Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

When her car was stopped, Villega, then pregnant, failed to produce a valid driver’s license. At the jail, an agent of the U.S. through Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s 287(g) program, 8 U.S.C. 1357(g), determined that Villega was not lawfully in the U.S. A detainer was imposed, so that federal immigration officials would delay action until resolution of pending state charges. Unable to post bond, she was classified as a medium-security inmate because of the detainer and held for two days, until she informed a guard that she was about to have her baby. For transportation, Villega was placed on a stretcher with her wrists handcuffed in front of her body and her legs restrained together. At the hospital, the handcuffs were removed, but one of Villega’s legs remained shackled to the stretcher before and after the birth. In her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted summary judgment on her shackling and denial-of-breast-pump claims; a jury awarded $200,000. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, noting material factual disputes surrounding whether Villega was shown to be a flight risk, whether officers had any knowledge about a doctor’s no-restraint order, and the conflicting expert testimony about the ill effects of shackling. View "Villegas v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cty." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of the Philippines and a lawful permanent resident, sought review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal of the IJ's order of removal, as well as the BIA's denial of petitioner's motion to reconsider. Petitioner was charged with removability for committing an "aggravated felony" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) when he pled guilty to violating Georgia Code 16-8-14, a statute that criminalized shoplifting. The court concluded that a section 16-8-14 conviction did not categorically qualify as an aggravated felony; petitioner's record of conviction did not establish that he committed an aggravated felony; and the court granted the petition and reversed the BIA's rulings. View "Ramos v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, sought review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's finding that he had been convicted of an aggravated felony and was ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court concluded that petitioner's New York state conviction under NYPL 220.39(1) constituted an aggravated felony, which deprived the court of jurisdiction to review the order of removal. The court also denied petitioner's additional motions as moot. View "Pascual v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order that he be deported because he was an alien convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude. Petitioner conceded that his 2010 conviction was a crime involving moral turpitude. At issue was whether his 2003 Florida conviction for resisting an officer with violence, was also a crime involving moral turpitude. Because the Florida statute required intentional violence against an officer, it criminalized conduct that exhibited a deliberate disregard for the law, which the court considered to be a violation of the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed to society. Therefore, the court concluded that the Florida conviction was a crime involving moral turpitude and that the BIA properly determined that petitioner was removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). View "Cano v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Yeremin, a Russian citizen, lawfully entered the U.S. in 1999; in 2004, he pled guilty to violation of 18 U.S.C. 1028(f), for conspiracy to traffic in fraudulent identification documents in violation based on “unauthorized transfer or use of any means of identification unlawfully to produce or obtain any other means of identification, and … possession of 5 or more means of identification that unlawfully were produced from, or obtained by the use of, another means of identification. Yeremin was sentenced to five months of imprisonment followed by two years of supervised release. n 2005, DHS initiated removal proceedings, under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), which allows removal of aliens convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years of admission to the U.S., if the crime is punishable by at least one year in prison, and second under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). An IJ rejected an argument that his conviction did not involve moral turpitude, because he did not plead guilty to an offense which necessarily involved fraudulent or deceptive conduct. The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied review, applying the “categorical approach” because the conduct prohibited by the statute he was convicted under inherently involves deceit. View "Yeremin v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to a one-count indictment charging him with illegal reentry of a removed alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). On appeal, defendant challenged his sentence of twelve months imprisonment. The government conceded that the district court's lack of notice that it intended to depart upward from the Sentencing Guidelines was a clear and obvious error in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(h). Even assuming that the error affected defendant's substantial rights, defendant has not met his burden of showing that the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant where the district court was permitted to consider the need for deterrence as a sentencing factor and defendant's previous immigration encounters and removals in departing upward from his sentencing range. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Zelaya-Rosales" on Justia Law

In 2003, Petitioner pled guilty to conspiracy-to-commit larceny stemming from a scheme in which Petitioner stole from the dorm rooms of his college classmates. At the time, Petitioner was a lawful permanent resident. Consequently, an immigration judge and the board of immigration appeals (BIA) found that Petitioner was removable because his crimes involved "moral turpitude" within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The First Circuit Court of Appeals granted Petitioner's petition for review and vacated the BIA's order dismissing Petitioner's appeal, holding that the BIA erred in finding Petitioner removable, as there was no statement in Petitioner's plea colloquy admitting an intent to commit a permanent deprivation. Remanded. View "Patel v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of the BIA's denial of his application for adjustment of status and its denial of his motion to reopen based on new evidence. The BIA concluded that petitioner was ineligible for adjustment of status because of a 1997 conviction for possession of marijuana for sale in violation of California Health & Safety Code section 11359. Petitioner contended that the conviction was actually for simple possession of marijuana in violation of Health & Safety Code section 11357, and that, as a result, he was eligible for relief. The court concluded that petitioner failed to establish that the state court changed his 1997 drug conviction from possession of marijuana for sale under section 11359 to simple possession of marijuana under section 11357. Because petitioner remained inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182 notwithstanding the state court's expungement of his section 11359 offense, he was ineligible for adjustment of status. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of El Salvador, sought discretionary relief from his removal under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111, Stat. 2160, 2198. The BIA found petitioner ineligible for relief because he was unable to demonstrate that his 1996 Virginia conviction for assault and battery was not a crime of violence. The court concluded that the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996's, 8 U.S.C. 321(c), retroactive application of the revised definition of "aggravated felony" survived petitioner's constitutional challenges. The court also held that the government had demonstrated that petitioner's removability and petitioner had failed to demonstrate that he was eligible for discretionary relief from removal, as afforded by NACARA. Accordingly, the court denied his petitions for review. View "Mondragon v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico and lawful permanent resident of the United States, petitioned for review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's order of removal. Petitioner had pled guilty to false imprisonment in violation of California Penal Code 210.5 and the IJ held that petitioner's conviction qualified as a crime of violence. The court concluded that California Penal Code 210.5 was categorically a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b) and was therefore an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The court otherwise lacked jurisdiction to review petitioner's final order of removal. Accordingly, the court denied the petition in part and dismissed in part. View "Barragan-Lopez, et al v. Holder" on Justia Law