Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Since entering the U.S. from Mexico in 1993, Garcia-Segura has had arrests. He was first removed in 2003 after serving two years in jail for possessing cocaine. Less than two months later, he was arrested in the U.S. for delivering cocaine to an undercover officer. After serving part of his nine-year prison sentence, he was removed a second time in 2007 but returned within three days. In 2009, he encountered immigration officials while incarcerated on charges of possession of cocaine and possession of a firearm by a felon. He was charged with unauthorized presence in the U.S. after removal, 18 U.S.C. 1326(a). He pleaded guilty and sought a 19-month reduction to account for time he served in county jail after immigration officials learned of his illegal presence but before he was charged. He argued that, had the government charged him when immigration officials first discovered him, he would have received concurrent sentences. The government responded that concurrent sentences would have been inappropriate because the state crimes were unrelated to the illegal-reentry and that his recidivism merited a more severe sentence. The district court imposed a sentence of 90 months’ imprisonment, within the guideline range of 77 to 96 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Segura" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision finding that his conviction for possession of marijuana for sale in violation of California Health & Safety Code 11359 was categorically a crime relating to a controlled substance. The court concluded that petitioner failed to met his burden of proving a "realistic probability" that Cailfornia would apply section 11359 to conduct not related to a controlled substance. Just as section 11359 was categorically a controlled substance offense for sentencing purposes, it was categorically a crime relating to a controlled substance for immigration purposes. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Macias-Carreon v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant challenged his conviction and sentence under 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b) for being an alien found in the United States after removal. The court held that the district court correctly rejected defendant's collateral challenge to the validity of the removal order underlying his section 1326(b) sentencing enhancement; rejected defendant's arguments that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation by admitting documents from his immigration file; and rejected defendant's claims that the district court erred procedurally and substantively in imposing a sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Rojas-Pedroza" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Jamaica, petitioned for review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's denial of his petition to defer removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and dismissal of his appeal. To the extent petitioner challenged the legal standard used by the BIA, the court rejected that challenge on the merits. Petitioner's remaining challenges, including his factual dispute with the BIA's application of the "willful blindness" standard, were foreclosed by the criminal alien bar in 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C) and were beyond the court's jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review. View "Gallimore v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident charged with removal based on his alleged conviction of two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs), petitioned for review of the BIA's decision concluding that petitioner's conviction for endangerment under Arizona law constituted a CIMT. The Attorney General held in Matter of Silva-Trevino that an IJ could rely on evidence outside the record of conviction to determine whether a petitioner had been "convicted of" a CIMT. The court joined the Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits in holding that Silva-Trevino was wrongly decided. The court held that a CIMT was a generic crime whose description was complete unto itself, such that "involving moral turpitude" was an element of the crime. Because it was an element of the generic crime, an IJ was limited to the record of conviction in determining whether an alien had been "convicted of" a CIMT. In this case, the court concluded that the IJ and BIA improperly considered evidence beyond the record of conviction in holding that petitioner was "convicted of" a "crime involving moral turpitude." Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. View "Olivas-Motta v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Afghanistan, petitioned for review of the BIA's final order of removal, contending that the BIA erred when it ruled that his Maryland second-degree assault conviction was for a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16, and thus an "aggravated felony" under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F) that triggered his removability. The court concluded that the Attorney General failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that petitioner's assault conviction necessarily rested on facts identifying his second-degree assault offense as a type of assault that qualified as a crime of violence. Consequently, the Attorney General had not met his burden of proving petitioner's removability as an aggravated felon. Therefore, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA's order of removal, and remanded to the BIA with instructions to reinstate petitioner's asylee status. View "Karimi v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant, a Mexican native, first entered the U.S. illegally before June 1988. He was convicted of receiving stolen property, auto theft, attempting to pass a fraudulent check, selling cocaine, and forgeries, and was deported in 1992. In 1994, he burglarized