Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Tahawwur Hussain Rana, a Pakistani national, was tried in a U.S. district court for his involvement in supporting a terrorist organization responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks. He was convicted of providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization and conspiring to support a foiled plot in Denmark but was acquitted of conspiring to support the Mumbai attacks. After serving seven years in prison and being granted compassionate release, India requested his extradition to face charges related to the Mumbai attacks.The magistrate judge certified Rana as extraditable, rejecting his arguments that the U.S.-India extradition treaty's Non Bis in Idem (double jeopardy) provision protected him from extradition and that India failed to provide sufficient evidence of probable cause. Rana then filed a habeas corpus petition in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, which upheld the magistrate judge's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of Rana's habeas corpus petition. The court held that the term "offense" in the extradition treaty refers to a charged crime defined by its elements, not the underlying acts. Therefore, the Non Bis in Idem exception did not apply because the Indian charges contained distinct elements from the crimes for which Rana was acquitted in the U.S. The court also found that India provided sufficient competent evidence to support the magistrate judge's finding of probable cause that Rana committed the charged crimes. View "RANA V. JENKINS" on Justia Law

Three years after becoming a U.S. citizen, Melchor Munoz pleaded guilty to a drug-conspiracy offense, admitting under oath that he began trafficking marijuana in 2008. The government sought to denaturalize Munoz under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), alleging that his prior participation in the drug conspiracy made him ineligible for citizenship. The government moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Munoz was collaterally and judicially estopped from denying his 2008 involvement. The district court granted the motion and entered a judgment denaturalizing Munoz.Previously, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida accepted Munoz’s guilty plea, where he admitted to drug trafficking starting in 2008. Munoz later moved to vacate his conviction, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, but the motion was denied. The government then filed the denaturalization action, and the district court granted the government’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, applying both collateral and judicial estoppel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It concluded that collateral estoppel was unavailable because the starting date of Munoz’s drug offense was unnecessary to his prior conviction. The court also found that the district court abused its discretion in applying judicial estoppel, as the findings lacked evidentiary support. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings, allowing Munoz to litigate the issue of when he began participating in the drug conspiracy. View "USA v. Munoz" on Justia Law

Fesnel Lafortune, a Haitian national, entered the U.S. on a B-2 visitor visa in 2008 and overstayed. In 2019, he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud and aggravated identity theft, receiving a combined prison sentence of 31 months. Following his convictions, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged him with removability due to his lack of lawful status and his conviction for an aggravated felony involving fraud exceeding $10,000.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Lafortune removable and denied his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Lafortune, appearing pro se, requested continuances to find counsel, which were denied. He admitted to the allegations and expressed fear of returning to Haiti. The IJ ruled him ineligible for asylum and other protections, citing his conviction as a particularly serious crime. Lafortune appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which remanded the case for him to secure counsel. On remand, the IJ again denied his requests for continuances and upheld the original decision. Lafortune, now with counsel, appealed again to the BIA, which dismissed his appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the BIA's decision, agreeing that Lafortune's conviction for conspiracy to commit bank fraud constituted a particularly serious crime, making him ineligible for withholding of removal. The court also found no error in the IJ's and BIA's handling of Lafortune's CAT claim, concluding that he failed to demonstrate a particularized risk of torture by or with the acquiescence of Haitian officials. The petition for review was denied. View "Lafortune v. Garland" on Justia Law

A former immigration attorney was convicted of conspiring with clients, interpreters, and employees to defraud the U.S. by submitting fabricated asylum applications. The attorney would create false stories for clients, often including fabricated details of persecution, and submit these to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Interpreters assisted by coaching clients to memorize false information and providing fraudulent translations during asylum interviews. Nine former clients testified against the attorney, and the jury found him guilty of conspiracy to defraud the U.S.The attorney's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. He then moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming undisclosed benefits were provided to witnesses. The district court authorized broad discovery, held a weeklong hearing, and denied the motion. The court found that undisclosed pre-trial benefits were immaterial and that post-trial benefits did not violate the attorney's rights as they were not promised to witnesses and would not have affected the trial's outcome.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the undisclosed pre-trial benefits were immaterial and that the post-trial assistance provided to witnesses did not constitute a Brady violation. The court found no evidence of pre-trial promises regarding immigration status and concluded that the undisclosed availability of an "insider" for post-trial assistance was not material to the trial's outcome. The attorney's § 2255 motion was denied. View "Dekelaita v. USA" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Socorro Colin-Villavicencio, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States lawfully in 1988. Her mother became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1998. Colin-Villavicencio applied for adjustment of status but missed fingerprint appointments, leading to the abandonment of her application. In 2015, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings after she was convicted of multiple felonies, including child abuse and drug possession. Representing herself, she claimed derivative citizenship based on her mother’s naturalization, but an Immigration Judge (IJ) denied this claim, finding she did not become a lawful permanent resident as a minor. The IJ also denied her relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing that Colin-Villavicencio did not establish a likelihood of torture if returned to Mexico. The BIA found that the country conditions and her brother’s attack did not sufficiently demonstrate a particularized risk of torture or police acquiescence. The BIA also upheld the IJ’s determination that her prior convictions precluded asylum and withholding of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court denied Colin-Villavicencio’s derivative citizenship claim, concluding she did not meet the requirements under 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3) because her parents never married, and her father’s paternity was established by legitimation under Baja California law. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the BIA’s denial of CAT relief, noting she did not show a particularized risk of torture or police acquiescence. The Ninth Circuit thus denied her petition for review. View "COLIN-VILLAVICENCIO V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Dolores Ortega-Cordova, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States without inspection in 2002. In 2012, he was arrested in Norfolk, Virginia, and charged with solicitation of prostitution under Virginia Code § 18.2-346(B). He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 90 days’ imprisonment, with 86 days suspended, and fined. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him. Ortega-Cordova conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Ortega-Cordova’s application, finding him ineligible for cancellation of removal because his conviction for solicitation of prostitution was deemed a crime involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). The IJ relied on the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) long-standing position that prostitution-related offenses are morally turpitudinous. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, noting that Ortega-Cordova failed to prove that solicitation of prostitution is no longer considered morally reprehensible by society.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA’s decision. The court concluded that solicitation of prostitution under Virginia law categorically involves moral turpitude because it debases a moral norm against treating sex as a commercial transaction. The court rejected Ortega-Cordova’s arguments that societal views on prostitution are evolving and that the statute criminalizes consensual conduct between adults. The court also dismissed his procedural arguments, including the claim that the BIA abused its discretion by not referring his case to a three-member panel. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit denied Ortega-Cordova’s petition for review. View "Ortega-Cordova v. Garland" on Justia Law

