Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Odulene Dormescar, a native and citizen of Haiti, appealed a removal order issued by an immigration judge because he had been convicted of an aggravated felony. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal of that order. He has petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for review. His petition presented three issues: (1) whether the Eleventh Circuit had subject matter jurisdiction; if it did, then the second (2) issue was whether res judicata barred the Department of Homeland Security’s proceedings against Petitioner based on the aggravated felony conviction. If it did not, the third (3) issue was whether the Department had the authority to amend the notice to appear to charge Petitioner as "admitted to the United States, but . . . removable" when he was originally charged as an inadmissible "arriving alien." Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that it had jurisdiction over this case, res judicata did not apply, and that the Department had the authority to amend the notice to appear to charge Petitioner as admitted but removable. View "Dormescar v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Adams entered the U.S. from Jamaica in 1990 on a visitor’s visa and overstayed. Arrested in New York in 1992, for attempting to sell cocaine to an undercover officer, Adams represented that he was “Michael Thomas” and pleaded guilty. “Thomas” failed to appear for sentencing. The state court received a form from Jamaica certifying that “Michael Thomas” had committed suicide. Adams returned to Jamaica where, in 1994, he married a U.S. citizen. Adams applied for an immigrant visa, representing that he had never been in the U.S. and had never been arrested or convicted. The consul granted an immigrant visa in 1997. He was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident. In 2008, returning from a trip to Jamaica, he was stopped by Customs officials, who suspected that Adams was “Michael Thomas” in the outstanding arrest warrant. The Board of Immigration Appeals ultimately ordered removal. Adams argued that the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1256(a), barred removal because Adams was the beneficiary of an adjustment of status when he obtained an immigrant visa and that there is a five-year limitation on rescinding the status of a lawful permanent resident. The Second Circuit rejected the arguments.View "Adams v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered in the United States in 1999. She had authorization to remain for a temporary period, not to exceed six months, but she remained beyond that period without authorization. In 2007 Petitioner was convicted of unlawful possession of fraudulent identifying information. The Department of Homeland Security then charged Petitioner with removability as an alien who remained in the United States for a time longer than permitted. Petitioner filed an application for cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents, which an immigration judge denied. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Petitioner's appeal. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding (1) Petitioner's ineligibility for cancellation of removal depended solely on whether her prior state-court conviction was for a crime involving moral turpitude; and (2) Petitioner's offense was one of moral turpitude, and therefore, Petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal. View "Nino v. Holder" on Justia Law

Laguna immigrated to the U.S. with his parents in 1967, and became a lawful permanent resident. In 2001 he was convicted of unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle, with other related offenses. Because those felonies qualified as crimes of moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), an immigration judge ordered Laguna removed and required Laguna to obtain a Polish passport. In 2004, after he finished serving his state sentences, Immigration and Custom Enforcement released Laguna on an order of supervision, which also required Laguna to obtain a passport. In 2010 Laguna finally completed the requisite application. The Polish consulate confirmed that his passport would be available on April 21, 2010. Laguna refused to pick up the passport and was detained and convicted of willfully interfering with a final deportation order (8 U.S.C. 1253(a)(1)(B) and (C) and sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court’s exclusion of evidence that ICE’s liberal treatment of Laguna during supervision negated the element of intent.View "United States v. Laguna" on Justia Law

