Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Haldar, an Indian citizen, came to the U.S. in 1999 and has been a permanent resident since 2006. He founded GVS-Milwaukee, a Hare Krishna religious society and, from 2004 to 2007, GVS sponsored 25 applicants for religious-worker “R-1 visas,” 8 C.F.R. 214.2(r)(1), 17 of which were approved. In 2007 the State Department advised the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that GVS-Milwaukee might be involved in visa fraud. DHS also received a similar anonymous tip and began an investigation that included temple visits, surveillance, searches of Haldar’s luggage on international trips, and interviews with GVS-sponsored visa recipients. In 2010 Haldar was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. under 18 U.S.C. 371. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments (not raised in the district court) that certain statements from the prosecutor and a government witness improperly called into question the validity of his temple and were unfairly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403; the prosecutor misrepresented testimony during his closing argument and relied on facts outside the record; and the district court on its own initiative should have instructed the jury not to scrutinize the religious qualifications of the visa recipients. View "United States v. Haldar" on Justia Law

Defendant is a United States citizen with a history of convictions for smuggling illegal aliens. At issue was whether defendant encouraged or induced an illegal alien to reside in the United States or aided and abetted the commission of this crime merely by escorting that alien from a fast food restaurant near the border to a nearby vehicle. The court concluded that encouraging an illegal alien to reside in the United States must mean something more than merely transporting such an alien within this country. On this scant record, no rational trier of fact could conclude that defendant encouraged an illegal alien to reside in the United States. Accordingly, there was insufficient evidence to prove that defendant aided and abetted the commission of the crime. The court vacated the district court's judgment revoking defendant's supervised release and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition. View "United States v. Thum" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for illegal reentry following deportation, seeking a judgment of acquittal. The court concluded that so long as the documents in an A-file have been properly admitted in the criminal case, and the jury has been instructed as to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, which is higher than the standard required in a deportation hearing, such documents may be considered by the jury and, depending on their contents, may constitute sufficient proof of alienage if the jury so concludes. Under Jackson v. Virginia, the jury verdict must stand where, as here, after receiving proper instructions, the jury concluded that defendant was guilty on all elements of illegal reentry and the verdict was supported with sufficient evidence. A rational trier of fact could certainly come to the conclusion that the Form I-213 was accurate. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not err in denying a judgment of acquittal and affirmed. View "United States v. Ruiz-Lopez" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for assault on a federal officer and illegally entering the United States. The court vacated the conviction for assault on a federal officer and remanded the case for a new trial. Defendant was deported during the pendency of the appeal. The government requested that the court affirm the conviction, without prejudice to a later request by him to vacate the conviction, should he return to the United States or waive his right to be physically present at retrial. The court saw no reason to apply United States v. Aguilar-Reyes, which only concerned resentencing. Given the government's authority to permit defendant to return for retrial, and counsel's assurances that defendant would be willing to do so, this case was unlikely to languish for an indefinite period before the district court, should the government choose to retry defendant. More importantly, defendant's conviction for assault on a federal officer will have been reversed, unless and until he should be retried, he must be presumed innocent of that charge. Accordingly, the court vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. View "United States v. Barrios-Siguenza" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for illegal reentry into the United States after he was deported because of an aggravated felony conviction. Defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the government failed to prove his physical departure from the United States on March 7, 1992 airline flight from JFK Airport to Kingston, Jamaica. The court held that a properly executed warrant of deportation, coupled with testimony regarding the deportation procedures followed at that time, was sufficient proof that a defendant was, in fact physically deported from the United States. In this instance, the warrant of deportation specifically indicated that the immigration officer "witnessed" defendant's departure, and set forth the date, flight number, and time it was affected. Further, defendant stipulated that he signed the warrant and that it contained his fingerprints. Accordingly, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to establish defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Harvey" on Justia Law

