Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The district court entered a preliminary injunction concerning four provisions of Arizona S. B. 1070, enacted in 2010: Section 3 makes failure to comply with federal alien-registration requirements a state misdemeanor; 5(C)makes it a misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to seek or engage in work in Arizona; 6 authorizes state and local officers to arrest without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe a person has committed any offense that makes the person removable from the U.S.; and 2(B) requires officers conducting a stop, detention, or arrest to attempt, in some circumstances, to verify immigration status. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, holding that Sections 3, 5(C), and 6 preempted. Section 3 intrudes on the field of alien registration, in which Congress has left no room for even complementary state laws. Section 5(C)’s criminal penalty is an obstacle to the federal regulatory system. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 makes it illegal for employers to knowingly hire, recruit, refer, or employ unauthorized workers, 8 U. S. C. 1324a(a)(1)(A),(a)(2); requires employers to verify prospective employees' status; and imposes criminal and civil penalties on employers, but only imposes civil penalties on aliens who seek, or engage in, unauthorized employment. Congress decided against criminal penalties on unauthorized employees. Section 6 creates an obstacle to federal law by attempting to provide state officers with additional arrest authority, which they could exercise with no instruction from the federal government. Generally, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain in the U.S. It was improper to enjoin section 2(B) before state courts construed it and without some showing that its enforcement actually conflicts with federal law. The mandatory nature of the status checks does not interfere with the federal scheme. Consultation between federal and state officials is an important feature of the immigration system. It is not clear yet that 2(B), in practice, will require state officers to delay release of detainees for no reason other than to verify immigration status. That would raise constitutional concerns and would disrupt the federal framework, but the section could be read to avoid these concerns. View "Arizona v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant, a Mexican citizen, pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and re-entry as a previously removed alien. The district court imposed a 420-month sentence. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss for improper venue and his sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) venue was proper in the Northern District of Iowa because authorities learned of Defendant's deportation in the Northern District; (2) the district court did not err procedurally by applying an importation enhancement and refusing to grant an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 420-month sentence, as the sentence was substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Rivera-Mendoza" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from his conviction and sentence for illegally re-entering the United States after previously having been deported. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's prior conviction for burglary under Cal. Penal Code 459 qualified as a crime of violence under the immigration laws and for sentencing purposes; (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant a two-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under the sentencing guidelines. The Court distinguished the district court's denial of an acceptance of responsibility adjustment here from cases in which district courts interpreted the guidelines to forbid the award of such an adjustment to any defendant who forces the government to prove his guilt at trial. View "United States v. Ramos-Medina" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. illegally in 1991. In 1997, he pleaded guilty to felony flight after attempting to elude a police officer who had signaled him to stop for speeding. As a first-time offender, he received a sentence of 40 days. In 2006, INS issued a Notice to Appear, charging him with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), which permits removal of an alien present without being admitted or paroled, and 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), which permits removal of an alien convicted of acts which constitute the essential elements of a crime involving moral turpitude. Petition conceded the first ground for removability but challenged the second ground. The IJ concluded that because of the wanton or willful mental state required under the state statute and the resulting inference that petitioner had disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk to the safety of others, his Washington law categorically rose to the level of a CIMT, and ordered removal. The BIA dismissed an appeal. The Sixth Circuit denied review. View "Ruiz-Lopez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to one count of structuring financial transactions to evade federal reporting requirements. DHS subsequently attempted to introduce defendant's Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) in a removal proceeding; the immigration court refused to admit the PSR without the district court's approval, which DHS then sought. Defendant in turn requested criminal contempt sanctions against the DHS attorneys who pursued disclosure of his PSR. The district court granted DHS's motion after redacting much of defendant's information and denied the sanctions request. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the United States v. Huckaby factors, for determining a "compelling, particularized need for disclosure," nor did it err in evaluating and balancing those factors. Further, that court did not abuse its discretion in declining to initiate contempt proceedings, as DHS's attorneys did not contumaciously violate a clear order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Iqbal" on Justia Law