Petitioner Elias Jimenez-Galicia, a native and citizen of El Salvador, sought judicial review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). The BIA's order affirmed an immigration judge's ("IJ") order of removal and denial of Petitioner's request for cancellation of removal. The denial was based on a determination that Petitioner lacked good moral character. Because the Fourth Circuit was not presented with a genuine question of law, the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's discretionary determination that Petitioner lacked good moral character. Therefore the Court dismissed the petition. View "Jimenez-Galicia v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner Jose Barahona, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitioned the Fourth Circuit for review of the final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (the "BIA") which affirmed his ineligibility for a "special rule" cancellation of removal under section 203 of the Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act of 1997 (the "NACARA"). Petitioner contended that the BIA erred by deeming him ineligible for NACARA relief because he had provided material support to a terrorist organization in the early 1980s by allowing anti-government Salvadoran guerrillas of the so-called "FMLN" (the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Libercion Nacional) the use of the kitchen of his Salvadoran home. Upon review, the Court rejected Petitioner's contentions and denied his petition for review. View "Barahona v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Mirna Del Carmen Gomez, a citizen of El Salvador, pled guilty to unlawful reentry of a deported alien after an aggravated felony conviction. Although she agreed with the statement of facts submitted by the government in support of her guilty plea, Defendant objected to the government's assertion that her prior conviction for child abuse under Maryland law amounted to a crime of violence for purposes of the U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) sentencing enhancement. According to Defendant, because the relevant portion of the statute did not contain a division between forceful and nonforceful conduct, the district court could not use the modified categorical approach to determine that her prior child abuse conviction was a crime of violence. The district court employed the modified categorical approach to determine that Defendant's child abuse conviction constituted a crime of violence and added sixteen levels to her base offense level. Thereafter, the district court calculated her Guidelines range to be forty-one to fifty-one months, but made a downward variance and sentenced her to twenty-four months' imprisonment. Because the Fourth Circuit found that the district court's application of the modified categorical approach to the indivisible provision at issue was in error, it vacated Defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Defendant, an alien, was convicted of robbery under Cal. Penal Code 211 in 1994 and again in 1996. Defendant later pleaded guilty to a charge of unlawful reentry after he illegally reentered the United States. The presentence report recommended a sixteen-level enhancement in the offense level for Defendant's prior robbery convictions, which it identified as crimes of violence under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2. Defendant objected to the enhancement, arguing that after a recent decision by the California Supreme Court, convictions under section 211 were no longer categorical crimes of violence. The district court rejected this argument and imposed the enhancement. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a conviction under section 211 remains a categorical crime of violence under the "enumerated offenses" definition in section 2L1.2. View "United States v. Flores-Mejia" on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen of Colombia, illegally entered the U.S. in 1982. In 1985, he was convicted of drug offenses, 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1), was sentenced to five years in prison; in 1987 he was deported to Colombia. About five years after his deportation, he reentered the U.S. and was arrested twice, but managed to avoid deportation. In 2010 he was arrested in Illinois for driving under the influence. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents were informed of his illegal status. Defendant was indicted on one count of illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and 6 U.S.C. 202(4) and pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. The district court determined his criminal history category to be 3 and, after applying a 16-level enhancement (U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)), determined his offense level to be 21, resulting in a calculated Guidelines range of 46 to 57 months’ imprisonment. Neither the government nor defendant objected to this calculation. He was sentenced at the low-end of the Guidelines range to 46 months in prison, claiming that his 1985 conviction was stale and that the calculation overstated the seriousness of his current reentry offense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Marin-Castano" on Justia Law

VLiranzo was born in 1955 in the Dominican Republic. He entered the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1965; in 1972 his mother became a naturalized citizen and he obtained derivative citizenship, 8 U.S.C. 1432(a)(3) Liranzo did not know he had become a citizen and continued to renew his "green card" through 2006.In 2006 Liranzo was released from incarceration in New York for possession of a controlled substance. Before his release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement erroneously identified him as a permanent resident alien, subject to removal. He was transported to a detention center in Louisiana pending removal. During removal proceedings, it was discovered that Liranzo is a U.S. citizen, and he was released. He filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that federal immigration officials had falsely arrested and imprisoned him. Following two years of discovery, the district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because there was no private analogue to the immigration detention suffered by plaintiff. The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of a Fourth Amendment claim, but held that the court had jurisdiction over the FTCA claim, because there is a private analogue: false imprisonment. View "Liranzo v. United States " on Justia Law