Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner John Waldron, a native and citizen of the United Kingdom, had his permanent resident status in the United States terminated because of his conviction for second degree assault. Petitioner sought an adjustment of status and a waiver of inadmissibility. An immigration judge (IJ) concluded that Petitioner was eligible for relief, granting both Petitioner's adjust of status and the waiver. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reversed and ordered Petitioner removed to the United Kingdom. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the BIA erred by failing to review the IJ's factual findings for clear error. Remanded. View "Waldron v. Holder" on Justia Law

From 1996 to 2001, while working as a licensed realtor, Mendoza helped borrowers obtain federally insured mortgages. He was charged with conspiring to fraudulently induce the Federal Housing Authority to insure mortgage loans, 18 U.S.C. 371 and 1001. Mendoza’s counsel, Cavanagh, explained that he could avoid prison by pleading guilty, but did not apprise Mendoza that, as an aggravated felony, his crime would lead to mandatory deportation to his home country, Ecuador, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Prior to sentencing Mendoza learned from his Presentence Investigation Report that his conviction might result in removal. The district court sentenced Mendoza to two years’ probation and ordered him to pay $100,000 in restitution. As a condition of his probation, Mendoza was required to cooperate with immigration officials. The government instituted removal proceedings. After completing his sentence, Mendoza moved, under 28 U.S.C. 2255, to vacate his sentence and withdraw his plea. The district court denied the motion. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Mendoza v. United States" on Justia Law

Rivas, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. in 1970 as a lawful permanent resident. In 2009, DHS charged Rivas with removability because of a 1980 conviction for statutory rape. At his hearing Rivas argued that the conviction did not constitute an aggravated felony and that he was not removable. The IJ rejected the argument and a subsequent motion to reopen. In 2010 Rivas was removed to Mexico. Two months later Rivas filed a petition for habeas corpus. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the claim barred by 8 U.S.C. 1252(g), which prevents courts from hearing challenges to the execution of removal orders, and also that Rivas was not “in custody” as required under 28 U.S.C. 2241(c). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Rivas’s situation is sympathetic, but consideration was precluded by multiple jurisdictional bars. View "Rivas-Melendrez v. Napolitano" on Justia Law

Petitioner was born in Czechoslovakia and was admitted as a permanent resident in the United States. After Defendant was convicted of racketeering, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings. Petitioner applied for cancellation of removal and applied for a waiver of inadmissibility. An immigration judge found Petitioner eligible for both of these forms of relief, denied Petitioner a waiver of inadmissibility, and granted Petitioner cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held Petitioner to be ineligible for both a cancellation of removal and a waiver of inadmissibility. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the BIA did not err in finding (1) Petitioner's racketeering conviction was an aggravated felony and that he was therefore ineligible for cancellation of removal; and (2) Petitioner was ineligible for a waiver because he was lawfully admitted for permanent residence at the time of his admission, and therefore, his aggravated felony disqualified him from seeking a waiver of inadmissibility. View " Spacek v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant Alfredo Huizar pled guilty to reentering the United States illegally after an earlier deportation. The district court held that Defendant's 1995 California conviction for residential burglary qualified as a "crime of violence," triggering a sixteen-level enhancement. On appeal, Defendant argued the enhancement wasn't legally authorized and his sentence should have been reconsidered. Upon review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit agreed that the district court erred in calculating Defendant's sentence. Accordingly, the Court vacated Defendant's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. View "United States v. Huizar" on Justia Law

In 1990, defendant, a Mexican citizen, illegally entered the US. Between 1994 and 2005, he was convicted of multiple crimes, including theft and drug offenses, and was deported twice. In 2009, he was convicted in state court of attempted aggravated kidnapping and sentenced to four years in prison. While serving that sentence, he was discovered by immigration authorities. He pleaded guilty to illegal reentry without a plea agreement, 18 U.S.C. 1326(a). At sentencing, after a 16-level enhancement pursuant to USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), the district court determined an offense level of 12 and a criminal history category of IV. The corresponding range was 57-71 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that: defendant was deprived of the opportunity to argue for a concurrent sentence and should therefore be given credit for time already served on his attempted aggravated kidnapping conviction; to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, a below-Guidelines sentence is appropriate to account for the lack of a fast-track program in the Northern District of Illinois; and that that the district court erred when it added a 16-level enhancement. View "United States v. Garcia-Ugarte" on Justia Law

