Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Caspeta, a Mexican citizen born in 1973, attempted to enter the U.S. in 1999, using a border pass issued to another individual, and was sentenced to 90 days of custody and 2 years of supervised release for violating 8 U.S.C. 1325(a)(3). The sentence was suspended. He was escorted across a bridge back to Mexico and was given an Order instructing him that he was prohibited from re-entering the U.S. for five years and that if he wished to re-enter the U.S. he would first need to obtain the permission of the Attorney General. The Notice included a warning that violation would be subject to prosecution for a felony. In 2012, Caspeta was convicted of a traffic offense in Detroit and was charged with unlawful reentry under 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). He argued that once more than five years had elapsed since his removal, so that the statute did not require him to obtain consent prior to reentry. He was found guilty. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the statutory scheme does not eliminate the need for consent after five years, but only makes consent possible after five years. View "United States v. Romero-Caspeta" on Justia Law

On September 22, 2011, a grand jury returned a one-count indictment charging Appellant with conspiracy to defraud the United States. The indictment alleged that, from about March 29, 2005 until at least June 22, 2007, Appellant knowingly and willfully participated in a sham marriage to secure a change in immigration status for her spouse. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment as time-barred, alleging that she committed no overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy within the five-year period before the return of the indictment. Following a bench trial, Appellant was convicted of the charge. On appeal, Appellant revived her argument that the indictment should have been dismissed as time-barred because the conspiratorial object was achieved on October 7, 2005, when her spouse attained conditional lawful permanent resident status, and any subsequent acts could not have been in furtherance of an already-completed conspiracy. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court correctly found Appellant’s signing of Form I-751 on June 22, 2007 on her spouse’s behalf was an overt act committed in furtherance of the objects of the conspiracy as alleged in the indictment. View "United States v. Stewart" on Justia Law

The government appealed the dismissal of defendant's indictment for unlawful reentry. Defendant had pleaded guilty to "conspiracy to commit the crime of burglary" in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 199.480.205.060(1) and was subsequently ordered removed as an undocumented alien convicted of an aggravated felony. Applying the methodology prescribed by the Supreme Court for defining generic offenses for categorical purposes, the generic federal definition of conspiracy, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(U), conditioned conviction on performance of an overt act in pursuit of the conspiratorial objective. Because Nevada's conspiracy statute criminalized a broader range of conduct than the properly determined generic definition of conspiracy, defendant's conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's determination that defendant's prior removal order was constitutionally inadequate because she was denied her right to seek discretionary relief from removal. View "United States v. Garcia-Santana" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's determination that he was not eligible for cancellation of removal because he committed an aggravated felony. In 2005, defendant pleaded guilty to delivering cocaine in violation of Florida Statute 893.13(1)(a)(1). Defendant's conviction under the Florida statue did not require that he knew that the substance at issue was a controlled substance whereas a conviction under the federal statute did. Therefore, the state offense was not analogous to the federal offense. Accordingly, the court held that the Florida offense was not categorically an aggravated felony and granted the petition for review, vacating the order and remanding for further proceedings. View "Sarmientos v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged a new method the Attorney General and the Board used to determine that he had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude for the purposes of admissibility under section 212 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1100 et seq. The court agreed with four of its sister circuits and concluded that the "convicted of" clause of section 212(a)(2)(A)(i) was not ambiguous. The court rejected the Attorney General's argument that "convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude" was ambiguous and concluded that Congress had spoken directly to the issue. Consequently, the court found no analogous permission to abandon the categorical approach and look beyond the conviction record. In this instance, the court found that the BIA looked beyond the conviction record to conclude that petitioner had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Because the court's precedent did not permit such an inquiry, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Silva-Trevino v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal from an IJ's entry of a final order of removal. In 1989, petitioner pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute after police officers pulled over a truck in which petitioner was the driver and the sole occupant and where the truck contained 900 pounds of cocaine. The conviction was overturned on appeal because the officers lacked sufficient suspicion to make a traffic stop. As a general rule, a voluntary guilty plea to criminal charges was probative of evidence that the petitioner did, in fact, engage in the charged activity, even if the conviction was later overturned for a reason unrelated to voluntariness. The court concluded that the BIA did not violate due process or otherwise err in holding that petitioner was removable under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(C)(i) where there was "reason to believe" that he "is or has been an illicit trafficker" in a controlled substance or knowingly has assisted others in trafficking. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Chavez-Reyes v. Holder" on Justia Law