Defendant Manuel Avitia-Guillen, a citizen of Mexico, lawfully entered the United States in 1955. He obtained permanent resident status in 1988 but was deported in June 1996 after being convicted of an aggravated felony. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") discovered Defendant in Denver, Colorado, in May 2011. A grand jury indicted Defendant with one count of being found in the United States. At trial, the Government called a fingerprint examiner with the Colorado Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to testify that Defendant's fingerprints matched those on his 1996 deportation records. Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, but the district court denied the motion, and the jury returned a guilty verdict. The district court sentenced Defendant to the low end of the guideline range, 41 months' imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argued the district court failed to make adequate findings of reliability with respect to the CBI expert's testimony. "The issue Defendant raises on appeal is extremely narrow[:] . . . the district court erred 'by failing to create an adequate record demonstrating that it satisfied its gatekeeping obligations.'" Defendant did not object to the expert's methodology at trial. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court did not plainly err in its implicit determination that the CBI expert's testimony was based on "reliable principles and methods" that were "reliably applied." View "United States v. Avitia-Guillen" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Canada, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal because petitioner's previous convictions were for crimes involving moral turpitude. Petitioner argued that his crime, for providing a false name to a peace officer, was not "inherently base, vile, or depraved" and therefore the BIA should have "looked behind his conviction." The court agreed and concluded that the IJ and the BIA departed from the methodology mandated In Matter of Silva-Trevino in not requiring the Government to meet its burden. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bobadilla v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen of Somalia, was convicted of unlawful wounding and grand larceny. 8 U.S.C. 1226(c) required the mandatory federal detention, without the possibility of bond, of certain deportable criminal aliens "when" those aliens were released from other custody. At issue was whether, as the district court held, defendant, a deportable criminal alien who was not immediately taken into federal custody upon his release from other custody, was exempt from section 1226(c)'s mandatory detention provision and therefore was entitled to a bond hearing. The court held that the BIA's interpretation of section 1226(c) in In re Rojas was reasonable, and must be afforded deference. Moreover, the Government's supposed failure to comply with a statutory immediacy requirement - when the statute did not specify a consequence for such noncompliance - did not bestow a windfall upon criminal aliens. Therefore, defendant remained subject to mandatory detention. View "Hosh v. Lucero" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Sudan, petitioned for review of the BIA's final order affirming the IJ's order of removal and denial of petitioner's application for waiver of inadmissibility under section 209(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1159(c). The court held that the IJ and the BIA committed no error in determining that petitioner was a violent or dangerous individual subject to In re Jean's heightened, "extraordinary circumstances" standard for determining whether to grant a discretionary section 209(c) waiver of inadmissibility. The court held, however, that the IJ and the BIA erred by failing to consider evidence of the country conditions in Sudan and the hardship petitioner individually would suffer upon removal to Sudan. Accordingly, the petition was granted in part, denied in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Makir-Marwil v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

In 2010 defendant was arrested for driving under the influence and without a license. He admitted that he had reentered the U.S. without permission in 2007, having been removed to Mexico in 2003. The 2003 removal followed a conviction in New Mexico for aggravated assault involving a deadly weapon. He pled guilty to reentering the U.S. after being removed following a conviction for an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b)(2). The presentence report utilized U.S.S.G. 2L1.2, which provides for a 16-level enhancement if the defendant previously was deported after conviction for a felony that is a crime of violence. The PSR subtracted three levels for acceptance of responsibility. The recommended guidelines range was 57-71 months of imprisonment. The court departed downward one criminal history level, which reduced the range to 46-57, and, reasoning that the offense was a relatively minor crime of violence and that defendant would not be able to take advantage of certain rehabilitative programs while confined, the district court imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 36 months. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Aggravated assault under New Mexico law is not categorically a crime of violence and available documents do not reveal what version of the offense defendant committed. View "United States v. Rede-Mendez" on Justia Law