Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Orabi, an Egyptian citizen, was admitted to the U.S. in 1990. He became a lawful permanent resident without conditions in 1996. In 2010, he was convicted, in federal court, of conspiracy to commit fraud in connection with access devices, possession of counterfeit access devices, possession of counterfeit and forged checks, and aggravated identity theft, and was sentenced to 70 months in prison. Appeal to the Second Circuit is pending. DHS initiated removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) based on conviction for an aggravated felony. Orabi notified DHS and the Immigration Court that he was appealing the conviction, and DHS moved to withdraw the removal charge. At a subsequent removal hearing, Orabi appeared pro se. Following an ambiguous exchange, removal charges were reinstated, although there is no documentary evidence that Orabi withdrew his appeal. Orabi was ordered removed. The BIA dismissed an appeal. The Third Circuit reversed. A conviction does not attain a sufficient degree of finality for immigration purposes until direct appellate review of the conviction has been exhausted or waived. View "Orabi v. Att'y Gen. of U.S." on Justia Law

The FBI investigated Alwan, an Iraqi living in Bowling Green, after his fingerprints appeared on an improvised explosive device in Iraq, and introduced Alwan to a confidential source (CHS), who recorded their conversations. CHS convinced Alwan that he was part of a group supporting Jihad. Alwan assisted in sending what he believed to be money and weapons to the Mujahidin several times and eventually asked to lead the fictional terrorist cell. CHS instructed Alwan to recruit others. Hammadi agreed to join, stating that he had participated in IED attacks on American troops and had been arrested, but bribed his way free and fled to Syria. In Syria, he applied for refugee status to immigrate to the U.S. and answered “no” when asked if he had engaged in terrorist activity. Hammadi had moved to Bowling Green on the recommendation of Alwan, whose family he knew from Iraq and whom he had met in Syria. The two transported $100,000 from CHS to a truck, believing that it would find its way to Iraq, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2339A. They hid rocket-propelled grenade launchers, machine guns, plastic explosives, and sniper rifles in another truck, for transport to terrorists, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B. They loaded Stinger missiles into another truck and plotted to murder a U.S. Army Captain. Hammadi pleaded guilty to 10 terrorism and two immigration offenses. Rejecting claims of entrapment and sentencing manipulation, the district court imposed a life sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that Hammadi would not qualify for a departure under either theory.View "United States v. Hammadi" on Justia Law

Defendant entered the United States from Ghana and received permanent legal resident status pursuant to a diversity visa. Five years later, Defendant applied for a diversity visa under the false name Willberforce Appiah. A few months later, Defendant applied for citizenship under his own name. The Government issued a diversity visa to Appiah. In the midst of his activities to create a second identity as Appiah, Defendant became a citizen. Defendant was later charged with and convicted of unlawful procurement of naturalization. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) as to Defendant's most substantial claim of error, the district court did not clearly err in allowing the prosecutor's peremptory challenges to two Asian-American potential jurors; and (2) the remainder of Defendant's allegations of error, including claims of constitutional violations to the allegedly improper admission of propensity evidence, were unavailing. View "United States v. Mensah" on Justia Law