Defendant, a native and citizen of Mexico, appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment charging him with attempted reentry after a prior removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. The court concluded that defendant's removal as an alien "not admitted or paroled" as alleged in the Notice to Appear was not "fundamentally unfair" where the termination of his temporary resident status returned him to the status of an inadmissible alien subject to removal; defendant was foreclosed from demonstrating prejudice because INA 212(h) did not provide relief for aliens removed for illegal presence in the United States without admission or parole in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), the sole basis of defendant's removal; and defendant did not preserve his claim that the IJ failed to advise him of his right to counsel and/or obtain a valid waiver of the right to counsel. Finally, the district court's imposition of a below-Guidelines fine was not procedurally erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Hernandez-Arias" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's decision finding him inadmissible and denying his application for cancellation of removal. The court held that the conviction under which petitioner was convicted, California Health & Safety Code 11377(a), was a divisible statute under Descamps v. United States, and therefore, the court applied the modified categorical approach in analyzing his prior convictions. The court concluded that the government satisfied its burden in proving that petitioner was twice convicted of methamphetamine, a controlled substance listed in the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 802. Accordingly, the court concluded that the BIA did not err in finding petitioner inadmissible based on his prior convictions. However, the court remanded because the BIA failed to address petitioner's due process claims regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel and bias by the IJ. Finally, the court dismissed petitioner's unexhausted equal protection claim for lack of jurisdiction. View "Coronado v. Holder" on Justia Law

Aljabri, born in Jordan, married a U.S. citizen in 1997 and became a lawful permanent resident in 2000. In 2003, he sought naturalization under 8 U.S.C. 1430. USCIS conducted an interview and then delayed for nine years. In 2007 Aljabri was convicted of wire fraud, money laundering, and structuring transactions not to trigger financial institution reporting requirements. He was sentenced to 84 months in prison. In 2008 DHS alleged that Aljabri was removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), having been convicted of a crime causing victims a loss of more than $10,000. He was ordered removed in absentia. He filed suit, asking the district court either to naturalize him or declare him a U.S. citizen based on the still-pending 2003 application. The district court held that it lacked subject‐matter jurisdiction and dismissed in January, 2012. On May 3, 2012, USCIS denied the naturalization petition, stating that the final order of removal meant that he was no longer a lawful permanent resident and only permanent residents can be naturalized and that Aljabri could not demonstrate the good moral character necessary for naturalization. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court overlooked 8 U.S.C. 1447(b), which gives the court exclusive jurisdiction over the naturalization application until the matter is remanded to the agency. View "Aljabri v. Holder" on Justia Law

Galarza, a U.S. citizen, was working at a construction site. The contractor sold cocaine to an undercover detective, Correa, who arrested the contractor, Galarza, and other employees for conspiracy to deliver cocaine. Galarza had a wallet, containing his Pennsylvania driver’s license, his Social Security Card, a debit card, and his health insurance card. The complaint listed Galarza’s place of birth as Perth, N.J. and contained his Social Security Number and date of birth. Correa called ICE and provided Galarza’s information. Galarza claims that, by making the call, Correa indicated that she suspected Galarza had given false identification information. Galarza was detained and went through booking; officials took his wallet and its contents. ICE Agent Szalczyk, acting on information relayed by Correa, filed an immigration detainer that described Galarza as a suspected “alien” and citizen of the Dominican Republic. The detainer was not accompanied by a warrant, an affidavit of probable cause, or a removal order. A surety company posted bail, but Galarza was told that he would not be released. Galarza had not been interviewed by ICE nor provided with a copy of the detainer. Three days after his arrest, a counselor told Galarza about the detainer. Galarza protested and urged the counselor to retrieve his wallet. The counselor refused. Galarza later met with ICE officers. The detainer was removed and Galarza was released about three days after his arrest. Galarza was acquitted and filed complaints under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 346(b). The district court dismissed the complaint against Lehigh County, holding that it could not be held responsible for Galarza’s detention because it was compelled to follow the detainer. The Third Circuit vacated. Immigration detainers do not compel a state or local law enforcement agency to detain suspected aliens subject to removal.View "Galarza v. Szalczyk" on Justia Law

Bautista, a legal permanent resident, was ordered removed from the U.S. as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). The IJ found him ineligible for cancellation of removal because his New York conviction for attempted arson constituted an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a). The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal, finding that the arson conviction fell within the definition of an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43). The Third Circuit granted a petition for review. The attempted arson conviction is not an aggravated felony with respect to collateral immigration consequences. Applying the categorical approach, the New York statute under which Bautista was convicted does not match the elements of 18 U.S.C. 844(i), the corresponding federal statute, which requires a connection to interstate commerce. View "Bautista v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S." on Justia Law