Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a defendant, Nelson Barros, who was charged with one count of assault and battery on a household member. Barros, a noncitizen, chose to represent himself during his arraignment and plea hearing. He signed a form acknowledging he had waived his right to counsel. The judge informed him of his right to counsel and confirmed that Barros wished to represent himself. However, the judge did not conduct any further inquiry to determine whether Barros' waiver of counsel was made knowingly and intelligently. Barros admitted to sufficient facts to warrant finding him guilty and was placed on one year of probation. Later, Barros was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers due to his admission to sufficient facts to find him guilty of assault and battery on a household member.The lower courts denied Barros' motions to withdraw his plea. The motion judge, who was not the plea judge, found that Barros' waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and voluntary. Barros appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted his application for direct appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the lower court's decision but on alternate grounds. The court held that Barros' waiver of counsel was invalid, in violation of his right to counsel under art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The judge did not conduct an adequate inquiry to determine whether Barros' waiver of counsel was made knowingly and intelligently. However, Barros did not challenge this waiver of counsel in his first motion to withdraw his admission to sufficient facts. Therefore, he must establish a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice to prevail on appeal. The court concluded that Barros did not raise a serious doubt that the result of the proceeding might have been different had his waiver of counsel been adequately informed. View "Commonwealth v. Barros" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Aleksandra Malgorzata Stankiewicz, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, who was convicted in 2003 for violating a New Jersey statute that criminalizes distributing a controlled substance on or near school property. In 2018, removal proceedings were initiated against her, with the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) concluding that her conviction was an aggravated felony, making her both removable and ineligible to apply for cancellation of removal.The BIA dismissed Stankiewicz's appeal, maintaining its reasoning that her conviction was an aggravated felony. Stankiewicz then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review of the BIA's decision.The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that Stankiewicz's conviction under the New Jersey statute is not an "aggravated felony" under federal law. The court applied the "categorical approach," comparing the state law to any federal controlled substance offense that is a felony subject to a prison sentence greater than one year. The court found that neither of the parties' proposed federal analogs categorically matches the New Jersey statute. The court therefore granted Stankiewicz's petition for review, vacated the agency’s ruling, and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings. View "Stankiewicz v. Garland" on Justia Law

In the case of Antonio E. Gonzalez v. State of Maryland, the defendant, Antonio E. Gonzalez, was charged with assaulting his then-wife, M., and their son, F. During the trial, Gonzalez's counsel attempted to cross-examine M. about her application for a U visa, which is a visa for noncitizens who are victims of certain crimes and are helpful to law enforcement in the investigation or prosecution of criminal activity. The trial court ruled that it would not permit cross-examination of M. concerning her immigration status because Gonzalez's counsel had not established an adequate foundation for such inquiry.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the trial court erred in precluding Gonzalez's counsel from cross-examining M. about her U visa application. The Supreme Court concluded that, given the nature of the requirement that, for a U visa to be approved, an applicant must be helpful in the investigation or prosecution of criminal activity and provide a certification from a law enforcement or government official to that effect, a sufficient factual foundation for impeachment of a witness concerning a U visa application is established under Maryland Rule 5-616(a)(4) where there has been a showing that a U visa application, based on the witness being a victim of a crime that the defendant is charged with, has been submitted to the government for approval.However, the Supreme Court also concluded that, because any error in precluding cross-examination concerning U visa application was harmless, it was not necessary to deviate from general practice of refraining from addressing issue not decided by the trial court or raised in petition for writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court concluded that trial court’s error was harmless beyond reasonable doubt as defendant testified to committing acts that formed basis of offenses for which he was convicted, witness’s testimony was consistent with another witness’s testimony who was not applicant for U visa, witness’s testimony was consistent with initial description of incident, and other evidence corroborated that both witnesses had been assaulted by defendant. View "Gonzalez v. State" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Nguyen Chi Cuong Nmn Huynh, a Vietnamese citizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted in Iowa for knowingly purchasing or possessing a visual depiction of a minor engaging in a prohibited sexual act. Following this conviction, the Department of Homeland Security sought his removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), arguing that his crime constituted "sexual abuse of a minor," an aggravated felony that warrants removal. An immigration judge found Huynh removable, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed de novo whether Huynh's state crime qualifies as sexual abuse of a minor. The court applied the "categorical approach," examining whether the state statute defining the crime of conviction categorically fits within the generic federal definition of a corresponding aggravated felony. The court found that the Iowa statute is broader than the generic federal offense of sexual abuse of a minor.The court held that the conduct criminalized by the Iowa statute, namely, knowingly possessing a prohibited image, falls outside the generic federal offense of sexual abuse of a minor. The court reasoned that none of the definitions of "sexual abuse of a minor" in the INA, reliable dictionaries, or a closely related statute captures simple possession of child pornography. The court also found that the BIA's preferred definition, which requires something more than simple possession of child pornography, does not apply to Huynh's case.The court also considered the Department of Homeland Security's charge that Huynh committed a "crime involving moral turpitude" within five years of his admission to the United States. The court found that the government could not defend the BIA's decision on this charge and granted the government's request for voluntary remand for the BIA to reconsider its decision.In conclusion, the court granted Huynh's petition for review, vacated the BIA's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Huynh v. Garland" on Justia Law