Hanna, born in 1979, is a citizen of Iraq. Hanna and his family left Iraq in 1990, moving to Canada, with permission to live and work in that country. In 1993 Hanna’s parents obtained U.S. permanent resident status through Hanna’s sister, a citizen. In 1993, Hanna entered the U.S. as a nonimmigrant. Hanna’s parents sought permanent resident status for Hanna. While the petition was pending, Hanna attended school in Canada. By overstaying his visitor’s visas, Hanna attended a U.S. high school, worked at the family business, and obtained a Michigan driver’s license. Hanna was admitted as a lawful permanent U.S. resident in1998. His Canadian permanent resident status expired. In 1996, Hanna, then 17 years old, was arrested for threatening a man with a three-inch folding knife during an argument. Charges were twice dropped, but the state reinstated charges of felonious assault and driving with a suspended license. The court sentenced him to 30 days in jail and two years of probation. The government commenced removal proceedings, charging him as having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), with Iraq as the country of removal. Hanna sought asylum and withholding of removal, claiming that being a Chaldean Christian placed him at risk in Iraq. After reopening, an IJ stated that an alien who “firmly resettled” in another country before arriving is not eligible for asylum and that Hanna was bound to his first attorney’s concession of removability. The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit reversed the holding that Hanna’s admission-concession was binding and remanded for determination of whether Hanna’s offense was a crime involving moral turpitude. View "Hanna v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for being voluntarily present and found in the United States, arguing that he was not in the United States when he was found. The court concluded that, although defendant had indisputably been present in the United States illegally for nearly a decade, defendant was not "found" while has in the country. When he was found - admittedly not long after his departure from the United States - defendant had neither a physical nor a legal presence in the country. When defendant had been "found" at the Canadian border, he had been returned involuntarily with neither a desire to enter, nor a will to be present in, the United States. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded, concluding that defendant was not "found in" the United States within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1326. View "United States v. Vasquez Macias" on Justia Law

Chavarria, born in Mexico, became a legal permanent U.S. resident in 1982. In 2009, Chavarria pleaded guilty to distributing cocaine. One year later, the Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky, imposing a duty on defense attorneys to inform noncitizen clients of deportation risks stemming from plea agreements, and held that legal advice, or the lack thereof, involving the prospect of deportation resulting from guilty pleas can support a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Chavarria filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that his trial counsel stated that “the attorney had checked with the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement … and they said they were not interested” in deporting him. Chavarria was deported before counsel was appointed. The district court denied a motion to dismiss, holding that Padilla could be applied retroactively. Shortly thereafter, the Seventh Circuit decided, in Chaidez v. U.S., that Padilla was a new rule and not retroactive. The district court vacated its ruling and dismissed. While appeal was pending, the Supreme Court affirmed Chaidez, foreclosing Chavarria’s argument that Padilla was retroactive. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that Chaidez distinguished between providing no advice (actionable under Padilla) and providing bad advice (actionable under pre‐Padilla law). View "Chavarria v. United States" on Justia Law

Flores, an alien who returned to the U.S. without permission following removal, was charged with illegal reentry and other crimes arising from his armed drug dealing. Flores, who maintained that U.S. law did not apply to him and that the court had no jurisdiction to try him, refused to consider a guilty plea. He was convicted on all counts and was sentenced to concurrent 96-month sentences on all counts but one. His conviction, for possessing firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking felony, led to a consecutive term of 360 months’ imprisonment, which was compulsory because of Flores’s earlier conviction of the same crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(B)(ii). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that trial counsel furnished ineffective assistance by telling the jury that Flores indeed had distributed cocaine after reentering the U.S. without permission, while arguing that the prosecution did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the weapons-related charges. View "United States v. Flores" on Justia Law