Defendant, a 27-year-old Mexican citizen, pleaded guilty to being in the U.S. after being deported, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a), and was sentenced to 71 months, the top of the 57-71 month guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the judge should not have taken into account 41 arrests that had not resulted in convictions without determining that defendant had actually engaged in conduct for which he was arrested. A court may not rely on the prior arrest record itself in determining a sentence, but may consider underlying conduct detailed in arrest records where there is sufficient factual basis to conclude that the conduct actually occurred. For 15 arrests there was a summary either of a petition for adjudication of wardship or of the arrest report. The defendant did not question the accuracy of any of those and did not suggest that the other 26 arrests were ungrounded. The judge was entitled to assume that the arrests considered as a whole, coupled with five convictions, gave a more accurate picture of the likelihood of recidivism than the convictions and arrest summaries alone and justified the sentence. Given defendant’s criminal record, there was no basis for a cultural-assimilation adjustment. View "United States v. Lopez-Hernandez" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of illegal re-entry. Defendant contended that the district court erred in considering his need for anger management courses in determining the length of his sentence. At issue in this case was whether, when the law at the time of trial or plea is unsettled, but becomes clear while the case is pending on appeal, review for the second prong of the plain error test properly considers the law as it stood during the district court proceedings or at the time of the appellate court's decision. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals joined the majority of other circuits in holding that where the law is unsettled at the time of trial but settled by the time of appeal, the plainness of the error should be judged by the law at the time of appeal. The Court then held that the district court's determination under the second prong of the plain error test was plain error, and the error affected Defendant's substantial rights. The Court vacated Defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing in accordance with this opinion. View "United States v. Escalante-Reyes" on Justia Law

The Criminal Justice Act (CJA) creates a system for the appointment and payment of counsel for defendants unable to afford representation. At issue here was subsection (c), which concerns the ability of district courts to appoint counsel in federal criminal prosecutions. Defendant, a Mexican national, pled guilty to illegal reentry. Before sentencing, Defendant filed a motion under subsection (c) for an additional court-appointed attorney to seek to have a prior state felony conviction set aside in an Iowa court. The prior Iowa conviction lengthened the advisory sentencing range for the illegal reentry offense. The district court determined the purpose would not be an appropriate use of CJA funds. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant's challenge to a prior, unrelated conviction in a state court that could affect the sentence he received on a new federal conviction was not an "ancillary matter" under the statute, and therefore, it was inappropriate to appoint counsel for Defendant in this case. View "United States v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Appellant Temitope Akinsade appealed a district court's denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, claiming that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when he plead guilty to embezzlement by a bank employee. Appellant is a Nigerian citizen who legally came to America in July 1988 at the age of seven and became a lawful permanent resident in May 2000. During his employment, Appellant cashed checks for several neighborhood acquaintances, who were not listed as payees on the checks, and deposited a portion of the proceeds from those checks into his own account. When interviewed by the FBI several months later, Appellant agreed to cooperate against the individuals for whom he cashed the checks. In early 2000, Appellant was charged with embezzlement by a bank employee. Relying on his attorney's advice that one count of embezzlement was not a deportable offense, Appellant pled guilty. The plea agreement made no mention that deportation was mandatory or even possible due to the offense. The district court sentenced Appellant to one month of imprisonment to be served in community confinement, a three-year term of supervised release, and a special assessment of $100. At sentencing, the district court recognized that Appellant's conduct was "out of character" based on his family background. The court thus gave Appellant the minimum sentence under the sentencing guidelines. Almost nine years after Appellant's conviction, immigration authorities arrested him at home and placed him in detention in Batavia, New York. After seventeen months in detention, the immigration authorities released Appellant and charged him with removability as an aggravated felon. The court held that while counsel's affirmative misrepresentations rendered his assistance constitutionally deficient under the first prong of "Strickland v. Washington," (466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)), Appellant was not prejudiced as required under Strickland's second prong. It reasoned that its admonishment of the potential for deportation during the plea colloquy cured counsel's affirmative misrepresentations. The issue before the Fourth Circuit was whether counsel's misadvice was an error of the "most fundamental character" such that coram nobis relief is required to "achieve justice." Upon review, the Court found that counsel's affirmative misrepresentations that the crime at issue was non-deportable prejudiced Akinsade. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for writ of error coram nobis and vacated Appellant's conviction. View "United States v. Akinsade" on Justia Law