Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Hugo Abraham Aguilar, a native and citizen of Honduras, entered the United States without inspection in 2001 and has three U.S. citizen children. In January 2014, he was arrested in New Jersey for allegedly sexually assaulting his stepdaughter and remained in pretrial detention for 1,332 days due to his inability to afford bail. In May 2017, Aguilar pled guilty to a reduced charge of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child and was sentenced to 1,332 days in prison, with credit for time served. Shortly after his sentencing, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Aguilar statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal, citing his inability to demonstrate "good moral character" due to his confinement for more than 180 days as a result of his conviction. The IJ also denied his request for a continuance to challenge his conviction in state court. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Aguilar's appeal, agreeing with the IJ's findings and concluding that the IJ acted within his discretion in denying the continuance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that pre-conviction detention credited toward a defendant's sentence is considered confinement "as a result of conviction" under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Consequently, Aguilar's 1,332 days of pre-conviction detention, credited as time served, precluded him from establishing the required good moral character for cancellation of removal. The court also denied as moot Aguilar's challenge to the BIA's decision dismissing his appeal from the IJ's denial of a continuance, as his state post-conviction relief efforts had concluded unsuccessfully. The Third Circuit denied Aguilar's petition for review. View "Aguilar v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The case involves Sergio Manrique Gutierrez, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, who was convicted of carjacking under California law. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld an Immigration Judge's (IJ) decision that Gutierrez was removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony crime of violence and for having been convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude.The BIA held that Gutierrez's conviction for carjacking under California law is a categorical crime of violence. The BIA did not address the second ground for removal, concluding that Gutierrez waived his challenge to the moral turpitude removal charge. Gutierrez separately petitioned for review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen his appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that California carjacking under Cal. Penal Code § 215(a) is not a categorical crime of violence. The court also concluded that the BIA erroneously determined that Gutierrez waived his challenge to the moral turpitude removal charge. The court remanded the case to the BIA to decide, in the first instance, whether Gutierrez is removable for having been convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude. The court dismissed Gutierrez’s petition for review of the IJ’s sua sponte reopening of his case to consider a change in the law. The court denied Gutierrez’s petition as to his remaining claims concerning the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, the discretionary denial of his application for waiver of admissibility, the denial of protection under the Convention Against Torture, and the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen his case to consider new evidence that he was incompetent and to consider his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. View "GUTIERREZ v. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant, Nelson Barros, who was charged with assault and battery on a household member. Barros, a noncitizen, chose to represent himself during his arraignment and plea hearing. He signed a form acknowledging he had waived his right to counsel. The judge did not conduct any further inquiry to determine whether Barros' waiver of counsel was made knowingly and intelligently. Barros later admitted to sufficient facts to warrant a guilty verdict and was placed on probation for one year. After completing his probation, the charge was dismissed. However, upon returning to the U.S. from a trip to Portugal, Barros was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers due to his admission of guilt in the assault case.The lower courts denied Barros' motions to withdraw his plea. The motion judge found that Barros' waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and voluntary. Barros appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted his application for direct appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel must be made knowingly and intelligently, regardless of whether the defendant is at arraignment or a plea hearing. The court confirmed that a trial court judge has the responsibility of ascertaining whether the waiver is made knowingly and intelligently. The court also recognized that for a noncitizen defendant, the disadvantages of self-representation include forgoing counsel's advice about the immigration consequences of a disposition. However, the court affirmed the lower court's decision on alternate grounds, concluding that Barros' waiver of counsel was invalid, but he failed to establish a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice to prevail on appeal. View "Commonwealth v. Barros" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Antonio E. Gonzalez, was charged with assaulting his then-wife and their son. During the trial, the defense sought to cross-examine the wife about her application for a U visa, which is a visa for noncitizens who are victims of certain crimes and are helpful to law enforcement in the investigation or prosecution of criminal activity. The trial court ruled that the defense had not established a sufficient factual foundation for this line of questioning and thus it was not allowed. The defendant was convicted and appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court erred in precluding the cross-examination.