Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a permanent resident alien and federal inmate, appealed the dismissal of his action under 8 U.S.C. 1503(a) for a judgment declaring him a United States national. Petitioner has resided in the United States since the age of eleven and has been a permanent resident for almost twenty-five years. Petitioner alleged that he was a United States national because he applied for citizenship, registered for the Selective Service, and declared his permanent allegiance to various United States officials. The court held that these facts failed to allege United States nationality under section 1503(a) and affirmed the dismissal of his action. Petitioner could not state a claim to be a United States national under United States v. Morin because the court must defer to the BIA's contrary, post-Morin interpretation of section 1101(a)(22). View "Patel v. Napolitano" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Bangladesh, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's determination that petitioner was ineligible for withholding of removal and withholding under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) because his conviction for resisting arrest constituted a particularly serious crime. The court held that it had jurisdiction over petitioner's challenges, which were premised on constitutional and legal considerations, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C). Because the BIA had not adequately explained its reasons for designating petitioner's conviction a particularly serious crime, the court granted the petition with respect to the particularly serious crime determination and remanded to the BIA for an appropriate explanation. As to petitioner's CAT claim for deferral of removal, the court denied the petition. View " Alphonsus v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the decision of the BIA that he was removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony. The IJ concluded that petitioner's conviction for attempted sexual assault under Texas Penal Code section 22.011 was a crime of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. 16(b) because the offense presented a substantial risk of the use of physical force against another. When petitioner appealed the IJ's order of removal, the BIA dismissed the appeal. Because the record did not establish that petitioner was convicted of an aggravated felony, as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43), the court granted his petition and vacated the order of removal. View "Rodriguez v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen of Mexico, pleaded guilty to third degree rape under Oregon law in December 1999. In 2002, he pleaded guilty for failing to register as a sex offender and voluntarily left the country some time later. After being indicted in 2010 for illegally reentering the country after having been previously removed, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that his 2004 order of removal was invalid because the IJ incorrectly determined that his Oregon statutory rape conviction was an aggravated felony and, as a result, erroneously informed him that he was not eligible for voluntary departure. The court concluded that defendant's underlying removal proceeding was consistent with due process because he was correctly informed that he was ineligible for discretionary relief from removal under the applicable law at the time of his removal hearing. Accordingly, the court reversed the dismissal of the indictment against defendant and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Vidal-Mendoza" on Justia Law

The Mungiki are a violent, outlawed sect, notorious for extortion, torture, and murder by dismemberment. The Kenyan government has been unable to bring the group under control. At age 14, Wanjiru accepted his teacher’s invitation to join the Mungiki, unaware of the group’s character. He was afraid to leave because the Mungiki punish defectors by execution. At age 20 he came to the U.S. on a student visa in 2005. He briefly attended school. He was arrested in 2009, following a sexual encounter with a woman he met in a nightclub while intoxicated. Wanjiru pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor and received a suspended sentence, requiring surrender to immigration authorities. He petitioned for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3) and deferral under the U.N. Convention Against Torture. The IJ found that Wanjiru was convicted of a “particularly serious crime,” was not persuaded of the Kenyan government’s acquiescence in the threat to Wanjiru, and denied relief. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit remanded, stating that the CAT does not exist only for persons with unblemished records. The possibility of deferring removal rather than withholding it exists for people who might be undesirables but who are entitled not to be sent to experience torture.View "Wanjiru v. Holder" on Justia Law

In a direct criminal appeal, Defendant-Appellant Enrique De La Cruz challenged the district court’s decision to deny his motion to suppress evidence the United States obtained during an investigative seizure. ICE agents detained Petitioner while looking for another person they believed to be in the United States illegally. Upon review of his fake identification card, agents discovered that Petitioner was himself unlawfully in the United States after having been previously deported. On that basis, the agents arrested him. A federal grand jury indicted Petitioner for unlawfully reentering the United States after a previous deportation. Petitioner moved to suppress the evidence agents obtained from him arguing that, at the time the agents asked him for his identification, they were no longer justified in detaining him because the agents no longer had reasonable suspicion to believe that he was involved in criminal activity. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Petitioner's motion. He then entered a conditional guilty plea, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2), reserving the right to appeal the district court’s suppression ruling. Upon review of the matter, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Government failed to establish that an objective officer would have had reasonable suspicion to believe that Petitioner was involved in criminal activity once the agents determined that he was not the original person they were looking for and before Petitioner provided the agents with the false identification card. The Court reversed the district court’s decision denying Petitioner's suppression motion and remanded this case to the district court for further proceedings. View "United States v. De La Cruz" on Justia Law

Clarke cooperated in a scheme to defraud her employer. The scheme netted more than $250,000; Clarke’s share was $50,000. She pled guilty to committing a fraudulent act that caused a loss of $8,000 and was sentenced to 14 months. Clarke was a lawful permanent resident of the U.S. An alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony is deportable, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); “aggravated felony” includes an offense that involves fraud in which the loss exceeds $10,000. Removal proceedings were instituted after Clarke completed her prison sentence. She filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion asking that her conviction be set aside because neither the judge nor her lawyer had advised her that she could be removed if convicted. Her lawyer had told her there might be “immigration consequences.” The district court denied the motion. She has been removed to Jamaica. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The one-year statute of limitations begins to run on the date on which the conviction becomes final. A lawyer’s failure to advise his client concerning a critical consequence of conviction can be a “fact” supporting a claim of ineffective assistance, but in this case it could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence within a year after the plea. View "Clarke v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's holding that his conviction for simple kidnapping under California Penal Code (CPC) 207(a) was categorically a crime involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), making him statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court held that simple kidnapping under CPC 207(a) was not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude where simple kidnapping did not involve an intent to harm someone, the actual infliction of harm upon someone, or an action that affected a protected class of victim. The court granted the petition for review and remanded to allow the BIA to conduct a modified categorical analysis of petitioner's crime. View " Castrijon-Garcia v Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Afghanistan, appealed the district court's denial of his petition for review of a determination by the USCIS that his felony conviction of assault with intent to commit rape rendered him ineligible to become naturalized as a United States citizen. The court held that the district court's grant of summary judgment to the USCIS as a matter of law was justified. Contrary to petitioner's claims, he had not been deprived of due process of law or been the victim of the improper retroactive application of a statute. Although he was barred from naturalization as a citizen, his status as a legal permanent resident remained in full force. View "Alocozy v. USCIS, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for voluntary departure. Petitioner argued that the IJ erred by considering facts which, in a criminal case, might be evidence of a crime. He contended that in doing so, the IJ was using a crime as evidence against him even though he had not then been convicted of the crime alleged against him. The evidence of petitioner's sexual conduct with a minor was probative as to his bad character and undesirability for permanent residency, and it was therefore properly considered by the IJ. Although petitioner had not been convicted of a crime for the activity, he admitted the underlying facts before the IJ. Further, the IJ's discretionary consideration of that admission did not violate petitioner's due process rights by denying him a presumption of innocence. Accordingly, the court held that the IJ committed no error and denied the petition. View "Rojas v. Holder Jr." on Justia Law