza petitioned the Tenth Circuit for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision upholding an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of his request for cancellation of removal. The agency determined that he was ineligible for such relief because he could not establish that he "ha[d] been a person of good moral character" due to his confinement in a penal institution for more than 180 days. In 2010, he was arrested and charged with driving under the influence and leaving the scene of an accident. He could not afford bond and remained confined during his pretrial criminal proceedings. He was released after he had been confined for a total of 197 days when the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) took him into custody and initiated removal proceedings. Petitioner conceded that he was removable for remaining in the United States beyond his authorized period of stay and applied for cancellation of removal. The IJ denied his request because petitioner had been confined for more than 180 days for his 2010 conviction and therefore he could not establish the requisite good moral character. While petitioner’s appeal of that decision was pending with the BIA, he filed a motion with the state trial court seeking to amend his sentence. In the motion, he alleged that his counsel failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of his sentence before he entered his guilty plea. He asked the court to resentence him to 166 days with no credit for time served. The state court granted the motion and issued a modified mittimus nunc pro tunc to the original sentencing date. Petitioner then filed a motion for remand with the BIA based on the new evidence that his sentence was modified to 166 days. The BIA granted the motion and remanded to the IJ. On remand, the IJ again denied cancellation of removal, noting that the nunc pro tunc order modifying the sentence did not change the fact that petitioner had already been confined for more than 180 days as a result of his conviction. The BIA upheld the IJ’s decision. Petitioner then petitioned the Tenth Circuit. Seeing no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals denied review. View "Garcia-Mendoza v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner pled guilty to four counts of sexual assault in the fourth degree under Connecticut General Statute 53a-73a(a)(2), which criminalizes subjecting "another person to sexual contact without such other person's consent." The United States then commenced removal proceedings against petitioner under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). Under federal immigration law, petitioner's removal turns on whether the crime he was convicted of is a crime involving moral turpitude. Because the court is unable to predict what level of mens rea the Connecticut courts would require, and because the issue involves the weighing of important policy considerations, the court certified questions to the Connecticut Supreme Court. View "Efstathiadis v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to using a fraudulent visa as proof of permission to enter the United States. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's application of a two level enhancement for previous deportation under U.S.S.G. 2L2.2(b)(1). The court affirmed the sentence, rejecting defendant's contention that because he voluntarily departed he had not "been deported" for the purposes of U.S.S.G. 2L2.2(b)(1). View "United States v. Murillo-Acosta" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss an indictment charging attempted entry after deportation. The court applied the modified categorical approach and held that defendant's state conviction for aggravated assault constituted a crime of violence. Consequently, defendant was not eligible for voluntary departure at his February 2005 immigration hearing. Accordingly, defendant's attempt to attack collaterally the deportation order underlying his illegal reentry conviction because he was not adequately advised of the voluntary departure remedy failed. The court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Cabrera-Perez" on Justia Law

In 2011 Cadapan, a citizen of the Philippines and a lawful permanent U.S. resident, was convicted of indecent assault with a person less than 13 years of age, indecent assault without consent, corruption of minors, and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment not less than three months nor more than 23 months and supervised probation for 36 months, In 2012, Cadapan was granted parole and was transferred to the custody of the Department of Homeland Security, which charged him with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an alien who, after admission, was convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A) and with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), as an alien convicted of a crime of child abuse. He argued that the Pennsylvania statute for indecent assault encompassed conduct that could not be considered sexual abuse of a minor under the federal statute. The Immigration Judge rejected this argument. The BIA dismissed Cadapan’s appeal. The Third Circuit dismissed and also rejected an argument that the statute did not apply because Cadapan had not been admitted to the U.S. as not having been raised below. View "Cadapan v. Att'y Gen. of U.S." on Justia Law

Defendant, a native and citizen of Barbados, appealed the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment for illegal reentry in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1326(a), (b)(2). At issue was whether the Supreme Court's ruling in Vartelas v. Holder required the court to find that defendant was eligible for relief from deportation under former section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(c). The court held that deeming noncitizens like defendant ineligible for section 212(c) relief merely because they were convicted after trial would have an impermissible retroactive effect because it would impermissibly attach new legal consequences to conviction that pre-date the repeal of section 212(c). In this instance, the court found that the district court erred because defendant was erroneously found to be ineligible for relief under section 212(c). The court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Gill" on Justia Law