Hugo Abraham Aguilar, a native and citizen of Honduras, entered the United States without inspection in 2001 and has three U.S. citizen children. In January 2014, he was arrested in New Jersey for allegedly sexually assaulting his stepdaughter and remained in pretrial detention for 1,332 days due to his inability to afford bail. In May 2017, Aguilar pled guilty to a reduced charge of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child and was sentenced to 1,332 days in prison, with credit for time served. Shortly after his sentencing, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Aguilar statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal, citing his inability to demonstrate "good moral character" due to his confinement for more than 180 days as a result of his conviction. The IJ also denied his request for a continuance to challenge his conviction in state court. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Aguilar's appeal, agreeing with the IJ's findings and concluding that the IJ acted within his discretion in denying the continuance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that pre-conviction detention credited toward a defendant's sentence is considered confinement "as a result of conviction" under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Consequently, Aguilar's 1,332 days of pre-conviction detention, credited as time served, precluded him from establishing the required good moral character for cancellation of removal. The court also denied as moot Aguilar's challenge to the BIA's decision dismissing his appeal from the IJ's denial of a continuance, as his state post-conviction relief efforts had concluded unsuccessfully. The Third Circuit denied Aguilar's petition for review. View "Aguilar v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The case involves Sergio Manrique Gutierrez, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, who was convicted of carjacking under California law. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld an Immigration Judge's (IJ) decision that Gutierrez was removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony crime of violence and for having been convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude.The BIA held that Gutierrez's conviction for carjacking under California law is a categorical crime of violence. The BIA did not address the second ground for removal, concluding that Gutierrez waived his challenge to the moral turpitude removal charge. Gutierrez separately petitioned for review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen his appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that California carjacking under Cal. Penal Code § 215(a) is not a categorical crime of violence. The court also concluded that the BIA erroneously determined that Gutierrez waived his challenge to the moral turpitude removal charge. The court remanded the case to the BIA to decide, in the first instance, whether Gutierrez is removable for having been convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude. The court dismissed Gutierrez’s petition for review of the IJ’s sua sponte reopening of his case to consider a change in the law. The court denied Gutierrez’s petition as to his remaining claims concerning the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, the discretionary denial of his application for waiver of admissibility, the denial of protection under the Convention Against Torture, and the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen his case to consider new evidence that he was incompetent and to consider his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. View "GUTIERREZ v. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant, Nelson Barros, who was charged with assault and battery on a household member. Barros, a noncitizen, chose to represent himself during his arraignment and plea hearing. He signed a form acknowledging he had waived his right to counsel. The judge did not conduct any further inquiry to determine whether Barros' waiver of counsel was made knowingly and intelligently. Barros later admitted to sufficient facts to warrant a guilty verdict and was placed on probation for one year. After completing his probation, the charge was dismissed. However, upon returning to the U.S. from a trip to Portugal, Barros was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers due to his admission of guilt in the assault case.The lower courts denied Barros' motions to withdraw his plea. The motion judge found that Barros' waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and voluntary. Barros appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted his application for direct appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel must be made knowingly and intelligently, regardless of whether the defendant is at arraignment or a plea hearing. The court confirmed that a trial court judge has the responsibility of ascertaining whether the waiver is made knowingly and intelligently. The court also recognized that for a noncitizen defendant, the disadvantages of self-representation include forgoing counsel's advice about the immigration consequences of a disposition. However, the court affirmed the lower court's decision on alternate grounds, concluding that Barros' waiver of counsel was invalid, but he failed to establish a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice to prevail on appeal. View "Commonwealth v. Barros" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Antonio E. Gonzalez, was charged with assaulting his then-wife and their son. During the trial, the defense sought to cross-examine the wife about her application for a U visa, which is a visa for noncitizens who are victims of certain crimes and are helpful to law enforcement in the investigation or prosecution of criminal activity. The trial court ruled that the defense had not established a sufficient factual foundation for this line of questioning and thus it was not allowed. The defendant was convicted and appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court erred in precluding the cross-examination.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the trial court did err in this regard. The Court found that the defense had established a sufficient factual foundation for the cross-examination, as the wife had submitted a U visa application based on being a victim of the crime for which the defendant was on trial, and a member of the State’s Attorney’s Office had signed the necessary certification for the U visa. The Court reasoned that these circumstances could have led a jury to infer that the wife had a personal interest in the outcome of the trial or a motive to testify falsely.However, the Court ultimately concluded that this error was harmless and did not influence the verdict. The Court noted that the defendant had acknowledged committing acts that constituted the assaults for which he was convicted, and that the wife's testimony was consistent with other evidence presented at trial. Therefore, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Gonzalez v. State" on Justia Law