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the trial court did err in this regard. The Court found that the defense had established a sufficient factual foundation for the cross-examination, as the wife had submitted a U visa application based on being a victim of the crime for which the defendant was on trial, and a member of the State’s Attorney’s Office had signed the necessary certification for the U visa. The Court reasoned that these circumstances could have led a jury to infer that the wife had a personal interest in the outcome of the trial or a motive to testify falsely.However, the Court ultimately concluded that this error was harmless and did not influence the verdict. The Court noted that the defendant had acknowledged committing acts that constituted the assaults for which he was convicted, and that the wife's testimony was consistent with other evidence presented at trial. Therefore, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Gonzalez v. State" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a defendant, Nelson Barros, who was charged with one count of assault and battery on a household member. Barros, a noncitizen, chose to represent himself during his arraignment and plea hearing. He signed a form acknowledging he had waived his right to counsel. The judge informed him of his right to counsel and confirmed that Barros wished to represent himself. However, the judge did not conduct any further inquiry to determine whether Barros' waiver of counsel was made knowingly and intelligently. Barros admitted to sufficient facts to warrant finding him guilty and was placed on one year of probation. Later, Barros was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers due to his admission to sufficient facts to find him guilty of assault and battery on a household member.The lower courts denied Barros' motions to withdraw his plea. The motion judge, who was not the plea judge, found that Barros' waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and voluntary. Barros appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted his application for direct appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the lower court's decision but on alternate grounds. The court held that Barros' waiver of counsel was invalid, in violation of his right to counsel under art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The judge did not conduct an adequate inquiry to determine whether Barros' waiver of counsel was made knowingly and intelligently. However, Barros did not challenge this waiver of counsel in his first motion to withdraw his admission to sufficient facts. Therefore, he must establish a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice to prevail on appeal. The court concluded that Barros did not raise a serious doubt that the result of the proceeding might have been different had his waiver of counsel been adequately informed. View "Commonwealth v. Barros" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Aleksandra Malgorzata Stankiewicz, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, who was convicted in 2003 for violating a New Jersey statute that criminalizes distributing a controlled substance on or near school property. In 2018, removal proceedings were initiated against her, with the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) concluding that her conviction was an aggravated felony, making her both removable and ineligible to apply for cancellation of removal.The BIA dismissed Stankiewicz's appeal, maintaining its reasoning that her conviction was an aggravated felony. Stankiewicz then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review of the BIA's decision.The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that Stankiewicz's conviction under the New Jersey statute is not an "aggravated felony" under federal law. The court applied the "categorical approach," comparing the state law to any federal controlled substance offense that is a felony subject to a prison sentence greater than one year. The court found that neither of the parties' proposed federal analogs categorically matches the New Jersey statute. The court therefore granted Stankiewicz's petition for review, vacated the agency’s ruling, and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings. View "Stankiewicz v. Garland" on Justia Law

In the case of Antonio E. Gonzalez v. State of Maryland, the defendant, Antonio E. Gonzalez, was charged with assaulting his then-wife, M., and their son, F. During the trial, Gonzalez's counsel attempted to cross-examine M. about her application for a U visa, which is a visa for noncitizens who are victims of certain crimes and are helpful to law enforcement in the investigation or prosecution of criminal activity. The trial court ruled that it would not permit cross-examination of M. concerning her immigration status because Gonzalez's counsel had not established an adequate foundation for such inquiry.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the trial court erred in precluding Gonzalez's counsel from cross-examining M. about her U visa application. The Supreme Court concluded that, given the nature of the requirement that, for a U visa to be approved, an applicant must be helpful in the investigation or prosecution of criminal activity and provide a certification from a law enforcement or government official to that effect, a sufficient factual foundation for impeachment of a witness concerning a U visa application is established under Maryland Rule 5-616(a)(4) where there has been a showing that a U visa application, based on the witness being a victim of a crime that the defendant is charged with, has been submitted to the government for approval.However, the Supreme Court also concluded that, because any error in precluding cross-examination concerning U visa application was harmless, it was not necessary to deviate from general practice of refraining from addressing issue not decided by the trial court or raised in petition for writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court concluded that trial court’s error was harmless beyond reasonable doubt as defendant testified to committing acts that formed basis of offenses for which he was convicted, witness’s testimony was consistent with another witness’s testimony who was not applicant for U visa, witness’s testimony was consistent with initial description of incident, and other evidence corroborated that both witnesses had been assaulted by defendant. View "Gonzalez v. State" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Nguyen Chi Cuong Nmn Huynh, a Vietnamese citizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted in Iowa for knowingly purchasing or possessing a visual depiction of a minor engaging in a prohibited sexual act. Following this conviction, the Department of Homeland Security sought his removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), arguing that his crime constituted "sexual abuse of a minor," an aggravated felony that warrants removal. An immigration judge found Huynh removable, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed de novo whether Huynh's state crime qualifies as sexual abuse of a minor. The court applied the "categorical approach," examining whether the state statute defining the crime of conviction categorically fits within the generic federal definition of a corresponding aggravated felony. The court found that the Iowa statute is broader than the generic federal offense of sexual abuse of a minor.The court held that the conduct criminalized by the Iowa statute, namely, knowingly possessing a prohibited image, falls outside the generic federal offense of sexual abuse of a minor. The court reasoned that none of the definitions of "sexual abuse of a minor" in the INA, reliable dictionaries, or a closely related statute captures simple possession of child pornography. The court also found that the BIA's preferred definition, which requires something more than simple possession of child pornography, does not apply to Huynh's case.The court also considered the Department of Homeland Security's charge that Huynh committed a "crime involving moral turpitude" within five years of his admission to the United States. The court found that the government could not defend the BIA's decision on this charge and granted the government's request for voluntary remand for the BIA to reconsider its decision.In conclusion, the court granted Huynh's petition for review, vacated the BIA's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Huynh v. Garland" on Justia Law

Ulises Romeo Lucas-Hernandez was arrested by Border Patrol Agent Brian Mauler in a remote area north of the U.S.-Mexico border. During the arrest, Agent Mauler asked Lucas-Hernandez three questions in Spanish about his citizenship and immigration status. Lucas-Hernandez was subsequently charged with misdemeanor attempted entry by an alien under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1). Before trial, Lucas-Hernandez moved to exclude Agent Mauler from testifying to his Spanish-to-English translation of the questions and answers, arguing that the statements were hearsay and that Agent Mauler was not qualified as an expert to translate the statements. The magistrate judge denied the motion regarding hearsay, reasoning that the statements made by a defendant are considered party admissions, not hearsay.The magistrate judge found Lucas-Hernandez guilty of violating 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1) and he was sentenced to time served. Lucas-Hernandez challenged his conviction in district court, asserting that Agent Mauler’s testimony of his field statements was hearsay and fell outside the hearsay exclusion in Rule 801(d)(2) because Agent Mauler was not a “mere language conduit” under United States v. Nazemian. The district court affirmed the magistrate judge’s ruling and found that Nazemian did not apply, and so Agent Mauler’s testimony as to Lucas-Hernandez’s field statements was not hearsay.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Nazemian analysis applies to the statements of a party opponent that are translated by the testifying witness. However, the court concluded that any error in admitting Agent Mauler’s testimony was harmless, considering the evidence presented from Lucas-Hernandez’s A-file, the database searches, and the circumstances when he was found by Agent Mauler. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling upholding Lucas-Hernandez’s conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1). View "United States v. Lucas-Hernandez" on Justia Law

The case involves Marken Leger, a Haitian citizen who has lived in the United States as an asylee since 2000. In 2009, Leger pleaded no contest to a charge of lewd and lascivious battery, in violation of Florida Statute § 800.04(4). In 2013 and 2018, Leger pleaded no contest to two other offenses, both for the possession of marijuana, in violation of Florida Statute § 893.13(6)(b). The government initiated removal proceedings against him in 2019, alleging that his convictions made him removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).The immigration judge concluded that Leger was removable, finding that his marijuana possession convictions constituted controlled substance offenses under the INA and that his conviction under Florida Statute § 800.04(4) was an aggravated felony. Leger appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the immigration judge’s decision.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the court held that Leger's marijuana possession convictions did not constitute controlled substance offenses as defined under federal law, and thus, the BIA erred in determining that Leger was subject to removal on these grounds. The court also held that Leger's conviction under Florida Statute § 800.04(4) did not constitute the sexual abuse of a minor and was not an aggravated felony under the INA. The court vacated the BIA's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Marken Leger v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law