Deported following a 1996 conviction for attempted first degree murder and armed violence, Lara, a citizen of Mexico, returned to the U.S. and was arrested for armed robbery and attempted armed robbery. After a second illegal return, he was convicted of illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b)(2) and sentenced to 78 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Lara argued that the district judge should have disqualified himself from hearing Lara’s motion to dismiss the indictment or erred in failing to dismiss the indictment because Lara was erroneously denied an opportunity to seek discretionary relief from deportation under the Immigration and Nationality Act section 212(c) in his first deportation proceeding in 1997–1998. The Seventh Circuit rejected the claims. The judge was not disqualified from ruling on Lara’s motion based on the judge’s service as INS District Counsel when Lara was first deported. The court did not reach the question of whether precedents interpreting 8 U.S.C. 1326(d) foreclose Lara’s collateral attack on his underlying deportation order because counsel conceded the issue. View "United States v. Lara-Unzueta" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Antigua, petitioned for review of the BIA's affirmance of an IJ's determination that petitioner was not eligible for cancellation of removal because he committed an aggravated felony. The court concluded that a conviction under Fla. Stat. 893.13(1)(a)(2) for the possession of cannabis with the intent to sell or deliver was not, as a matter of law, a drug trafficking aggravated felony. Petitioner and others convicted under this statute could still be able to meet their burden to demonstrate eligibility for cancellation of removal, and should be given a chance to shoulder that burden. Accordingly, the court granted the petition, vacating and remanding for further proceedings. View "Donawa v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico and lawful permanent resident, petitioned for review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's finding that petitioner was removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Petitioner was charged with seventeen counts of lewd and lascivious acts upon children in violation of various provisions of the California Penal Code. The court denied the petition, holding that petitioner was an alien convicted of an aggravated felony within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F) because petitioner's state crime of conviction, California Penal Code section 288(c)(1), was a categorical crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b) where it posed a substantial risk of the use of physical force. View "Rodriguez-Castellon v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Soto entered the U.S. in 1978 as an infant and became a lawful permanent resident in 1991 at age 13. She was convicted of theft in 2002, of passing a worthless check in 2003, and of possessing methamphetamine in 2005, a felony under Kansas law. In 2005, immigration authorities initiated removal on grounds of commission of an aggravated felony, of two crimes involving moral turpitude, and of a controlled substance offense, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (a)(2)(A)(iii), and (a)(2)(B)(i). At the time, the circuits were split on whether a drug possession conviction that was a state law felony but that would be a federal misdemeanor should be considered an aggravated felony for purposes of immigration. In 2006 the Seventh Circuit held that such convictions were not aggravated felonies for immigration purposes. Soto claims that an immigration officer and a legal aid organization stated that she had no chance of avoiding removal, so she signed a stipulation with an admission of the factual allegations, waiver of any right to seek relief from removal, and an acknowledgment that she signed voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Three weeks after removal, Soto returned to the U.S. illegally to live with her four U.S.‐born children and their U.S.‐citizen father, whom she married in 2009. In 2010 authorities discovered Soto and reinstated the 2005 order of removal using an expedited process. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed her appeal, filed from Mexico. The Tenth Circuit ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to review the 2005 order. Soto moved to reopen the 2005 removal order, arguing that the 90‐day deadline did not apply or was equitably tolled. The IJ and BIA rejected her arguments. The Seventh Circuit held that that her illegal reentry after her 2005 removal permanently bars reopening that earlier removal order.View "Cordova-Soto v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the DHS's Final Administrative Removal Order issued under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) section 238(b), 8 U.S.C. 1228(b). The court concluded that petitioner did not fail to exhaust his administrative remedies, and even without the bar of exhaustion, there was still the impediment that no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an alien who was removable by reason of having committed an aggravated felony. The court denied the petition because petitioner was an alien convicted of an aggravated felony and, therefore, he was properly subjected to the expedited administrative removal process. View "Valdiviez-Hernandez v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a conviction of illegally reentering the United States following deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a)(2) and (b)(2). The court concluded that defendant's statute of limitations defense failed where he was not "found in" the United States in 2002, as he argued, but was instead "found" here in 2010. The court also concluded that defendant's ineffective assistance claim failed where the IJ relied upon multiple grounds for denying defendant relief and the court did not think clearly erroneous the district court's finding that evidence of defendant's cooperation was before the court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to illegally entering the United States during an "Operation Streamline" proceeding. The court concluded that, although the district court did not err by advising defendants of their rights en masse, it erred by not questioning defendant individually to ensure that she understood her rights; the government has not carried its burden of proving that defendant would have pleaded guilty even without the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1) error; and, therefore, defendant's convictions must be vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Arqueta-Ramos" on Justia Law