Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners Martinez and Garcia sought review of the BIA's dismissal of their appeal of the IJ's order of removal after the IJ denied their motions to suppress evidence uncovered by a warrantless entry. In the order, the IJ conflated Martinez's testimony with that of his son. Both the IJ and the BIA found the officers' warrantless entry justified by exigent circumstances solely based on the son's yell to Garcia "not to open the door" because immigration officers were outside. Assuming petitioners' accounts of the ICE officers' conduct were true, any Fourth Amendment violations they suffered were not sufficiently egregious to entitle them to the remedy they seek - exclusion of decisive evidence in a civil removal proceeding. Although both the IJ and BIA clearly erred in their treatment of Martinez's and his son's testimonies, the error did not necessitate remand because the error was not prejudicial. The court lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant's burden-shifting argument pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1252 because they failed to raise this issue at the administrative level. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Carcamo, et al v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to illegal entry after deportation and was sentenced to fifty months in prison. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's calculation of his prison term. The court concluded that the district court committed no legal error by its interpretation of U.S.S.G. 2L1.2. Instead the district court properly calculated the advisory Guidelines range by enhancing defendant's offense level, pursuant to section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), in that he had been convicted of a drug trafficking felony in Oregon. Therefore, the sentence imposed was reasonable and the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Medina-Campo" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 911 for making a false claim of citizenship. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion for a new trial. Defendant argued that his misstatement was not willful because he suffered from a delusion that caused him genuinely to believe that he was a United States citizen. The court concluded that the given instructions, considered as a whole, were adequate in the circumstances of this case. Although defendant's requested instruction more clearly articulated the knowledge requirement, the given instruction was adequate under the circumstances because a "misrepresentation... deliberately made" suggested a knowing falsehood. Combined with the testimony and closing arguments at trial, which focused on what defendant knew, the jury was aware that his subjective belief was the dispositive issue. The court also concluded that there was no plain error in the prosecutor's questioning of defendant's expert witness. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Anguiano-Morfin" on Justia Law

Petitioner, who pleaded nolo contendere to assault with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to 364 days in county jail but probation was imposed instead, petitioned for review of the BIA's holding that he was removeable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) for having committed a crime involving moral turpitude for which a sentence of at least one year's imprisonment could have been imposed. The court concluded that its holding in Gonzales v. Barber - that assault with a deadly weapon under California Penal Code section 245(a)(1) is a crime involving moral turpitude - remained good law. Because CPC 17(b) did not apply and because the minute order designated petitioner's conviction as a felony, the court held that petitioner's conviction was a felony. The felony sentencing provisions of section 245(a)(1) allowed for imprisonment for more than one year. Accordingly, petitioner's conviction was a conviction for a "crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed." Therefore, the court denied the petition. View "Ceron v. Holder Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty in federal court to an information charging that he was "found in" the United States on or about November 25, 2009, after he had been previously deported. The court joined its sister circuits in holding that U.S.S.G. 4A1.1(d) could be applied to a deportee "found in" the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326, while he was imprisoned. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's sentence. View "United States v. Reyes-Ceja" on Justia Law

Defendants, both Chinese nationals, shipped tens of millions of dollars worth of sophisticated electronic components from the United States to China with little regard for whether the parts they sold were export-controlled. In 2008, Defendants were arrested and later indicted for thirty-four counts of export-related offenses. The two were ultimately convicted of, among other things, exporting without a license items designated as defense articles on the U.S. Munitions List and items controlled under the Commerce Control List, conspiracy to violate the Munitions List and Commerce Control List restrictions, and conspiracy to file materially false Shipper's Export Declarations (SED) with the Commerce Department. On appeal, Defendants argued that the federal government's arms export control system constituted a regulatory scheme that violated the Due Process Clause. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) affirmed the Commerce Control List convictions and SED convictions, holding that the federal government's arms export control system does not violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause; and (2) vacated the Munitions List convictions, holding that the district court erred by not submitting to the jury an element of the offense, and the error was not harmless. Remanded. View "United States v. Wu" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was detained for eight months by immigration officials and filed a complaint for money damages against a federal official afterwards. The parties initially agreed that plaintiff was a citizen of the United States, and the district court determined that it had jurisdiction over plaintiff's complaint because the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. 1252(g), barred complaints only by aliens. The district court later dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. While plaintiff's appeal of that decision was pending, the United States issued an official notice of cancellation of plaintiff's citizenship on the grounds that it was obtained by fraud and illegally, and the parties then disagreed about whether plaintiff was a citizen. The court vacated the order that dismissed the complaint and remanded for the district court to determine whether plaintiff was a citizen of the United States and, if not, whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over his complaint. View "Belleri v. United States, et al" on Justia Law

The BIA found that petitioner was removable as an aggravated felon and denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The BIA found petitioner removable and denied his claims for asylum and withholding of removal because his underlying offense - pointing a firearm at another person, in violation of S.C. Code 16-23-410 - was a particularly serious crime of violence that disqualified him from those forms of relief. The BIA also denied his claim for CAT relief based on factual determinations that he would not be tortured upon return to his native Jamaica. After thorough review of petitioner's arguments on appeal, the court concluded that none of petitioner's claims justified the grant of his petition. View "Cole v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of the BIA's decision holding that there was no "realistic probability" that California would apply California Penal Code 243.4(e) to conduct that was not normally turpitudinous and the BIA's decision denying his motion to reconsider. The court held that section 243.4(e)(1)'s requirement that defendant specifically intended to damage his victim psychologically evidenced the malicious intent that was the essence of moral turpitude. The BIA's decision that this kind of behavior was per se morally reprehensible and intrinsically wrong was persuasive. Because the court agreed that there was no "realistic probability" that California courts would apply section 243.4(e) to conduct falling outside the generic federal definition of moral turpitude, the court denied the petitions. View "Gonzalez-Cervantes v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Rodriquez entered the U.S. illegally in 1988 and came to the attention of the Department of Homeland Security in 2005, following a misdemeanor DUI conviction. He subsequently pleaded guilty to using a fraudulent social security card, 18 U.S.C. 1546(a). He sought cancellation of removal based on hardship to his children, who are U.S. citizens, but failed to timely comply with the IJ’s request for biometrics. The IJ deemed the petition abandoned and ordered removal, after which Rodriguez provided the information. Following a remand, DHS notified the BIA that Rodriguez had been removed. BIA withdrew the remand. The Seventh Circuit remanded. An IJ then held that Rodriguez was ineligible for cancellation of removal, based on his conviction of a crime of moral turpitude (8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C)). The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal, holding that fraudulent use of a social security card is a crime involving moral turpitude. View "Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder" on Justia Law