Nebraska construction companies. He was deported again in 1999. By 2005, defendant had returned and was convicted of burglarizing companies, stealing payroll checks, and fraudulently cashing checks. He was deported for the third time in 2008. In 2010 defendant stole blank checks from Illinois and Iowa businesses. Three banks cashed checks, losing more than $42,000. Defendant was charged with unlawful reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and 1326(b)(2); bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344; conspiracy to utter forged securities, 18 U.S.C. 371; and uttering forged securities, 18 U.S.C. 513(a). Defendant pleaded guilty unlawful reentry and to three bank fraud counts,. The district court sentenced him to a total of 84 months’ imprisonment, followed by 36 months of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence. Neither party objected to the sentencing reports at the time, but both agree that the sentence was based on an improper U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range and that the error affected defendant’s substantial rights. View "United States v. Tovar-Pina" on Justia Law

Moncrieffe, a Jamaican citizen legally in the U.S., was found with 1.3 grams of marijuana in his car. He pleaded guilty under Georgia law to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, a noncitizen convicted of an “aggravated felony” is deportable, 8 U.S.C. 227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and ineligible for discretionary relief. The INA lists as an “aggravated felony” “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance,” including conviction of an offense that the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) makes punishable as a felony (by more than one year’s imprisonment). A state conviction is a felony punishable under the CSA only if it involves conduct punishable as a felony under federal law. Possession of marijuana with intent to distribute is a CSA offense, 21 U.S.C. 841(a), punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment. An Immigration Judge ordered Moncrieffe removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting reliance on section 841(b)(4), which makes marijuana distribution punishable as a misdemeanor if the offense involves a small amount for no remuneration. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. If a noncitizen’s conviction for marijuana distribution fails to establish that the offense involved either remuneration or more than a small amount of marijuana, it is not an aggravated felony under the INA. The Court employed the “categorical approach,” examining what the state conviction necessarily involved and not the facts underlying the case, and presuming that the conviction involved the least of the acts criminalized. Conviction under Georgia’s statute, alone, does not reveal whether either remuneration or more than a small amount was involved, so Moncrieffe’s conviction could correspond to either the CSA felony or the CSA misdemeanor. The Court rejected an argument that section 841(b)(4) was merely a mitigating sentencing factor, not an element of the offense. The government’s proposal that noncitizens be allowed, during immigration proceedings, to demonstrate that their convictions involved only a small amount of marijuana and no remuneration is inconsistent with the INA’s text and the categorical approach and would burden immigration courts and the noncitizens involved. Escaping aggravated felony treatment does not necessarily mean escaping deportation, because any marijuana distribution offense renders a noncitizen deportable as a controlled substances offender, but with an opportunity seek relief from removal. View "Moncrieffe v. Holder" on Justia Law

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, immigration officials “shall take into custody any‖ deportable alien who has committed various crimes” when the alien is released from detention for those crimes, 8 U.S.C. 1226(c)(1). The Act requires officials to hold such aliens without any possibility of release while awaiting removal. Sylvain, a citizen of Haiti, entered the U.S. as a legal permanent resident in 1988. He has been convicted of more than 10 drug-related crimes and served a three-year prison sentence for making and selling cocaine. He was convicted for unlawfully possessing a weapon and for criminal mischief. Sylvain was last arrested in 2007 for possessing drugs. He pled guilty and received a conditional discharge. Under New York law, a conditional discharge does not require imprisonment or probation. Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials arrested him in 2011, concluding that he was deportable and subject to mandatory detention, although he was last in custody four years earlier. The district court granted his petition for habeas corpus, finding that mandatory detention did not apply. Sylvain received a hearing, paid bond, and is not in custody. His next removal hearing is in 2014. The Third Circuit reversed; mandatory detention does not require immediate detention. View "Sylvain v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S." on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted in state court of attempted arson in the second degree in violation of New York law, petitioned for review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's finding that he was removable and ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court held that the attempted arson in the second degree was a felony that, by its nature, involved a substantial risk of the intentional use of physical force against the person or property of another. Therefore, attempted arson in the second degree was a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), and an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 101(a)(43)(F), (U). Therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the petition for review. View "Santana v. Holder" on Justia Law