Ulises Romeo Lucas-Hernandez was arrested by Border Patrol Agent Brian Mauler in a remote area north of the U.S.-Mexico border. During the arrest, Agent Mauler asked Lucas-Hernandez three questions in Spanish about his citizenship and immigration status. Lucas-Hernandez was subsequently charged with misdemeanor attempted entry by an alien under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1). Before trial, Lucas-Hernandez moved to exclude Agent Mauler from testifying to his Spanish-to-English translation of the questions and answers, arguing that the statements were hearsay and that Agent Mauler was not qualified as an expert to translate the statements. The magistrate judge denied the motion regarding hearsay, reasoning that the statements made by a defendant are considered party admissions, not hearsay.The magistrate judge found Lucas-Hernandez guilty of violating 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1) and he was sentenced to time served. Lucas-Hernandez challenged his conviction in district court, asserting that Agent Mauler’s testimony of his field statements was hearsay and fell outside the hearsay exclusion in Rule 801(d)(2) because Agent Mauler was not a “mere language conduit” under United States v. Nazemian. The district court affirmed the magistrate judge’s ruling and found that Nazemian did not apply, and so Agent Mauler’s testimony as to Lucas-Hernandez’s field statements was not hearsay.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Nazemian analysis applies to the statements of a party opponent that are translated by the testifying witness. However, the court concluded that any error in admitting Agent Mauler’s testimony was harmless, considering the evidence presented from Lucas-Hernandez’s A-file, the database searches, and the circumstances when he was found by Agent Mauler. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling upholding Lucas-Hernandez’s conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1). View "United States v. Lucas-Hernandez" on Justia Law

The case involves Marken Leger, a Haitian citizen who has lived in the United States as an asylee since 2000. In 2009, Leger pleaded no contest to a charge of lewd and lascivious battery, in violation of Florida Statute § 800.04(4). In 2013 and 2018, Leger pleaded no contest to two other offenses, both for the possession of marijuana, in violation of Florida Statute § 893.13(6)(b). The government initiated removal proceedings against him in 2019, alleging that his convictions made him removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).The immigration judge concluded that Leger was removable, finding that his marijuana possession convictions constituted controlled substance offenses under the INA and that his conviction under Florida Statute § 800.04(4) was an aggravated felony. Leger appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the immigration judge’s decision.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the court held that Leger's marijuana possession convictions did not constitute controlled substance offenses as defined under federal law, and thus, the BIA erred in determining that Leger was subject to removal on these grounds. The court also held that Leger's conviction under Florida Statute § 800.04(4) did not constitute the sexual abuse of a minor and was not an aggravated felony under the INA. The court vacated the BIA's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Marken Leger v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The defendant, Luis Antonio Flores Atilano, was found guilty of being an alien in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(5)(A) and 924(a)(8), and was sentenced to 36 months’ imprisonment. The case arose when law enforcement officers were dispatched to a motel room in South Dakota, where they found Atilano. Upon searching him and his belongings, they discovered three firearms and ammunition. Atilano, who was born in Mexico and entered the U.S. in 2008, claimed that he believed he was lawfully in the U.S. due to paperwork completed by his wife, and that he had the firearms for self-protection due to threats from gang members.The district court held a one-day bench trial, during which the government presented evidence including law enforcement witnesses, Atilano’s recorded interview with law enforcement, and various other exhibits. The court found Atilano guilty of being an alien in possession of three firearms and eight rounds of ammunition. Atilano was subsequently sentenced to a within-Guidelines sentence of 36 months’ imprisonment.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Atilano argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew he was an alien unlawfully present in the U.S. and that he was acting under duress at the time of the offense. The court, however, affirmed the district court's decision. It found that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude Atilano knew he was in the U.S. unlawfully. The court also rejected Atilano's duress defense, stating that his evidence consisted of a generalized and speculative fear of violence and he failed to show that he had no reasonable legal alternative to committing the crime. View "United States v. Atilano" on Justia Law

Buzzy Martinez was arrested and charged with transporting undocumented aliens hidden in his tractor-trailer after a U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) canine alerted to the vehicle. Martinez argued that the canine’s alerts could not provide the handler with the necessary reasonable suspicion to extend the stop of his vehicle and probable cause to search it because dogs are unable to reliably differentiate between the scents of a vehicle’s driver and concealed humans within the vehicle. The district court denied Martinez’s motion to suppress the evidence gathered from his vehicle, and he pleaded guilty while preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling.The district court found that the USBP canine and its handler were adequately trained and certified to detect concealed humans, and that dogs are capable of detecting concealed humans. The court concluded that the canine’s alerts and indications were reliable, providing reasonable suspicion to extend the stop for a second sniff, and probable cause to search Martinez’s tractor-trailer after Martinez was removed from the vehicle. Martinez was sentenced to eighteen months in prison, followed by a term of supervised release of three years, and he appealed the ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the district court's finding that the canine was reliable in detecting concealed humans was not clearly erroneous. The court also noted that the canine was trained and certified to detect both concealed humans and controlled substances, and Martinez did not contest the canine's ability to detect controlled substances. Therefore, the canine's alert provided the handler with reasonable suspicion to investigate for and probable cause to search for controlled substances. The court concluded that the canine's alerts and indications at the primary inspection point provided reasonable suspicion to extend the stop and investigate for concealed humans, and at the secondary inspection point, after Martinez exited the vehicle and stated no one else was inside, the canine's continued alerts to the cab area of Martinez’s tractor-trailer provided probable cause to search the cab for concealed humans. View "United States v. Martinez" on Justia Law

David Orlando Marquez Cruz, a Salvadoran national and lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of attempted second degree child sexual abuse under Washington, D.C., law. The conviction stemmed from a sexual relationship he had with a fifteen-year-old child. Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security charged him with removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) on the grounds of being a noncitizen convicted of a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment, and as an aggravated felon. Cruz denied that he was removable and requested that his removal be cancelled as a matter of discretion.The immigration judge found Cruz removable based on his conviction of a crime of child abuse, but dismissed the aggravated felony removal charge. The judge declined to cancel Cruz’s removal and ordered him removed. Cruz appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), challenging the immigration judge’s finding that his D.C. conviction qualified as a crime of child abuse. The BIA agreed with the immigration judge and dismissed the appeal. Cruz then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review.The Fourth Circuit held that Cruz’s conviction for attempted second degree child sexual abuse under D.C. law qualifies as a removable crime of child abuse. The court rejected Cruz’s arguments that a crime of child abuse under the INA does not cover attempts and that statutes imposing strict liability as to a victim’s age cannot satisfy the mens rea requirement because they do not require a culpable mental state. The court concluded that a crime of child abuse requires a culpable mens rea and an actus reus of conduct that either injures a child or creates a sufficiently high risk that a child will be harmed. The court denied Cruz's petition for review. View "Marquez Cruz v. Garland" on Justia Law

Sergio Rosas-Martinez, who had been living in the United States since he was nine years old, was arrested in 2019 for possessing illegal drugs. Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings. Rosas-Martinez applied for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), arguing that if he returned to Mexico, the Sinaloa Cartel would kill or capture him because he lost their drugs when police arrested him. An immigration judge granted his CAT application, but the Board of Immigration Appeals reversed the decision. Rosas-Martinez then filed a motion for reconsideration with the Board, which was also denied.The Board of Immigration Appeals reversed the immigration judge's decision to grant Rosas-Martinez's CAT application. The Board found clear error in the immigration judge's predictive findings and legal error in the application of the law. The Board used the factual findings to show that the immigration judge clearly erred in predicting that Rosas-Martinez would be tortured if he returned to Mexico. The Board also justified its decision that the Mexican government would not acquiesce to or be directly involved in any torture of Rosas-Martinez, citing evidence of Mexico's recent efforts to purge corruption from its ranks.Rosas-Martinez then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to review the Board's reversal of the immigration judge's decision and its denial of his motion for reconsideration. The court denied both petitions for review, holding that the Board correctly applied its standard of review and refrained from independent fact finding. The court also found that the Board provided sufficient justification for its determination that the immigration judge erred in predicting that Rosas-Martinez would be tortured if he returned to Mexico and that the Mexican government would acquiesce to or be directly involved in his torture. View "Sergio Rosas-Martinez v. Garland" on Justia Law